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Note from the Editor

The Center for Asian Studies is pleased to publish five research papers from 2020 and 2021. The journal accepts outstanding Asia-related papers written by students in various disciplines at CU and other universities in Colorado, covering a wide range of topics. This issue contains papers written by students in the ASIA 4830 *Senior Seminar* class, an excerpt from an honors thesis in International Affairs, as well as a special section featuring two policy-oriented papers from the IAFS 4500 *Culture and Conflict in South Asia* course. These papers cover a wide range of issues and cultures, including "Sexuality and Gender Expression in Male K-Pop Groups: Queering Hwarang Culture, Contemporary Korean Masculinity, and Fandom Desires" by Reilly Gabel, "Painting Identity on the Peninsula: A Century-Long Search for 'Korean' Art" by Anne Feller, "Institutional Barriers and Temporary Shanghai Migrants" by Renee Gagne, "Investing in Equitable Development in Post-Conflict Sri Lanka" by Thomas Raney, and "Emissions Trading in India: A Policy for Combatting Toxic Air and Global Warming" by Colton Zadkovic.

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Painting Identity on the Peninsula: A Century-Long Search for "Korean" Art

Anne Feller

Over the first half of the 20th century, national identity on the Korean peninsula was shaken to the core with decades marked by struggle, oppression, and violence. Japanese annexation in 1910 and the subsequent thirty-five years of suppressive colonization had widespread, crippling effects for the communal national identity of the Korean people. No less important, after Korea's liberation from Japanese rule, celebration was short lived as the Korean War erupted and the single Korean nation was violently split in two. The hardships experienced by the Korean people during this time have left a lasting imprint on the country's collective consciousness, thus creating a catalyst for intellectuals to search for and define a unique "Korean" identity.

Sparked by questions about what it meant to be "Korean," intellectuals on the peninsula began to formulate strong nationalistic identities starting in the late 19th century. In response to this exploration, the term "Koreanness" emerged in the 1940s in debates surrounding national characteristics.[1] Ethnic origins would define Koreanness prior to the liberation of Korea in 1945; however, following the North-South divide in 1953, politically charged nationalism served to unite the masses.

With increasing importance throughout the twentieth century, the exploration of Korean identity became a significant concern to local cultural and artistic scenes.[2] An urgency to search for, define, and (re)claim a collective "Korean" identity, whether ethnic or national, defined Korea's modern and contemporary art history for over a century, as artists on the peninsula aimed to understand an authentic Koreanness detached from established foreign standards. The pursuit of Korean identity through artistic expression would reach an apex in the decades following the establishment of North Korea and South Korea.

Suppression of Creativity: Art Under the Colonial Period

At the start of the new century, indications surfaced that Korea's monarchy was weakening. At the same time, the strength and confidence of the Japanese Empire were soaring following victory in the Russo-Japanese War.[3] As the Japanese military passed through Korea, familiarity with the land and interest in the potential resources the peninsula could offer increased. As a result of these circumstances, Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910. The nation would be recognized as a Japanese colony until the end of World War II in 1945. The first stage of Korean colonization was known as Military Rule, which lasted from 1910-1919. This period was marked by "administrative dominance and physical brutality," and few freedoms were given to the Korean people.[4]

To justify colonization, the Japanese Empire recognized the importance of "self-

[1] Charlotte Horlyck, *Korean Art: From the 19th Century to the Present*. (London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2017), 123.
[2] Ibid, 71.
[3] Christine Hahn, "Unearthing Origins: The Use of Art, Archaeology and Exhibitions in Creating Korean National Identity 1945-1962," *Visual Resources* 28, no. 2 (2012), 139.
[4] Horlyck, *Korean Art*, 32.

representation" through international exhibitions. At the time of annexation in 1910, the Japan-British Exhibition was at its peak. This type of international exhibition brought together countries from around the world, providing space to showcase the best aspects of each country. Within the section "Palace of the Orient," Japan was able to frame the worldly view of its empire and colonies through art.[5] These displays of "self-representation" allowed Japan to simultaneously create an image of the power and modernity of its empire while projecting an attitude of benevolence and betterment to its "backward" colonies.[6] These exhibitions effectively elevated Japan into its place as a world power.[7]

With the international acceptance of Japanese colonial rule and methods of modernization, the next objective became the assimilation of the colonized population under Japanese reign. Assimilation policies throughout Korea's colonial period underwent many stages of reform; however, specific attention to cultural assimilation began with the Cultural Rule starting in 1920 and extending into the 1930s. The art scene was valued by Japan as an important means of assimilation if promoted properly. As a result, the Korean art scene became inseparable from the political agendas of the Japanese Empire.[8]

The assimilation of cultural identity took root in Korean education and national art exhibitions. Korean artists were encouraged with scholarships and grants to study abroad at the Tokyo School of Fine Art in Japan.[9] This renowned art school taught a French academic style of Impressionistic art.[10] In order to retain the school's learning, Koreans were restricted from overseas travel to any other countries.[11] This narrowed the access to art outside of Japanese influence, providing an opportunity for the government to single-handedly tailor the Japanese aesthetic to the Korean art scene. Oil paint was the primary medium taught, as it was recognized as Western and thus associated with concepts of modernity.[12]

Notably, the first recognized Korean oil painter to graduate from the Tokyo School of Fine Arts was Go Hui Dong, who was known for his self-portraits. A unique approach to combining old traditional Korean imagery with the new techniques of Western painting can be seen in his piece "Self Portrait with Hat". This piece made in 1915 features Go Hui Dong in a classic half-bust pose wearing traditional Korean attire against a monochrome backdrop. This portrait would have fulfilled Go Hu Dong's final requirement for graduation, which requested all fine art students to paint a self-portrait to be hung together in a final student exhibition. "Self Portrait with Hat" would have been a shocking contrast to the portraits prepared by his Japanese peers. While his peers depicted themselves in Western clothes, associating themselves with modernism, Go Hui Dong's depiction of traditional Korean culture through clothing was one of pride in identity. Art historians now view Go Hui Dong's portrait as an assertion of ethnic identity amidst colonial rule in his own search for Koreanness.[13]

The Japanese government was not interested in such representations of the "old"

[5] Shim Ji-won, "Constructing Images Through Art Exhibitions: Chosn Art Exhibition and Inventing the Colonial Image of Chosn," *Story & Image Telling* 13 (2017), 288.

[6] Horlyck, *Korean Art*, 30.

[7] Shim, "Constructing Images," 287.

[8] Horlyck, *Korean Art*, 32-41.

[9] Jin Han, "Ambivalent Representations of Nationalism and Regionalism in Early Modern Korean Art," *The Review of Korean Studies,* no. 11 (2008), 136..

[10] Horlyck, *Korean Art*, 55.

[11] Ibid, 43.

[12] Joan Kee, "Contemporary Art in Early Colonial Korea: The Self-Portraits of Ko Hui-Dong," *Art History 36,* no. 2 (2013), 393.

[13] Kee, "Self-Portraits," 403-4.

and restrictions became harsher over acceptable artistic expression. By the start of the 1920s, authorities actively discouraged any use of traditional themes and subject matter on the peninsula, forcing artists to change styles to maintain status in the community.[14] As a result, art on the peninsula in the first half of the 20th century essentially "imitated so-called Japanized Western art."[15]

One movement that gained traction amidst these restrictions was *nihonga*, translating literally to "Japanese painting," which combined traditional Japanese ink techniques with more recent Western techniques. This style was meant to promote a sense of nationality among the Japanese and subsequent colonies. Artists such as Yi Yu-tae accepted *nihonga* as an alternative to oil painting and were promoted by the empire through national exhibitions.[16] His pieces such as "Research" (1944) – depicting a scientist surrounded by lab equipment – were highly regarded as exceptional displays of Japanized Western art through a mixture of traditional material, modern imagery, and Western techniques.

In opposition to Japanese nationalistic movements, a group of Korean artists coalesced to form the Society of Calligraphy and Painting in 1921. The goal of this community was to search for a Korean identity through art in the face of an oppressive "other" – that is, Japan, which was trying to eliminate Korean identity through assimilation. On this matter, scholar Shim Ji-won notes, "the cultural nationalist endeavor to preserve Korean culture and find 'Koreanness' in many realms applied to art, and the [Society of Calligraphy and Painting] was one organized effort to that end by Korean artists."[17] In reaction to this, the Japanese government formally established the Joseon Art Exhibition one year later in 1922. This swift action by the authorities revealed that both sides, the Japanese Empire and the Korean intellectuals, understood the significance of constructing cultural identity through art.[18]

Despite their efforts, the Society of Calligraphy and Painting experienced many hardships over the decade, and eventually the Society quietly disbanded in 1936 due to lack of funding.[19] As a result, many Korean artists were forced to either conform to the standards of the Joseon Art Exhibition or give up their careers. To this end, the Japanese Empire's goal to suppress Korean national groups, such as the Society of Calligraphy and Painting, was achieved and the creation of a complete hegemony over the cultural scene was realized.[20]

Out of this hegemony, the intentions of the Japanese government were revealed as the jurors of the Joseon Art Exhibition began to promote an artistic movement known as "local color," which emphasized concepts of "regionalism."[21] The movement was advertised by the Japanese Empire as means to display an interest in local scenes and express Korean sentiments. The reality, in contrast, affirmed Japan's encouragement of Korean artists to portray their local scenes as "rural, unsophisticated, ahistorical and powerless," thus deserving of Japan's colonial rule.[22] Lee In-Sung was a role-model for the movement, and his pieces such as "On an Autumn Day" (1934) won him special artistic recognition.[23] Jin Han described the scene:

> [On an Autumn Day] shows a skillful description of figures and individual

[14] Shim, "Constructing Images," 314.
[15] Han, "Ambivalent Representations," 136.
[16] Kee, "Modern Art," 218
[17] Shim, "Constructing Images," 290.
[18] Ibid, 307.
[19] Horlyck, *Korean Art,* 38.
[20] Shim, "Constructing Images," 294.
[21] Han, "Ambivalent Representations," 141.
[22] Horlyck, *Korean Art*, 70.
[23] Shim, "Constructing Images," 329.

> motifs. Yet the figures are awkwardly spaced against the rural background in a typical pose. The half-naked woman looks like a hybrid of a Gauguinesque primitive woman, with her heavy physicality depicted in localized colors and simplified shading, and a classical nymph holding a European-style fruit basket in an elegant pose. Despite the overall exotic ambience, a number of art critics and historians . . . thought the painting represented a proper Korean theme.[24]

This powerful description is indicative of the disconnect between the "local color" movement and the reality of Korea, as well as Japan's desire to portray Korea as a rural and "backward" society.

Artists who opposed the "local color" movement criticized it for fostering a sense of belittling "primitivism."[25] They also argued that the movement completely disregarded the reality of the Korean people under colonial suppression. The movement idealized a national identity that "disguised the one-directional flow of power from the colonizer to the colonized, and essentially paralleled the colonial government's cultural policy."[26] Most artists were forced to conform to the new concepts of "regionalism" to maintain recognition by the art establishment. Due to this necessity to conform to the government's oppressive standards, art historians retrospectively recognize that the search for Koreanness and national identity was greatly hindered by the "local color" movement.[27]

The control of Korean identity by the Japanese Empire only grew stronger as assimilation plans became more intense by the late 1930s. In 1936, the Governor-General of Korea, Minami Jiro, implemented one of the most aggressive plans the peninsula had seen thus far. He bluntly called for the "eradication of Korean cultural identity" through forced assimilation.[28] Many Korean organizations were shut down by the Governor-General of Korea in an attempt to propel a large portion of the population into forced labor or military work. It was assumed that this plan would strengthen ties between Japan and Korea, so the mobilization of the Korean population for World War II efforts would be inherent.[29] During this period, a large proportion of the Korean population was uprooted and families were fractured.

The relation between art and politics merged closer together again as Korean art in the final war years was used for propaganda purposes to promote pro-Japanese Empire sentiment.[30] Artists were expected to "all produce works that support the war and Japan's vision for the future," and harsh restrictions on creative agency were administered.[31] More than ever, the Korean people suffered under colonial rule. Their land, their people, and their resources were solely mobilized to serve the empire, even as that empire began to buckle under the strain of World War II.

Violence and Separation: The Korean War (1950-1953)

Ultimately, the last years leading up to the collapse of the Japanese Empire in 1945 were insufferable for the Korean people. The abuse of the people by the government, as

[24] Han, "Ambivalent Representations," 140.
[25] Shim, "Constructing Images," 298.
[26] Han, "Ambivalent Representations," 142.
[27] Shim, "Constructing Images," 284.

[28] Jane Portal, *Art Under Control in North Korea*. (London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2005), 45.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Horlyck, *Korean Art*, 37-70.
[31] Ibid, 37.

Japan became increasingly more desperate, took a huge toll on the peninsula. Severe food shortages, tens of thousands of political prisoners, and millions of civilians forced to serve abroad in horrendous working conditions marked a dark period in the history of the Korean people.[32]

The suffering of the population under the brutal thirty-five years of colonial rule led to deep resentment by the Koreans towards the Japanese. Identity formation in post-colonial society was as a result shaped by strong feelings of resentment. How to "disavow" the remnants left behind by Japanese colonization was of utmost concern for Korean intellectuals following the liberation of Korea in 1945.[33] Hence, Korea put primary emphasis on the value of cultural identity as a means to reclaim a sense of "Koreanness" following decades of utter suppression under colonial rule.[34]

Questions arose in relation to adapting or disposing of techniques taught and developed during the Japanese reign. Debates on how to properly reference and express traditional Korean culture also arose in contrast to the prior Japanese-endorsed "local color" movement.[35] These topics were met with ambivalent responses, as many artists needed time to reflect on their past works that were so closely related to Japanese aesthetic standards. Yi Yu-tae, who spent the final years of colonization producing war propaganda paintings, stated: "I spent my artistic career in a net of Japanese influence. . . I even had to ask what [Korean] 'independence' meant. . . I did not recognize the word."[36] Many artists like Yi Yu-tae had to completely change their style under the new political pressures that rapidly distanced Korea from Japan or anything reminiscent of the colonial period.[37]

As artists grappled with the sudden freedom of liberation, further political changes were set in motion by the arrival of the Soviet Union and United States on the peninsula. The presence of opposing political forces sparked debates over the best form of governance for the liberated nation: United States-backed democracy took hold in the southern half, while Soviet-backed communism was favored in the northern half.[38]

This indecisiveness led to political instability that was reflected in the rapid formation and dismantling of artistic groups in the years leading up to the Korean War.[39] One group worthy of mention was the New Realism Group formed in 1947. This group advocated for the development of new styles and techniques to be applied to subject matter that engaged local scenes. Within these new perspectives, the early seeds for abstraction were planted and would begin to take form throughout the 1950s.[40] Unfortunately, with escalating political tensions, any artist groups that survived the rapid changes of the late 1940s would almost certainly face disbandment as the Korean War broke out in 1950.

Over the three years of the Korean War, the peninsula was utterly devastated, leaving millions dead, wounded, or missing and another several millions of families divided or made into

[32] Portal, *Art Under Control*, 45.
[33] Michelle Bae and Greg Dimitriadis, "Travelling Home(s): Contemporary Korean Art After the Postcolonial," *Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education* 36, no. 3 (2014), 317.
[34] Nam Young Lim, *Re-Thinking South Korean Postcolonial Multiculturalism in the Fine Art Textbook for Fifth- and Sixth-Graders*, 89.
[35] Horlyck, *Korean Art*, 98.
[36] Kee, "Modern Art," 237.
[37] Shin Ji-Young, "The Construction of National Identity in South Korea and the Tradition of Masculinity in Korean Abstract Painting," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 8*, no. 3 (2007), 377.
[38] Ibid, 375.
[39] Horlyck, *Korean Art,* 71.
[40] Horlyck, *Korean Art.* 100.

refugees.[41] The physical destruction wiped out nearly half the industrial capacity and a third of the housing in the South, while the North was essentially reduced to rubble by intense bombing.[42] The war resolved nothing, as an agreement was never attained between the two sides. As a result, the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) formed at the 38th parallel, a zone that would divide the two nations indefinitely.

During the war years, artists were left with few options to create. Many had to give up their careers to work at manual labor jobs to earn a living. Artists who remained either painted portraits for American soldiers or created works with the very limited supplies they had on hand. Artist Lee Jung-seop was one example of the latter – he made etchings on found tin foil from cigarette packs to create drawings such as "Children in Spring" (1952-55). Many of his works showed images of women and children, as the hardships of the war had separated him from his own wife and children. A select few more fortunate artists were able to maintain their practice through leftover supplies from the 1940s. The most commonly depicted themes were refugee camps and separated families. Unfortunately, most art from this period was destroyed in combat and very few pieces survive today.[43]

In addition to physical loss, Koreans were mentally and emotionally impacted by the violence and destruction.[44] Jane Portal notes that the Korean War "left a legacy of tension and mistrust between Koreans of the North and South, which remains to the present day."[45] It is within this legacy that the formation of Korean identity in the post-colonial society shifted from ethno-centric modes to politically nationalistic ones.

Over the next two decades, the Korean peninsula would experience a "rebirth" in art with an inward search for a "Korean" national identity and a way to express "Koreanness" through art. This would be sparked by the political interests of both Korean governments, leading to drastic divergences in the two nations' art scenes. Politically, art in North Korea was viewed as a method to serve the country and all art was highly directed, while art in South Korea developed towards loose abstractionism that reflected a sense of emotional and democratic "freedom."[46] Both sides of the DMZ understood the importance of purging all Japanese influences, but each governing body debated over how to appropriately merge Korea's traditional past to the progressive future.[47]

From these philosophies, the art scene in South Korea focused on abstraction and the aesthetic call of "art for art's sake."[48] Meanwhile, the art scene in North Korea worked exclusively with Socialist Realism; as stated by Kim Il-sung himself, art would "develop in a revolutionary way, reflecting the Socialist content with the national form."[49] Mirroring their polarizing ideologies, North Korea and South Korea guided their respective art scenes in opposite directions in their search for a new collective identity and a renewed sense of Koreanness.

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[41] Chung Moojeong, "Abstract Expressionism, *Art Informel*, and Modern Korean Art." Order No. 9959173, City University of New York, 2000. In Proquest Dissertations and Theses, 74.
[42] Portal, *Art Under Control*, 52.
[43] Horlyck, *Korean Art*, 99-103.
[44] Ibid, 118.
[45] Portal, *Art Under Control*, 52.
[46] Horlyck, *Korean Art*, 71; Shin, "Construction of National Identity," 375.
[47] Chung, "Abstract Expressionism," 40.
[48] Horlyck, *Korean Art*, 79.
[49] Portal, *Art Under Control*, 130.

The Rebirth of Korean Art and Identity in the North

In the northern half of the Korean peninsula, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was established in September of 1948 with Kim Il-sung as premier. This took effect one month after Syngman Rhee declared his presidency under the Republic of Korea in the South.[50] With polarized stances, inexperienced governments, and rising tensions between the foreign presences of the Soviet Union and United States, a precarious political situation formed on the peninsula. In an urgent effort to empower the authority of the newly established regime in the North, Kim Il-sung praised the nation for its "strength and autonomy" and its "economic success."[51] It was critical for the legitimacy of the regime and unification of people in the North for the public to positively perceive these two main pillars within the context of national identity.

