Locating Power

Proceedings of the
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Volume 2

Edited by Kira Hall, Mary Bucholtz,
and Birch Moonwomon

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Why is it that women in Rwanda cannot marry?

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INTRODUCTION

In the Kinyarwanda language, there are many verbs, especially those which refer to sex or marriage, which do not permit females to be candidates to subjecthood because women are not seen as agents or partners but rather as patients. In this same language, there are also words that married women cannot utter (taboo language). This linguistic restriction and lack of freedom is also seen in other aspects of the culture of this partiarchal society.

These observations support the familiar Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that not only does language reflect culture but it also affects the culture as well, in shaping the way people think and consequently how they behave.

GENDER IN KINYARWANDA

Kinyarwanda, like other Bantu languages, does not have grammatical gender but has sixteen grammatical classes which have been grammaticized: There are no semantic considerations for including nouns in a particular class, except classes 1 and 2 (singular and plural respectively), which are exclusively for human beings. There are times, however, when a feminine marker is used to derive nouns referring to females. The suffix -*kazi*, which in many Bantu languages means 'woman', is used for this purpose:

(1)			
umuhutú	→	umuhutúkazi	'hutu' (Rwandan social group)
umutuutsi	→	umutuutsikazi	'tutsi' (Rwandan social group)
umwáarimú	→	umwáarimúkazi	'teacher'
umuforoma	→	umuforomakazi	'nurse'
umunyarwaanda	→	umunyarwaandakazi	'Rwandan'
umunydameriká	→	umunydamerikákazi	'American'
umwaámi	→	umwaámikazi	'king'
umugabé	→	umugabékazi	'monarch'/'queen-mother'

The use of this suffix is very limited, however. It is restricted to terms for nationalities, ethnic groups, and professions. When it is necessary to identify the gender, the associative construction with *umugoré* 'woman' as a modifier is used instead:

(2)		
umugaanga w'úmugoré	'female doctor'
umushófeéri w'úmugoré	'female driver'

umuperezida w'úmugoré	'female president'

Animals' gender is not marked, either. The noun refers either to the male or female animal. The only exceptions are *imbwá* 'dog', whose feminine counterpart is *imbwáakazi*, and *inkokó* 'chicken', whose feminine form is *inkokókazi*. In the case of *imbwáakazi*, however, the meaning is not 'female dog' but is used as an insult to a female human being. This is equivalent to *bitch* in English.

The only three words which are marked for masculine gender are those in (3), with the suffix -*rume*, which in many Bantu languages means 'man':

(3)		
nyokórume	'your mother's brother' (nyoko 'your mother')
isekúrume	'male goat'
impweerume	'male dog'

In rituals such as divination, initiation, marriage, coronation of a new king, burial, etc., certain objects are given masculine or feminine gender. It is interesting to note that good objects, those associated with positive influence, are classified as masculine and objects associated with evil forces are classified as female. This classification is very similar to the Chinese *yin* and *yang* concepts, according to which objects and natural phenomena are classified into two categories. The yin category is feminine and has negative influence, whereas the yang category is masculine and has positive influence. Likewise, in Kinyarwanda masculinized objects are also good and feminized objects are bad, as shown in (4):

(4)		
uruyúzi rw'úrugoré	'bad die in divination which falls on the left side'
uruyúzi rw'úrugabo	'good die in divination which falls on the right side'

The clearest gender marking is in names. The majority of female names are derived from male names by adding one of the feminine prefixes *mukáa-*, *nyirá-*, or *káa-*. Onomastic prefixes, names, and their meanings in Kinyarwanda are discussed in great detail in Kimenyi 1989.

(5)			
Nkusi	→	Mukankusi
Mazimpaka	→	Mukamazimpaka
Ntabana	→	Mukantabana
Manzi	→	Mukamanzi
Kimonyo	→	Nyirakimonyo
Bagenzi	→	Nyirabagenzi
Karangwa	→	Nyirakarangwa
Kigeri	→	Nyirakigeri
Yuhi	→	Nyirayuhi
Mibambwe	→	Nyiramibambwe
inyaánge 'royal bird'	→	Kanyange [kaanyaánge]
inkuyo 'cow's brush'	→	Kankuyo [káankuyo]
amabéra 'pearls'	→	Kamabera [kaamabéra]

These names clearly indicate that even though Kinyarwanda is not a gender language, still it is a male-dominated language because the masculine form is the unmarked one and the feminine the marked one which is always derived from the unmarked form, the masculine.

SELECTIONAL RESTRICTIONS

In Kinyarwanda many verbs, especially those which refer to courting and sexual activities never accept females as their subjects. Examples include *kuroongora* 'to marry', *gusaba* 'to be engaged', *gukwá* 'to give a dowry', *kuráambagiza* 'to court', *gutoongoza* 'to seduce', *gucyúura* 'to marry a married person', *guhárika* 'to have two or more spouses', *kuréshya* 'to seduce', *kwíirukana* 'to repudiate a spouse', *guséenda* 'to repudiate a spouse because of misconduct', *kweenda* 'to have sex'. The female can be the subject of these types of verbs only in the passive form.

(6)   *Yohadni yaróongoye Mariyá* 'John married Mary'
John   married   Mary
*Mariyá yaróongoye Yohadni 'Mary married John'
Mary   married   John
Mariyá yaróongowe na Yóhadni 'Mary got married to John'
Mary   was-married by John
*Yohadni yaróongowe na Máriyá 'John got married to Mary'
John   was-married by Mary

(7)   *Yohadni yasabye   Mariyá* 'John got engaged to Mary'
John   got-engaged-to Mary
*Mariyá yasabye Yohadni 'Mary got engaged to John'
Mariyá yasabwe na Yóhadni 'Mary is engaged to John'
*Yohadni yasabwe na Mariyá 'John is engaged to Mary'

(8)   *Yohadni yatóongoje Mariyá* 'John seduced Mary'
John   seduced   Mary
*Mariyá yatóongoje Yohadni 'Mary seduced John'
Mariyá yatóongojwe na Yóhadni 'Mary was seduced by John'
*Yohadni yatóongojwe na Máriyá 'John was seduced by Mary'

(9)   *Yohadni yakóoye . Mariyá inka ebyiri* 'John gave a dowry of two cows for Mary'
John   gave-dowry Mary cows two
*Mariyá yakóoye Yohadni inká ebyiri 'Mary gave a dowry of two cows for John'
Mariyá yakóowe inká ebyiri na Yóhadni 'Two cows were given for Mary's dowry by John'
*Yohadni yakoowe inká ebyiri na Máriyá 'Two cows were given for John's dowry by Mary'

The verb *gusáambana* [ku-sáamb-an-a] 'to have an affair' can have a female subject because it already has an intrinsic reciprocal morpheme *-an-*, but when the causative morpheme *-y-* is added to it to show the agent (the one who initiated the action), a female is no longer a candidate for subjecthood.

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(10)   *Yohadni yasdambanye na Máriyá* 'John committed adultery with Mary'
Mariyá yasdambanye na Yóhadni 'Mary committed adultery with John'
Yohadni yasdamban(y)ije Mariyá. 'John had an affair with Mary'
*Mariyá yasdamban(y)ije Mariyá 'Mary had an affair with John'
Mariyá yasdamban(y)ijwe na Yóhadni 'Mary got into an affair with John'
*Yohadni yasdamban(y)ijwe na Máriyá 'John got into an affair with Mary'

It is also interesting to note that the verbs which prohibit a female subject never allow the subject-object reversal which exists in this language:

(11)
a.   *Yohdani arasoma igitabo* 'John is reading a book'
    John   is-reading book
b.   *igitabo kirasoma Yohdani* 'John is reading the book'
    book   is-reading John

(12)
a.   *Yohadni yaróongoye Mariyá* 'John married Mary'
    John   married   Mary
b.   **Mariyá yaróongoye Yohadni* 'John married Mary'

The reason why nouns referring to females are not allowed to be subjects of the types of verbs mentioned above is that, as noted earlier, in Rwandan society a woman is denied the role of agent. As a girl she receives orders and advice from her parents and as a wife she is supposed to bear children for her husband and to serve him.

A woman is not allowed to show initiative or active participation. As the following proverb shows, she is not even permitted to show her sexual desires:

(13)   *Umushyúuko w'úmukoóbwa ushirira mu matdko*
    erection   of girl   ends   in buttocks
    'A girl's erection ends in her thighs'

Note, however, that the verb *kubéenga* 'to reject a marriage proposal' can have a female subject:

(14)   *Mariyá yabéenze Yohdani* 'Mary rejected John'
    Mary   rejected John
Yohdáni yabéenze Mariyá 'John rejected Mary'
Yohdáni yabéenzwe na Mariyá 'John was rejected by Mary'
Mariyá yabéenzwe na Yóhadni 'Mary was rejected by John'

Even though this verb allows female subjects, it is not considered good by the society for a girl to reject marriage proposals. She may end up by not get married at all; *kugumirwa* 'to become a spinster' is the worst thing that can happen to a girl. As far as sex and marriage are concerned, the male-dominated language talks more or only about the man's experience, thus ignoring that of the woman.

TABOO LANGUAGE

The taboo language or prohibition language is also restricted to men. There is a linguistic behavior called *gutsíinda* in Kinyarwanda which prohibits women from saying parents-in-law's names. If the husband has uncles who are married, his wife cannot utter the names of his uncles nor those of their respective wives, because they are all considered fathers- and mothers-in-law. This practice extends also to words which might have sounds similar to the ones found in those names. To refer to these homonymous words, the woman has to use synonyms or create her own words. Some examples are presented below; substitutions for the taboo words are given in the right column. Those substitute words without glosses have been conventionalized and have no other meaning.

(15)			
umugoré 'woman/wife'	→	*umuheté* 'the mother who has given birth to the second child'	
umukoóbwa 'girl'	→	*umurobdanurwa* 'the selected one'	
umugabo 'man'	→	*umugaanji* 'winner of the war'/*umugomóke*	
gutabaara 'to go to war'	→	*kujamiira*	
urutaro 'winnower'	→	*urugósoozo*	
umunadni 'inheritance'	→	*umugomóke*	
Imdana 'god'	→	*Ingomóke*	
inká 'cow'	→	*ingabé* 'royal cow'	
akanyamasyo 'turtle'	→	*ingágará*	
izúuru 'nose'	→	*itoónde*	
ihené 'goat'	→	*intuúngwa* 'domesticated animal'/*limpimá* 'Hima cow'	

Rwanda is a patriarchal society in which the wife has to abandon her family and become part of her husband's family. The children belong to the husband or his family unless the husband has not officially married or has not given dowry. Since it is an extended family, she is referred to by her husband's "brothers"—who may include all his parallel cousins, namely his half-brothers, his father's brother's sons, and his mother's sister's sons—as *umugoré wáacu* 'our wife', because any of these can be her lover or marry her if the husband dies, since there is no sex taboo between the wife and the husband's brother in this society. Thus the proverb:

(16) *Umugoré mwiizá ataabá   uwdawé yaaba   uwa múkuru   waawe*
woman good if-she-is-not yours she-should-be of older-brother of-you
'A good woman should be yours or your older brother's'

The wife refers to any of her relatives listed above as *umugabo wáacu* "our husband". This the reason that, when referring to someone's marriage, instead of identifying the husband, the speaker may mention the family, the lineage, the clan, or the region, as in seen below.

(17) *Mariyá yaróongowe mu Bubirigi* 'Mary was married in Belgium'
Mariyá yaróongowe mu Babirigi 'Mary was married among the Belgians'
Mariyá yaróongowe n'Ababirigi 'Mary was married by the Belgians'

Mariyá yashdatse inzu mu Bubirigi 'Mary looked for a house (husband) in Belgium'
Mariyá yashdatse inzu mu Babirigi 'Mary looked for a house (husband) among the Belgians'

If a woman happens to say her parents-in-law's names by accident, she has to be cleansed by drinking a ritual medicine called *isúbyo*. Since Rwandan society consists of extended families, the wife's parents-in-law can number in the hundreds. She is forbidden to say not only the names of the parents of her present husband—including all the husband's father's wives, since polygamy was practiced in Rwanda until 1962—but also those of her former husbands. Further, the husband's father's brothers are considered her fathers-in-law, and all their respective wives and sisters are considered her mothers-in-law. (For more on kinship terms, see Kimenyi 1978.) Because of this linguistic taboo, there are hundreds of words that the daughter-in-law has to delete from her vocabulary. As in many Bantu cultures, however, a woman who gives birth to twins is no longer subject to this linguistic avoidance.