Between 1954 and 1961, Kim Il-sung traveled across the nation to factories, mines, steel mills, and farms to give on-the-spot guidance to workers. This campaign, known as the Chollima Movement, flattered the working class and provided two primary benefits to the nation – it spurred national devotion resulting in increased industrial productivity, and it framed Kim Il-sung as all-knowing, generous, hardworking, and benevolent.[52] During this time, Kim used art as a vehicle to teach lessons on strength, nationalism, and greatness.[53]

Scenes featuring on-the-spot guidance by Kim Il-sung became a common theme in new nation's art world. Paintings, such as the "Chollima Steel Factory Mural," showcased Kim Il-sung's connection with the people of North Korea. The paintings also promoted the legitimacy of his reign through advertising a collective push for national greatness and the strength of self-reliance in North Korea. The DPRK identified early on in its establishment the importance of culture in the formation of national identity and the benefits of art in serving to revolutionize the masses in support of the regime. As a result, Kim Il-sung endorsed development in the arts through considerable funding.[54]

To initiate aspiring artists into the politics of the DPRK, the Pyongyang University of Fine Art was established in 1947 in North Korea. University admission was highly competitive; however, if accepted, one's career and success was guaranteed so long as one abided by the orders of the regime. After graduation, artists were registered as members of the Korean Artists Federation and would receive monthly salaries in exchange for an average of two paintings per month.[55] Charlotte Horlyck states: "Artists were valued as socialist workers whose output would function as a means to uphold the ideological tenets of the Party."[56] With such close ties to the functions of the regime, it was deemed unacceptable for artists to express any personal ideas.

The Party controlled every aspect of the art scene, and no alternatives were available to escape these restraints. In North Korea, no museums or galleries unaffiliated with the government were ever established. The National Art Exhibition hosted in Pyongyang was the only official art exhibition. Art pieces accepted into the show were selected solely by

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[50] Ibid, 70.

[51] Brian Myers, "North Korean Art Responds to the Outside World," *Journal of History of Modern Art* 30 (2011), 286.

[52] Portal, *Art Under Control,* 54-99.

[53] David La Boon, "Romanticism in North Korea: Reconceiving North Korean Revolutionary Art for State Construction," *International Journal of Foreign Studies 11*, no. 2 (2018), 35.

[54] Horlyck, *Korean Art*, 79-81.

[55] Portal, *Art Under Control*, 126-7

[56] Horlyck, *Korean Art*, 83.

the National Art Council, which would take into account personal comments by Kim Il-sung and later his son Kim Jong-il.[57] Since all art was selected based on the regime's standards, all art criticism in the North was abolished, exemplifying the lack of individualism among artists.[58]

This complete artistic control could dictate the narrative of what constituted the culture, which was seen as critical to solidifying the Party and Kim Il-sung's reign. North Korean artists were likened to "craftsmen of culture," wherein ritualistic support of the regime in an "art-follows party" view is a prerequisite for artists.[59] Interestingly, this system of strict art standards managed by a select few was reminiscent of the Japanese colonial assimilation policies that placed heavy restrictions on the narrative of the Korean art scene for nationalistic gains. Despite this correlation, Kim Il-sung directly declared the need to dispose of colonial cultural practices in order to build a new national art. To do this, artists needed to learn from "advanced countries" such as the Soviet Union.[60]

Many prominent artists in the 1950s traveled to the Soviet Union to learn the official painting style of Socialist Realism. Within this style, the foundation for the future of North Korean art took root.[61] The key characteristics of Socialist Realism included "accessibility to the masses, class consciousness, relevance to current issues, and faithfulness to the Party."[62] In terms of presentation, Socialist Realism involved realistic depictions of people or events infused with a strong political substance. A fine example of this ideal was the fresco mural in Pyongyang of Kim Il-sung's speech of 1945. The mural depicts the speech given by Kim Il-Sung upon return to Pyongyang following Korean liberation. The scene features people gathered around Kim in a joyous celebration. The realism of each person can be felt in their naturalistic poses and facial expressions. The political substance of the piece can be found in the context of the event that shows the liberation of Korea from Japan, thanks to Kim Il-sung's efforts. After the first set of trained artists returned from the Soviet Union to North Korea, all exposure to foreign art scenes sharply declined in order to maintain a unified nationalistic style.[63]

Between the 1950s and 60s, clear instructions were disseminated by Kim Il-sung through addresses to the nation on how art should be produced and understood. These addresses did more than just construct a discipline of artistic thought; they constructed a national identity fueled by resentment towards South Korea, Japan, and the United States. This resentment can be seen in one address by Kim Il-sung, who called for artists to implement three standards: art should reflect contemporary realities with depictions of the working masses, art should display the struggle for democracy in South Korea alongside a burning hatred for the imperialistic United States, and art should positively reference the People's Army often.[64]

Kim Il-sung thought these subject matters would constitute "an identity of nationalism expressing survival, struggle, strength, and perseverance."[65] By constructing such guidelines, Kim was able to infuse nationalism and animosity toward international

[57] Portal, *Art Under Control,* 126.
[58] Ibid, 19.
[59] Alzo David-West, "Aesthetics and Politics in North Korean Socialist Realist Painting: On Approved Ways of Seeing," 118.
[60] Horlyck, *Korean Art* 83.
[61] La Boon, "Romanticism," 25.
[62] Portal, *Art Under Control*, 21.
[63] Myers, "North Korean Art," 283.
[64] Horlyck, *Korean Art*, 87.
[65] La Boon, "Romanticism in North Korea: Reconceiving North Korean Revolutionary Art for State Construction," 26.

"others" into the communal experiences and perceived identity of the North Korean people. As a result, by the late 1950s, acceptable subject matters to paint were narrowed to depictions of workers, peasants, and soldiers.[66]

Over the course of the 1960s, Kim Il-sung's guidance for the art scene became increasingly more dogmatic, which resulted in a fusion between the developing Juche principles and the already established Socialist Realist art form. This merge perfectly illustrated the turn in ideologies of the regime.[67] Juche was first defined in 1955 as "Korean revolution," and then expanded upon in 1965 to be synonymous with multiple political concepts including the most widely known – "self-reliance."[68] Juche is a foundational ideology that "seeps into all spaces of existence in the North," and, by 1966, Juche would forever be tied to the art scene.[69]

In the 1960s, Socialist Realism was reformatted to be known as "Juche Realism" in the North.[70] As a bid to be more nationalistic in an ethnic context rather than a political context, Juche ideology revitalized Korean traditions that had been discarded in the 1950s in order to elicit national pride and a Korean sensibility. From this shift, the search for a national art that adapted Korean traditions into a Socialist context began.[71] Kim Il-sung famously stated in his speech in 1966, "Let's develop our National Form, with a Socialist Content."[72] Here, the reference to "National Form" was defined as a call for artists to return to traditional Korean art practices, particularly those based in indigenous ink techniques.

The traditions of Korean ink paintings were only partially translated, as the regime outlined the qualities of traditional practices that were respectable for adaptation.[73] Kim Il-sung highly regarded and promoted two Joseon ink painters, Jeong Seon and Kim Hong-do. Jeong Seon was known for his depictions of natural Korean landscapes in pieces such as "Hyeolmang Peak" (mid-18th century), and Kim Hong-do was appreciated for his depictions of everyday human activity such as his piece "Weaving a Mat" (late 18th century). Both artists were noted for their inspiring inward observations of the Korean peninsula that focused on the beauties of the local landscape and the reality of the people.[74] This inward gaze matched well with the Juche principle of self-reliance and national pride.

Over the course of the 1960s, the North Korean art scene experienced an explosion of interest in traditional ink techniques, and a uniquely North Korean art movement emerged known as Joseonhwa, or ink paintings drawn in a traditional Korean style.[75] Paintings, such as "Joyfully Anticipating the Completion of the Dam," highlighted the new style's ability to capture realism in a more fluid approach. The looser qualities of the ink allowed artists to create more emotional and dynamic compositions. The way in which the details of the workers are fully realized, while the surrounding objects are lost in a "haze," is reminiscent of the qualities of Jeong Seong's "vanishing" mountain landscapes. This more stylized approach to depiction was a direct break from the previous Socialist Realism movement. Through the government promotion of Joseonhwa, a unique North Korean identity emerged in these ink paintings, and Joseonhwa became a highly successful mode of expression

[66] Jane Portal, *Art Under Control in North Korea*, 128-30.
[67] La Boon, "Romanticism," 28.
[68] David-West, "Aesthetics and Politics," 113.
[69] La Boon, "Romanticism," 27.
[70] Portal, *Art Under Control*, 124.
[71] La Boon, "Romanticism," 27.
[72] Portal, *Art Under Control*, 79.
[73] Brian Myers, "North Korean Art Responds to the Outside World," 281.
[74] Horlyck, *Korean Art*, 94.
[75] Ibid, 93.

that married the regime's socialist ideologies with an authentic Korean sentiment.[76]

In a post-colonial society following the Korean War, North Korea's formation of an artistic Korean identity was mirrored in the search for Koreanness in the South. The two separate formations of identity in art were as polarizing as the two governments' politics. While Juche Realism and Joseonhwa surfaced as the national art form in the North, the South was in the process of developing a uniquely Korean style of abstractionism.[77] In the eyes of Kim Il-sung, abstractionism was deemed as "...anti-people, capitalist, corrupt, imperialist, insane, and decadent art," and abstract movements were strictly forbidden from ever evolving within the North Korean borders.[78] As such strong declarations were echoed throughout the North, a mere 120 miles away across the DMZ, abstract art dominated the scene in South Korea's capital of Seoul as artists pushed to develop their own sense of "Koreanness" throughout the 1950s, 60s, and 70s.[79]

The Rise of Abstractionism in South Korea

The Republic of Korea, in the southern half of the Korean peninsula, was established in August of 1948, when the government nominated Syngman Rhee to the presidency. Amidst rising political tensions, South Korea needed to search for a new national identity, one distanced from colonialism and the Korean War. Shin Ji-young asserted "the national identity of South Korea could only be acquired by the paranoiac creation of the 'other.' South Korea must neither be Japan nor North Korea."[80] A strong anti-communist stance was seen as the most efficient method to form national identity, and this stance was promoted as a means to protect national security.[81]

In the wake of the ideological division between the two Koreas, a readjustment of emphasis was needed to displace the preconceived understanding of Korean ethnic identity. Nam Young Lim highlights this objective:

> South Korean knowledge producers might have had to deconstruct the old belief about national identity, which simultaneously expected to enhance the country's political stance and decisively dissociate itself from North Korea. It was, in other words, an effort to resist the given notion of blood-based ethnicity, and to establish a new, modern, and emancipatory meaning of South Korean ethnicity.[82]

As a result, Syngman Rhee's uncompromising anti-Japanese and anti-communist stances were the ideal vehicles through which to form a national identity.[83]

Similar to North Korea in the 1950s, in order to stabilize the nation the South Korean government acknowledged the need to unify the masses with art as an essential tool in educating and molding the national identity.[84] Throughout the decade, the South Korean government as well as the United States provided funding to the art community – albeit

76 Horlyck, *Korean Art,* 96.
77 Portal, *Art Under Control*, 124.
78 David-West, "Aesthetics and Politics," 109.
79 Portal, *Art Under Control*, 124.
80 Shin, "Construction of National Identity," 368.
81 Oh Il-Whan. "Anticommunism and the National Identity of Korea in the Contemporary Era: With a Special Focus on the USAMGIK and Syngman Rhee Government Periods," 72.
82 Lim, *South Korean Postcolonial Multiculturalism*, 88.
83 Kim Djun Kil, *The History of Korea*. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO LLC, 2014), 179.
84 Kim Hyungsook, "National Identity Discourses in Visual Culture and Art Education," *Korea Journal* 55, no. 1 (2015), 113.

not as significant as the North's art funding – to aid in the development of the new national culture.[85] The aid was directly connected to anti-communist campaigns; thus, the rise of abstract art in the coming decades would be attributed to concepts of "freedom" which were associated with "democracy."[86]

Three major societal shifts informed the foundation of the South Korean art scene. The first shift occurred after the peninsula's liberation in 1945, which sparked an "othering" of Japan and a desire for Korea to distance itself from colonialism and to search inwardly for an understanding of Koreanness.[87] The second shift occurred in the early 1950s, brought by the violent conditions of the Korean War that fashioned the adolescent mindset of a new generation of artists.[88] Then, in the latter half of the decade, the post-war political "othering" of North Korea led to the promotion of art styles that directly challenged the North's Socialist Realism.[89] In response to these circumstances, artists had begun experimenting heavily with abstractionism starting in the 1950s.

In the early period of colonial liberation, the disavowal of Japanese influences sparked the initial artistic interest in casting aside the old colonial art practices to develop something new. What exactly this would look like was still not fully realized by the late 1940s. Unlike the highly directed North Korean art scene, artists in South Korea were left to develop their own styles. While this allowed for considerable artistic freedoms, there was a palpable lack of direction, and any progress made in the late 1940s would be abruptly interrupted by the destruction of the Korean War.[90] The one lasting legacy of this era was the abstract experimentations that signified a strong interest in non-figurative forms of expression.[91] Since figure painting was the predominant subject matter during colonial rule, the development of figureless representation was a purposeful step towards distancing Korea from its colonial past.

In the late 1950s, a more intentional form of abstractionism began to appear in the South Korean art scene. By 1957, most artists were emphasizing the act of painting rather than the resulting product. This new form of art, rising out of the ashes of suffering from colonialism and war, became known as Art Informel. The characteristics of Art Informel in Korea were closely connected to the action of painting. These works were recognized by aggressive and energetic brushstrokes on large canvases that emphasized the materiality of the piece rather than the aesthetic representation.[92] In response to the horrors of the war, the production of Art Informel was viewed as an "emotional outlet in the application of paint."[93]

The Informel movement visually captured emotional wartime violence through dynamic material engagement and an inward look on the Korean peninsula via the use of unconventional local materials. Common art materials were hard to attain during the 1950s due to economic ruin; thus, artists were forced to repurpose any cheap materials accessible.[94] Kim Ku-lim's "Death of Sun I" (1964) was a prime example of the type of abstract pieces that were produced during the time. Kim's piece captured a destructive quality through his process of mounting vinyl on a wooden panel, then setting it on fire until the form took on a desirable texture. The piece was finished with black paint to emphasize the circular form and charred

[85]Horlyck, *Korean Art,* 107.
[86] Chung Moojeong, "Abstract Expressionism, *Art Informel*, and Modern Korean Art," 261.
[87] Shin, "Construction of National Identity," 368.
[88] Chung, "Abstract Expressionism," 74.
[89] Horlyck, *Korean Art,* 107
[90] Ibid, 97.
[91] Ibid, 103-18.
[92] Chung, "Abstract Expressionism," 236.
[93] Horlyck, *Korean Art*, 118.
[94] Chung, "Abstract Expressionism," 239.

cracks. Similar to "Death of Sun I," Art Informel was marked by loose explorations of materials that purposefully broke from established traditions and often spoke to the destructive nature of war.[95]

The Korean Informel movement would last from the late-1950s into the mid-1960s, with Park Seo-bo as one of its most prominent artists. Park was known for his repetitive graphite and oil paintings, such as his "Ecriture No. 8-67" (1967), which was one part of a much larger series. Systematic in his approach, Park likened the repetition of brushwork seen in many of his pieces to "reciting a sutra" and meditation.[96] Including Park, the new wave of artists arriving on the scene in the 1950s differed from the older artists in that the new artists were the first generation to graduate from Korean, not Japanese, universities.[97] Their main goal was to establish an "autonomous artistic identity" and "they struggled to preserve, transform, and universalize their cultural legacy, and deeply resisted the blind assimilation of Western culture."[98] The Informel artists, thus, became the pioneers for the search for a unique Korean identity in the South Korean art scene.

In May of 1961, a military coup was staged in South Korea, and a military government with Park Chung-hee as president was established. Park Chung-hee's "presidency" – more commonly referred to as a dictatorship – promoted abstractionism as the national art, leading to further developments in the art scene under his authority. As a result of Park's endorsement, an abstract piece won the grand prize for the first time in history in the 1965 National Art Exhibition.[99] Over the course of the 1960s, Park Chung-hee promoted a national identity that could be expressed through the construction of a new Korean society – a society that would prioritize "national uniqueness, traditions, self-reliance, culture, and art."[100]

The enthusiasm for the Korean Informel movement diminished by the mid-1960s, leading to the eventual rise of a new style of abstractionism in the late-1960s known as Dansaekhwa. Dansaekhwa, translated as Monochrome Painting, was a pivotal turning point in the South Korean art scene as artists, under encouragement of Park Chung-hee's government, searched to develop a uniquely Korean art style that merged western abstractionism, Informel experimentation, and a sense of Koreanness through traditional arts and culture.[101] Simon Morley notes, "while Dansaekhwa is inconceivable without the Western precedents, these paintings boldly re-routed Western attributes in wholly different directions."[102] Thus, Dansaekhwa would merge East with West, tradition with modernity, and past with present in order to define a new, modern Korean national identity.[103]

In 1973, a Five-Year Cultural Renaissance Plan went into effect. This plan declared an urgency to reconnect with tradition, with Park Chung-hee specifying what "national traits" were needed to appropriately convey Koreanness in art.[104] The hand-selected traditional symbols were chosen based on their appeal to the people's democratic nationalism that complimented the government's agenda for national identity.[105] Noteworthy, this act was very similar to how the North Korean regime hand-selected traditional characteristics to

[95] Horlyck, *Korean Art*, 115.
[96] Horlyck, *Korean Art*, 129.
[97] Ibid, 117-20.
[98] Chung, "Abstract Expressionism," 267.
[99] Ibid, 261.
[100] Kim Hyungsook, "National Identity Discourses in Visual Culture and Art Education," 115.
[101] Shin, "Construction of National Identity," 377.
[102] Simon Morley, "Dansaekhwa," *Third Text* 27, no 2 (2013), 207.
[103] Horlyck, *Korean Art*, 123.
[104] Kim, "National Identity," 133.
[105] Ibid, 116.

formulate the national art of Juche Realism in the 1960s to further the North's own brand of nationalism.

An additional similarity to the North was found in South Korea's promotion and admiration of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Joseonpoong artists. The North used their inward gaze to promote nationalism under Juche Realism. In South Korea, the Joseonpoong artists were viewed as emphasizing a uniquely Korean "direct and spontaneous" response to the local land and culture.[106] While the technical achievements of the national landscapes appealed to the attitudes of Juche Realism, the spontaneity and the sense of connection with nature complimented the free form of Dansaekhwa.

Dansaekhwa was characterized by monochromatic paintings visualized in hues of gray, brown, beige, and white. The earthy tones are attributed to a Korean response of Taoist, Buddhist, and Neo-Confucian sentiment. On the topic of the color white's relationship to Korean tradition, curator Yoon Jin-sup explained, "the colour white was present in many corners of Korea's life. . .It existed as a cultural base to form part of a collective identity, which was revealed through Dansaekhwa."[107] Additionally, Kim Hyung-sook stated that the color white was a "Korean beauty" embedded into Monochrome Paintings, affirming a strong connection between the color white, nationalism, and the spirituality of East Asian societies. The influence of East Asian philosophy mixed with the characteristics of traditional Korean culture worked to identify the unique Koreanness found in Dansaekhwa in contrast to Western monochrome art.[108]

Aside from color, materiality and execution of the pieces were also of utmost importance in the search for Koreanness. Many paintings featured local materials such as *hanji*, Korean traditional mulberry bark paper, adding an easily identifiable, physical Korean characteristic to the pieces.[109] As for execution, the gestural movements involved in most Dansaekhwa art are associated with spirituality as the pieces aim to capture a spontaneous connection between mind, material, and space.[110]

Kwon Young-woo was one of the most important artists involved in Dansaekhwa. The Koreanness reflected in his pieces can be seen in his common choice of local materials as well as his straightforward landscape-esque compositions. The Leeum Samsung Museum of Art wrote on Kwon's piece "Untitled" (1984):

> In Untitled, Kwon Young-woo has cut the paper horizontally using a sharp tool and then applied blue-grey ink to gouache to the incision, allowing it to seep through the cut. The white empty space that harmonizes and joins with the applied color is a pure tone of light that contains limitless possibilities of spirituality.[111]

In this statement, the museum's mention of harmonizing empty white space and spirituality solidifies Kwon's art within the framework of Dansaekhwa.

In the mid-1970s, Emergency Decrees were signed by the South Korean government that made political criticism a punishable offense. These decrees rendered art making a dangerous act, but Dansaekhwa, with its loose and uncritical forms, was approved by the authorities, making the style safe for artists to engage in. Despite the eventual backlash

[106] Morley, "Dansaekhwa," 198.
[107] Morley, "Dansaekhwa," 195.
[108] Kim, "National Identity," 121.
[109] Ibid, 119.
[110] Morley, "Dansaekhwa," 197.
[111] Kwon Young-woo, "Untitled," Modern and Contemporary Art Collections, Leeum Samsung Museum of Art. Seoul, South Korea.

towards Dansaekhwa in the 1980s, the legacy of the search for Koreanness would have a long-lasting impact. Today, Dansaekwa is thought to have brought a strong sense of Korean identity to the South Korean art scene.

Painting Identity on the Peninsula

As Korean intellectuals debated the ever-evolving search for national identity in the first half of the twentieth century, artists sought to reflect this social consciousness. The severe traumas of the first half of the twentieth century brought about by the suppressive colonial rule and the violent split of one nation into two plagued the mind of the average Korean for decades, including artists. Art became a mode, particularly under government control, to interpret, express, and convey nationalism in the search for an authentic Koreanness. The accessibility of art to the masses provided a bridge to convey national interests; thus, art was recognized to be an essential tool for both North Korea and South Korea.

The search for Korean identity through art has defined Korea's modern and contemporary art history of the last century. Following the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, art was used by the Japanese government to restructure Korean identity. Subjected to political interests, art on the peninsula was employed by authorities as a method to instill a branded nationalism into the masses. The Japanese aesthetic standards promoted Korea as a backward nation, and artists were expected to conform, as seen in the "local color" movement. During colonial rule, the Japanese maintained this standard through forced assimilation plans that suppressed domestic art groups. The assimilation plans successfully acquired complete control over the cultural scene in Korea and left artists with few freedoms until national liberation in 1945.

By the 1950s, the main concern for artists was how to shift artistic techniques, styles, and politics away from the deeply ingrained Japanese standards. Less concerned with what was "Korean" and more concerned with how not to be "Japanese," new art styles emerged in North and South Korea. The North emphasized influences from the Soviet Union in the development of Socialist Realism, while the South focused on European and American styles of abstractionism leading to the rise of Art Informel. These art movements were as polarizing as each nations' politics. The North's art depicted the good of the regime and the unity of the working class in a realistic, vibrantly colored oil paint style. The South's abstractionism was more interested in gestural paintings with unconventional materials that reflected the violence of war while promoting democracy and freedom.

As the political systems of North and South Korea were stabilizing, a new desire emerged to rethink the previous decade's indifference towards Korean traditions. Both nations adapted selected Korean characteristics that would benefit the development of culture, nationalism, and government politics. Despite the polarizing political stances, both nations promoted Joseonpoong artists from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as examples of approved notions of Koreanness. The North looked to Joseonpoong artists' technical achievements and praised them for their inward perspective on the peninsula that reflected the North's Juche policy of self-reliance. The South chose to focus on the spontaneity of the gaze and the spirituality of the landscape paintings as an echo of local practices of abstractionism.

The search for a truly authentic Korean art form ended with North Korea's realization of Juche Realism and a unique style of ink painting known as Joseonhwa. On the other side of the DMZ, the South satisfied their search with the development of abstractionism into a meditative and spiritual experience known as

Dansaekhwa. For many decades after their inceptions, these developed notions of identity and "Koreanness'' would have long lasting effects on both North Korea and South Korea's art scenes.

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Institutional Barriers and Temporary Shanghai Migrants

Renee Gagne

China's unparalleled economic growth coincides with the largest rural-to-urban migration in human history. Behind China's reputation as a rising economic power are the people who have played a critical role in establishing and sustaining the country's upward trajectory: domestic migrants who seek improved educational and economic opportunities. Over the course of the past few decades, China's largest cities have become known for their dense migrant populations.[1] Shanghai, one of the top destinations for rural-to-urban migrants, showcases many of the difficult realities migrants must face in adapting to the urban lifestyle. Institutional barriers create regulations that favor locals, leaving migrants with limited, unaffordable, and low-quality housing options. Specifically, the household registration system — also known as *hukou* (戶口簿 *hukoubu*) — and the implementation of city-specific policies discourage migrants from becoming well-situated in urban areas. This article will investigate the history and implications of institutional barriers as well as the housing arrangements for temporary migrants in Shanghai.

The Household Registration System

The household registration system in China is a government-enforced institution that categorizes the Chinese populace "based both on their place of residence (living in rural/urban areas) and eligibility for certain socioeconomic benefits (agricultural/non-agricultural)".[2] The *hukou* system is upheld by the Chinese government through legal and bureaucratic processes that maintain barriers to internal movement. The specific implications of these policies can be observed on an individual level, specifically through the experiences of rural-to-urban migrants.

Cindy Fan, a globally recognized researcher known for her work on migration, articulates a layered distinction between agricultural (农村 *nongcun*) and non-agricultural (非农 *feinong*) *hukou* classifications.[3] Citizens with 'non-agricultural' status receive support through welfare services, subsidies, and various benefits unique to this distinction.[4]

In contrast, individuals who maintain "agricultural" status are granted land access to sustain their generally rural lifestyles.[5] Although both classifications are associated with *hukou*-specific benefits, there is a noteworthy imbalance which favors those of non-agricultural status. The second layer of Fan's *hukou* categorization refers to the specific location (所在地 *suozaidi*) of residence, which allows people in particular locations to access benefits that those from outside regions cannot.[6]

The distinctions established by the household registration system play directly into the domestic migration processes in China today. An individual's *hukou* status has the power to both discourage and disadvantage

[1] F. Wang and X. Zuo, "Inside China's Cities: Institutional Barriers and Opportunities for Urban Migrants," *American Economic Review* 89, no. 2 (1999), 1.

[2] Congressional Research Service, *China's Hukou System: Overview, Reform and Economic Implications* (2016), 1.

[3] C. C. Fan, "Population Mobility and Migration," *The SAGE Handbook of Contemporary China Vol 1-2* (2018), 849.

[4] Ibid, 2.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

certain groups of people – primarily rural citizens seeking to reside in urban areas. Moving from one region to another does not immediately guarantee a citizen the same benefits as received by those who already reside in the area and have been granted a favorable *hukou* status. This is particularly notable when looking at the residence and educational opportunities accessible by rural-to-urban migrants.

The *hukou* is referred to as one of the "most important institutional mechanisms" in China with respect to the dichotomy between the rural and urban divide it manifests.[7] The systematic allocation of resources and benefits based upon individual's place of origins in China contributes to a plethora of modern-day challenges and forms of discrimination that primarily impact those of rural agricultural statuses looking to live, work, and study in major cities such as Shanghai.[8]

Efforts have been made by both the city and state to mitigate movement into Shanghai and encourage migration to smaller, developing cities — an act motivated by the prospect of further economic growth. The challenges pertaining to not having a local Shanghai status are generally outweighed by the prospect of advancing a family's economic standing. Though migration from rural areas is challenging, the trend continues today, as many aspire to have a better lifestyle for themselves and their families.

History of the *Hukou*: Domestic Immobility During the High-Socialist Era

The earliest records of the *hukou* system in China suggest that it was first utilized as a means of overseeing migration during the Zhou Dynasty (1046-256 BCE).[9] During the years leading to the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the household registration system was primarily used for land distribution and tax-related purposes.[10] Although the system has been embedded in China's infrastructure for much of its history, scholars tend to focus on the *hukou* system just prior to the founding of the PRC in 1949. This was a period of time when the *hukou* underwent drastic changes and became a central policy adopted by the Communist Party.

For instance, there was a steep rise in the imposition of regulations following the founding of the PRC. The categorization of citizens, food rationing, and collectivization were all highly influential in inscribing a government-established separation between the rural and urban. Most noteworthy among the changes was the decision to ban rural-to-urban migration beginning in 1958. Parallel to these policies that encouraged a division between the rural and urban areas was the gradual restriction and re-addition of mobility rights to the Chinese citizenry. These policies, specifically in reference to making internal movement illegal, would later be gradually modified into the rules and regulations that are enforced today.

Defining Migrant Population Segments

There are multiple terms used in reference to migrants in China; it is imperative to distinguish each term from each other for the purpose of clarity. Note that the *hukou* system is embedded in China-specific migration terms. The following definitions,[11] based on Everett Lee and Cindy Fan, will be used in this article to refer to the following segments of the population:

[7] K. W. Chan and Y. Ren, "Children of migrants in China in the twenty-first century: Trends, living arrangements, age-gender structure, and geography," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 59, no. 2 (2018), 133.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Fan, "Population Mobility and Migration," 850.
[10] Chan and Ren, "Children of migrants," 134; "Fan, "Population Mobility," 850.

[11] Definition based upon Everett Lee's "A Theory of Migration" (1966) and from Cindy Fan's *Population Mobility and Migration* (2018). Note that permanent and temporary migrant definitions are referenced in terms of a five-year period.

Migrant: A person who undergoes any form of semi-permanent movement regardless of physical distance

Floating Population: Chinese citizens who leave their place of *hukou* registration for periods of time valued at six months or longer

Permanent Migrant: Migrants who have changed their *hukou* registration to their place of destination

Temporary Migrant: Migrants who have not changed their *hukou* registration to their place of destination

Fan makes a distinction between the "floating population," permanent migrants, and temporary migrants. The term 'floating population' is used in reference to people who go beyond the bounds of their *hukou* registration, marked by six months of time or more, used as a 'stock measure' to help quantify any migratory-related behavior that disregards the time associated with migrating.[12] Though this terminology is broad, it adds a layer of specificity in reference to internal movements in China and the relevance of the household registration system.

Like the "floating population," the distinction between permanent and temporary migrants is also embedded in the *hukou* status that a migrant does or does not maintain. Both terms are measured in periods of five years. The major difference between being "temporary" and "permanent" is whether a citizen decides to maintain or alter their regional distinction. The decision to change one's *hukou* registration is significant because it can greatly influence the ability for a migrant to access resources, transition to the city, and improve their lifestyle overall.

The incorporation of the *hukou* system into migratory terminology showcases that the modern-day infrastructure pertaining to citizen mobility remains influenced by the past.

The dichotomy between rural and urban citizenry is prevalent when comparing that of agricultural and non-agricultural *hukou* statuses; the entitlements and resources of citizens are based upon this form of identification. Peoples' household registration status can help or harm their ability to access services such as welfare benefits, education, and housing—dependent upon their status. Those residing in urban areas with local status are granted access to a wide variety of benefits, such as subsidized housing and access to higher-paying jobs. In contrast, migrants in urban areas are barred from sharing local urban benefits and often face forms of discrimination and inadequate resource access. This is significant because it puts rural-to-urban migrants at a disadvantage, especially in their movement to major cities such as Shanghai.

Motivations to Migrate

There are many factors that lead individuals to migrate out of their hometowns, but the primary reason pertains to economics.[13] Families in rural areas generally face a series of financial burdens including earning little income from their jobs, having expensive rents, being able to afford education costs for their children, supporting both familial elders and children, medical expenses, and having few employment benefits.[14] A study conducted in Shanghai found that rural-to-urban migrants whose destination is Shanghai nearly double their income after their move.[15] This drastic improvement in a family's income is a major "pull factor" that falls

[12] Fan, "Population Mobility and Migration," 153.

[13] Xiaochu Hu, "China's 'New Generation' Rural-Urban Migrants: Migration Motivation and Migration Patterns," *SSRN Electronic Journal* (2012).

[14] Bao-Liang Zhong et al., "Acculturative Stress of Chinese Rural-To-Urban Migrant Workers: A Qualitative Study," *PLOS ONE 11,* no. 6 (2016), 9.

[15] Wang and Zuo, "Inside China's Cities," 276.

in Everett Lee's classification of "factors associated with area of destination."[16]

The prospect of alleviating a proportion of a family's financial stress greatly appeals to many of those who choose to move. In a series of interviews conducted by Zhong et al., one of the interviewees articulated this, saying:

> I have a very heavy financial burden that you can't imagine! I'm the only person who has a paid job to support the whole family. My parents are farming in my village, and my two younger brothers are and one younger sister is receiving education in schools. They all need money from me.[17]

This account conveys the personal reality endured by one female worker who has to take on the stress of supporting her extended family by herself. The accumulation of pressures associated with supporting a family and sustaining an income is a critical factor that has long continued to drive China's large-scale domestic movement. Migration is seen by many rural citizens as being an outlet that can help with alleviating the extent of financial and familial-related burdens.

As children reach an age in which they are able to pursue work, many feel a pressure to help support their families financially.[18] The age of an individual's first migration experience has been on the decline; between 1980 and 1990, the average age for a young citizens' first time migrating was 21.1 years, but for the younger generation born after 1990, the average age is 17.2 years.[19] This accentuates the prominence of economic hardship endured by rural families and the primary reason that people have and continue to move to major cities.

In addition to the pursuit of improving families' economic standing, there are numerous other reasons for migrating. In a survey among China's young generation, a trend among interviewees showed that additional reasons for motivation include feeling exhausted from school, being drawn to an urban lifestyle, a curiosity to experience the city, career advancement, wanting to have "fun," and working a less-labor intensive position.[20] Although these accounts convey a variety of motivations to pursue a life-changing decision, there is a shared objective to obtain an improved lifestyle.

Hukou **Challenges in Shanghai**

Possession of a *hukou* specific to Shanghai has noteworthy benefits, including the ability to buy a house, access medical insurance, enroll in public schools, and receive retirement benefits.[21] Temporary migrants who hold an agricultural status in Shanghai are essentially prevented from accessing comparable benefits. This has the potential to contribute to a situation whereby migrants have limited access to generally low-quality and expensive housing and services while being subject to discrimination.

Although migrants can apply for non-agricultural *hukou* status, the process to obtain the registration is difficult. *China Briefing News* outlines the following qualifications necessary to obtain this documentation in Shanghai specifically:

1. Possessing a noteworthy talent, such as those in reference to starting business, having a leadership position in a company, or obtaining patents
2. Obtaining a bachelor's degree in a foreign country
3. Graduating from a university

[16] Lee, "A Theory of Migration," *Demography* 3, no. 1 (1966), 50.
[17] Zhong et al., "Acculturative Stress," 9.
[18] Hu, "New Generation," 3.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid, 5-10.
[21] Fuki Fu, "How to Get a Shanghai Hukou," *China Briefing News* (September 24, 2018), 1.

4. Being close to family members with a Shanghai registration
5. Having a Shanghai permit and making contributions to social insurance over the course of seven years[22]

Qualifications such as these demonstrate a preference for people who possess notably high levels of human capital. The ability to "check off" achievements such as attending a university or becoming established in the world of business requires having ample resources and opportunities to do so. These are not common attributes among temporary rural-to-urban migrants. As previously discussed, migrants are primarily incentivized to move to urban centers in order to advance their family's economic standing. This typically entails occupying low-skill positions, as opposed to white collar positions that are associated with having a degree or holding a managerial position at a business. By having such high levels of achievement as the benchmark to determine whether an individual can become a Shanghai citizen, migrants are subject to a form of discrimination that favors highly skilled and well-resourced individuals, despite the need for low skill positions to also be filled.

In addition to standards such as these, migrants' ability to obtain a Shanghai status is further impeded by a point-based system, first implemented in 2013.[23] In Beijing, a comparable system has been adopted. Citizens are "scored" on the premise of things including their education level, contributions to social insurance, age, criminal record, and "entrepreneurial ability."[24] Thus, migrants are not only subject to high standards of achievement to be considered for changing their registration status, but they are also subject to being scored on the premise of their personal attributes. This process to obtain the new *hukou* status is an obstacle for migrants who seek to reside in the city. Temporary migrants endure a plethora of challenges amidst the process to acclimate to a Shanghai lifestyle. Like the preference for high achieving and well-off citizens, the point-based system conveys additional areas that systematically disadvantage migrants, preventing them from having a straightforward transition into the city.

Shanghai and the "Blue *Hukou*"

Although temporary migrants do not possess local *hukou* status, there are ways for migrants to obtain a status comparative to that of being a "local." Known as the "blue seated" or "blue-stamped" *hukou*, migrants who have outstanding talent, experience, or other desirable attributes can qualify by purchasing their status in the megacity and so receive benefits.[25] In Shanghai, the city began to target migrants and foreigners affiliated with business, investment, education, government, and health in the 1990s.[26] A significant draw of the "blue-stamp" status is being able to enroll one's children in high-quality schools and to apply for a business license.[27] However, this is not an affordable endeavor for most; the hefty price tag of one million RMB ($143,020) for domestic investors is approximately 150 times the average yearly income of a rural migrant.[28]

The premise of the "blue-stamped" *hukou* indicates that Shanghai values and welcomes individuals with high levels of human capital. However, the majority of migrants who seek to advance their economic standing and often work low-skill, highly labor-intensive jobs are not afforded the same level of value. Various forms of discrimination, such a financial

[22] Ibid.
[23] H. Wen et al., "Do educational facilities affect housing price? An empirical study in Hangzhou, China," *Habitat International* 42 (2014), 155.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Wang and Zuo, "Inside China's Cities," 279.
[26] Ling Wu, "Decentralization and Hukou Reforms in China," *Policy and Society* 32, no. 1 (2013), 35.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Wang and Zuo, "Inside China's Cities," 279.

discrimination pertaining to buying a Shanghai *hukou* status, demonstrates that it is difficult for migrants to overcome the challenges that they must endure in the big city.

Shanghai Housing Arrangements for Urban Migrants

As Wu writes, "restricted access to urban housing, together with the temporary status for migrants, contributes to their poor housing conditions."[29]

The affordability, environment, location, and quality of a home greatly influence the experiences and lifestyle of an individual. With the mass rural-to-urban migration China has experienced since its Reform and Opening Up, the necessity for affordable, safe, and quality housing in destination cities such as Shanghai has increased exponentially. However, despite efforts to resolve this issue, housing continues to be a major challenge for temporary migrants arriving in megacities. The negative impact on migrants has captured the concern of scholars and news outlets alike. Wang and Zuo have gone as far as describing the migrant housing landscape as "residential segregation," arguing that locals reap the greatest housing-related benefits.[30]

In Shanghai, it is said that housing is the greatest household registration-related benefit celebrated by those with Shanghai status.[31] With this benefit, however, it is important to make the connection between work and housing, such that work provides the capital to help individuals afford their place of residence. Shanghai locals generally occupy higher paying and higher quality positions with greater benefits relative to temporary migrants from rural communities.[32] This is significant because migrants who occupy low paying, manual labor positions do not receive assistance with finding affordable housing, and thus work hard to pay more for lower quality facilities.