The complex linguistic taboo is made easier by the following facts:

(i) The wife and her sisters-in-law (husband's brothers' wives) use the same name to refer to their parents-in-law and use the same words to refer to objects or concepts which have sounds similar to the parents-in-law's names.

(ii) To avoid using words which are homonymous with the in-laws' names, synonymous words from regional dialects of Kinyarwanda can be used.

(iii) There exist jargons that the speaker can borrow from, such as the blacksmith language, the language of decoration, the sports language (especially *igisoro*, African chess), and the hunting language. The latter greatly resembles the taboo language and has an extensive vocabulary. Although no longer in use, it was used to refer to animals or other hunting activities mostly to avoid bad luck such as being killed by the animal or accidentally shot by other hunters, or to trick the animals because they might hear or understand what the hunters' plans were. Thus, *ishá* 'gazelle' is called *nyamwaanga-zígeenda* 'the one who doesn't like to see them (cows) leave' and *inkwaáre* 'partridge' becomes *intábaambwá* 'the one that cannot be crucified'.[1]

(iv) The language user can also use euphemisms. The most common ones are activities referring to the king or to the cow, which is the country's cultural icon. For instance, parts of the king's body are referred to by special words, and his actions and activities require special words as well: *igisaabo* 'king's stomach' (milk container); *inyuundo* 'king's leg' (hammer); *kwíibaambura* 'to wake up' (instead of *gukaanguka*); *gutabaara* 'to die' (to go to war); *umugogó* 'king's corpse' (big tree); *iseembe* 'king's behind' (instead of *ikibúno*).

(v) The ritualistic language of divination, initiation, and coronation is different from everyday language. It can also be used in place of the taboo language.

(vi) Poetic language may be drawn upon as well. There are three types of poetry in Kinyarwanda: the dynastic poetry (praise for kings), panegyric poetry (praise for national heroes and great warriors), and pastoral poetry (praises for elite cows). Each type of poetry has its own vocabulary.

(vii) In traditional Rwandan society, many people had praise names. The daughter-in-law would refer to her parents-in-law by these names. The formal and semantic properties of praise names are examined in both Kimenyi 1989 and 1990.

(viii) The introduction of Christianity has facilitated the linguistic taboo because the daughter-in-law can refer to her husband's parents by their Christian names. It is thus becoming easier now to refer to in-laws because many people have been baptized. The other way to refer to, e.g., the mother-in-law is as *the mother of so-and-so*, usually using the name of the youngest child. The speaker can also use the praise name or she can create a new name which will be understood by everybody.

When a woman is talking about her husband, she always uses the polite form, which is the same as the plural form.

(18) *Arashaaka ku-ba-vugiisha* 'S/he wants to talk to you' (polite)
      Arashaaka ku-ku-vugiisha 'S/he wants to talk to you' (regular)
      Nti-ba-harí 'He is not here' (polite)
      Nt-aa-harí 'He is not here' (regular)
      Mu-ra-garuka rydari? 'When are you coming back?' (polite)
      U-ra-garuka rydari? 'When are you coming back?' (regular)

These taboos of course are not restricted to language alone but are also found in other aspects of Rwandan culture. For instance, women are not allowed to whistle, hence the word *igikóobwakóobwa* from *umukoobwa* 'girl' (a type of whistle used to excite cows when they are drinking; since this type of whistle is different from the regular whistle, its invention is attributed to women because they supposedly don't know how to whistle properly). Women are not allowed to build or fix houses or compound fences; they are not allowed to milk cows; they are forbidden from closing or opening the compound-fence gate; they are not allowed to cut firewood; they are not permitted to jump (hence the proverb *Umugoré arabyína ntaasiimbúka* 'A woman dances, she doesn't jump', meaning a woman has to behave like a lady). Women are not allowed to tend cattle or take them to the well (*Umugoré w'umupfú akubitirwa kw'iibúga* 'A stupid woman is beaten at the cow's well', meaning that she brings herself problems because she is not supposed to be there in the first place). These taboos clearly make her dependent on men. If a woman doesn't have a husband or male children to do these activities for her, she asks for help from the neighbors. These husbandless women are called *indushyi* 'destitute'. *Umwana w'umugoré agira akamero ntaagira akamaro* 'The child of a woman (without a husband) has looks, but lacks use'. An unmarried woman is not a complete human being.

In the Rwandan culture many people believe in bad luck. Certain individuals, not because of supernatural power or individual bad intentions, but because of their membership in certain families or clans, find themselves causing bad luck to other people by talking to them or interacting with them. Women are the only ones who are blamed for belonging to a bad clan. Those who come from the *Abacyaba* and *Abashingwe* clans, even though they may be very beautiful, have difficulty finding husbands because they are supposed to bring bad luck to the husband and all his extended family.

IDIOMATIC EXPRESSIONS

Not only does the woman have a second-class citizen status but in some cases she is considered a domestic servant. A woman who is looking for a husband is said to be 'looking for a home' (*gushaaka inzu*) or 'looking for a master' (*gushaaka ubuhaké*). A woman who has had trouble finding a husband is said 'not to find a home/house' (*kubúra amazu*), and one who keeps having marital problems and therefore has had many divorces is said 'to have problems with homes/houses' (*kunanirwa n'ámazu*). A woman who works hard to please her husband is said to 'have broken houses' (*gucá amazu*), and one who has been going from husband to husband is said to 'have finished homes' (*kumara amazu*). It is also revealing to note the language which refers to her: the cattle vocabulary. If a wife runs away from her husband, this is referred to as *kwáahuk(an)a* (*kwáahuka* 'to go out to graze') and when the husband goes to her family to bring her back, this is referred to as *gucyúura* 'to bring the cattle back home'. The same expression is also used to mean to marry a woman who has already been married.

Idiomatic expressions which have 'man' in them have a positive connotation but those which have 'woman' have a negative connotation. Thus, *kuba umugabo* 'to be a man' means to be brave, as in *Uyu mugoré ni umugabo* 'This woman is a man (courageous)'.[2] But *gukóra kigoré* 'to do like a woman' means 'to do things awkwardly', as in *Yohaáni akora kigoré* 'John does things like a woman (awkwardly)'. Similar expressions are *gukóra iyó (ubugabo) bwaábaga* (lit. 'to touch where manhood used to be') 'to do one's best/to try'; *gutwáaza ubugabo* (lit. 'to carry with/to use manhood') 'to refuse to give up'; *gukóra kigabo* (lit. 'to act manly') 'to do correctly'; *gukúbita kigabo* (lit. 'to hit like a man') 'to hit with force'; *kugéna kigabo* (lit. 'to decide like a man') 'to make a correct and final decision'. To name somebody as a witness in court is *gutáangaho umugabo* 'to name somebody a man', as in *Mariyá ni wé Yohaáni atáangahó umugabo* 'Mary is the one that John presents as his witness'.[3] This is so because women traditionally could not act as witnesses.

PROVERBS

The popular culture, especially folk music and folk literature such as anecdotes, jokes, riddles, and folktales, is full of comments and statements which are derogatory to women. In Kinyarwanda folktales, the cruel stepmother, the stupid wife, the virago, all called by the derogatory term *igishéegabo* 'she-man' and typified by the character of *Nyirarunyonga*, are common and very popular motifs. Nyirarunyonga is not a conventional woman. She breaks all the taboos and behaves like a man.

Some proverbs taken primarily from Crépeau and Bizimana (1988) are provided below to show what the popular culture thinks of women. In general, a woman is seen as childlike—immature, irresponsible, and unrealistic; she is materialistic, ungrateful, and stupid:

(19) *uútaazí   umugomé aharira umugoré urugó*
who-doesn't-know bad-person trusts woman house
'He who doesn't know a bad person trusts his house to a woman'
(i.e., 'One should not confide important things to a woman')

uútaazí   umugaambaanyi yiriingira umugoré
who-doesn't-know traitor   trusts   woman
'He who doesn't know a traitor trusts a woman'

umugoré gitó   agutatira   agúseguye
woman ungrateful betrays-you using-her-arm-as-your-pillow
'An ungrateful woman betrays you while you are together in bed'
(i.e., 'Your enemies are your trusted friends')

umugoré umukamira   impéenda impíinduká yaazá   akabariza
woman you-milk-for-her many   cows   consequence when-it-comes
imbere yé
she-asks in-front-of
'You give plenty of milk to a woman but when disagreement arises she confronts
you right away'
(i.e., 'Few people are grateful')

ukubóko k'úmugoré gucura   uk'úmugabo arí
hand of wife   gets-larger-share-of-food-than that-of-husband being
kó   kugukamíra
the-one that-milks-for-it
'The wife's hand gets more food than the husband's even though it is the latter who
brings food home'
(i.e., 'People take things for granted without realizing that it is not easy to get
them')

intdazí   y'dgasóre ikamira   umugoré
a-non-experienced young-man milks-for woman
'An inexperienced young man feeds a woman'

uruvúga   nyirdgoré ntirugordma
the-one-which-talks-about woman it-does-not-bend
'The tongue which talks about a woman never bends'
(i.e., 'It is easy to criticize somebody else')

inzímuzi y'úmugoré ntireengá   umuhana
a-gossiper of-woman doesn't-reach-beyond neighborhood
'A female gossip doesn't belong in the neighborhood'
(i.e., 'A person with bad character cannot have many friends')

umugoré w'úmupfú ntaaburá   inzu imfúubyi ziríhó
woman stupid   doesn't-lack house orphans when-they-exist
'A stupid woman doesn't lack a husband when orphans are around'
(i.e., 'A poor person doesn't have choice')

umugoré w'úmupfú agirango mukeebá yaagabuye
woman of stupid thinks-that co-spouse fed
'A stupid wife thinks that her husband's other wife has given dinner (to her husband)'
(i.e., 'Never take anything for granted')

umugoré w'úmupfú ateeka bwíije   umugabo akamuhiinduka
woman stupid   cooks when-night-falls husband beats-her
atúhiinduye
she-doesn't-herself
'A stupid woman cooks very late and when the husband gets angry at her, she
remains unchanged'
(i.e., 'It is hard to change somebody's character')

umugoré w'úmupfú amena ibaanga rimukamíye
woman stupid   breaks secret which-gives-her-milk
'A stupid woman reveals the secret of her wealth'

umugoré amenya ay'úmukazdana   muu nkííke
woman knows of daughter-in-law in corner-of-the-compound-fence
ntaamenyá   ay'úmukoóbwa muu mpiínga
she-doesn't-know of-daughter on top-of-hill
'A woman knows about her daughter-in-law's problems next door, unaware of her
daughter's problems on the top of the hill'
(i.e., 'People quickly notice others' problems without being aware of their own')

umugoré w'úmwuuga   yishiima   yúkoze   muu
woman of-profession (poisoning) becomes-happy when-she-touches-herself in
nda
stomach
'A witch congratulates herself when she poisons her own children'
(i.e., 'It is only when you become a victim of somebody's misdeed that you realize
that what you did to somebody else was not good')

umugoré umwiita   inká ya Rwogera waarimúkuura   akagukuura   mu
woman you-call-her cow of Rwogera if-you-take-it-back she-kicks-you-out of
rugo
compound
'If you praise a woman and then stop she kicks you out of the house'
(i.e., 'It is not good to make promises you cannot keep')

umugoré abyaara   uwdawé ntaabá   uwdawé
woman gives-birth-to yours she-doesn't-become yours
'A woman gives birth to your children but she is not yours'

umugoré w'íngadre agirwa n' úmugóongo w'úmuhoro
woman difficult is-tamed by back   of machete
'A difficult woman understands the language of beating only'

agahúgu karímó   indushyi,   abapfú   ntíbaburá amazu
country in-which-they-are miserable-people, stupid (women) don't-lack houses
'In a country where there are destitute people, stupid women find husbands easily'