The *hukou* system is structured such that only Shanghai locals, not migrants, qualify to live in free public housing; that benefit being allocated to locals leads migrants to pay nearly double the cost of housing.[33] The housing-related inequity migrants endure while residing in Shanghai is the product of *huko*u-related discrimination. Migrants face several challenges, including those related to housing unaffordability, being restricted in what housing options are available to them, and occupying lower quality housing.

In the City: Where do Temporary Migrants Live?

Many scholars agree that obtaining a place of residence is a challenging endeavor in China's megacities, especially for temporary rural-to-urban migrants.[34] In the cities across China, renting is generally the most commonly used method among temporary migrants.[35] This is also true in Shanghai. Data collected in 2002 indicates that 49% of temporary migrants in Shanghai occupied privately rented homes, followed by 28.8% residing in dormitories, and 11.6% renting public housing.[36] Comparatively, locals and permanent migrants both show a different trend, whereby locals in Shanghai primarily occupy public rentals (43.8%) and permanent migrants most commonly live in private housing (51.3%).[37] When looking at the physical space a home encompasses, the rentals migrant rentals are significantly smaller, being on average half the size of local houses (which

[29] W. Wu, "Migrant Housing in Urban China, Choices and Constraints," *Urban Affairs Review* 38, no. 1 (2002), 90.
[30] Wang and Zuo, "Inside China's Cities," 278.
[31] Ibid, 277.
[32] Ibid, 279.
[33] Ibid, 277-279.
[34] Wu, "Migrant Housing," 93.
[35] "Migrant workers and their children," *China Labour Bulletin* (September 18, 2019); M. Lu and Y. Xia, "Migration in the People's Republic of China," *Asian Development Bank Institut*e; Wu, "Migrant Housing," 101.
[36] Wu, "Migrant Housing," 101.
[37] Ibid.

are typically 8. 2 square meters).[38] This dichotomy in housing arrangements can be traced to the restrictions and regulations implemented through the *hukou* and local Shanghai policy.

Urban Living Conditions for Temporary Migrants

A place of residence's quality can be characterized by the well-being and experiences of its inhabitants. However, the concept of quality is subjective; it is often "context dependent" and lacks a universally agreed upon set of standards that determine whether an entity can possess this label. Factors including accessibility, affordability, and the surroundings of a home are all common indicators used to measure the overall condition of a housing arrangement.[39] Despite the nebulous definition of quality, for the purposes of this essay, quality of migrant housing will be based on affordability, size, safety, access to basic amenities/appliances, and the character of the neighborhood. The specific conditions of a unit for temporary migrants in Shanghai are generally depicted by scholars and news reporters as being expensive, exceptionally small, lacking access to necessities, and even unsafe – all attributes that do not fit the definition of quality housing.

One area of contention is migrants' limited access to housing essentials, including kitchens and bathrooms. In Shanghai, 60% locals have access to a kitchen and 50% to bathrooms, compared to 12% and 6% of temporary migrants.[40] The rent for spaces with kitchens and bathrooms that are accessible to migrants is much higher; this housing dilemma not only pertains to having access to living necessities but also hints at the lack of affordability of housing that accepts migrants. For example, in the Baoshan District, the cost of housing increases from 500-1,000 RMB ($71.01-$142.03 USD) to 2,000 RMB should migrants select a home with a kitchen or bathroom.[41] This is a substantial increase considering that the average Shanghai local pays an average of 22.5 RMB ($3.22 USD) per month compared to migrants who pay an average of 133 RMB ($19.02 USD) per month.[42] Therefore, there is a substantial gap in monthly housing costs for people in Shanghai, largely due to the household registration system. Furthermore, many temporary migrants occupy places that not only negatively impact their finances, but also constrict their lifestyle and wellbeing. Migrants who generally seek economic gain are paying higher prices for lower quality facilities. Alternatively, locals, who can be inferred as having comparatively higher incomes in addition to subsidized housing, have an elevated standard of living.

A Look into Shanghai Migrant Experiences

Although statistics describe harsh realities and bring light to the prevalence of housing related issues, they do not draw connections between factual representations and the actual human experience. Photographs, quotes, and excerpts provide a more complete view of the hardships that migrants endure. Weiping Wu, a specialist in Chinese urban studies, provides a glimpse into the realities faced by migrants residing in Shanghai. Wu describes:

> Overcrowding seems to be a feature of migrant housing, with each person using only about a third of the space occupied by a typical urban resident. These migrants also tend to live in dwellings that are less equipped with kitchen/bathroom facilities, are used

[38] Wang and Zuo, "Inside China's Cities," 277.
[39] Wu, "Migrant Housing," 94.
[40] "Migrant workers and their children," *China Labour Bulletin*; Wang and Zuo, "Inside China's Cities.
[41] "Migrant workers and their children," *China Labour Bulletin*.
[42] Wang and Zuo, "Inside China's Cities.

> for working or other purposes in addition to serving as residences and have less stable structural features (such as temporary dorms on construction sites). It is not unusual to see a family of three sharing a single rental room with no facilities and using a corner to set up a small cooking area with either a kerosene burner or propane stove. A small portion of temporary migrants (about 3%-4% in both cities) encounters the worst housing conditions for prolonged periods of time, ranging from sleeping on hospital benches to resting by vendor stalls sheltered by only plastic sheets to sleeping under staircases in multistory apartments.[43]

Wu's account brings attention to a multitude of complications that are associated with being a temporary migrant living in Shanghai. Exorbitant prices, small living quarters, limited access to basic amenities and appliances, and unsafe setups are all realities that many migrants endure upon moving to the big city; situations such as these are not explicitly conveyed through solely an investigation of data.

Migrant Worker's Personal Experiences

News reports allow for a deeper and up-to-date insight as to the housing conditions temporary migrants face. In *Laoximen* (老西門), one of Shanghai's oldest neighborhoods known for being densely populated by migrant workers, migrants pay approximately 1,000 RMB ($143.06 USD) for monthly rent.[44] This rent is notably high compared to the average price of 133 RMB ($19.02 USD) per month computed by Wang and Zuo. During the winter, however, the price further increases if residents utilize indoor heating. A 2018 news report articulated that migrants cannot afford to buy a heater nor pay an additional 100 RMB ($14.31 USD) per month to have heating during the winter.[45] As an alternative, residents use other methods to keep warm, such as using hot water or, if they do own a heater, only using it for large gatherings with family and friends.[46] Despite having small, cold living conditions, Bao, a 64-year old migrant residing in *Laoximen* said:

> I'm very happy here to earn one or two hundred yuan a day. Making money every day makes me happy… I will go back to my hometown when I'm 70.[47]

One of the few affordable housing options available to non-Shanghai *hukou* holders are dormitories owned by employers.[48] These facilities are often small and crowded, do not allow for privacy, and lack their own kitchen/bathroom.[49] Although these arrangements exist (see photo below), they are similar to dormitory arrangements across the city, and as such do not offer the best quality living and are not ideal for families raising children.

Shantytowns – unsafe and illegally constructed housing areas – are arrangements that have been adopted by many migrants in Shanghai. A key feature of shantytowns is their lack of safety, along with the use of gas cylinders, inefficient drainage systems, and poor construction.[50] Despite such circumstances, the greatest appeal of these neighborhoods is the

[43] Wu, "Migrant Housing," 105.
[44] "Old Shanghai neighborhood shivers in winter," *AFP International Text Wire* (January 4, 2018).
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] "New Report on Migrant Workers' Housing," *China Development Brief* (8 May 2018).
[49] Ibid.
[50] Yang Jian, "'Urban Village' Is a Disappearing Oxymoron," (17 April, 2018).

low rent.[51] Enduring unsafe living conditions in exchange for a low cost of living accentuates the necessity for affordable housing that can be accessed by temporary migrants. Capturing the hardship of the shantytowns, resident Wu Xiaodi says,

> I can barely sleep at night every summer and winter for fear that the low-lying village might be flooded or that roofs will collapse under heavy snow.[52]

Another news article tells of a migrant worker in Shanghai who does not have the funds to afford a place to live. As an alternative to expensive housing arrangements, this individual has resorted to living in a 24-hour McDonald's located at the *Tonghe Xincun* metro station.[53] This man's situation reflects the limitations of *hukou*-derived housing benefits. Given the necessity of having a local status to obtain access to free public housing, subsidized housing, or more affordable options in general, it can be assumed that this man's status greatly influences his inability to establish a place to live, even if he intends to work in Shanghai for a temporary period.

Shanghai's Housing Landscape Today

Shanghai has been marked by its proactive measures to help improve its quality of housing since the 1990s, such as increasing investment in housing and replacing unsound structure.[54] However, Wu highlights that changes such as these, while bringing about positive change to some communities, have little to no influence on the residential circumstances of temporary migrants.[55]

More recent data suggests that rental options for migrants are decreasing, and that migrants are more likely to pay market price and reside in collective housing or market rentals.[56] It is forecast that only about two thousand rental homes will be constructed and made available in the upcoming years.[57] Since migrants in the city face extreme overcrowding and do not have the ability to afford many housing options, this small-scale future development does not appear to be a solution or a realistic option that will be extended to a significant number of temporary migrants. Although a small effort is expected to be made, it does not seem to be intended for migrants, but rather for locals who have the means to afford new living complexes. Therefore, the current and future limitations on housing supply are an indirect institutional barrier created by the city. There does not appear to be a substantial effort being made to accommodate the city's large population of temporary migrants.

Another important issue that is of misinformation circulating amongst people looking for housing through advertisements. A study conducted by *CityLab* analyzed approximately 33,000 advertisements for Shanghai rentals that described desirable characteristics, such as being centrally located, having a kitchen or bathroom, or a shared room for affordability. However, by responding to 200 advertisements, researchers found that many of the advertised homes were greatly overcrowded, having upwards to 24 people occupying a space intended for a small family.[58] As the number of renters increased per unit, the overall cost of rent decreased, making arrangements such as these more accessible to migrants' pocketbooks.[59] However, places such as these – deemed "informal rentals" – are becoming difficult to find. The government has

[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] "Shanghai Migrant Worker Lives at 24-Hour McDonald's," *Shanghai Daily* (Aug 24, 2013)..
[54] Wu, "Migrant Housing," 94.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Logan et al., "Access to Housing in Urban China," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research.*
[57] Linda Poon, "When Affordable Housing in Shanghai Is a Bed in the Kitchen." *CityLab*.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.

made an effort to delete advertisements for "bed spaces" targeted towards migrants on popular housing websites, therefore making somewhat more affordable arrangements inaccessible.[60] The study conducted by *CityLab* showcases the situations migrants are willing to endure to ensure so they have a place to live, along with the fact that deliberate efforts are being made to prevent migrants from obtaining the few affordable (even if not ideal) housing options available to them.

Along with restricting access to overcrowded yet affordable homes, the city administration is also endeavoring to demolish areas deemed as shantytowns. Areas that are recognized as shantytowns are the product of insufficient living spaces, which has led to the construction of illegal structures. In 2014, the Shanghai government began to pursue a course of action involving the destruction of 35 shantytowns. To make this a reality, the state has offered subsidies to former inhabitants to relocate, with the amount being greater the sooner the resident signs an agreement. There are two points to highlight in this situation. First, the majority of these illegal structures are not deemed as safe, since they are subject to heavy flooding and the structures are unsound. However, some inhabitants feel attached to their homes and do not think that the money given in exchange for relocation is sufficient to sustain their families for long. An additional consideration is that although the demolition process does clear up space, it does not guarantee that the space will be intended for temporary migrant housing.[61] Rather, opened up space can also be used for expensive shopping centers or apartments.

The lack of affordable housing leads a sizable proportion of Shanghai migrants to share small apartments with an abundance of fellow tenants – assuming that places such as these can be found and occupied without local status. This hardship can be related to the *hukou*, in that locals generally do not endure comparable instances of high rent or overcrowding.

Excellent and the BRI: The Shanghai Master Urban Plan 2017-2035

In addition to the current limitations placed on migrants through the country-wide *hukou* institution, Shanghai has recently adopted a policy that will further hinder migration. Part of China's vision for sustaining economic growth and gaining further prominence in the international community is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) strategy. Within this project, Shanghai has become a key player identified as a site of further economic growth, specifically via the Shanghai Master Urban Plan 2017-2035. With reference to migration to Shanghai, the most noteworthy aspect of this plan is it seeks to control the growth of the city's population. By 2035, the population of Shanghai is forecast to be capped at 25 million people.[62] For context, the estimated population of Shanghai for 2020 is approximately 27 million people.[63] Assuming that this goal remains into the future, this implies that restrictions on migration will become more stringent, thus imposing a city level institutional barrier on top of the preexisting *hukou* system.

Conclusion

Recently, Shanghai became the first city to issue residence permits which are intended to be distributed to high-skilled foreigners with the intention to temporarily work in the city.[64] Although this policy allows for Shanghai to

[60] Ibid.

[61] Jian, "Urban Village."

[62] "Master plan for our global city," *Shanghai Daily* (January 5, 2018).

[63] "Shanghai Population," *World Population Review* (2020).

[64] Dezan Shira, "Shanghai Becomes First City in Mainland China to Grant Foreign Domestic Workers Residency," *China Briefing News* (April 13, 2017), 1.

celebrate increased citizen integration, this policy does not ease the process that domestic temporary migrants undergo. There is a gap between Shanghai locals, foreigners issued a residence permit, and people without a Shanghai registration. The experience of living within the city accentuates these gaps between the individual experiences of different categories of migrants. A collaborative qualitative study conducted among 17 rural-to-urban migrants in Shenzhen reveals a glimpse into the frustration migrants feel as they encounter the hurdles of city life through the *hukou* system. One individual expressed:

> It's a joke! I'm a Chinese citizen from a rural area, and the city residents are also Chinese citizens. We are living and working in the same territory, we are all Chinese. Why only I should apply for the residence permit?[65]

This individual account shows that there is a sense of division between people and place which is embedded in the regulations of the *hukou* system. Conversely, the interview also suggests the importance of unity – "We are all Chinese." The dichotomy facilitated by the institutional barrier of the registration system creates challenges that not only pertain to external infrastructure, but also the human experience.

The decision to migrate from a rural hometown to Shanghai is a major decision. Migrants must consider an abundance of challenges, including the lack of possessing a Shanghai status, not being the recipient of *hukou* benefits allotted to locals, the costs associated with moving and living in the city, and discrimination. Despite these realities, migration has and continues to occur on a large scale. The primary reason to endure circumstances such as these is the migrant's hope to better support their families and achieve an improved lifestyle.

The implications of the *hukou* system constricts migrants' abilities to lead a comfortable lifestyle in the city through policies that are discriminatory. Among the many realities of transitioning to an urban lifestyle, migrants are prevented from living in affordable and safe houses, changing their registration status, and enrolling in quality public schools. In contrast, urban locals are granted a variety of benefits and services that essentially shield them from experiencing hardships comparable to those of migrants. The ongoing discriminatory nature of the *hukou* system and city policies not only disadvantage migrants, but also contribute to maintaining the rural-urban divide.

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Sexuality and Gender Expression in Male K-Pop Groups: Queering *Hwarang* Culture and Contemporary Korean Masculinity

Reilly Gabel

During the Silla kingdom of the Three Kingdoms Period (57 BCE – 935 CE) in Korea, an elite military organization called the *hwarang* ("flowering knights") flourished as a social group that studied Buddhist teachings on nature and beauty as well as the military arts of fighting. The young men that constituted the *hwarang* were model national citizens that set a physical and moral standard for people at the time. Advancing many years forward in Korean history, in 2013, a year after South Korean solo artist Psy's YouTube recording-breaking single "Gangnam Style" (2012) took the entertainment world by storm, an all-male, seven-member musical group called BTS (Bangtan Sonyeondan or Beyond The Scene) debuted as a K-pop idol group. Originally a hip-hop group with fierce, synchronized choreography, BTS' style and image has shifted with their increasing global popularity. Their lyrics convey young adult themes of attending school, struggles with identity, mental health, and contemporary South Korean social issues. By making a typological parallel between the *hwarang* and K-pop idols, I argue that male K-pop groups, primarily BTS, are a modern representation of *hwarang* masculinity because they share a distinct social role that contributes to the concept of nation-building. At the same time, however, BTS challenges traditional Korean gender norms through their unique hybrid representation of Western LGBTQ culture. I believe the lyrics and music video of "Spring Day" represent this hybrid masculinity and deconstruct notions of toxic and hegemonic masculinity within and across Korea's borders.

Origins and functions of Hwarang and male K-pop idols

Korean historical documents reveal previous expressions and practices of Korean masculinity. The figure of the *hwarang* ("flowering knights") indicates one type of Korean masculinity that was popular during that time. Two handwritten documents purportedly copied from Kim Taemun's original *Hwarang segi* (Annals of Hwarang) were uncovered in an elderly women's dormitory in 1989. The manuscripts were written by Park Chang-hwa, a historian who studied ancient Korean history in Japan and contributed to academic discourse on Sillan history during the 1920s and 1930s.[1] Based on this, Richard McBride II, a well-known writer on the historiography of the *hwarangdo* (plural of *hwarang*), states that "these writings show an evolution in the way [Park Chang-hwa] conceived of the *hwarang* institution, [and] it is impossible to separate them from the *Hwarang segi* manuscripts.[2] Essentially, the historical fiction of Park Chang-hwa must not be dismissed as wholly fictitious due to his accreditation and the fact that the original *Hwarang segi*, written by Kim Taemun in 704, was lost in the 13th century. Additionally, this historiography is an

[1] Richard D. McBride II, "Pak Changhwa and the Hwarang Segi Manuscripts," *Journal of Korean Studies* 13, no. 1 (2008), 60-61.

[2] Ibid, 58.

important factor in forming the contemporary reincarnation of *hwarang*-like masculinity in South Korean popular culture. Thus, I consider the possibility of historical inaccuracy in my comparison of *hwarang* members and K-pop idols.

Within South Korean popular culture, historical dramas like *Hwarang: The Poet Warrior Youth,* originally airing in 2016, feature famous actors and K-pop idols such as Choi Min-ho (a former member of SHINEE) and Kim Taehyung (a current member of BTS), that exemplify soft masculine hybridity in terms of appearance and behavior. Promotional posters depict these stars with long-haired wigs and makeup, smiling either at each other or towards the camera with perfectly white teeth. Teaser trailers display the soldiers' physical training, nature excursions, and curiously, intimate same-sex behavior that is perceived as platonic by Korea's homosocial society. The drama not only depicts the lives of *hwarang* members (as they are understood from historiographical record) but also creates a typological link between two expressions of Korean masculinity. Additionally, *Hwarang: The Poet Warrior Youth* exemplifies how *hwarang* culture still resonates within contemporary Korean culture, and thus, solidifies a long-lasting moral standard for today's Korean men. For the rest of this section, I will first briefly introduce the *hwarangdo* and discuss their social relevance within ancient Korean society. From there, I will introduce the modern-day K-pop idol and how the K-pop industry systematizes this aspect of modern Korean culture. Lastly, I will compare these two figures to demonstrate how they reinforce hegemonic masculinity.[3]

The *Samguk sagi* and *Samgungnyusa*, originally published in the 12th century, similarly provide information on the real-life *hwarangdo*. The *hwarang* originated as a unique social group, where young men from high-class families learned important societal values through military arts, poetry, and music. Once the Silla kingdom expanded their territory, the *hwarang* became a military organization comprised of boys from *jingol* ranking families who were taught Buddhist principles of nature, virtue, and harmony.[4] *Jingol*, or True Bone rank, was one of the highest positions in Silla's *golpum* (bone rank) caste-like class system, from which top officials and monarchs were selected to lead the nation.[5]

The characteristics of *hwarang* set a moral and physical standard for Korean men during the Silla Period. Trainees were selected from groups of beautiful young men and garnered public interest due to their physical appeal: "Faces made up and beautifully dressed, they were respected as *hwarang,* and men of various sorts gathered around them like clouds."[6] Successfully trained *hwarang* were recommended for court positions and served as great generals or soldiers for the kingdom. Since the *hwarangdo* has religious ties to Buddhism, the groups prayed for national security and welfare. To become a politician or solider, each member was encouraged to read Confucian classics, focusing on loyalty and sincerity to the king, to their teachers, and amongst themselves. These characteristics served to create an ideal subject for the common people; one dedicated

[3] "Hegemonic masculinity" is a culturally idealized form of masculinity that defines masculine character and expression. Any other expressions of masculinity performed by the individual or by other cultures is considered "marginalized masculinity." See Cheng, Cliff, "Marginalized Masculinities and Hegemonic Masculinities," *Journal of Men's Studies* 7, no. 3 (1999), 300.

[4] Peter H. Lee and William Theodore De Bary, *Sources of Korean Tradition.* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 54.

[5] Kyung-moon Hwang, *A History of Korea*. (New York: Palgrave, 2017), 24.

[6] Lee and De Bary, *Sources*, 55.

to protecting the country through cultural cultivation and native martial arts, such as Taekwondo. The practices of the *hwarangdo* display a set of moral principles that "men of various sorts" sought to follow and adopt into their own lives. In this way, contemporary K-pop idols serve the same purpose within a different time frame and sociopolitical context.

Emerging out of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, K-pop became a cultural product for South Korea to sell on a global market. With the infiltration of Hollywood blockbusters like *Jurassic Park* (1993) and *Titanic* (1997), South Korea saw Hollywood as a role model, so conglomerates like Hyundai, Samsung, and Daewoo plunged their efforts into the creative sector. To rebuild its economy, South Korea adopted neoliberalist strategies to commodify, privatize, and rationalize their culture through popular music and cinema.[7] After the global success of the movie *Shiri* (1999), South Korean cinema shifted to produce more non-nationalistic, globalized films that are called *mugukjeok,* which translates to "lacking in or having no nationality."[8] In addition to *mugukjeok* films, popular artists of the time, such as Rain or Se7en, were also inspired by American hip-hop and R&B. Pop stars like Rain, a solo artist that gained popularity by playing the lead role in a television drama, appeal to a wider audience because of his culturally hybridized appearance and choreography, his English stage name, the generalized themes of love or jealousy found in his lyrics, and the production of high-quality, cinematic music videos. Present-day K-pop systematizes Rain's model by manufacturing idols within the transcultural image of *mugukjeok* and making them more marketable to a global audience. Consequently, idols undertake the difficult task of being a national spokesperson who is expected to be a role model for listeners across the globe.

K-pop idols and *hwarang* share physical and moral standards that maintain hegemonic masculinity. K-pop trainees are also selected by appearance but are manufactured into idols by entertainment companies: "…they [girl or boy groups] are formed through intensive auditions and training sessions. In other words, band members are made, rather than found, through a highly rationalized and systematic business practice."[9] *Hwarang* were also selected and trained by harnessing their innate talents, but for K-pop idols, talent, innate or not, is optional, depending on how well the trainee adapts to the training process. A K-pop idol's job is multi-faceted, requiring skills in choreography, modeling, and even acting. K-pop idols are not only required to sing; they must be entertaining personalities seemingly dedicated to the happiness of their fans. Likewise, *hwarang* were required to master multiple skills, such as military fighting, poetry writing, and government administration. The ability to perform multiple talents and skills, as seen through the *hwarang* and K-pop idol training process, sets a physical standard for Korean men.

In terms of moral standards, K-pop idol recreational activities are heavily monitored, so that they maintain a drug-free, sex-free, scandal-free image for impressionable South Korean teenagers to follow. K-pop idols embody the result of hard work through education and practice and reinforce this narrative for Korean teenagers, who spend upwards of sixteen hours a day in school.[10] Like the *hwarang*, who were taught to respect all personal relationships, K-

[7] Kang Inkyu, "The Political Economy of Idols," 52-3

[8] Sun Jung. "Korean Masculinities and Transcultural Consumption," *K-Pop: The International Rise of the Korean Music Industry*. (New York: Routledge, 2015), 17-18.

[9] Ibid, 56.

[10] Deepti Mani, "Education in South Korea," *WENR: World Education News + Reviews* (2018).

pop idols reinforce filial piety by motivating their audience to succeed financially so that their families may live happier as well. Since the *hwarangdo* consisted of members who fought for the welfare of their kingdom, the same could be said about K-pop idols. Rising from the ashes of the 1997 Asian financial crisis possessing a *mugukjeok* appearance, K-pop artists and groups "fight" to keep their nation afloat, even if it means heavily sculpting their image to be marketable. However, this *mugukjeok* appearance acts as a disguise to initially intrigue international audiences. Once the apathetic viewer becomes a fan of a particular K-pop star or group, a gateway into Korean culture and language is open for them to discover, if they so choose. Regardless, the dedication to developing one's mind through education and devotion to one's country, as exhibited through the *hwarang* and K-pop idol lifestyle, sets a moral standard for Korean men.

Blurring the lines of friendship and romance: an analysis of *hwarang* and K-pop lyricism

Another aspect of *hwarang* culture that K-pop idols share is the inclination to engage in sensual, intimate, yet supposedly chaste same-sex interactions between members. The queer[11] nature of these relationships would not shock a seasoned K-pop fan because this behavior has one intended purpose: "fanservice." A number of videos titled "[title of band] being gay for 10 minutes straight" or "[name of two idols] flirting nonstop" exist on YouTube to highlight this homoerotic relationality. Still, some videos go beyond this format and argue that fanservice is not the only reason for this behavior; rather, there is genuine sexual attraction and tension between two members. For *hwarang*, the nature of these interactions is clouded in missing historical records and forgery, obscuring facts from fiction. Korean folk songs, or *hyangga*, provide limited insight into same-sex practices between *hwarang* members or non-*hwarang* citizens. For this section, I will lyrically compare a *hwarang*-related *hyangga* with an excerpt from BTS' "Spring Day" to highlight their aesthetic similarities and homosocial themes. Additionally, I will conclude by discussing how these characteristics are negatively subject to homoerotic coding by viewers, by citing an example from Western music culture, while conversely providing a possible shield for queer relationships within an East Asian context.

In *Song of Yearning for the Flower Boy Taemara*, found in the *Samgungnyusa,* scholars argue that the following verse conveys same-sex attraction:

> The whole world weeps sadly
> The departing Spring.
> Wrinkles lance
> Your once handsome face,
> For the space of a glance
> May we meet again.
> Fair Lord, what hope for my burning heart?
> How can I sleep in my alley hovel?[12]

In an article highlighting historical and contemporary sources of Korean masculinity, Kim and Hahn believe this song illustrates the promiscuous acts *hwarang* members shared with same-sex partners as a clear example of ancient Korean homosexuality.[13] However, the authors miss an important detail in their analysis: the author's gender. Indeed, a man or woman, who may be a lover or admirer, could have written this song as an expression of romantic or platonic yearning. Additionally, Kim

[11] "Queer" refers to anything that stands against the norms of gender and sexuality. Within this context, I refer to same-sex interactions as "queer." See Jeffrey Weeks, *The Languages of Sexuality.* (London: Taylor and Francis Group, 2011), 145.

[12] Kim Young-Gwan, and Sook-Ja Hahn, "Homosexuality in Ancient and Modern Korea," *Culture, Health and Society* 8, no. 1 (2006), 60.

[13] Ibid, 61.

and Hahn cite *The Song of Choyong*, a *hyangga* about a man's wife in bed with a demon, as another example of *hwarang* member's promiscuity, though their argument is somewhat unclear. Regardless, if one is to assume male authorship, as *hwarang* were expected to be prolific in poetry writing, then this *hyangga*, in my reading, conveys a platonic attraction rather than a sexual one. The sixth line, "may we meet again," entails feelings of longing to see someone, but these feelings are not necessarily homoerotic. Rather, I think automatically reading this *hyangga* as homoerotic contributes to toxic masculinity because the implication is that men cannot express platonic same-sex desire or attraction without being labeled as having homosexual intentions. The lines "Wrinkles lance/ Your once handsome face" indicate that the two subjects have spent enough time apart that the effects of aging are noticeable. Considering the *hwarangdo*'s duties to the state, calls to war or high-ranking promotions are likely reasons for a *hwarang* member to leave his hometown. Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that the author was close friends with "flower-boy Taemara" and wished to rejoin his company by writing this *hyannga*. If the identity of a homosexual partner can be assumed from this piece, then the possibility of a long lost, close friend reaching out to his counterpart should also be a possible interpretation.

Furthermore, this platonic yearning and shared feelings of friendship are reflected in BTS' lyrics as well, most notably in "Spring Day." Similar to the flower boy *hyangga* above, the bridge and pre-chorus lyrics in "Spring Day" utilize seasonal, light/dark symbolism to convey subjective emptiness as time seemingly stretches onwards:

> You know it all
> You're my best friend
> The morning will come again
> No darkness, no season is eternal
> Maybe it's cherry blossoms
> And this winter will be over
> I miss you (I miss you)[14]

An admission of intimacy and friendship is directly expressed in the first two lines, and then a sense of hope is presented by the next two lines in the stanza. Interestingly, V (stage name of Kim Taehyung) sings the first two lines and is accompanied by Jungkook (stage name of Jeon Jeongkuk) who sings the next two, indicating the turn in a conversation. I imagine this stanza being spoken slowly over the phone as Jungkook consoles V. "The morning will come again" responds to "You know it all" because Jungkook acknowledges that he certainly knows when their separation will end. As such, the end of separation will occur at the same time "this winter will be over" or when cherry blossoms start to bloom in April, the first full month of spring. In the last line, the echoing of "I miss you" represents an exchange of mutual feelings, where both parties come to the same conclusion. Thus, this section of "Spring Day" could very well show a platonic desire between two friends, rather than a sexual one. Yet, like the flower-boy *hyangga*, "Spring Day" has been subject to sexual coding by viewers, who immediately interpret "I miss you" and other ambiguous song lyrics as homoerotic.

Speculating on the nature of a relationship between two K-pop idols who are still alive can be more harmful than historical speculation of *hwarang* member relationships or sexual orientations. Since the *hwarang* are deceased and lived many centuries in the past, missing documents or forged archives about their lives lead to historical speculation, which can spark harmless queer archival work in the search for historically queer icons. However, the private life of a K-pop idol, or any celebrity for

[14] BTS, "Spring Day," (February 13, 2017).

that matter, does not belong to their fans. For example, the case of "Larry Stylinson" shows that pressure from fans on the nature of a relationship between two people, whether they are homosexual or not, can cause those individuals to drift apart. Before the British boyband One Direction disassembled, fans were passionately obsessed with a relationship between two members, Harry Styles and Louis Tomlinson (hence the combined name, "Larry Stylinson," given to the pair by fans), both of whom were openly fond of each other when the band first debuted. In a 2017 interview with *The Sun*, Louis Tomlinson admitted that the overreaction to minor physical intimacy by fans online made the two members avoid each other in public.[15] Fans went as far as to say that Louis' girlfriend was a fake, or "beard," to hide his relationship with Harry, which is quite untrue and possibly harmful to both Louis' platonic and romantic relationships.

Although, I do not wish to negate the possibility that K-pop idols do feel same-sex desire and engage in same-sex relationships under the shield of compulsory heterosexuality. As Robertson showed in the case of an all-female theater troupe Takarazuka in Japan, "the *musumeyaku*'s role was to enhance the charm of the *otokoyaku*, [but] the same relationship did not pertain offstage."[16] Within the theater of Takarazuka, *musumeyaku* refers to female characters, and *otokoyaku* refers to male characters. This means that the *musumeyaku*, as well as all members of the company, should support the *otokoyaku* in their portal of masculinity onstage, but they should not do this offstage. Yet, the desire and encouragement to perform androgyny by Takarasiennes onstage are, as Robertson states, "an extension of their private lives," as some Takarasiennes were involved in same-sex relationships offstage.[17] However, even when considering non-sexual interactions between Takarasiennes, the boundary between friendship and homosexuality among Japanese women and girls enters difficult to define territory. The term *doseiai* refers to a close, supposedly platonic relationship between females, especially among college students, educators, and thespians.[18] This word eventually becomes the term for homosexuality, but its original usage highlights the blurry effect of homosociality in East Asian culture.

Using K-pop to queer Korean heteronormativity

Within South Korea, audiences and fans overlook common Western formations of queerness and idolize the masculine duality – soft and beast-like[19] – that is presented through androgynous live performances, interviews, "variety" television shows, and live streams. Yet, Korea's history of heteronormative family values and military culture challenges the visibility and acceptance of LGBTQ lives in South Korea. The acceptance of androgynous, homoerotic K-pop idols juxtaposes the contemporary gender paradigm used against queer Korean subjects. Other forms of Korean entertainment, such as movies and television shows, have already exemplified the radical potential for "queering" the preexisting gender paradigm, but little research has been done on the queer potential

[15] Noelle Devoe. "Louis Tomlinson Confirms That Larry Shippers Ruined His Deep Friendship With Harry Styles," *Seventeen* (July 24, 2017).
[16] Jennifer Robertson, *Takarazuka: Sexual Politics and Popular Culture in Modern Japan*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 173.
[17] Ibid, 176.
[18] Ibid, 68.
[19] "Beast-like masculinity" refers to the hyper-masculine K-pop groups that emerged from the second generation of K-pop groups that expressed a tough, manly image through their stage presence and difficult choreography. See Sun Jung, *Korean Masculinities and Transcultural Consumption* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011), 164.

of K-pop.[20] I believe that this potential will not only garner visibility for LGBTQ Korean subjects but will also decenter the commonly accepted definitions of queerness by international audiences.

Within queer theory, the technique of "queering" a text "deconstructs the logics and frameworks operating within old and new theological and ethical concepts."[21] In other words, a queer reading of a text requires a deconstruction of heteronormativity by rejecting identity binaries and the power structures surrounding those identities. "Queering" is not limited to gender and sexuality, but also includes the questioning of race, class, ability, etc. that would otherwise be deemed "marginalized" by society. Queer theory functions to dismantle the power structures that unevenly benefit or represent heteronormative subjects. In this sense, "queering" is synonymous with "questioning" the logic of already established social institutions that erase marginalized groups. For this section of the paper, I use this definition of queer to argue that K-pop boy groups discordantly subvert and perpetuate hegemonic Korean masculinity, as well as allow fans, of any gender or nationality, to experience homosocial desire with self-benefitting effects.

Before discussing how K-pop boy groups perform this ambiguous gender role, a cultural backdrop must be established. Confucianism has greatly influenced Korean culture for centuries, while the Neo-Confucianism of the Koryo and Joseon dynasties emphasized the importance of relationships – familial, platonic, and national – to promote social harmony. Korean families are patrilineal, favoring firstborn sons to assume responsibility for ancestral rites and economic well-being.[22] Thus, heterosexual marriage and birth provide the basic elements of the Korean family model. When conjoining the precepts of Neo-Confucian family ideals with those of Christianity, the concept of monogamous, heterosexual marriage is tightened around the image of a strong, working husband that provides for his childbearing, housekeeping wife, which "functionally assigned women and men to the 'inside' and 'outside' of the household, respectively."[23] Additionally, Christianity strengthens the image of a submissive, chaste, and virtuous woman, who is defined by her roles as a daughter, then a wife, and lastly a mother. From there, the definition of masculinity is the inverse of femininity, as men control the "outside" space of work that defines them as the primary family provider. However, philosophical and religious belief systems are not the only reason these expectations are gendered in Korean society.

Hoon Choi argues that "one of the major reasons for the maintenance of such norms is the relentless encouragement of young Korean men by the military."[24] After a thirty-five-year occupation by Japan and peninsular split following the Korean War, the South Korean people sought a stronger nation by investing in the military and implementing mandatory conscription for all young South Korean men. Military service contributes to hegemonic masculinity for two reasons: the mandatory nature and physical expectations while in

[20] Stephen Epstein and James Turnbull, "Girl' Generation? Gender, (Dis)Empowerment, and Kpop," *The Korean Popular Culture Reader* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 316.

[21] Nikki Thelatia Young, "Queering 'The Human Situation,'" *Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion* 28, no. 1 (2012), 127.

[22] John Duncan, "The Korean Adoption of Neo-Confucianism," *Confucianism and the Family* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 87.

[23] Moon Seungsook, "The Production and Subversion of Hegemonic Masculinity," *Under Construction: The Gendering of Modernity, Class, and Consumption in the Republic of Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 84.

[24] Choi Hoon," Brothers in Arms and Brothers in Christ?" *Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics* 32, no. 2 (2012), 76.

service. The standards for a "real man" incorporate militant, authoritarian aspects such as toughness, complete obedience to higher-ranking individuals, and utilizing sex as entertainment or stress relief. As Choi writes, "soldiers who do not fit neatly into, or who do not adhere to, these expectations are often treated abusively."[25] Since military service is viewed as a crucial part of hegemonic masculinity, Korean society highly disapproves of exemption or evasion from service.[26] From the time of conscription, Korean men undergo a physical examination that denotes the suitability of their bodies for the military. If certain physical requirements are not met, the enlistee is pardoned, but they will not receive bonus points on their resume and will have a harder time finding a career in an already saturated and highly competitive job market. Additionally, military law mentions the criminalization of homosexuality between soldiers as an act of sodomy and molestation. This not only deems LGBTQ people as inferior and unsuitable national subjects but also "produc[es] a climate of secrecy and shame surrounding homosexual sex acts and identities throughout society."[27] Thus, a combination of military culture and heteronormative family values creates a compulsory hegemonic standard for Korean men to be physically fit, college-educated, and the sole providers of their immediate family.

Due to this, compulsory heterosexuality practically eradicates the assumption of queer identity by Korean audiences because of the "strong normative assumptions about lived heterosexuality [that] allow for what would be understood from a Western point of view as alternative queer performances."[28] However, Oh and Oh only focus on the theatrical aesthetics and rhetorical messages of live cross-dressing performances, where campy humor and absurdity are directly utilized for entertainment. By providing "verisimilitude, or hyperreality, an illusion that the couple could exist," on-stage male-on-male physicality sparks sexual excitement from the assumed female gaze.[29] Due to compulsory heteronormative assumptions, Oh and Oh assume that the female gaze is the only gender finding pleasure out of the performance, but they do not consider a male or queer gaze. This gaze can be sexual, or it can be homosocial. First coined by Eve Sedgewick, "male homosocial desire" considers the social bonding and mentorship between men as a result of intense fear against homosexuality; "men promoting the interests of men."[30] The male homosocial gaze in K-pop functions by interrelating the positive qualities of an idol (who is a manufactured role model) into a fan's behavior, outlook, or self-expression. For example, the message of BTS' ballad "Spring Day" conveys the strength of platonic romance and highlights the importance of self-love for the overall betterment of the group. Another example of this theme includes BTS' "Fake Love," an emo hip-hop track which describes love as fake if you have to drastically change yourself for the sake of someone else. When the listener of these lyrics is assumed female, these themes are encouraging like an older brother or boyfriend, but when the listener is assumed male, the lyrics act as a mentor or *hyung*[31] figure.