umugoré mukina   agúkiinze umutíma waatebá   akagutaambuuka
woman you-play-together hiding-you heart when-you-get-tired she-jumps-over-
   ajyá gushaaka imbere yé
you going to-look-for in-front of-her
'You play with your wife without her showing her feelings but when you get tired
she jumps over you going to look for other lovers'
(i.e., 'There is no way you can be sure whether a woman loves you')

akabúza   umukoóbwa inzu, arakageendana
what-prevents girl   house he-walks-with-it
'The cause which prevents a girl from finding a husband never leaves her'
(i.e., 'It is almost impossible for a person to change his or her character')

amóoshya y'úmugoré aseenya inzu
bad-advice of wife   destroys house
'Ill advice of a wife destroys the family'

indúurú y' úmugoré iseenya umudugúdu
noise of woman destroys neighborhood
'The screams of a wife destroy the neighborhood'

umwíijuto n' ámatsiko byiíshe umugoré ukúze
satiety   and curiosity killed woman old
'Satiety and curiosity killed an old woman'

umugoré abarirwa   imbyáaro ntaabarírwa   amazu
woman is-talked-about children she-is-not-talked-about houses
'It is irrelevant to talk about how many husbands a woman has had but instead how
many children she has had'
(i.e., 'The most important thing is not a woman's character but whether she can
bear you children')

gukúbita umugoré utaákooye   ni uguhanira rubaanda
to-beat wife   that-you-have-not-given-a dowry it-is to-educate-for others
'It is useless to beat a wife for whom you have not paid the dowry because you are
doing it for others'

urubaánza   rwoonka umugabo, ntírwoonká umugoré
family-business sucks   husband, doesn't-suck wife
'Family businesses are affairs of husbands, not wives'

ingabo y' úmugoré iragushoora ntíigukúura   ku rugaámba
shield of wife   takes-you-to it-doesn't-bring-you-back from battlefield
'The wife's shield causes you to go to war, it doesn't bring you back'
(i.e., 'A woman cannot give you good advice')

ntaa   mugoré ugíra   ijaambo
there-is-no woman who-has word
'A woman's word is worthless'

umugoré ni nk' ihené bayizirika ahó amatovu   arí
woman is like goat they-tie-it where thorny-plants are
'A woman is like a goat, you tie it next to the thorny plant *umutovu*
(i.e., 'A woman is like a child, she sometimes needs spanking')

umugoré urí   ku mutibá ntaaburá   umutíma
woman who-is on attic doesn't-like heart
'A woman who sees wealth doesn't refuse you love'
(i.e., 'Women are materialistic')

This inequality and lack of freedom is also seen in other aspects of the culture: A
woman is always considered second to her husband. In social functions, such as
family disputes, she cannot speak for herself. Somebody else has to do it for her.

CONCLUSION

Some of the comments made here are valid only for the traditional culture
because certain aspects have changed. Some of the cultural prohibitions are no
longer enforced. The idioms and proverbs shown here, however, are still in full
use, and the grammar has not changed.

There are certain linguistic expressions, mainly interjections, ideophones, and
words which refer to the addressee, which are used mostly or only by women.
Thus, interjections or swear words such as *yeekoóyo wé*, *yeemaáma wé* 'you my
mother', and *maáma Bikíra Mariyá wé* 'you my mother the Virgin Mary' are used
more by women than men. Intimate expressions which refer to the addressee, such
as *nyabúsa* 'poor one', *nyagúcwa* , *diísi* 'dear', and *nyakúnyagwa* 'the ought-to-
be dispossessed one', are used only by women. Women also have a tendency to
use emotive words and hyperbole. No detailed study has yet been done on this
subject, however. The woman is still considered a second-class citizen and the
language not only provides testimony to the deprivation of her human and civil
rights but also reinforces and perpetuates this deplorable status. To ensure faster
change, a linguistic revolution must occur very soon.

NOTES

1. All hunting societies seem to use the taboo language when referring to wild or game
animals. In Middle English the bear was referred as *bruin* 'the brown one'.
2. Compare this to English *virtue* 'high moral principles' from Latin *vir-tus* 'quality of being a
man', *vir* 'man'.
3. Note also the association in English between *testimony* 'witness account' and *testicle*
'witness or evidence of virility', from Latin *testis* 'witness'.

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Gender interference in transsexuals' speech[1]

H. MERLE KNIGHT

For transsexuals and other cross-gendered people,[2] a significant concern in interpersonal contacts is the ability to *pass*: i.e., to be recognized and treated as a member of the target gender. Because of the conflict between their psychological identity and the sociosexual expectations of their original gender, the gender-dysphoric experience successful passing as a major source of personal empowerment.[3] Moreover, failure to pass can bring undesirable repercussions, ranging from mild embarrassment to physical attack, loss of employment, etc.

Most cross-gendered people find it in their best interest to present themselves to the world as unambiguously as possible as members of one gender or the other. It can be unnerving—even disastrous—to arrive at a job interview where the receptionist addresses you as *ma'am*, the interviewer addresses you as *Mr. Jones*, and you overhear a gaggle of employees at the water cooler speculating about your sexual orientation.[4]

Passing thus requires credible self-presentation as a member of the target gender. In order to gauge their success in this realm, the cross-gendered must cultivate an acute sensitivity to others' reactions as well as to the nuances of gender cues that help reinforce the desired image.

Given that men and women display different patterns of language usage and conversational style (cf. especially Lakoff 1975 and Tannen 1990), successful passing ideally incorporates the speech styles associated with the target gender. Other important components of the package are visual gender markers such as dress, grooming, gestures, and secondary sexual characteristics. Any cues indicating the original gender constitute *interference*, which compromises the ability to pass.

The cross-gendered therefore must consciously overcome various forms of gender interference in order to operate effectively in the target role. Many have their physical appearance altered through hormonal therapy and/or surgery. A small army of consultants offer coaching in voice, grooming, wardrobe selection, and social comportment. Often career changes become necessary when the new role proves incompatible with the demands of the accustomed work environment.

The subtleties of communication style are typically more difficult to identify and change than physical details like hairstyle, wardrobe, and voice pitch. With scholars at the frontiers of research still debating the nature and extent of male/female differences in language, cross-gendered people must learn by trial and error the boundaries of gender in communication. Depending on their individual strategies for coping with gender dysphoria,[5] some can expect to spend a lifetime shifting from one gender role to the other as circumstances demand. Those who choose sex reassignment are required to spend a year or two in transition, learning to live in the target role before undergoing surgery. For these reasons, virtually all cross-gendered people experience life on both sides of the fence (at least in their social roles).

Adding further complexity to this situation is the fact that cross-gendered people vary widely in the degree to which they assimilated their original gender roles. They vary equally widely in their natural ability to pass in the assumed role. A female-to-male (FTM) who has donned only male attire since childhood faces different adaptive choices than another woman (possibly with equally masculine inner identity) who has learned to be comfortable in skirts and makeup. A male-to-female (MTF) with size 14 feet and proportionate height may never pass, even after sex reassignment.

All cross-gendered people experience some measure of interference from the original gender in which they were reared. A pre-transsexual boy inevitably receives pressure from multiple forces attempting to socialize him as a male. For example, his family may enroll him in team sports, Boy Scouts, and other conventionally masculine group activities. No matter how strongly he identifies as a girl and seeks inclusion in girls' activities, social obstacles bar him from full acceptance into the network of dyadic, conversation-based friendship where little girls master feminine modes of interaction.[6] Later, powerful incentives push him to adopt acceptably masculine behavior (including masculine communication styles) in order to survive in mainstream society and advance in a career.

A pre-transsexual girl, willingly or not, likewise receives a strong dose of feminine socialization. Even if she aggressively pursues masculine activities, she finds many organized group activities (such as Boy Scouts, football, etc.) closed to her. Friendship with other girls is usually the most accessible social outlet. Pressures from family and others may also lead her to present a more or less feminine appearance.

To the best of my knowledge, research to date on gender dysphoria has never addressed the issues of language use or code-switching. I have observed, however, that even before transition, FTMs appear far less likely than MTFs to exhibit the most marked speech styles associated with their original (feminine) gender. Although pre-transitional MTFs may function as fire captains, executives, etc., with communication styles appropriate to these roles, it is rare to find a pre-transitional FTM with extremely feminine speech. I have never met a FTM (pre-transitional or in transition) who spoke with such obviously feminine characteristics as singsong pitch, rising intonation in statements, or marked strategies of indirectness.[7] Furthermore, I have never encountered a FTM whose conversational style alone posed a barrier to passing. (The situation of MTFs, as we shall see, is quite different.) One reason for these differences could be that the competitive arenas of work and higher education neither reward the extreme stereotypes of feminine speech nor severely punish a somewhat masculine style in women. Men who appear even slightly effeminate, however, face immediate stigmatization.

Gender interference in speech usually assumes one of the following forms: (1) display of knowledge atypical of the target gender; (2) style of asserting authority (most marked in MTFs); and (3) assumptions about the purpose of communication among peers.

An example of the first type of interference occurred when a young FTM unthinkingly recited the Brownie pledge in response to a buddy's remark about Girl Scout cookies. Only after the words had left his lips did Brad realize with

mortification that as a man he was not supposed to know the Brownie pledge. Similarly, at a national convention on gender issues, an elegantly groomed and coiffed MTF belied her femininity when, impatient with an equipment problem, she threatened to "kick some ass" in the hotel's program office.

In matters of sex and gender, ignorance can be dangerous as well. Maryanne, a well-dressed MTF of stunning femininity, felt flattered—and assumed she was passing—when a gentleman approached her in a pickup bar. The encounter appeared promising until he suddenly asked her if she had a clitoris. Thinking he was inquiring about a venereal disease, Maryanne responded with a horrified "No!" Only months later, when some FTM friends provided her with a brief lesson in female anatomy, did Maryanne understand why her prospective boyfriend had walked away chuckling.

It is a truism that women enjoy more latitude than men in expressing some cross-gendered traits. For instance, women can wear men's pants and shoes publicly, but men cannot wear dresses. Extremely assertive speech, however, is more jarring in a woman of feminine appearance than comparably effeminate speech in a man. A man who speaks in singsong tones or frequently uses adjectives like *divine* and *fabulous* evokes suspicions of homosexuality. Some FTMs who identify as gay men speak this way; they easily pass as such. When an otherwise passably feminine MTF speaks in a certain commanding tone, however, she immediately ceases to pass as a woman.

It is, in fact, in their styles of expressing authority that MTFs depart most strikingly from the speech-role expectations of their target gender. Many highly educated MTFs who held positions of authority as men—physicians, scientists, military officers, etc.—convey by their speech styles that they expect a certain unquestioning deference unknown to women of comparable status. In extreme cases, one senses that they expect others to listen to them in silence or to ask questions only as subordinates seeking instruction from a master. They are far more likely than women of similar credentials to react with anger or defensiveness if they perceive a lack of deference.

I have observed that professional women tend to exert their authority in a more subtle manner, possibly because a heavy-handed approach would antagonize others counterproductively. They may become skilled at deflecting overt challenges with equilibrium, simply because their career survival requires a certain flexibility in this area. Women as a rule do not learn the most extreme hierarchical styles associated with combat and football coaching (to name just two arenas of hypermasculinity), and they rarely learn to expect unquestioning deference. It jolts the eye to see a MTF claiming her (his?) masculine prerogatives.

Finally, in their adopted gender roles, many individuals continue to reflect in their speech certain subtle assumptions about the functions of communication within a group of peers. Tannen (1990) describes research indicating that boys learn early to assert independence and jockey for status, whereas girls learn to share feelings and build emotional connections. It is hardly surprising that such strategies, absorbed from the preschool years without explicit recognition, pose a major form of gender interference in adulthood.

In an illuminating instance, John (a FTM transgenderist) was conversing in a restaurant with Sue and Jill, both MTFs. Troubled about a romantic disappointment, John mentioned to his companions that a woman had just rebuffed him after he had sent her a dozen roses. He wondered aloud why she would react this way after earlier seeming receptive to him. Sue, visibly discomfited by the topic, hesitated before responding, "I'm not a therapist, but it sounds as if the flowers were a concrete symbol of something she didn't want to deal with." Jill then added a perfunctory comment before changing the subject.