[25] Ibid, 79.
[26] Na Young-Jung, Ju Hui Judy Han, and Koo Se-Woong, "The South Korean gender system," *Journal of Korean Studies* 19, no. 2 (2014), 364.
[27] Ibid, 365.
[28] Chunyun Oh and David C. Oh, "Unmasking Queerness," *The Journal of Popular Culture* 50, no 1 (2017), 13.
[29] Ibid, 18.
[30] Eve Sedgewick, *Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 696-7.
[31] "Hyung" is a Korean kinship term used by a younger male friend to address an older male friend; it is also used by younger male siblings to refer to older male siblings.

Gender expression and K-pop aesthetics: A visual analysis of "Spring Day"

To further investigate K-pop's representation of Korean homosocial culture, I will visually and lyrically analyze the music video "Spring Day" (2017) by BTS. I argue that the shot-to-shot transitions, color scheme, and wardrobe choices convey a message about the importance of friendship for not only BTS but for Korean society and the ARMY (the pet acronym for BTS fans, or "Adorable Representative MC for Youth") fanbase. Additionally, these characteristics replicate aspects of *hwarang* masculinity, which is centered on intimate comradery, feminine-like expressions or gestures, and personal connections or parallels to seasonal changes found in nature. Moreover, "Spring Day" is considered a timeless classic for its authentic, emotional themes of recovering from hardship and loss through remembrance and companionship. BTS confirms that "Spring Day" was written and composed in reference to a specific event, which led many fans to believe that the song and accompanying music video was created to memorialize the Sewol Ferry Incident. For these reasons, I choose to analyze this music video over other, more popular music videos by BTS, such as "Boy With Luv" (2019) which has almost 550 million views on YouTube.

For this section, I will focus my analysis on the youngest member, Jungkook for simplicity and the frequency with which he appears in cinematic shots. Indeed, Jungkook appears alone in a moving train car eight times throughout the video, but during the eighth shot, the camera pans out to show that the rest of the band members are sitting with him in the surrounding seats. The continued presence of these shots with Jungkook alone indicates that Jungkook is the main character of the music video's narrative and that the other scenes are a combination of memories and dreams.

In the first sequence of shots shown above, Jungkook blinks lethargically while gazing out of the window next to his seat. Right after this, RM (stage name for Kim Namjoon) is seen walking past Jungkook's seat to enter the next train car, which leads to a room filled with all the members engaged in a slow-motion food fight. Thus, I believe that the moving train represents the mind's thoughts as they drift off during the most mundane moments of life, including the lucid state of falling asleep. This is why RM walks into a memory of a food fight, instead of another train car, because dreams do not follow the rules of reality. However, in both lucid and daydreaming states, the mind will wander to reflect on darker thoughts or memories.

At the start of the chorus' first recitation, Jungkook can be seen opening his eyes while standing in front of a rusted, worn down carousel – a symbol of lost childhood. As the chorus continues, Jungkook's profile is captured as he is looking out a train car window, one hand resting behind the other and his elbow propped up on the window's edge. He lets his mind, like the train car, stream forth into a space where he can process the previous and future routes his life has taken.

The second sequence of shots exhibited above shows all the BTS members engaging in intimate scenes at a motel called Omelas. The montage of scenes includes two members brushing their teeth together; one member piercing another's ear with a sewing needle; two members getting dressed; an assortment of members napping on each other; one member pulling pranks on a sleeping member. These shots are reminiscent of *hwarang*-like comradery and homosocial closeness between the members. Additionally, the shot transition from Jungkook alone to this montage reflects his longing to be with his friends again, as the lyrics state: "How long do I have to wait/ and how many sleepless nights do I have to spend/ to see you/ to meet you?" Since these lyrics are found in the song's chorus, I believe that Jungkook's separation from his friends, perhaps in a physical and/or emotional sense, is the main conflict of the music video's narrative, which is

resolved by the end of the chorus' second recitation. Indeed, as the camera widens the frame while those lyrics play, the viewer realizes that Jungkook was never alone to begin with because his friends are sitting in nearby seats. Thus, when Jungkook exits the train with the rest of the members, he wakes up from his dream state to find himself back in the present moment.

In the end, BTS attempts to remind the audience that no matter how fast the train goes, there is always a way off. Despite life's harsh lessons, such as becoming an adult or dealing with loneliness, nothing matters more than spending the current moment with cherished loved ones. Tying this concept back to my previous analysis of *hwarang*-related *hyangga*, the overall message of "Spring Day" highlights the importance of emotional intimacy and vulnerability in platonic relationships. This is especially important for addressing hegemonic masculinity within Korean culture, but also for toxic masculinity across all cultures.

Once the train stops, Jimin, one of the group's vocalists, is the first to open the train car door and run out in the snowy field. Wearing a long-sleeve striped shirt under a baby blue sweater jacket, Jimin twirls and gives a flirtatious wave at the camera. The shirt and jacket sleeves cover most of Jimin's hands, which is a style trend called "sweater paws." The wearer of sweater paws is perceived as cute and small, two traits that are often grouped and emphasize feminine qualities. Jimin creates a soft, feminine version of masculinity by engaging in flirtatious gestures, and gazing at an assumed female audience, wearing oversized clothing that makes him appear smaller, and dying his hair a pink color that matches the dawning sky above him. His baby blue sweater contrasts this hair color, visibly symbolizing how his gender expression in the current scene is androgynous.

In the final sequence of shots included above, Jimin walks up to a barren tree with a pair of white shoes and presumably throws them onto a branch. Right after a shot of all the group members joined together, the scene transitions to a wide scenery shot of the blue, snowy field. As the song crescendos, the blue suddenly turns a pinkish orange color to symbolize the start of a new season: a spring day. By this point, Jungkook has grown through his trials and reflections arm-in-arm with his *hyungs*, and all of them are ready to be reborn like the leaves of trees after a long, harsh winter. The white shoes hanging by their shoelaces on a branch in the final frame represents the unchanging element of memory that will stay despite the seasonal changes.

Conclusion

BTS' 2017 music video for "Spring Day" provides an example of *hwarang* masculinity's soft, sensitive characteristics and conveys a message about the importance of social bonding among friends. In my analysis of the music video, I selected Jungkook as the main character of "Spring Day" and see his conflict throughout the narrative music video as the separation from his friends. The reason for his separation is unclear, but within a real-world context, the character played by Jungkook could be leaving due to the start of a new career or to attend a different school, which appeals to BTS' age demographic of teenagers and young adults. However, when Jungkook realizes that his friends are still with him on the train, he also realizes that the discomfort and sadness of leaving them should be addressed, instead of bottling up those feelings. In this way, Jungkook accepts the sharing of his desires and fears to his friends so that he may "never walk alone." Indeed, "Spring Day" debuted on the album *You Never Walk Alone* in 2017, which further emphasizes the theme of experiencing emotional vulnerability with companions rather than facing those hardships alone. In this way, BTS deconstructs traditionally Western gender roles assigned to men, namely the outward expression of emotion and affection towards other men. By

utilizing K-pop as a medium for this deconstruction, BTS broadcasts this message to their international audience and subsequently presents an alternative to hegemonic masculinity within and outside of Korean culture.

As I have outlined in this paper, a typological parallel can be made between the historical *hwarangdo* and modern-day K-pop idols to discuss the similarities in these Korean masculinities. By comparing lyrics from *hwarang*-related *hyangga* and an excerpt from BTS' "Spring Day," I address the ambiguous song lyrics as conveying platonic desire between two friends as an alternative to a queer narrative. This soft version of masculinity challenges hegemonic Korean masculinity, which has been defined by a national history of military culture and Confucian family values, while also tapping into the predominant South Korean values of hard work and dedication. Moreover, within a South Korean context, the androgynous appearance and performance of a K-pop idol are not interpreted as "queer" due to South Korea's compulsory heterosexual and homosocial society. Additionally, the *mugukjeok* representation of masculinity in South Korean popular culture shows how K-pop idols are transcultural products that appeal to a global audience. Finally, BTS harnesses this *mugukjeok* characteristic to convey an important message about male companionship. Thus, I believe this is one of the many ways K-pop can deconstruct hegemonic masculinity across cultures and function as a safety net for queer subjects who fear discrimination. I hope that, by the end of this paper, the readers realize that no matter what gender, nationality, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or language you claim as part of your identity, *You Never Walk Alone* when facing the arduous struggles of life.

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Emissions Trading in India: A Policy for Combatting Toxic Air and Global Warming

Colton Zadkovic

The Indian state currently finds itself in a unique position in the fight against air pollution. It needs to improve the quality of toxic air that plagues many of its cities in order to improve the health of its citizens now, and it must also recognize its hugely important role in the fight against greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that contribute to global warming. With a rapidly growing population that is not showing signs of slowing down, the outlook on the fight against toxic air and global warming in India looks bleak, and action must be taken now. Emissions trading is a policy that can begin to combat both of these issues. Through a particulate matter (PM) emissions trading scheme (ETS), which builds off of the one currently being tested in the state of Gujarat, India could take a huge step towards improving air quality throughout the country. Then, using knowledge gained from Gujarat, as well as from other ETS used in India and in other parts of the world, the Indian government should establish a cap-and-trade greenhouse gas ETS that would increase Indian efforts to fight global warming.

This paper serves as an informative piece on the state of air pollution in India as well as the efficacy of ETS initiatives. It provides two policy recommendations to the Indian government over five sections. The first section of this paper will provide background information on the PM pollution that causes the toxic air found in many urban areas in India. The second section will define an ETS and provide examples of such schemes of the past. The third and fourth sections will include policy recommendations regarding PM and GHG emissions in India, respectively. And the fifth section will outline reasons why India should be interested in adopting a more intensive ETS, before finishing with potential objections to the recommended policies and concluding thoughts.

Particulate Matter (PM) Pollution in India

As one of the main culprits behind the smog and toxic air that is frequently associated with many urban centers, PM pollution poses a significant threat to the health of those who are subjected to it. This type of pollution is categorized as containing particles between 2.5 and 10 micrometers in diameter; for scale, a strand of hair is roughly 70 micrometers in diameter.[1] These particles are accompanied by liquid droplets that contain certain toxins. When they are inhaled into the respiratory tract, health issues can ensue. According to an analysis by Anderson et al. published in the *Journal of Medical Toxicology*, PM pollution has a significant effect on the health of humans across the world, most notably in the form of cardiovascular disease-related hospitalizations and deaths.[2]

PM air pollution concentration levels are at unhealthy to very unhealthy levels in large portions of India.[3] Across the country, over one million deaths per year can be attributed to PM pollution, with the largest percentage of the deaths being a result of ischemic heart disease and stroke.[4] This is a huge percentage of the deaths worldwide that are attributed to PM pollution, and as the welfare of Indian citizens

[1] Jonathan O. Anderson, Josef G. Thundiyil, and Andrew Stolbach, "Clearing the Air: A Review of the Effects of Particulate Matter Air Pollution on Human Health," *Journal of Medical Toxicology* 8 (2012), 166.
[2] Ibid, 173.

[3] Berkeley Earth, "Map of Particulate Matter Air Pollution in India" (Feb 20, 2021).
[4] World Health Organization, "Global Ambient Air Quality Database 2018 Update," (2018).

continues to suffer, India's economy will continue to take a hit as well. As shown by a 2016 report from the World Bank and the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, the Indian economy lost roughly 8.5% of its GDP (or about $560 billion) because of air pollution related health issues and deaths in 2013.[5] These losses were seen in the form of forgone labor output and "welfare losses," which represent a monetary valuation of the negative effects on individuals' welfare as a result of air pollution. In 2013, this level of GDP losses connected to air pollution was second only to India's neighbor, China.

What is interesting, and perhaps somewhat unique, about India's PM pollution situation is that it varies drastically based on the season and on the location of the urban area. As explained by two Indian civil engineers at the Vellore Institute of Technology, the period of peak PM concentration in the air varies for different cities in India.[6] The monsoon season seems to be the deciding factor in determining when cities will suffer the most from toxic air quality caused by PM pollution, as cities can expect the periods leading up to and during monsoon season to have the lowest levels of PM concentration in the air. This is because the pre-monsoon season is typically characterized as being very sunny and more humid, which allows for the aerial PM to be less concentrated. Then, during the monsoon season, frequent rainfall does a good job of washing a great deal of PM out of the atmosphere. The problem for cities comes during the post-monsoon season when the PM concentration is very dense due to low humidity and decreased rainfall. This monsoon season can come at different times for different cities, and for some it will not come at all during certain years. So, it must be taken into account that no two cities in India have the same PM pollution situation, and thus the fight against this type of pollution may vary significantly across different areas of the country.

Emissions Trading Schemes Defined

Before describing the ins and outs of an ETS made for PM pollution in India, an in-depth analysis of emissions trading as a whole should be provided. In *Emissions Trading for Climate Policy: US and European Perspectives*, Bernd Hansjürgens (an economist at the Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research) and his team of political scientists, lawyers, and environmental experts provide an excellent examination of emissions trading. Their work will be here be used to define the various aspects of emissions trading. In the introduction of the book, Hansjürgens states that "the idea behind emissions trading is to assign permits governing the limited use of the environment, with the sources subject to the trading scheme being required to surrender [a permit] for every unit of a pollutant they emit."[7] At this point, the market is expected to kick in. Industrial firms that did not use all of their permits during the set period of time can sell them to other firms that were unable to sufficiently reduce emissions and had already used all of their permits.[8] So, while it may appear undesirable that some firms are able to continue to emit to a degree that is detrimental to the established environmental goal, their emissions are offset by the decreased emissions of other firms that have cut emissions to a higher degree than they previously would have, due to their ability to profit from selling emissions permits. This

[5] World Bank and Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, "The Cost of Air Pollution: Strengthening the Economic Case for Action," (2016).

[6] N. Manojkumar and B. Srimuruganandam, "Health Effects of Particulate Matter in Major Indian Cities." *International Journal of Environmental Health Research* (2019), 1–13.

[7] Bernd Hansjurgens et al., *Emissions Trading for Climate Policy: US and European Perspectives* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 2.

[8] Esther Duflo, et al, "Towards an Emissions Trading Scheme for Air Pollutants in India," (Cambridge: Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, 2010).

ensures that the pollution-reduction goals are met.

Applying a market-based approach to climate policy works, but that does not mean it is easy to do. The market must be set up properly or else it will be inevitably doomed to fail. A. Danny Ellerman, a climate policy expert at MIT, outlines the need for an easy to use, well-functioning permit market in any successful emissions trading scheme.[9] Ellerman believes that the right to trade must be clearly defined, and that every individual trade should not be subject to review. Essentially, he is stating that the permit market needs to be as easy to use as possible in order for firms to utilize it and reduce their costs of complying with the emissions cap to the fullest extent.

Additionally, the correct permit allocation method must be used, and the right number of permits must be allotted in order for the scheme to gather sufficient support and ultimately be a success. Firstly, permits can either be given to firms at the start of the scheme for free, or they can be auctioned off. Allocating them for free based on firms' historical emissions rates will garner much more political support for the scheme, while also having lower compliance costs compared to an auctioning allocation method.[10] Moreover, the right number of permits must be allocated, because if there are too many permits, emissions will not be adequately reduced. Likewise, if there are not enough permits, it will be costly for firms to comply with the emissions cap. For example, in an analysis of ETS initiatives from this year, published by the International Energy Agency (IEA), the EU Emissions Trading Scheme was deemed to have "not been the primary driver of emissions reductions in the sectors that it covers, due to the over-allocation of [permits].[11] So, while emissions were reduced in Europe following the implementation of the EU's ETS, the scheme was too lenient on firms and did not force them to reduce emissions as much as they could have.

Also included in its analysis, the IEA provides an important distinction between the two main types of ETS: mass-based and intensity-based. Mass-based schemes put an absolute cap on the emissions of a pollutant, whereas intensity-based schemes give firms a relative emissions reduction target that corresponds to their level of output.[12] What this means is that mass-based ETS do not allow for the emissions to grow at all in the future — in fact, they typically become more intensive as time goes on — but mass-based ETS do allow for emissions to grow if the output levels of firms are growing as well. For this reason, intensity-based schemes are generally favored by developing countries that have rapidly growing industrial sectors. However, mass-based schemes of the past, such as the United States' sulfur dioxide ETS, provide ample evidence to show that putting an absolute cap on emissions, and doing more to solve environmental issues in the short-term, does not necessarily have to be overly harmful economically.

The sulfur dioxide (SO_2) ETS was deployed in 1995 in the US in an attempt to reduce acid rain—a phenomenon primarily caused by SO_2 emissions.[13] This was broken into two phases: Phase One of the scheme involved subjecting the 263 energy-generating combustion devices that emitted the most SO_2 to a fixed emissions cap. Phase Two, which began in 2000, involved subjecting "virtually all existing and new fossil-fueled electric generating units in the continental United States" to the same cap.[14] In their pre-Phase Two evaluation of Title IV, Schmalensee et al. concluded that the ETS had overperformed in

[9] Hansjurgens et al, *Emissions Trading*, 81.
[10] Ibid, 90.
[11] IEA, "Defining the Role – Implementing Effective Emissions Trading Systems – Analysis," (2020).
[12] Ibid.

[13] See Title IV of the *Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990*.
[14] Richard Schmalensee et al., "An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 12 (1998), 54.

reducing SO_2 emissions, all without "extensive litigation, and at costs lower than had been projected [between $225-$375 million per year saved by firms compared to the costs of a scheme with the same allocation of allowances but no ability to trade]."[15]

The work of Richard Schmalensee and his collaborators illustrates how much Title IV reduced SO_2 emissions during Phase One compared to what SO_2 emissions were forecast to be by the EPA if Title IV had never been put in place.[16] Firms were eager to cut SO_2 emissions as much as possible during Phase One so that they could avoid having to pay higher prices for emissions permits during Phase Two when emissions limits became much lower. As a result, SO_2 emissions were reduced to a level far below the limits set in 1995 and 1996. A similar outcome would certainly be plausible for an ETS that targets particulate matter.

Emissions Trading for Reducing PM Pollution in India

As already established, India has a problem with PM pollution, but it is a problem that could be tackled in part via emissions trading. A novel ETS for PM pollution is already being tested in the state of Gujarat. In conjunction with the Energy Policy Institute of University of Chicago (EPIC-India), the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL South Asia) and Evidence for Policy Design at Harvard University (EPoD-India), the Gujarat Pollution Control Board (GPCB) is doing a trial run of a PM ETS in the industrial hub of Surat.[17] All initial indications point to the trial being a success and as soon as the trial period is over, this ETS should be imposed upon other industrial hubs throughout India to improve India's air quality and the health of its citizens.

The Surat trial run will not only improve the air quality in and around the city; it will also provide valuable resources and lessons that can be applied for a PM ETS which could be practiced across India. Firstly, Surat was chosen as the trial location due to the fact that most of the industrial firms in the city fall under the 17 highest polluting categories (including pulp & paper, fertiliser, and chlor alkali), as outlined by India's Central Pollution Control Board.[18] Additional locations for PM ETS initiatives beyond Surat should be chosen based on the industrial hubs that have the highest concentration of firms that fall within these 17 categories.