In this encounter John, despite physically passing as a man, perplexed his companions by talking like a woman. Not only did he introduce awkwardness into the conversation by gratuitously announcing a personal failure, but he also disconcerted the MTFs by requesting something (advice? reassurance?) they were not prepared to offer. The FTM also felt slightly betrayed because his companions, while assuming the guise of women, refused to provide the support he would receive from female friends in such a situation.

John suffered no long-term loss of status from his lapse, but one can imagine the consequences if he had tried, let us say, over a period of weeks, to engage the sympathies of male co-workers at a machinist shop in this manner. Likewise, Sue and Jill would alienate female co-workers in an office if they rebuffed friendly overtures of emotional revelation.

Lisa, a lesbian MTF, found herself at odds with members of a lesbian rap group because of her communication style. Lisa passed perfectly as a woman at work and in the group. She often impressed others with her keen sensitivity to interpersonal relations. However, she spoke in an extremely forceful, straightforward manner, presenting facts and arguments with logical development, free of hesitation or hedges. Although she spoke politely, never interrupting or criticizing others, the lesbians objected to her speech. They told Lisa her "aggressive" manner made them uncomfortable.

A conversation among Lisa, John, and Les (a pre-transitional FTM still living as a woman) provides further evidence of this type of interference in both directions. Les wanted information on weight-training, an activity she had never tried, but in which both Lisa and John were experienced. Lisa immediately launched into a detailed discussion of the training method she had used as a man, punctuated with assertions that such training was *the* best program for most purposes. John, who had followed an entirely different method with satisfying results, had never heard of the program Lisa was describing. Out of curiosity (as well as to facilitate friendly rapport with Lisa) he listened attentively, asking polite questions. When John attempted to describe his weight-training methods, however, Lisa seemed to interpret this as a challenge to her authority. Instead of expressing interest with questions as John had, she offered rebuttals on specific points where her method held superior benefits. John, who desired only a friendly exchange with the purpose of giving the novice Les information on training options, became vexed at the prospect of a debate. He changed the subject with a conciliatory remark to Lisa about being happy to have learned something new. This exchange shows John and Lisa both carrying over conversational modes from their original genders in ways that cause misunderstanding.

If masculine interference in the form of aggression or commanding behavior can pose an obstacle to MTFs, it is also the case that adoption of a certain aggressive style can help a FTM pass, even when his physical appearance raises doubts. One FTM, challenged with a stranger's taunt, "Are you a man or a woman?" defiantly responded, "What's it to you, buddy?" This seemed to satisfy curious onlookers—as well as the aggressor—that the FTM was indeed a man. Hearing this anecdote, a MTF ruefully noted that in her case, the same reply would only serve to destroy her credibility as a woman.

From all these examples we see that gender interference appears more marked in MTFs than in FTMs, at least in the sense of impeding the ability to pass. Extreme forms of masculine expression in a woman of feminine appearance are more jarring than effeminacy in a man. This may be partly due to the fact that MTFs as men often cultivated the extreme expressions of that role, whereas even when living as women, FTMs rarely have a history of extreme conformance to feminine-role expectations. Moreover, as earlier noted, secondary transsexualism is common among MTFs but exceedingly rare in FTMs. This means that FTMs perceive their gender dysphoria from an early age—often from childhood—while a good number of MTFs enter middle age before reaching awareness of cross-gendered feelings. It stands to reason that people who have questioned or rejected their assigned gender role from childhood would assume their new role with a lesser burden of interference to overcome.

Feminine interference in FTM speech, by contrast, is subtler and rarely offends. In fact, a FTM who retains the communication tactics attributed by Tannen (1990) to women will operate effectively in most work situations and will attract the friendship of both sexes. It is true that his tendency to conciliate and his lack of one-upmanship may render him conspicuous in a competitive all-male arena. Unless he engages in excessive "troubles talk," however, he can expect to preserve his status. Even if he reveals personal weaknesses to the point of losing respect, this is unlikely to compromise his ability to pass. Few FTM speech acts—aside from revelations of sex-specific knowledge like the merits of tampons versus sanitary napkins—could destroy his gender credibility the way a certain intonation unmasks the former drill sergeant within a begowned MTF.

The cross-gendered are a remarkably diverse group whose experiences highlight little-explored questions of gender as psychological identity and social construct. Because most have lived as both men and women, they also offer a valuable resource for understanding code-switching in relation to sex/gender roles. I hope this article will stimulate further research on language use in a still poorly understood social minority group.

NOTES

1. H. Merle Knight holds an M.A. in linguistics from Cornell University and is self-employed as a translator. Interested readers may direct correspondence to P.O. Box 1105, Chino, CA, 91708-1105.
2. The cross-gendered population encompasses a broad range of subcategories based upon psychological identity and adaptive style. Medical science usually defines *transsexuals* as those

who pursue full physical transformation through hormonal therapy and sex reassignment surgery. More loosely, individuals who desire such reassignment are also considered transsexuals, even if (say, for financial or medical reasons) they never complete it.

Transgenderists, in contrast, assume the gender role opposite that of upbringing without desiring to change their physical sex. Some individuals identify as both men and women, choosing to live part of the time in each role or presenting such an ambiguous appearance that others cannot easily identify their sex or gender.

Mental-health professionals use the term *gender dysphoria* to include all cross-gendered phenomena (including transsexualism, transgenderism, and some forms of transvestism) that reflect discomfort with one's biological sex or the corresponding gender role. I have used the term *transsexual* in the title of this article because it is the most commonly understood word referring to gender-dysphoric conditions. In the text, however, I use other terms when appropriate. The reader will find a more thorough discussion of these issues in Money and Ehrhardt (1972), Benjamin (1966), Green (1974), and Green and Money (1969).
3. It is interesting that the satisfaction of passing often overrides other considerations. Valerie, a male-to-female (MTF) photography expert, worked as a saleswoman at a camera shop located in a notoriously conservative city. She knew she was passing because the executives who consulted her on technical questions would address her as *honey* and *babe*. Despite the demeaning nature of such treatment, the joy of passing, of feeling fully accepted as a woman, more than compensated for the insult to her professional status.
4. Contrary to popular impression, gender dysphoria is usually distinct from homosexuality. A cross-gendered person may function as heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual within the assumed gender role.
5. Although most cross-gendered people seek to modify their self-presentation in order to pass full-time if they can, the range of possible strategies is virtually limitless. Some individuals have been known to hold two jobs at a time, one as a man and the other as a woman. Some blend into mainstream society by obliterating every trace of their past, while others are entirely open about their status as transsexuals or transgenderists.
6. Tannen (1990) describes this process in detail, with a survey of relevant research in the disciplines of psychology and child development.
7. As observed by Seton (1991:10) some researchers believe that *secondary transsexuals*, who gradually become aware of gender-dysphoric feelings in adulthood, differ in etiology from *primary transsexuals*, who experience their conflict from early childhood. While primary transsexuals may be either male or female, secondary transsexuals are almost exlusively male. It appears logical that a man who functioned until mid-life as a conventional man, without significant gender conflicts, would have cultivated a fully masculine repertoire of behavior that poses strong interference in the adopted feminine role. A female-to-male, on the other hand, is likely to have consciously resisted certain aspects of her gender conditioning since childhood.

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Playing down authority while getting things done: Women professors get help from the institution[1]

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In *Language and Woman's Place*, Lakoff (1975) argues that women are faced with a dilemma: if they speak "like a lady," they are not taken seriously, while if they speak in a more serious, forceful way, they are not seen as "ladylike" and are still not accepted. Women in power repeatedly have had to confront that dilemma. Geraldine Ferraro, for example, has been called unflattering names because she's assertive.

Meanwhile, women have made some headway, enough, at least, for the glass ceiling to become noticeable. Some do have authority. So how do they deal with it? In this paper I will look at female professors, women with authority in a system that expects them to make clear to their students what they have to do and at the same time requires them, as female professors, to be perceived as both "nice/feminine" and competent enough to get good student evaluations.

In an analysis of directive speech acts of male and female professors at the University of California at Berkeley (Kuhn 1989), it was found that some women may indeed have found a way in which to have it both ways. Women used a technique that cut down on the "bossiness factor" while at the same time allowing them to make very clear what the students were supposed to do.

They accomplished this by appealing to "the institution," which shifted the apparent source of the imposition away from the professor, in a strategy similar to but more powerful than the supportive move "giving reasons," which also gives the students an "out" and saves their face. Female professors talked about "proceedings" and "requirements" as if they were detached from them, waving around syllabi as if they came from somewhere other than their own office, thus lessening the threat to their students' face. Once the main requirements were established, the need for mitigation was sharply reduced. The professors could talk about what they wanted their students to do in a straightforward and direct way since they were just "elaborating" on the requirements.

This strategy first caught my attention when I was puzzled to find that American professors used directives that were higher on the "display of authority" scale than those of the German professors with whom I compared them. Generally, Germans are considered more direct and blunt than Americans, so this was unexpected. However, after looking at the data more closely, it became clear that the Americans were able to get help from the university institution in a way the Germans were not. In this paper I will show how they did so and how it allowed women, especially, since they relied on this strategy most consistently, to use more direct speech acts for telling the students what they were supposed to be doing without appearing too blunt.

In Berkeley, professors were able to invoke the institutions of "requirements"

and "proceedings" as needed to get the students to work without having to resort to putting their own authority on the line. For example, they often announced, "We are going to talk about the requirements" or "Here are the proceedings," while waving their syllabi. This established what would be done in a way that suggested that there was some higher force that was responsible for it. For the most part, the details on the syllabus were to be taken as a given and there was not much room for discussion. Here is an example:

> I also tell you what the course requirements are, since I'm sure you're interested in that. Um, there is going to be a midterm and a final. Okay? The midterm is going to count forty percent of your total grade, and the final will count sixty percent. (Female Speaker 6)

The task at hand for the professors was to tell their students what to do. In the context of an American university, and of the University of California at Berkeley in particular, what the students were expected to do beyond simply participating in the proceedings was captured under the category *requirements*.

Requirements included buying books, reading them, writing papers, giving presentations, and taking exams. Even though students generally expected to do a certain amount of the above, there was some leeway on how much exactly they had to do.

Telling someone to do something is a face-threatening act (Brown & Levinson 1978). Thus, most of the professors in the study did not simply start telling their students, "You are to buy two books and read," or "You will buy two books and write two papers," but padded their requirements with an introduction. In most cases, they did so by explicitly referring to the institution of requirements. One very effective way was by pointing to the handout they had just passed out or were about to pass out to the students. These tactics created a distance between the professor and the requirements and made the professor appear a little less personally responsible for imposing on the students. Some professors even magnified this effect by giving reasons for having to go over the requirements.

In the following section I will show and analyze how some professors introduced their requirements. Female Speaker 1's introduction of her requirements was fairly typical:

> Now, let me say a little bit about the requirements for the course. I think if you look on the bottom of the second page, the cues are all there. (pause) I know all of you are interested in course requirements but also grading policies, and it's important I think for you to know about these in the beginning of the course, because I don't want there to be any surprises. There are two papers, the first paper, ah, let's see, is due it's back here (while looking on her sheet) at the beginning ...

The speaker begins by stating that she wants to talk about the requirements, using *let me say* and thereby asking for permission. Even though the request for permission is formulaic at best, it serves as a positive politeness feature, taking, at least on the surface, the wishes and feelings of the audience into account.

The specification *a little bit* serves as a downplayer, indicating that she is going

to talk only briefly and that the requirements are not to be thought of as imposing or burdensome.

When the speaker says, "Look at the bottom of the second page, the cues are all there," she cites the institution. She does not have to make the requirement explicit, at least not right away. The students are able to see for themselves. Besides, requesting students to take a look at something that is in front of them is an extremely low-cost request.