Next, the trial in Surat has provided some valuable insights regarding emissions monitoring. Firms involved in the trial have been required to install Continuous Emissions Monitoring Systems (CEMS) that have "all the equipment necessary to determine the concentration of gaseous emission and/or particulate matter and/or emission rate using analytical measurements and a computer program to provide results in units of the applicable emission limits or standards."[19] These CEMS reduce the need for frequent in-person monitoring and curtain the abilities of firms to fabricate their emissions data. Still, the CEMS need to be calibrated every so often so that they are reporting accurate data. This requires the third-party, in-person monitoring that had been funded and manipulated by the industrial firms themselves in the past. The GPCB has a solution for this issue as well. To eliminate the ability of firms to fund the emissions auditors themselves, the GPCB, in conjunction with EPIC India and

[15] Ibid, 66.

[16] See graph of "SO_2 emissions, caps, and forecasts for Phase I Units", in Schmalensee et al., "An Interim Evaluation", 57.

[17] Bhasker Tripathi, "Surat's Emission Trading Project Can Be A Powerful Tool to Reduce Air Pollution," *IndiaSpend* (2019).

[18] ENVIS Centre, "Parivesh," *New Delhi, India: Central Pollution Control Board* (2012).

[19] Aditya Sharma et al., "Guidelines for Continuous Emission Monitoring Systems," *New Delhi, India: Central Pollution Control Board* (2018).

EPoD, has tested a strategy where third-party auditors are instead paid from a central pool of funds and are then penalized if their emissions audits are proven to be inaccurate.[20] The evidence from the tests of this strategy have shown that instances of inaccurate emissions reports have dropped significantly, which of course bodes well for the prospective success of this trial ETS.

To make a PM ETS work across India, cities that choose to adopt the scheme to improve their air quality will need to look at what played out in Surat for guidance. This means that they should incorporate CEMS in addition to third-party emissions auditors that are not funded by industrial firms. It would also mean learning how many permits should be allocated in order to sufficiently reduce PM pollution, while also taking lessons learned from the permit trading market in Surat and applying them to their own scheme's market. According to a policy analysis from researchers at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research at MIT, an integral part of any ETS trial run must be active surveying of industrial firm participants to determine their compliance costs.[21] These surveys would show if the permit market component of the ETS did its job and lowered compliance costs as much as possible. If firms reported that their compliances costs were too high, either more permits should be allocated for future, related ETS, or a better job must be done in facilitating the use of the permit market. Conversely, if firms report that their compliance costs were lower than expected, conclusions could be made that the right number of permits were allocated and that the permit trading market was set up in an effective fashion. As previously stated, all signs point to the test trial in Gujarat being a success, but that does not mean it will be perfect. Indian cities and states that choose to adopt a PM ETS in the future must look at what worked and what did not work in Surat, and then establish their own schemes accordingly.

Emissions Trading for Reducing GHG Emissions in India

In the words of Ajay Mathur, a former climate negotiator and member of President Narendra Modi's council on climate change, the challenge for India is to continue growing its economy "without putting out enough carbon to break the world."[22] As India's already massive population and economy continues to grow without an end in sight, the world will become increasingly reliant on the South Asian giant to halt its increasing GHG emissions in order to prevent catastrophic levels of global warming. To be fair to the Indian government, they have made great strides in their efforts to reduce their nation's carbon footprint, but as is the case with almost every other country in the world, India must do more.

Included in its efforts to reduce its country's carbon footprint, the Indian government has developed the Perform, Achieve, and Trade scheme, or PAT. PAT is an intensity based ETS that gives participating firms energy efficiency targets and then rewards firms that met the targets by allowing them to sell certificates of energy savings to firms that did not.[23] This scheme is of course a step in the right direction for India, but it still allows for absolute GHG emissions to grow. This is because the energy efficiency targets are related to the level of output for each firm. So, as the levels of output of the firms continue to grow along with

[20] Michael Greenstone et al., "The Solvable Challenge of Air Pollution in India," *Harvard Kennedy School* (2017), 9.

[21] Duflo et al., "Towards an Emissions Trading Scheme," 7.

[22] Quoted in Joanna Slater, "Can India Chart a Low-Carbon Future? The World Might Depend on It," *Washington Post* (June 12, 2020), para 9.

[23] Divita Bhandari and Shrimali Gireesh, "The Perform, Achieve and Trade Scheme in India: An Effectiveness Analysis," *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews* 81 (2018), 1287.

the growing Indian economy, the efficiency targets will allow for more and more emissions. Ultimately, PAT does reduce the Indian carbon footprint compared to if there were no ETS put in place at all, but critically, it does not put a cap on emissions. In the end, the environment continues to suffer in the name of economic growth.

In their analysis of PAT, Stanford researchers Divita Bhandari and Gireesh Shrimali claim that the intensity-based scheme also failed to create a successful trading market because the targets were too easy to achieve. This means that there were far too many certificates of energy savings awarded, and so firms had no reason to trade.[24] Furthermore, it is believed that high energy costs in India were the cause of energy reductions among firms and not PAT.[25] In essence, PAT is not good enough in terms of reducing GHG emissions, and it is not sufficient in terms of its capabilities to operate as an effective ETS overall. What India needs (and what the world needs from India) is an effective, mass-based GHG ETS that puts a cap on emissions and does more to stop global warming. To do this would require the "Indian government to change its climate priorities away from increasing energy production and move towards limiting greenhouse gases."[26] Convincing the Indian government to change its mindset in this manner would of course be no small task, but President Modi and his administration could and should be persuaded to do so.

Reasons for persuasion can be found in the next section, but should the Indian government be convinced to change its priorities from increasing energy production outright to limiting GHG emissions, a GHG ETS with the following characteristics should be established:

1. The correct number of permits must be allocated from the start. This will ensure that overall emissions are reduced to a point that is compliant with the Paris Climate Agreement's goal of keeping global warming to 1.5℃, as compared to pre-industrial times. Permits should also be allocated for free to firms in relation to their individual, past GHG emissions data in order to gather political support for the scheme.
2. The permit trading market must be as easy to use as possible. This would mean educating firms on the trading market while also supporting them and ironing out any troubles that should arise during the trading process.
3. Different Indian states must be allowed to set up the scheme in various ways (e.g. letting states determine which of the highest polluting industrial sectors they would like to include in the scheme).
4. The fact that the scheme encourages flexibility and innovation in the emissions reduction tactics of firms should be emphasized in promoting it, resulting in less resistance. With successful adoption of the scheme, India could potentially become a leader in green manufacturing and green intellectual property, should Indian industrial firms discover new and effective ways of reducing emissions.

Persuading the Indian State to Adopt a Mass-Based ETS

Tactics for persuasion can be found in the book, *India's Climate Change Identity:*

[24] Ibid, 1291.
[25] Ibid, 1292.
[26] Manasvini Vaidyula et al., *India: An Emissions Trading Case Study* (Boston, Paris, Brussels: Environmental Defense Fund, CDC Climate Research, International Emission Trading Association, 2015), 8.

Between Reality and Perception, written by historian Aled Jones and Samir Saran, the president of the prominent Asian think-tank, Observer Research Foundation. In the book, India's "climate change identity" is defined and reasons are given for the Indian government to do more to fight climate change. The authors use India's key developmental identities, such as its industrial identity and its emerging nation identity, to generate a holistic portrayal of its climate change identity.

Jones and Saran reported that from their 30 interviews of government officials, NGO professionals, media personnel, academics, and private sector professionals, 30% of interviewees believed that energy security must factor into India's industrial planning and 43% of interviewees believed that India should focus on building a green manufacturing sector and green economy.[27] This represents India's industrial identity and demonstrates that there is a growing belief among Indian professionals that their country must shift towards green, renewable energy. It should be said that the 30% who believe energy security is most important predominantly believe that India should be more reliant on their massive supply of coal for energy as well as renewables. However, if these respondents truly place such a high importance on energy security, they will recognize that a shift to renewable energy should come sooner rather than later. A GHG ETS can help facilitate this shift by promoting the market for renewable energy sources to grow, all while gradually reducing the huge share of India's energy supply that comes from coal, which currently plagues India's climate report card the most. Data illustrated by The Climate Action Tracker, an independent scientific analysis produced by two research organizations tracking climate action since 2009, clearly exhibits this massive pitfall in India's climate policy by showing how, based on recent policy projections, India's coal usage is nowhere near a level that is compatible with the pathway required for keeping global warming to 2°C as compared to pre-industrial times (not to mention the 1.5°C limit set by the Paris Climate Agreement).[28]

Jones and Saran also argue that India's emerging nation identity is beginning to replace the developing nation identity that the country has maintained for so long.[29] In relation to climate change, the developing nation identity represents the argument that developing nations should be allowed to emit higher amounts of GHGs in order to develop their economies. It is a fair argument, but in adamantly supporting such logic, states stick to their developing nation identity and are kept somewhat on the periphery of the international stage as a result. India has the opportunity to escape this periphery. By taking greater strides to cut GHG emissions, India can position itself as the clear leader in the emerging world, in turn giving itself a bigger seat at the table for international negotiations. The Modi administration has already shown that this is indeed a goal they would like to achieve.

Ever since he took office in 2014, Prime Minister Modi has envisioned India's future as a state that shapes transnational agendas and norms instead of one that simply abides by them. Modi places a very high value on his administration's ability to develop an effective foreign policy that would allow India the opportunity to become a leading power in the international system. This importance placed on foreign policy is shown by his appointment of Subrahmanyam Jaishankar — one of the most respected Indian foreign service officers — as the minister of external affairs.[30] What is more, Jaishankar is not even a member of Modi's

[27] Aled Jones and Samir Saran, *India's Climate Change Identity: Between Reality and Perception* (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 77.
[28] Climate Action Tracker, "India's Share of coal in Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES)" (2016).
[29] Jones and Saran, *India's Climate Change Identity*, 127.
[30] Ian Hall, "Narendra Modi and India's Normative Power," *International Affairs* 93, no. 1 (2017), 2.

Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), illustrating Modi's commitment to getting the best people on the job to ensure his foreign policy objectives are met. Assembling the best minds regardless of party affiliation to work on foreign policy goals is a great start, but in order to really begin to carry weight on the international stage and dictate international norms and agreements, India must increase the amount of soft power that it holds. Expanding upon its climate change identity in a positive way would be an excellent way to do just that.

In the words of Joseph Nye, soft power is "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies."[31] Soft power can come from a country having elite institutions for higher education, or perhaps from a country's promotion of religious freedom that would make it a more favorable destination for immigrants. Essentially, anything a country does without the use of force or currency to put itself in a better standing internationally can count as acquiring soft power. Having an expansive and effective climate policy that combats the impending climate crisis is emerging as one of the most effective ways for a country to gain soft power. Modi likely recognizes this, as shown most clearly by his commitment to the International Solar Alliance.

The ISA, which has the aim of promoting solar electricity in particularly sunny states that mostly fall between the tropic of Cancer and the tropic of Capricorn, was launched by India and France in 2015 at the Paris climate conference, and it is the first international organization to be headquartered in India.[32] According to Sarang Shidore and Joshua W. Busby, two researchers from the University of Texas-Austin, the ISA will not only be used to grow the solar capacities of countries in the developing world, but it could also be used by India to gain recognition for its solar leadership, increasing its international status and eventually leading to greater global influence through its soft power.[33] This is precisely the model Modi and his administration could aim to follow in relation to a mass-based ETS. By creating a more intensive ETS that reduces India's carbon footprint even further, Modi can make India a climate action model for the developing world — and perhaps even the developed world — to follow. The end result would be an abundance of soft power for Modi to spend towards his ambitions of making India a leading power internationally.

Potential Objections

The main potential objection to any policy that would aim to further reduce GHG emissions in India is that the country should not be forced to sacrifice economic growth in the name of climate action. Simply put, fully developed nations have had their time to pollute, now it is India's turn. On paper, it is a fair objection, but what must be understood is that climate action and economic decline do not need to be synonymous. Jones and Saran argue that an additional identity — India's entrepreneurial identity — will have a key role to play in fighting global warming.[34] The two researchers report that 80% of the Indian professionals they interviewed believe that India is positioning itself to be a large consumer and producer of green energy and clean technologies. As the world progressively shifts from non-renewable to renewable energy, the market for green manufacturing is sure to explode, and the Indian government should look to capitalize. Plus, if future economic growth is truly the main focus, would it not be foolish to tie that growth to non-renewable energy sources? The Indian government needs to place a high value on their energy security for the

[31] Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (*New York City: Public Affairs, 2004), 3.
[32] Sarang Shidore and Joshua W. Busby, "One More Try: The International Solar Alliance and India's Search for Geopolitical Influence," *Energy Strategy Reviews* 26, (2019), 1.
[33] Ibid, 2.
[34] Ibid, 78.

long-term instead of merely in the short-term. This will mean relying less on coal reserves and focusing more on developing a green economy that can include a larger portion of India's growing population, while also better promoting that same population's health and quality of life.

In terms of objections to a nationwide PM ETS in India, those well-informed on the country's air quality situation will point out that in many heavily polluted urban areas, industrial pollution is not the main contributor to the toxic air dilemma. For example, in New Delhi, which is often seen as the poster child for toxic air in India, the two main culprits of PM pollution are the transportation sector and crop burning in neighboring Punjab.[35] Some may argue that the sectors that emit more PM pollution should be the focus, before turning the attention to the industrial sector. But that argument does not consider how large in scope the fight against air pollution truly is. Yes, there should be efforts made to reform the agricultural and transportation sectors throughout the country to reduce pollution, but claiming that industrial reform should be pushed aside simply because industrial emission levels are lower than the emissions levels of other sectors in certain areas of the country is irresponsible. If the Indian government wants to improve the health of its citizens and reduce economic losses caused by pollution-related health issues, then it must tackle the air pollution problem from all angles.

Conclusion

Although it has proven to be very effective in the past, emissions trading is not a policy that can be universally applied everywhere as a tool to combat air pollution and global warming. It is a policy that has become overly politicized in some countries, and in certain contexts it simply does not work. However, there is little reason to believe that it would be a failure in India. Most importantly, emissions trading has not been overly politicized in India like it has come to be in the United States. Indeed, Gujarat, Narendra Modi's home state and stronghold for his BJP, is the location for the trial PM ETS. Common logic would suggest that this bodes well for ETS initiatives receiving support nationwide. Furthermore, despite his shortcomings, Modi is far from a climate denier. He has instead recognized the threat that global warming poses as shown by his commitment to the Paris Climate Agreement. As president of a country especially at risk to global warming due to its expansive coastline and large agricultural sector, Modi would be wise to do more to take action.

The implementation of a far-reaching GHG ETS would represent a further recognition of the threat of global warming, and there is reason to believe that establishing such an ETS would be easier to do in India compared to other countries. Since India has experience with PAT, in addition to the relatively new PM ETS in Gujarat, Indian industrial firms will already be relatively well-informed on how to cut emissions and use energy responsibly. All that would be left to do is to take the next step and adopt a mass-based ETS that puts a cap on emissions. Unlike industrial firms in other countries, many Indian industrial firms already have a good understanding of ETS initiatives. So, by creating a GHG ETS to combat global warming, the Indian government would not be starting from square one.

To summarize, India not only has the urgent need for action in the fight against toxic air pollution, but it also has the ability to increase its efforts in the fight against GHG emissions and global warming. By adopting an ETS to aid in both fights, the Indian government could not only do much to reduce PM pollution and improve the health of its citizens, but it could also do more to ensure a prosperous future through sustainable growth, all while

[35] Aman Srivasta and Priyanka Mohanty, "Delhi's Deadly Smog: Policy Paralysis Around a Preventable Problem," *World Resources Institute* (2019).

placing itself at the head of the table among fellow emerging nations. India could become a climate-action model for the world to follow, and in doing so, our battle against global warming could become all the more winnable.

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Investing in Equitable Development in Post-Conflict Sri Lanka

Thomas Raney

In the 11 years since the end of the civil war, the Tamil ethnic minority in the South Asian island nation of Sri Lanka have faced economic and political difficulties. This paper will propose a development program aimed at creating and building new export industries in Sri Lanka's predominantly Tamil Northern and Eastern provinces. Implemented through the Asian Development Bank (ADB), this program will draw on financial and technical resources from developed member-countries with large Tamil diasporas (overseas Sri Lankans, OSL), namely the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and others. This program will respond to the economic needs of the Tamil population as well as the macroeconomic needs of Sri Lanka as a whole. In doing so, it will aim to help put Sri Lanka on a path towards prosperity and away from its violent past.

This policy paper is a recommendation to the ADB and its member countries with the principal goal of improving conditions for Tamils in Sri Lanka through targeted economic investment in new industries. This paper is divided into six sections: the first will provide context on Sri Lanka and the Tamil ethnic minority and OSL, as well as identify and establish the urgency of the issues involved. The second and third will cover the benefits and issues associated with this investment program; the fourth will detail the program and its implementation; the fifth will present potential objections to the program; and the sixth will conclude with a brief summary.

Context

The Tamil People

The Tamil people are an ethnic group who predominantly preside in the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu and the neighboring island nation of Sri Lanka. The main identifying factor for Tamils is the usage of the Tamil language. There are roughly three million Tamils living in Sri Lanka who constitute the majority in Sri Lanka's northern and eastern states,[1] making them the second largest ethnic group after the Sinhalese ethnic group, who make up the majority in the rest of the country.[2] Sri Lankan Tamils are not a homogenous group, there are multiple intra-ethnic divides, including caste, religion, country of origin, and geographic distribution.[3]

The Sri Lankan Civil War

In 1983, a violent conflict broke out in Sri Lanka between the Sinhalese-dominated government and the Tamil Tigers, a Tamil militant insurgency group.[4] The Tamil Tigers, officially the Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), aimed to establish an independent Tamil state in the north and east of the country. Twenty-six years of brutal fighting gave way to peace in 2009, when the Sri Lankan army defeated the LTTE and they officially surrendered.

The Situation Today

The situation in Sri Lanka has improved markedly since the end of the civil conflict; however, there are several areas in which those improvements have not or have only partially reached the Tamil people. Sri Lankan Tamils face

[1] Michael Ray, "Tamil People," *Encyclopedia Britannica* (2017).

[2] Kalyani Thurairajah, "'Who are we without the war?': The evolution of the Tamil ethnic identity in a post-conflict Sri Lanka" Ethnicities 20 (2019), 567.

[3] Ibid, 568.

[4] Nithyani Anandakugan, "The Sri Lankan Civil War and Its History, Revisited in 2020," *Harvard International Review* (August 13, 2020).

political as well as economic inequities that are worth investigating.

While Tamils have been integrated back into the national political system in Colombo, the Sinhalese-dominated government has routinely discriminated against the Tamil people. Today, Tamil regions of Sri Lanka remain heavily militarized with a large presence of government soldiers, and freedom of expression and assembly are reportedly limited.[5] Government policies such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) have been used to target Tamils, and the government-led process of "Sinhalization" has imposed Sinhalese Buddhist culture while repressing Tamil culture, which is predominantly Hindu.[6] In addition, the recent election of president Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his moves to amend the constitution to expand his power have renewed worries for Tamil rights in Sri Lanka.[7] In the political and human rights realm, the Tamil people have faced challenges since the end of the civil war, and, at the time of writing, the situation seems to be getting worse.

On the economic front, Sri Lankan Tamils have faced difficulties as well. The decades-long civil conflict combined with mass emigration from Tamil areas has repressed economic development.[8] In the Tamil stronghold city of Jaffna, on the northern peninsula of the island, there has long been widespread youth unemployment, which has not improved since the end of the conflict.[9] Household income rates in Tamil-dominated districts tend to fall well below the national average of Rs 33,894, with the northern Tamil districts of Jaffna, Kilinochchi, and Trincomalee faring slightly worse than eastern Tamil districts.[10] Formal employment is hard to come by in Sri Lanka; Tamils work in the informal sector at higher rates than Sinhalese, while those Tamils who do find work in the formal sector earn less than their Sinhalese counterparts.[11] The political and economic inequalities between the Tamil ethnic minority and the Sinhalese majority have remained since the end of the war and in many areas are becoming further exacerbated.

The Sri Lankan Economy

Sri Lanka is a lower-middle-income country with export industries traditionally focused on tea, garments, and rubber.[12] Its economy has grown 5.3 percent on average in the ten years after the conclusion of the civil war.[13] In the first quarter of 2020, the Sri Lankan economy contracted for the first time in 19 years as a result of faltering return from some of its main industries, as well as the COVID-19 pandemic.[14] The newly contracting economy presents problems for the country's leadership. Sri Lanka now has a sizable current account deficit, meaning it is importing more than it is exporting, in turn creating national debt. The issue of the rising current account deficit is caused by Sri Lanka's need for more export industries to help offset its rising imports.[15] In addition to the macroeconomic need for export diversification, the country's current export sectors tend to be low wage, and thus do not lead to the kinds of domestic economic

[5] "Sri Lanka Tamils," *Minority Rights Group International* (2018).
[6] Elizabeth Fraser, "Justice Denied: A Reality Check on Resettlement, Demilitarization, and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka," *The Oakland Institute* (2017), 4, 17.
[7] Maria Ali-Habib, "Sri Lanka Election Hands Rajapaksa Family a bigger slice of control," *The New York Times* (August 6, 2020).
[8] Gilbert Bowden & Tony Binns. "Youth employment and post-war development in Jaffna, northern Sri Lanka," *Conflict, Security & Development* 16, no 3 (2016), 207.
[9] Ibid, 204.
[10] Sri Lanka Dept. of Census and Statistics, "Household Income and Expenditure Survey - 2016 Final Results," (2017).
[11] Ramani Gunatilaka "Informal Employment in Sri Lanka: Nature, Probability of Employment, and Determinants of Wages," *International Labour Organization* (2008), 13.
[12] Jack Sennett, "Engaging Overseas Sri Lankans to Facilitate Export Diversification," *Harvard Kennedy School* (2018), 1.
[13] "Sri Lanka Overview," *The World Bank* (2020).
[14] Ibid.
[15] Sennett, "Overseas Sri Lankans," 1.

development needed to improve the lives and livelihoods of Sri Lankans.

The Urgency

I have outlined multiple points relating to the current state of Sri Lanka and the importance of taking action now. The Tamil ethnic minority are facing a growing political problem from the Sinhalese government, while also confronting unfavorable economic conditions in relation to much of the rest of their country. A continuation of these trends could see the country being put on a path similar to the one that led up to the civil war. In addition, the Sri Lankan economy as a whole is facing a rising national debt due to its lack of a diverse export market and rising imports, which in this paper I refer to as Sri Lanka's macroeconomic challenges. The difficulties of the Tamil people and Sri Lanka's macroeconomic challenges are the two issues this paper's policy recommendation aims to mitigate.

The Benefits of an ADB Investment Program in Sri Lanka

This paper proposes a policy of targeted investment in the majority Tamil North and East Provinces by the Asian Development Bank, with a focus on new export-oriented industries. Section five will go into further depth about which specific industries are to be involved and how the policy will be carried out. There are three main benefits to this policy proposal: an improvement in the economic conditions for the Tamil-dominated provinces of Sri Lanka, a reduction in the likelihood of a return to ethnic sectarianism, and a boost to Sri Lanka's overall economic stability.

Tamil North and East Province Economic Improvements

As established in the first section of this paper, the majority-Tamil North and East provinces of Sri Lanka are poorer than the Sinhalese-dominated regions of the country and have higher rates of youth unemployment and informal work.[16] The benefits of new industries, specifically in Tamil regions of Sri Lanka, would directly address those issues. The existing export industries in Sri Lanka (tea, rubber, and garments)[17] lend themselves to low wages and in some cases are informal and unstable.[18] In the Northern and Eastern provinces, where agricultural products are the largest exports, a diversification in the export sector can vastly increase the number of formal employment opportunities with higher wages.[19]

Preventing a Return to Ethnic Sectarianism

The economic and political difficulties faced by the Tamil people are risk factors in a potential return to ethnic sectarianism in Sri Lanka and even violence. The origins of the Sri Lankan civil war date back to British colonial rule and possibly even earlier,[20] but the immediate causes of the conflict in the years leading up to 1985 were largely political and economic.

Examining some of those factors which contributed to the Sri Lankan civil war are helpful for this research. In the time between the end of British rule in 1948 and the civil war, the Sinhalese government enacted policies such as *standardization*, which favored Sinhalese youth when it came to educational opportunities, and the Sinhala Only Act, which made Sinhala (the language spoken by the Sinhalese people) the only official language of Sri Lanka.[21] The combined effect of these policies and others would lead to less favorable opportunities for Tamil youth and bred

[16] Gunatilaka, "Informal Employment," 13.
[17] Sennett, "Overseas Sri Lankans," 1.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid, 4.
[20] Anandakugan, "Sri Lankan Civil War."
[21] S.I Keethaponcalan, "Social Cubism: A Comprehensive Look at the Causes of Conflict in Sri Lanka," *ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law* 8 (2002), 933.

resentment amongst the Tamil people.[22] Economic factors also contributed greatly to the onset of conflict.[23] The above mentioned policies from the Sinhalese government caused educational inequities which contributed to a lack of economic opportunities, as Keethaponcalan explains:

> The resulting lack of economic opportunities not only frustrated the Tamil community, particularly the youth, but also forced them to think about alternatives that would ensure their power and development. At that point of time a separate state seemed a viable alternative.[24]

As we know, this economic disenfranchisement would contribute to the rise of the LTTE and eventually the civil war. The presence of an investment program that specifically invests in building industry in Tamil areas would increase the amount of employment opportunities and thus reduce economic hardship and disenfranchisement. The aim of this policy would be to remove the economic frustrations in present day Sri Lanka that also existed in the years leading up to 1983.

Macroeconomic Benefits to the Whole of Sri Lanka

While the main aim is to help the Tamil people of Sri Lanka, a major strength of this policy recommendation is that it is also a response to Sri Lanka's existing macroeconomic needs. Sri Lanka's recent economic contraction is in part a result of its lack of a diversified export portfolio.[25] The situation has dramatically worsened since the beginning of 2020, when the current account balance went from a USD 450 million surplus to a 221 million deficit.[26] Investment through the ADB in new export industries would allow Sri Lanka to improve its economy and the welfare of its citizens. Given the recent downturn in Sri Lanka's economy, it is especially important that this program is initiated in the near future. The current major exports of rubber, tea, and garments, which can be classified as commodities and low durability goods, would need to give way to more durable, complex goods such as electronics, medical products, and industrial machinery, to name a few.[27]

Aligning Peace with the Economy

A final benefit of this proposed policy lies in the connection between over-reliance on primary commodities and civil conflict. Research has suggested that countries over-reliant on primary commodities for export are at a heightened risk for civil conflict.[28] Countries that have 26% of their GDP reliant on the export of primary commodities have been found to be at a 13% greater risk of civil conflict.[29] In the case of Sri Lanka, it is difficult to discern the exact percentage of GDP that is dependent on primary commodity exports, but commodities such as rubber, tea, coffee beans, and spices make up at least 20% of the country's exports, putting it close to that 26% danger zone.[30] A major supporting factor that works in tandem with high dependence on commodity exports is geographic separation, which is a characteristic of Sri Lankan Tamils. This investment program, while not affecting geographic distribution, would help the country to reduce its dependence on primary exports, thus helping to reduce one of the major factors in causing civil conflict.

[22] Anandakugan, "Sri Lankan Civil War."
[23] Keethaponcalan, "Social Cubism," 933.
[24] Ibid, 993.
[25] Sennett, "Overseas Sri Lankans," 2.
[26] Figures are from Q1 of 2020, in Trading Economics, "Sri Lanka Current Account," (2020).
[27] Sennett, "Overseas Sri Lankans," 11.
[28] Paul Collier, "Causes of Civil Conflict," (2006), 1.
[29] Ibid, 5.
[30] Trading Economics, "Sri Lanka Exports by Category," (2020).

The benefits of this project will be felt by the Tamil community living in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, as well as the whole of the Sri Lankan economy and people. Investments from the ADB to develop new export industries is a strategy for improving the lives of Tamils, which is ultimately beneficial to all the relevant actors involved in implementing this policy – this will become an important point as we examine the challenges that this policy will face.

Precedent

The ADB does not undertake development work with the specific goal of countering sectarianism, nor does it analyze the effect that its programs have on sectarianism. However, there is precedent which suggests that development work of this kind can and does alleviate these kinds of ethnic conflicts. A report from the RAND Corporation establishes a connection between civil society development (which includes economic development) and the alleviation of sectarian strife in Middle Eastern countries. The process of economic development, helped along by investment from an organization like the ADB, can transcend the disparate ethnic identities within a country, and create a common political and cultural movement that cuts across a national society.[31]

The Challenges Facing this Policy

The relevant actors in the creation and implementation of this policy are the ADB, its member states (particularly the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, and Italy), the Sri Lankan government, and the sizable Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora which lives in many of those ADB member countries. There are two major challenges to this policy: the first is ADB member countries' willingness to contribute to the program, the second is possible opposition from Colombo.

Member-Country Willingness

"Free riding" is a classic problem in international affairs. When it comes to this policy, how can free riding be prevented to make sure every country is contributing its fair share of funds; and furthermore, will member countries even be willing to contribute in the first place? This is the first major challenge to this program, and it must be solved before the program can be implemented, as the funding must come from the member countries.

The countries that would be targeted as the major donors to this program would be Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Italy, the United States, France, and Germany. The reason for this is because, in descending order, those are the ADB member countries which have the highest Tamil diaspora populations,[32] which is an integral component of this ADB program. As per Jack Sennet's recommendation, the Tamil diaspora will be referred to in this paper as overseas Sri Lankans (OSL). There are two characteristics of the Tamil OSL that are important for our purposes: one is the high level of salience that their host country's policy towards Sri Lanka holds for them,[33] and the other is the Tamil OSL's expertise in many industries that this ADB program would attempt to develop in Sri Lanka.[34] The Tamil OSL expertise will be discussed in section five of this paper as a part of the policy framework.

The Tamil OSL in countries like Canada and the UK have a long history of political activism when it comes to their host countries' policies towards Sri Lanka, especially during the Sri Lankan civil war and continuing to this day.[35] This policy would entail a considerable financial commitment from this set of ADB member countries, and the presence of the Tamil OSL will

[31] Jeffrey Martini et al. "Countering Sectarianism in the Middle East," *RAND Corporation* (2019), 137.
[32] Sennett, "Overseas Sri Lankans," 14.
[33] Dhananjayan Sriskandarajah, "Tamil Diaspora Politics," (2005), 493.
[34] Sennett, "Overseas Sri Lankans," 15.
[35] Sriskandarajah, "Tamil Diaspora," (2005), 497.

be a strong incentive for these countries to cooperate and not free ride. There are numerous Tamil groups that lobby their host governments, such as the Ilankai Tamil Sangam (US) and the UK-based Standing Committee of Tamil Speaking People (SCOT).[36] ADB engagement with those groups and other similar organizations will be very important, and if necessary, lobbying by those organizations on behalf of the ADB investment program will be an essential component in getting this program funded.

Willingness to Participate from Colombo

The Sri Lankan government in Colombo is another potential challenge to this policy being successfully implemented. This ADB program will be expressly aimed at helping the Tamil minority and will generate jobs and economic growth specifically in the Tamil-dominated Northern and Eastern provinces. This policy will potentially be looked upon unfavorably by the Sinhalese dominated central government in the Western province. A crucial point of understanding is who in Colombo holds the most decision-making power at the moment — the answer to which is undoubtedly the Rajapaksa family.[37] Gotabaya Rajapaksa, a relative of a former Sri Lankan president, is the current president in 2020 and the leader of the Sinhalese political party Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP).[38] Rajapaksa's Brother, Mahinda Rajapaksa is currently serving as the country's prime minister. These two, along with some other family members and members of the SLPP have instituted reforms that have increased their power over the country, worrying many that they might be taking Sri Lanka away from liberal democracy and towards a strong-man authoritarian regime.[39]

Despite these moves away from democracy, at the moment the Rajapaksa family and the SLPP are to a large extent still vulnerable to the democratic system, and their place in power is in no way completely secure.[40] As the country goes through the COVID-19 pandemic, while facing economic contraction, rising national debt, and potential ethnic strife, it is more important than ever for the Rajapaksas to respond to the needs of the country, lest they face potentially losing their grip on power.[41] As Dayanath Jayasuriya puts it,

> The Government faces critical issues relating to debt management, promoting ethnic harmony, balancing foreign interests in respect of national assets, and resolving long standing grievances of minority communities. How it performs in these areas will be watched closely by domestic and foreign observers alike.[42]

This ADB program will offer a crucial solution to the country's rising current account balance and related economic slowdown. Specifically related to the Rajapaksa and SLPP decision-making apparatus, the incentives to cooperate with the ADB and allow investment in the North and East will likely outweigh any objections that they have. This program's greatest strength is that it is a win-win for former enemies — the Tamils and Sinhalese — and will reduce the likelihood of them becoming enemies again.

Keeping in mind the various benefits and challenges of this policy, we can examine in detail the structure and implementation of this ADB investment program.

[36] Ibid.
[37] Bart Klem,"Sri Lanka in 2019: The Return of the Rajapaksas," *Asian Survey* (2020).
[38] Dayanath Jayasuriya, "Sri Lanka: the return of the strongman," *The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* 5 (2020), 610.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid, 611.
[41] Klem, "The Rajapaksas," 211.
[42] Jayasuriya, "The return of the strongman," 611.

The Program

The design, funding, and implementation of this program would be done through the Asian Development Bank with the help of its Western member countries. This program would be administered through the ADB Office of Public-Private Partnership. At its core, this program would be aimed at helping Northern and Eastern province entrepreneurs and existing businesses gain the capital and know-how needed to enter into new export sectors. This program also offers support to the Northern and Eastern provincial governments on managing investment and growth in their jurisdictions. This program has a special focus on building native industries and growth.

Member-Country Contributions

ADB member countries that have the highest OSL population (Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, Italy, the United States, France, and Germany) also tend to have high GDPs and high levels of aid donation.[43] The bulk of funding will come from this set of nations.

The Program on the Ground

This program's modality of assistance will primarily be in the form of grants, loans, and technical assistance. The goal of such aid is to spur the development of new export sectors, specifically electronics, industrial machinery and equipment, electrical equipment, fabricated metal products, and business administration and support.[44] The ADB will work with provincial governments to identify enterprises that can make the jump to these new sectors and provide loans and grants accordingly. The ADB will also provide loans and grants to local entrepreneurs with viable business plans. Technical assistance will also be provided to ease the process of entering into these new sectors.

The Tamil OSL

This is the area where the Tamil OSL's expertise becomes important. While the initial utility of the OSL is their political engagement with their host countries to support this ADB program in the first place, the Tamil OSL will also be a crucial source of technical assistance to the development happening in Sri Lanka through the ADB. Kaies Samet outlines two channels through which diasporas can contribute to their home country's economic growth, which can also be used in the case of Sri Lanka. The first is the "return option," which involves the measured positive effect of return migration on marginal productivity.[45] The idea is that if Tamil OSL return to Sri Lanka, they bring with them their skills and knowledge, engaging in entrepreneurial activities that can lead to the creation of entire new native industries.[46] The ADB can identify and engage with Tamil OSL who have returned to Sri Lanka if they have technical knowledge on the industries being targeted for investment.

The second channel is referred to as the "overseas option," which takes advantage of existing familial ties between OSL and their home communities.[47] The ADB can again identify and engage with OSL individuals with the relevant knowledge and enlist them to offer remote help to those in Sri Lanka that are building these new sectors.

Potential Objections

This paper has detailed many of the political problems present in Sri Lanka surrounding the Tamil people; however the objective of this paper is not to address those political issues, but rather economic problems. The proposed program involves giving aid which will likely help the president of Sri Lanka,

[43] OECD, "Net official Development Assistance (ODA)," Net ODA Table (2019).
[44] Sennett, "Overseas Sri Lankans," 2.
[45] Kaies Samet, "Circular Migration between the North and the South: Effects on the Source Southern Economies," *Procedia, social and behavioral sciences* 93 (2013), 234.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid, 229.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa. As discussed earlier, the president's biggest challenge is his country's stalling economic growth and limited exports.[48] This ADB program would represent a fix for his problems and would likely strengthen his popularity. This is relevant because Rajapaksa and his family have increasingly taken illiberal steps to increase their power and roll back the country's democratic framework.[49] A common criticism of aid is that it can empower strongmen like Rajapaksa and ultimately make conditions worse in the receiving country as those strongmen crack down on rights and freedoms. This is a valid concern for this program, as the group it is trying to aid, the Tamil ethnic minority, is also the group facing increasing oppression from their president. When looked at from this perspective, this program can appear counterproductive.

While not offering any political solutions, the economic solutions outlined in this paper will provide a real benefit to the Tamil regions of Sri Lanka and the country overall, which can have an indirect effect on the political situation. Economic growth and political stability are strongly connected.[50] If we recognise economic problems as an incentive for turning to violence and oppression, as is often the case with strongman-type leaders, there could be political benefits to this program that may outweigh some of the concerns about supporting Rajapaksa.

This policy proposal has many moving parts and many actors involved, but its principal goal of helping the Tamil people of Sri Lanka improve their economic opportunities and outcomes is achievable.

Conclusion

The pursuit of improved conditions for the Tamil people of Sri Lanka is one worth the time and money being proposed in this paper. The end of the civil war has had a positive impact on the Tamil people and the whole of Sri Lanka. With the recent turn in the country's economic and political prospects, however, this program from the Asian Development Bank, with the help of select Western countries and their Tamil OSL populations, will be crucial to continuing positive post-war development in Sri Lanka. While the ultimate goal is to help Tamils in the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka and to hopefully prevent a return to ethnic sectarianism and civil conflict, one could also look at this proposal as a recognition and response to Sri Lanka's macroeconomic difficulties more broadly. From this perspective, such a program offers a solution to those problems by providing grants and loans in regions of Sri Lanka that will reap a large economic benefit for the Tamil people specifically, as well as for the country as a whole. Once this program is implemented, it will spell a new economic and developmental beginning for a unified Sri Lanka and the Tamil people.

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[48] Klem, "The Rajapaksas," 207.

[49] Jayasuriya, "The return of the strongman," 610.

[50] Zahid Hussain, "Can political stability hurt economic growth?" *World Bank* (June 1, 2014).

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