In the next sentence, she presents a strong reason why it makes sense for her to talk about the requirements at this point. The students, she implies, want to know, so she is not only not imposing on them but actually doing them a favor by telling them what she is about to tell them. She is thus using another positive-politeness strategy: taking the interests of her audience into account. In addition, she introduces another reason, outside necessity, saying, *It's important that you know about these*, which she hedges with *I think*. After all this preparation, she follows up with a straightforward listing of the requirements.

Most professors are not as elaborate in introducing the requirements, but the general idea—some intimation that the requirements were coming up—in the sense of "let's get to this obligatory part of the event and get it over with"—is rather common. This can be seen in the example of Female Speaker 6, cited above.

Like Female Speaker 1, she adds *since I'm sure you're interested in that*, thereby giving the most convincing reason possible for telling the students what they will have to do in the course and feeding their positive-politeness needs at the same time. However, it is especially interesting to note the hemming and hawing at the beginning of Female Speaker 6's utterance, which is used by some of the other professors as well, and seems to be an indication that introducing the requirements is one of the more stressful parts of giving the introductory lecture. Male Speaker 2 shows a particularly pronounced case of hesitation when he introduces his requirements:

uh, now, uh, you know, let me uh just shift into some of the requirements for the class.

As soon as that part is past, the hemming and hawing stop. The moment the cat is out of the bag and the words *course requirements* have been uttered, the speakers are back to their eloquent and self-confident selves. Most hesitation in this context takes place before the crucial word. It seems it is a hard word to get out, almost a dirty word, but once it has been said, it does its job and the institution takes over while the professor is off the hook and is able to go ahead and ask the students to do what the institution demands. However, while the introduction of the requirements is apparently one of the more difficult tasks for the professors during the first meeting of a class or seminar, the institutions of requirements and proceedings provide a tool that makes it easier for them overall. The following examples illustrate how the female speakers generally handle this aspect of the lecture.

Female Speaker 1, after a few introductory statements, starts her presentation of the material that will be covered in her course with a syllabus reference:

If you look at the syllabus, you will find that the uh the uh first two meetings are described as an introduction and

She proceeds to read from the syllabus, which has been distributed to everybody in the class. As she continues down the list, she adds reasons for practically every major item on the syllabus. After finishing her rundown of topics that will be discussed, she introduces her requirements with an explicit reference, as already quoted above.

In her presentation of the requirements, the professor relies heavily on her syllabus and the institution. She continues to refer to the institution when she refers to other things she wants to have done:

Now another quarter of the course requirements are a final exam ...

Female Speaker 2 also starts by handing out her syllabus and referring to it. She refers explicitly to it when she introduces her required readings:

Let me say a bit about these books, actually I'll just go down the list here and say a little bit about all these things, give you a dramatic reading of the syllabus. Books, required texts. ...

She adds a humorous note to her introduction by announcing a "dramatic reading" of the syllabus, which deflects the potential face threat of the requirements.

Female Speaker 4 also connects references to the syllabus with her introduction of the requirements. After briefly discussing some organizational difficulties, she passes around the syllabus:

Um, let's see, what else? I have here syllabi which tell you what are in the reading packet and so on, and we should pass these around the room. Um, see, start these this way and this way, send 'em on down. (laughs) NN, you've got one of those, okay? Let's see. (looking at and referring to syllabus) The course will have regular problem sets, not absolutely every week, but more weeks than not, anyways; there'll probably be about ten problem sets. There will also be a midterm and a final exam; the final exam is May 16, for those of you who are interested. The grading will be, it says here on your syllabus, 40% problem sets, 25% midterm, and 35% final exam.

Throughout this passage, she refers to the syllabus in her hand and adds an explicit reference, *it says here on your syllabus*, when she explains the grading. All this serves to create a distance between the requirements and herself.

Female Speaker 6 likewise starts by distributing her syllabus and goes on to refer to it throughout her presentation of the proceedings. While most of her actual directive core speech acts are in prediction form, which is quite high on the "display of authority" scale, she offsets the effect somewhat by having the syllabus in front of her and literally giving an annotated reading of it. When she arrives at the requirements, however, she explicitly refers to the institution and also gave, as was shown earlier in the section on introductions of requirements, a compelling reason for why she spoke about them at all.

Female Speaker 9 introduces what she will do in the meeting in the very

beginning, just before she distributes the syllabi:

> All right, uhm, today I'd like to do four things: first thing I'd like to do is, uh, to cover the nuts and bolts of this course and tell you what the requirements are and talk about getting in.

After some introductory exchanges in which she asks students about their personal experiences and has them fill out a questionnaire, and after announcing that anyone who wants to be in the course can take it, she introduces her requirements:

> What I'd like to do now is to go over the course requirements. You'll be reading eight books.

Aside from the reference to the institution of requirements, which distances her from them, she is very straightforward in her entire presentation, using many predictions and other explicit directive core speech acts, i.e., the strongest categories. However, throughout the presentation, she, too, continues to refer to her syllabus.

At first sight, the male speakers at Berkeley utilize the institution in a very similar way. Male Speaker 1, for example, starts his presentation, after an informal discussion of the students' experience with the issues dealt with in the course, by passing out a syllabus:

> Okay, now let me just pass out a quick outline of what I want to do. It's not as rigid as it looks on paper, but, uh, since I didn't expect this many people in the class, uh, I don't know if there are enough to go around.

After passing the syllabi around, he resumes with some disclaiming statements about the outline:

> I have to give you an outline. On the other hand, I don't like to be hemmed in to it, so I'm a little ambivalent about an outline. It does give you a clear idea of what I want to do, at least to begin with. If your interests change as we go along, of course, we can make some modifications in this outline. The only reason [sic] had to plan ahead in order to order books for you to read. And the books are listed under topics here.

At first sight, the above introduction of the syllabus seems very much like the typical introduction of the female speakers, and Male Speaker 1 presents himself as even more flexible than his female counterparts. Then again, this flexibility, as presented in these data, is actually a symptom of something else that was going on: while Male Speaker 1 presented a syllabus and refers to it when he expresses what he wants his students to do, his introduction of the outline makes it very clear that he himself and nobody else is responsible for what is on it. He explicitly takes full responsibility for what he requires in the course.

Unlike many of the female speakers, he does not wave the syllabus about, saying, "As you can see on the syllabus," as if he has nothing to do with its contents. Instead, he explains in detail how and why he has chosen what is on the syllabus. This gives mentions of the syllabus an entirely different meaning.

In his next comments, he sounds again like one of the female speakers (Female Speaker 1):

> The, first let me just say, for, well, let me first say something about assignments, because that's something students worry about. I have two midterms and a final.

He proceeds to explain the reasoning behind his decision to add another midterm:

> and I added this first midterm rather early to get you going on reading, uh, discussions, so that you will not fall behind.

Here again, he explicitly refers to himself as the person who has made the decision, and he adds as an aggravator that the purpose of the midterm is to monitor the students' progress and keep them on their toes.

In the end, he asks for feedback on the idea of having two midterms and gives some reasons why he is doing it. Again, while certain elements lower the display of authority, the fact that he is explicit about being the person responsible for the midterms raises it again.

Male Speaker 3 also combines the mentions of the institution with statements that make it clear that it is really he who is responsible for the work the students have to do:

> I think the book list is fairly self-explanatory: when you go over the first assignment, which I expect you to read by Friday, I want you to read NN's XX. But I have not assigned a textbook for you to go out and buy because I assumed either you have a copy of XX which will include the NN, or you will be delighted to go out and provide yourself with it. As you see, when it comes to hardware, uh, I'm gonna ask you to do one midterm, which will primarily be a reading check to make sure that you're with it. And then, uh, you'll be doing a paper, well along toward the end of the term.

The phrases *which I expect you to read* and *I want you to read* are clearly an indication that Male Speaker 3 is taking on the responsibility. The next passage about not having assigned a textbook also indicates the source of the assignments. And in the introduction of the requirements, again he says he will ask the students to do the midterm and adds an aggravating remark about checking up on their doing the reading.

DISCUSSION

While both men and women referred to the institution, which probably made the requirement task easier for both groups, there was a clear difference between the men and the women in how they did so and how much they utilized this strategy to make their control acts less imposing.

Hardly any of the men's requirement references made it appear that they were covering a long list of the details. Most of their references were only for an individual requirement, and most of the time they were disambiguated right away. Thus, while the men used institutional references, they did not rely on them to a

great extent. Instead, they often made clear very quickly who wrote the syllabus and was thus the source of the students' workload by giving reasons why *they* put a specific item on the syllabus or elaborating what *they* wanted students to do.

The women, on the other hand, showed a much greater reliance on the mitigating power of the institutional reference. In the above description of the women's institutional references, one can see how the women presented the syllabus as the source of what would happen in the classroom and what the students would have to do. Once the students knew about the main requirements and the outline of the course, they merely needed to be filled in on the details. At that point, the professor needed to do less face-saving work and could thus use relatively straightforward and unmitigated directives without coming across as too authoritarian. When put together with the institutional references, even prediction-type directives (*You will read XXX by Tuesday*) no longer seemed to be coming from the professor directly, but were presented as something that the institution demanded. Thus, while the professors predicted what the students would do, this was acceptable because they—and the students—knew that it was what the institution expected from them.

In the same way, the women's reliance on the institution might have made up for their relatively low use of modifiers. While the institution enabled them to use more straightforward speech acts with fewer modifiers, the women also used their control acts in much more detail than did the men. Thus, their use of modifiers appears low in comparison to the Frankfurt women, and they do not appear to use many more than the Berkeley men.

Since the main work for the professor was to tell the students that they would have to, for example, write a paper, most of the modifiers tended to be in that part of the control act. When the professor proceeded to give details about the paper or add more details to a lecture plan, etc., the expectations of the students changed and less face-saving work was required from the professor.

Unlike hedges and downplayers and other such devices, references to the institution did not have the effect of making the speaker sound less authoritative, since she was not playing down herself and what she had to say, yet she decreased the threat to her hearers' face. It thus appeared to provide a possible way out of the double bind and enabled women professors to appear friendly and cooperative while getting students to do work.

To illustrate the politeness work that is done by this strategy, one has only to look at professors in a country that does not provide the tools to appeal to the institution in the same manner, e.g., Germany. Compared to the men, women used many more hedges, other mitigating and supporting devices, and directive speech-act variants that relied less on their authority, while in fact both women and men used far more mitigating and supporting devices than their American counterparts. In particular, women used more reasons, downplayers, and enticers, which played down their personal role in the requests while getting across what had to be done, something that the American women professors were able to accomplish simply by appealing to the institution. This explains the seemingly incongruous findings that the German speakers used more mitigated and polite forms than their American counterparts.

It also shows that even though the American women were very similar to the American men in their use of hedges and directive speech-act choice, their stronger reliance on the institution might have a profound impact on how they were perceived. They did give away their own authority by drawing on the authority of the institution to get their students to do their work. On the other hand, by avoiding hedges and other mitigating devices used by the German female speakers, they were able to accomplish the task at hand in a more reliable fashion: they did make it clear to the students that the work needed to be done.

Society has not changed very much. As we can see from the Ferraro example, women still have reason to worry about the double bind. Help from the institution may get the job done, but its use also shows that many women may not feel it is safe to openly use the authority they do in fact have. It could also show that the female professors feel they need help from the institution to bolster their authority, which they may perceive as not strong enough on its own account to get the students to do their work.

NOTES

1 . This paper presents data and analysis from a much larger project. A revised version of the entire project will appear later in 1992 under the title "Gender and Authority: Classroom Diplomacy at German and American Universities," at Gunter Narr, Tubingen.

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Gender differences in the use of persuasive justification in children's pretend play

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Recent research suggests that language can constitute power in interaction. For example, Lakoff (1973) and Ervin-Tripp (1976) have shown that *direct speech* is a construct of power and is used more by men than by women and more often to women than to men. Another linguistic form which may be related to the constitution of power in discourse is the *persuasive justification*. Persuasive justifications are speech acts which support and persuade addressees to comply with control moves (e.g., directives, plans) and beliefs. They may be marked by causal connectives (e.g., BECAUSE, SO).

(1) Now it's his turn BECAUSE the seals are tired out, right? (4 years, female)

(2) That guy was in a car crash SO he needs an ambulance thing right here. (7 years, male)

Control moves with persuasive justifications are given in (1) and (2). In (1), the control move is *now it's his turn*, which can be paraphrased *Let my seal have a turn* , and the justification or warrant is that the seal is tired (after all, he's been performing a while). The justification clause is marked with BECAUSE. In (2), the control move is the indirect request to bring the ambulance. The justification or warrant is that there has been a car crash. The causal expression has an evidential as well as a speech-act meaning—the warrant supports both the belief that an ambulance is needed and the indirect speech act (Kyratzis, Guo, & Ervin-Tripp 1990; Schiffrin 1987; Sweetser 1990). Evidential expressions have an important role in constituting social relationships in discourse (Ochs 1991). The person who is right commands greater power in the relationship.

Causal constructions with persuasive justifications can be formed without an explicit causal connective, as in (3).

(3) Child 1 : Okay, the kid's operation is over; you can put the grown-up back on this. [i.e., the stretcher]
    Child 2 : No! the grown-up's mom is on the telephone and his head is better. (4 years, male)

The control move is Child 2's refusal, *No!* The justification is the warrant that the grown-up's mother has called and said that the grown-up is all right. Other markers of dispreferred moves (e.g., BUT, WAIT) can also serve as head acts for justifications (Gerhardt 1990).

Persuasive justifications are constructs of power in that they are used to get addressees to go along with control moves and to comply. According to Ervin-Tripp, Guo, and Lampert (1990), they are especially likely when control moves are met with obstacles or potential obstacles, as in retries and refusals.

In this paper, I report on gender differences in the use of this tactic by boys and girls interacting in same-sex pairs. These gender differences will be evaluated in terms of recent models of gendered talk and gendered interaction. Gilligan's (1988) psychological framework, describing gender differences in reasoning about moral conflicts, characterizes the feminine orientation as focusing on the relationship and the masculine as focusing on the self. Sheldon's (1990) and Goodwin's (1980) work on conflict styles in same-sex dyads found that for girls, talk is a way in which intimacy is maintained, and when girls play in groups, they tend to make suggestions that are good for the group, rather than give orders. Boys' talk is concerned with negotiating status and structuring hierarchical relationships and is more heavy-handed and controlling. These findings support the view that boy-boy speech is more competition-oriented and adversarial, while girl-girl speech is more collaboration-oriented and affiliative.

To examine whether there are gender differences in use of persuasive justification consistent with the above interaction styles, use of this tactic by children in same-sex dyads was examined. Ten peer-peer dyads at each of two ages, 4 and 7 years, were videotaped in a role-play situation in which they were given an elaborate-scenario toy (i.e., either a medical- or circus-scenario toy) and were asked to play any way they wanted to for twenty minutes. There were five boy-boy dyads and five girl-girl dyads at each age. Children within each dyad were "best friends" in their class—parents had been asked to provide this information on the parental consent form. All instances of use of persuasive justifications were extracted and coded for pragmatic function and certain linguistic features. This paper reports on the findings from two of the five dyads of each sex at each age, in other words, on forty percent of the data collected.

The findings support the above characterizations of girls' talk as relationship-oriented and boys' talk as power- and status-oriented. Girls and boys used persuasive justifications in markedly different ways. Girls used them to validate their own control moves and those of their partner, trying to justify the fit of the control move to the overall theme or topic (i.e., circus or doctor's-office visit). Hence, girls were trying to validate and rationalize behavior in terms of a group goal. Boys, in contrast, used persuasive justifications only when they were having trouble getting their control moves complied with—that is, in *obstacle moves*. Obstacle moves are defined here as control moves which are likely to encounter a challenge from the addressee; they include refusals and moves attempting to get goods away from the addressee. In other words, boys used justifications to impose and receive compliance for difficult control moves; they did not use them to rationalize, validate, and reflect on control moves. The percentage of persuasive justifications in obstacle moves was 85% for boys and only 33% for girls. A helpful way to think about the boys' use is to liken it to the behavior of a teacher who uses explanations only to get students to comply with control moves rather than to understand or make sense of them.

These general pragmatic functions of persuasive justifications seem to correlate with other features: their participation structure and aspects of their linguistic marking. In many cases, girls' persuasive justifications were jointly constructed across speaker turns. One child would designate a control move and the other child would provide the justification for it. In terms of linguistic features, girls' persuasive justifications were more likely to get subordinate marking (54%) in comparison to boys' (31%). Concomitantly, boys' justifications were more likely to be unmarked by causal connectives (69%) in comparison to girls' (46%). Girls were also more likely than boys to use SO as a *pop-marker*, that is, as a marker of return to the role-play theme after a digression (see Polanyi 1978). Boys were more likely to use evidential justifications, constituting themselves as being "right" about matters at hand. Finally, another difference was in the reasonableness of the justification given: boys' more often than girls' justifications were non-reasons and ad-hoc reasons.

These differences in pragmatic functions and features of persuasive justifications between boys and girls are demonstrated in examples (4) through (7). Example 4 is from a dyad of four-year-old males. The justifications are presented in boldface. The head speech acts are presented in italics. Arrows lead from the justifications to the head acts they support. In some cases, a single utterance may serve as both head act to one causal structure and justification to another; these are presented in boldface as well.

(4)

```
1    C: You need him? [refers to musician]
2    J: Yeah.
3    C: No, no, no, no. No, I need him.
4    J: Carl ...
5    C: Okay.
6    J: That's mine.
7    C: I need ... need ... some of ...
8    J: I don't need this [musician], I need ... I'll need the hole [refers to seal hoop].
9    C: Hey John, this is a good guy [refers to the clown], that boy could play and
10      play, he could play all the way *home. 'Cause that's his home. [refers to
11      the concession stand]
12   J: ..A clown. [taking clown from C] Guess what I think, 'cause I have a clown.
13      So this is mine; I got an exciting show. You need these, Carl?
14   C: Yeah, I need 'em.
15   J: No, I need; umm ...
16   C: What?
17   J: I need, umm ... this! [referring to seal hoops]
18      So they could go through. 'Cause this is a hoop ...
19   C: Here! No, here! [handing J seal stool]
20   J: I don't need this. [throws the seal stool down]
21      I need ... um .. a big one and a little one. [refers to hoop sizes]
22   C: Oh.
23   J: A big round.
24   C: I think this is for him. [picks up seal] Look what he has!
25   J: Well, I'm gonna put everything in here. [J starts putting all the figures and
26      objects into the concession stand; C tries to grab it]
27   J: This ... No, Carl! This is mine! [pulls concession stand out of C's reach]
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28   C: No. No, that's a clown. See, there's a clown. That's the boy's home!
29      [referring to pictured clown on concession stand]
30   J: These are *all the boys' homes and this guy's home. See, he put ... he put
31      ... he goes with even his stuff that he brought. But he goes with these
32      guys. Aak! .. And his home. [J shoves all the figures and objects into the
33      concession stand]
34      And this .. and this ... come on *dolphin! Urgh! [forcing seal into concession
35      stand] Awww! I can't get it in! Can I put this guy on here?
36      [pointing to roof of concession stand] Can I have one of the music stands?
37      [J reaches into C's pile and pulls out a music stand]
38   C: No, no, because ...
39   J: Carl! Carl! [objecting] This is where I s'posed to start! [J pours
40      everything out of the concession stand onto the circus ring, where C had put
41      one of his figures]
42      I don't need this. You can have this if you want to. [gives C the concession
43      stand]
44   C: Oh, thank you. [starts to put the concession stand into the ring]
45   J: This ... No, Carl, this isn't your place, it's mine.
46   C: I know, but *that's mine. [referring to the bleachers surrounding the ring]
47      Hey, I need *that!
48   J: Then, *here. [sounding upset, he moves away from the part of the ring that
49      C wanted to use] And I need this. [J spreads his toys out so that they cover
50      almost all of the ring]
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The conflictive style evident here is consistent with the interaction style reported by Sheldon (1990) for three-year-old boys. There is continual conflict over goods appropriation, and conflict does not get resolved amicably, but through rather heavy-handed means. One-upsmanship is clearly involved here. Several features of boys' justifications are evident in Example (4). One is that the preponderance of justifications are used to support obstacle moves such as refusals and moves to appropriate the partner's goods. Refusals are entailed, for example, in (27) and (28) (*No, Carl, this is mine* and *No, that's a clown*). Goods-appropriating moves are entailed in (12) and (30); *Guess what I think, 'cause I have a clown* sanctions J's move of taking the clown away from C and *These are *all the boys' homes* challenges C's warrant that the concession stand belongs to the person having the clown.

A second feature of boys' justifications evident here is the ad-hoc nature of explanations, such as (30) (*These are *all the boys' homes*), which is not a true condition until J makes it so (by stuffing all the human figures into the concession stand) and (39) (*This is where I s'posed to start!*), in which J claims something that had not previously been agreed upon. Some justifications are also non-reasons, as in (27), (45), and (47); *it's mine* and *I need that* just restate control moves.

A third feature is that many of the causal constructions with justifications lack connectives or have discourse markers as connectives, as in (28) (*No, that's a clown* and *See, there's a clown. That's the boy's home*); (42) (*I don't need this; You can have this*); and (45) (*No, Carl, this isn't your place, it's mine*). The discourse marker SEE introduces an evidential clause in a particularly challenging way. The implications of lack of subordination will be discussed below.

Boys' justifications also lacked joint construction. The only exception is the causal construction in (47-8), *Hey, I need that; Then, here*, where C provides the warrant for his getting allocated a small amount of circus-ring space and J concludes he should therefore get it. However, this is not a truly validating move on the part of J, since in the next move he uses his conceding the small amount of ring space to C as a warrant for taking over the whole rest of the ring!

Finally, it should be noted that the circus theme or topic does not get well elaborated due to constant conflict over who gets what. Some reasonable circus-related plans get put forth (e.g., the plan to start a show, the plan to get seals to go through hoops), but these are not pursued or built upon. The circus plans are not important in and of themselves but are means to one-upsmanship goals.

These features contrast sharply with the features of the persuasive justifications of the four-year-old girls in (5) below.

(5)

1	[J and Z are playing with circus scenario; each has a seal and is trying to bend
2	it into sitting position]
3	J: Just do it like this, okay? Make it like this. [places seal on stool in non-seating
4	position]
5	Z: [leans over and grabs toy] No, *like this*, so the seal can sit.
6	J: Okay, how, how do we make it? [Z grabs seal away from J]
7	J: No, *wait*, I know. Okay. Wait a minute. [continues to play with seal]
8	Z: Like this, Jane. [displays her seal]
9	J: Okay.
10	Z: There we go. [Z manages to put human figure into sitting position]
11	J: Okay. Now. Oh! There his is. [attempts to take figure from Z and Z resists]
12	J: [tries to pull human figure away from Z] Zinnia, that's me. *I'm supposed to*
13	*act her*. **I'm supposed to act myself.**
14	Z: [grabs other human figure] This is you. The teenager.
15	J: Okay. [puts the other human figure aside] **This is me.** *So I'm supposed to*
16	*act her and you're supposed to act *her*, because you're the mom. Pretend I
17	was moving this up and down and up and down and up and down. [moves
18	appendage on figure]
19	Z: **Pretend that I could sit the seals**
20	J: [interrupts] *on, so it was harder*. And I didn't let the seals fall off.
21	Z: and pretend somebody was ice-skating on the rink. There was a mom.
22	Wait, *pretend you got off the rink* to watch for a while. [Z grabs J's figure
23	and places it in front of J]
24	J: Okay, I got off it. [picks up the figure]
25	Z: *Now, now somebody's on the ice-skate rink* 'cause when she ... [grabs
26	J's figure again] I'll set her up to be standing.
27	J: Okay. But *he is the audience. [grabs a male figure and places it in front of
28	Z] Wait. I'll be right back. [J goes to Z's side] Pretend they were
29	boyfriend and girlfriend, okay? [J returns to her seat]
30	Z: And you're sitting where the man- where the lady zooms by, but she slows
31	down when she gets to you. Okay? [Z runs her figure along the "ice" until it
32	reaches C's side of the circus ring]
33	They say, "Who's that?"
34	J: And I say- and I say- and I say [gets up and walks towards Z]
35	Z: "Mama!"

36	J: "*Oh, he's my boyfriend.*" **We're talking.**
37	Z: No, no, you ask, "Who's that?" and then you take a good look and say,
38	"That's your mom!"
39	J: Um, "Who's that?"
40	Z: And I say, "That's my mom."
41	J: And he, and he says, "That's my mom."
42	Z: Yeah, *they both say that* because they're twins.
43	J: [walks back to her side] Yeah, um, but but they're boyfriend and girlfriend
44	too.
45	Z: Come on, say that. Say it.
46	J: "Oh, we're brother and sis ... We're twins, and we're girlfriend and
47	boyfriend too."
48	Z: "Hello, sweetie!"

A striking difference is the decrease in the amount of opposition—refusing and giving reasons for refusing. The linguistic counterpart of this is the absence of NO-marking. Some opposition does occur, but when it does, it is well grounded. For example, in (12-13), *Zinnia that's me. I'm supposed to act her. I'm supposed to act myself*, J has good reason to oppose Z's opposition to giving her the figure, since they had previously designated that J would take on the role of that figure. Moreover, J is not threatened when Z suggests she take on the role of another figure (the teenager); she readily takes up that role and she herself follows up on the implication of that move (*This is me. So I'm supposed to act her*, lines 15-16). Justifications, rather than being deployed for one-upsmanship goals such as imposing moves likely to be resisted by the addressee, are used to explain and rationalize the control moves in terms of their topic-appropriateness, hence validating at the same time both control move and topic. This reflective function is seen in (36), where the justification *We're talking* rationalizes the appropriateness of the character speech that J is designating (*"Oh, he's my boyfriend"*).

Justification is an outcome of a process of joint construction for the girls. Jointly constructed justifications occur in (15-16), where J follows up on the implications of Z's suggestion (*This is me. So I'm supposed to act her*), and (40-42), where Z constructs a context within which both girls' role-play suggestions can be realized (*they both say that because they're twins*). Another example is (19-20) (*Pretend that I could sit the seals on, so it was harder*), where J follows up on Z's suggestion by saying that her proposal makes for a better ("harder") trick. These uptakes of partners' proposals and plans simultaneously validate both the partners' suggestions and the role-play theme as a whole.

Note that in this exchange the reasons are not ad hoc; nor are they non-reasons. The reflective rather than impositional stance taken here renders it unlikely that farfetched reasons will be called upon; the goal is to make sense of the control moves in terms of a larger cognitive context. Another difference in the reasons given is that they tend to tap social-conventional rules to a greater extent than is the case for the boys. For example, the twins solution (40-42) calls upon social conventions of who can call whom by what relational terms.

There is also more subordination in the girls' talk than the boys'. This too has to do with reflective stance. In earlier research (Kyratzis 1991) I found that

subordination occurs when the *reason clause* is asserted with a strong pragmatic force relative to the *action clause*. The reflective stance taken by the girls is more conducive of a true concern with reasons, hence increasing the likelihood that the speaker will want to assert the reason clause with a strong pragmatic force. In the boys' interaction, in which reasons are incidental and the goal is to impose control moves, coordination is more appropriate since this allows the control move (i.e., action clause) to be stated with a greater pragmatic force. A strong pragmatic force is necessary in refusals.

Another feature of the girls' discourse is the clear differentiation between *narrative* and *stage-managing* voices (Wolf & Hicks 1989). The *narrative voice* refers to when the role-play plan is actually being enacted. It is distinctly marked with event descriptions, third-person references to the action (e.g., *you're sitting where the man- where the lady zooms by, but she slows down when she gets to you*, lines 30-31). In contrast, the *stage-managing voice* refers to when the speakers are telling each other what should go on in the play. It is marked with first- and second-person references (e.g., *I'm supposed to act her, and you're supposed to act her*, lines 15-16) and metapragmatic utterances such as *pretend* (e.g., line 19). It is the negotiation or planning phase of the activity. In the conflict style of the boys, the two voices are undifferentiated, such that there is no clear forum for validating and evaluating plans.

The next question is whether these differences in interactional goals and justifications hold up across age. Examples (6) and (7) are interactions of a dyad of seven-year-old boys and one of seven-year-old girls, respectively. The boys' interaction maintains many features that characterized that of the four-year-old boys.

(6)

1	B: How do you get this cast off?
2	K: It's got to go on the other arm.
3	B: Doesn't fit. [can't manage to get cast off figure]
4	Well, anyways, this goes like this. [tries to put a second cast on the figure]
5	K: *No*, he could only have one.
6	B: *No. no.* **He had a broken, he had a broken wrist too.**
7	K: No, let's say ... [i.e., K wants his figure to get a cast]
8	B: [interrupts] *But* **that one didn't need a cast.**
9	K: He got run over by a truck.
10	B: yeah, and the other ...
11	K: *See if he has a broken wrist, I'll put it on.*
12	B: *No*, it doesn't fit.
13	K: *Yes, it will,* watch. Watch, watch, watch, watch, watch. There. [gets the cast
14	on]
15	B: Okay. Make the doctor (tired).
16	K: It has to be out quite a ways. [moving cast down figure's arm]. Chaa! Agh!
17	[cast comes off]
18	B: See, I told you.
19	K: Oh, well, this thing is hardest.
20	B: *So don't put it back on.*
21	K: You're supposed to say, "Yup."

22	B: **But he has a broken ... um, he has a bro-, he has a um .. sprained wrist,**
23	*so he's gonna need a wheelchair.* We don't have a wheelchair, though.
24	K: Yeah, we don't have a wheelchair.
25	B: Well, anyhow ...
26	K: [interrupts] What's this?
27	B: Some puratex, um, one pill of puratex ...
28	K: [interrupts] Yeah, one pack of pills-
29	B: [interrupts] No, one pill of puratex a day, and he should be all fixed up.
30	K: *But wait a minute.* He hasn't put the casts on it, okay? [meaning 'So how
31	can he be all fixed up?'] See how he hasn't put the casts on it , all right ?
32	B: [slowly, softly] He has.
33	K: No. Let's say he hasn't because he forgot to use his doctor kit.
34	B: Oh yeah, *he doesn't need doctor's kit.* All right, see? The doctor's kit's
35	not good.
36	K: Let me see. [looks inside doctor's bag] Oh yeah, I know; he has to trim
37	( ). We need to take these casts off.
38	B: *We have to cut his hair* to fit it.
39	K: To fit the cast and *you also have to cut the cast* to fix him.
40	B: Okay, we'll have to do it on the floor.
41	K: Let's say that he called for assistant,
42	B: No ..
43	K: *So here comes his neph- other assistant.*
44	B: Is um ...
45	K: because this guy, this is the guy's day off. [continue with long argument
	over who will be the assistant]

Like the four-year-old boys' interaction, this interaction is characterized by a great deal of opposition and conflict. Again, justifications are used to support obstacle control moves—refusals for the most part, as in (6) (*No. He had a broken wrist too*). There are no jointly constructed causals except one (*K: this thing is hardest; B: So don't put it back on*, lines 19-20), in which B uses K's own proposal in 19 against him (i.e., to keep the casts off, which is what B wants). Due to the extensive conflict and time it takes up, the theme is not advanced far, although interesting proposals are put forth: the doctor forgot his kit; somebody has a sprained wrist, the hair and cast have to be cut; an assistant has to be called for. Although non-reasons are not as frequent here as in the younger boys' discourse, there are a few. Line 5 (*he could only have one*) is an example.

Evidential justifications marked with SEE (e.g., lines 30-31, where K proves B is wrong about the patient being all fixed up; lines 34-5, where B proves himself right about the doctor's not needing his kit) are used to constitute the speaker as being one-up in the conversation by being "right." Forms lacking subordination (e.g., *no, it doesn't fit* and *Wait a minute, he hasn't put the casts on it*, lines 12 and 30) are used to assert obstacle moves with a strong pragmatic force.

How does the interaction of seven-year-old girls' compare with that of boys? In (7), two seven-year-old girls are playing circus.

(7)

1	Y: The cymbal's in the middle, the accordion's right here, and the cello
2	bass is right there.

3   R: Okay, I can't do this. *I'll go to *that.* [having trouble snapping
4   cuffs onto one musician, snaps them onto another]
5   Y: *Now, I'll put the cymbal player going.* Everybody's waiting for
6   the circus to begin. *I'll make the sound of cheering.* [she cheers and
7   R joins in].
8   R: There's only three people. Yvonne, there's only three people.
9   Y: [laughs] *Yeah, then we can *all snore.*
10   R: When's the show going to start? [Y is cheering]
11   Y: Yes, I'm so glad to be in the circus.
12   R: I know.
13   Y: *I don't think we should make so much noise* when someone is working
14   right next to us. Well, not right next to us.
15   R: Yeah, well, yeah, but the class .. , but a class, of course. [says this with
16   British accent] but a class, of course. But, of, but of course it's very close.
17   Y: Yeah.
18   R: *Man. I think, you know what? I think he should be a player in one of these*
19   *because it just won't work.* Can I, um, use this? [requesting cello from Y]
20   Y: *All right.* 'Cause then he could be the announcer because he doesn't
21   need both hands.
22   R: Yeah.
23   Y: Only needs one hand.
24   R: He's the announcer? Apouncer, pouncer, prouncer? [both girls giggle]
25   Y: Hey, look where cello bass hold on? Right there.
26   R: Yeah.
27   Y: Right there. But that wouldn't really be true [in real life]. You just rest it on
28   your chest.
29   R: Uh huh.
30   Y: *But* these are just toys, of course. *So you can't make toys look just like*
31   *real people.* Anyways, this is only Playmobil.
32   R: Yeah. And Playmobil's fun. Playmobil is fun.
33   Y: Even if it isn't realistic. Well, it *is realistic* because ...
34   R: *But* there's only three people at the circus. That's why I'm saying.
35   But there's only three people. Well, *who cares.* Maybe everyone's at
36   school today. And those kids, um, are um .. don't want to go to school.
37   Y: Or, *well,* you have to go to school even if you don't want to.
38   R: Yeah ..
39   Y: *But* they're sick. But, but that's why *they stay apart from each other.*
40   They've all got different sicknesses. [spreads the three audience
41   children apart in the bleachers].
42   R: Yeah.
43   Y: They're sick *so they all come to the circus.*
44   R: *No let's, let's just say it's a school day and everybody's out of town.*
45   *'Cause it's in, um, June.*
46   Y: *And no one knows about the circus, but them.* 'Cause this musician
47   invited her. This musician invited her. [points to musicians in audience]
48   R: Okay, um, okay. Okay, here. You want ... okay, I'm the announcer.
49   Y: I'll stay here. Listen to music, and you.
50   R: [in a deep voice] "Hello."
51   Y: If you're the announcer, *I think you should sit right here* so you can see
52   what you're doing. [means that R should sit at a place where she can control
53   the "announcer"]
54   R: Uh, okay. Okay. "Hello, everybody. My name is P."
55   Okay, what should his name be?
56   Y: Pee-ka-ree-kee. [both laugh]

57   R: *Okay,* that's a good name for a person. "Hello, everybody. My name is
58   Peekareekee. Welcome to the show. Um, my name is Pee ... oh, ya already
59   know that. Um, these are my ... " [drops figure] Oops! [both laugh] Cut,
60   cut, cut! [waves hand in front of researcher's camera]
61   Y: Hey, that's my (works)! [refers jokingly to R having knocked over her
62   figure]
63   R: Cut, cut, cut!
64   Y: Yes, yes, we'll cut. All right, the camera's cut in half.
65   R: Yeah.
66   Y: Cut in half, *it can't do anything anymore.*
67   R: *Okay, let's say he doesn't do that anymore and he has this because*
68   *that's always messing up.* But we'll (do it without that). Okay?
69   "Hello, ready, okay."
70   Y: No, he never talks out loud. *He doesn't use that.*
71   R: Let's say his name should be John Leshe.
72   Y: All right.
73   R: "Hello, everybody. My name is John Leshe. [places figure in center of
74   ring] and I want to welcome you to the performance of the music circus.
75   Of course, there is no animals. There is a clowns and a music band.
76   *So, uh, bye."*
77   Y: Yay! It's going to start! It's going to start! Yay, yay, yay!
78   *Okay, will you make the music?*

The gender difference remains at age seven. In Example (7), we see little opposition and use of justifications for non-obstacle control moves. There are numerous validations manifested through joint construction of causal constructions. For example, in (8-9), Y takes up R's observation that there are only three audience figures and points out its implications (i.e., now everybody can sleep through the show). In (20-21), Y takes R's suggestion that one of the musicians not function as such and validates this suggestion by saying that he can function as an announcer. In (34), R takes up Y's concerns with whether the toys are realistic, validating them with regard to her own concerns surrounding realism (i.e., there are only three audience figures). In (39-40), Y validates R's previous suggestion that the kids stayed out of school, which had encountered obstacle, by saying that the kids stayed out because they were sick (rather than by choice). In (46-47), Y takes up R's suggestion that everybody is out of town and extends it by saying that no one knew about the circus except the three kids who heard about it through the musicians.

Note that the reasons given are not ad hoc or non-reasons. Many relate back to things that had been previously agreed upon in the discourse. For example, (67-68) (*he doesn't do that anymore and he has this because that's always messing up*) refers back to what the girls had just agreed upon, that the character is always messing up the camera business. We see a concern again with social-conventional causality themes, such as the fact that one can't stay out of school just because one wants to and that everybody can be out of town when it's June.

Frequent subordination marks this interaction. To give just two examples, in (20-21), Y says, "he could be the announcer because he doesn't need both hands" and in (45), Y says, "They're sick, so they all come to the circus." Subordination involves a focus on reasons, indicating reflective stance.

Also occurring here are the pop-marking uses of SO and other markers. In (5), for example, Y considers the assignment of where all the instruments go as inviting the inference (marked with NOW), that they should start the show proper. In (74-77), the girls treat John Leshe's completed introduction of the circus as inviting the inference that the character leave the stage and the show get underway (*"So, uh, bye"*). These pop-marking uses imply a commitment to advancing the role-play theme forward by encoding returns to it.

Other notable markers in this segment are the mitigators and designators that the proposed control moves are open for negotiation. Such designators include the LET'S construction, as in (46), (*let's just say it's a school day*) and the question forms used in (55) and (68) (*Okay, what should his name be?* and *But we'll do it without that, okay?*). Note also use of the mitigator MAYBE in (35-36) (*Maybe everyone's at school today*).

Hence, concomitant with open or negotiatory or reflective stance, we see certain features of justifications produced: appropriateness, concern with social-conventional norms, subordination, and commitment to theme advancement.

In conclusion, girls and boys use persuasive justification in markedly different ways, boys using it to impose control moves and exert control, and girls to validate jointly constructed themes. These uses, together with other linguistic forms, help constitute adversarial versus negotiatory stance. These gender differences should be viewed in terms of the cross-cultural approach advocated by Tannen (1990), by which girls and boys are seen to accomplish and display coherence in conversation in different but equally valid ways. Moreover, these interactive styles vary in how adaptive and functional they are according to context. In interactions where power is at issue, the boys' style may be more adaptive in terms of remaining one-up in the interaction. However, the entailments of the one-up interaction may have a cost in terms of the depth of the common ground that is articulated between friends, and hence the depth of the relationships that can be formed. Recall in these data that the boys' role-play themes did not get articulated as extensively as those of the girls; if this finding generalizes to the articulation of the common ground that needs to be established in relationships, then the style would clearly have a cost.

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When agents disappear: How gender affects the implicit causality of interpersonal verbs

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The study of the relation between language and gender is certainly not new nor is it exclusive to any one discipline. Work in several fields has shown the various ways in which language reflects and circulates culturally based beliefs about women and men, and has documented how gender variously promotes different linguistic forms. Nevertheless, relatively little is known about how various language practices combine with existing sexist stereotypes to sustain power inequities between the sexes. For example, it appears that even apparently neutral verbal descriptions of interpersonal episodes involving women and men impose different inferences about who has the power to act and who can only be acted upon. This paper describes a social-psychological approach to this question. The general strategy involves analyzing the causal inferences that people make in response to sentences in which a man or a woman is described as doing something to or feeling something about either a man or a woman.

Within social psychology, a great deal of research has explored how people make judgments about why things happen. *Attribution theory*, as it is called, is concerned with how people explain all kinds of events, from the mundane to the monumental. A key distinction is whether people attribute someone's behavior to *internal* causes (for example, the person's personality) or *external* causes (for example, something about the person's situation, including others in the situation). The distinction has a number of implications, not the least of which is whether a person is seen as originating an act or outcome or whether it happened because of forces beyond their control. The present research derives from this tradition and seeks to determine the role that language plays in suggesting who is seen as causal when someone does something to or feels something about another person.

Although most words carry varying amounts of implicit information about human actors (Miller & Johnson-Laird 1976), verbs in particular have been found to be regularly associated with certain kinds of causal inference (Abelson & Kanouse 1966; Au 1986; Brown & Fish 1983; Fiedler & Semin 1988; Hoffman & Tchir 1990; McArthur 1972; Van Kleeck, Hillger, & Brown 1988). Specifically, two types of interpersonal verbs have been linked with different kinds of attributions: *action verbs* and *state verbs*. The former express behaviors or relations between individuals with reference to overt actions (e.g, *help*, *criticize*) while the latter describe emotional or cognitive states (e.g., *admire*, *distrust*). Both are transitive verbs, with a logical subject and object.

Data indicate that sentences containing action verbs such as *S helps O* or *S criticizes O* tend to imply causation by S. In contrast, sentences containing state verbs such as *S likes O* and *S abhors O* lead one to see O as the locus of causality;

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that is, O is the reason for S's feelings. In other words, people infer that the human subject of a sentence is causal when that person acts on another but that the human object of the sentence is causal when the subject is described as feeling something about that person. So, the action verb sentence *Paul criticizes Scott* leads one to focus on Paul. Conversely, the state verb sentence *Paul likes Scott* leads one to focus on Scott as the cause for the liking (Brown & Fish 1983).

To explain this divergence of attributions due to verb type, two European social psychologists advanced the interesting argument that action and state verbs implicitly suggest different ideas about what led to the behavior in question and what will likely follow (Fiedler & Semin 1988). To test this idea, the investigators presented research participants with target sentences of the usual kind, to wit, brief interpersonal events, containing either action verbs or state verbs. Participants were asked to write sentences that described both what might have preceded and what might have followed the target sentences. These supplied sentences were then coded for evidence of implicit causality, specifically whether the subject or the object of the original sentence was seen as the subject in the supplied sentences. The researchers argued that action verbs lead people to imagine that S has originated the act and this fact would be evident by their also placing S as the subject in the antecedent sentence. However, in the case of state verbs, O is the imagined instigator and hence should show up more frequently as the subject of antecedent sentences. This is indeed what Fiedler and Semin found. In the case of action verbs causality flowed from S to O, but in the case of state verbs the causality flowed from O to S. Thus, S controls when an action verb is used and O controls when a state verb is used.

To illustrate the above argument, let us compare the action verb (AV) sentence *S helps O* with the state verb (SV) sentence *S likes O*. A typical sequence containing an AV is as follows:

Antecedent: S thinks about O.
Target AV sentence: S helps O.
Consequent: O thanks S.

For the SV sentence, the sequence could be as follows:

Antecedent: O encouraged S.
Target SV sentence: S likes O.
Consequent: S acknowledges O.

The antecedent sentence tells us about what led to the target behavior, specifically whose action is central, while the consequent sentence describes the aim of the behavior. If S is the origin and O is the aim, the antecedent sentence expresses what S did (i.e., has S in the subject position) and the consequent sentence expresses what O does as a reaction (i.e., has O in the subject position). On the other hand, if O is the origin and S is the aim, the whole sentence is understood as caused by O. Action verbs were found to elicit the S-to-O causal direction while state verbs were found to generate the O-to-S causal direction.

At first pass, this work indicates that verb choice can substantially direct

interpretation of who is perceived as having the power to act and who can only be acted upon. If true, this has implications for how interpersonal actions for women and men are described. But gender itself may have inadvertently contributed to the results. Even though there exists a considerable number of studies reporting gender variability in language use (Graddol & Swann 1989; Lakoff 1975; Thorne, Kramarae, & Henley 1983), the literature on implicit causality has rarely considered the possible impact of targets' gender on causal inferences elicited by simple S-Verb-O sentences. In the aforementioned study, only male names were used in the target sentences. In fact, most prior research on implicit causality generated by verb type has adopted male names. For example, in the classic study on this topic, Brown and Fish (1983) used either male names or no names, e.g., *A likes B*, in the target sentences.

Consequently, we designed a study in which both sexes would be incorporated.[1] We anticipated that target gender would make a difference but were initially of two minds as to what specific impact it might have. On the one hand, target sex might affect implicit causality differently depending on verb type. For example, action verbs might have a more "masculine" cast to them, whereas state verbs might be more easily associated with things "feminine." Given the social stereotype of males as more instrumental and agentive than females and the stereotype of females as more emotional and reactive than males (Ruble 1983), it seemed possible that research participants might infer different causality when either a male or a female acts (action verb) or feels (state verb). Thus, sentences presenting action verbs with males as subjects might imply the established S-to-O causal direction more than if females engaged in the same action. But, the pattern might be reversed for state verbs such that female subjects might now elicit the S-to-O causal direction since women are supposed to be more emotional.

But it also seemed possible that target sex might affect attributions through another path. Perhaps male agents would be seen as more causal than female agents regardless of verb type simply because they are ascribed more agency and power than females. By definition, a man may be viewed as significant, a woman as inconsequential, irrespective of verb type. For example, a recent study found that when everything else was held constant, males were listened to more, their words were recalled better, and they were generally assigned more causality than females who said exactly the same thing (Robinson & McArthur 1982). Thus, it seemed possible that a male subject, regardless of verb type, would be seen as the causal agent of an act originating with him but that when a sentence subject was female, respondents might be less likely to see her as having originated the episode. An experiment was carried out to examine these possibilities.

METHOD

In the study, 80 research participants were given a set of 40 sentences containing verbs in which half were action verbs and half were state verbs. In addition, the verb types were themselves divided into two groups which varied in valence. That is, half the verbs had been selected, based on a pretest, as connoting positive events—e.g., *help, adore*—and half had been selected as connoting

negative acts—e.g., *criticize, detest*. For each sentence, participants were asked to supply two sentences which respectively represented plausible antecedent and consequent sentences, that is, to indicate what could have preceded and followed the behavior presented in the target sentence. The resulting database consisted of 6,400 sentences.

In addition, four different experimental conditions were created by varying the sex of the sentence subject and the sex of the sentence object. One group read sentences in which both S and O were male; a second group had sentences in which both S and O were female; a third group read mixed-sex sentences in which the S was male and O was female; and in another mixed-sex condition, the S was female and the O was male.

RESULTS

The results clearly show that inferences varied as a function of the sex of the parties involved in the interpersonal event, but not according to either one of the simple predictions that prompted the study. First, while the sex of the sentence subject did not make a difference in the inferences that were made, the sex of the sentence object did. Specifically, when the object of the verb was female, there were significantly more inferences about the sentence subject than when the object was male. In other words, when the recipient of an interpersonal action was female—for instance, when a woman was criticized or helped by someone else—the subject of the sentence (the criticizer or helper) received more causal attention than when he was criticized or helped. Similarly, when a woman was the one about whom someone felt something, e.g., when she was liked or detested, then the subject of the sentence (the liker or the detester) received more causal attention than when he was liked or detested.

A second finding indicated that assumed causality varied as a function of the particular gender composition involved. Specifically, results showed that the fewest inferences about the sentence subject occurred when the pair consisted of a female agent and a male object. Thus, when a woman helped or abhorred a man, participants were less inclined to see the action as originating with her. In contrast, participants gave more weight to the subject when any other gender combination was engaged in an interpersonal event.

The combination of these two findings indicates that if a sentence is phrased such that a female is described as doing something or feeling something, especially with respect to a male, then she fades from causal view, but when she is on the receiving end of someone else's actions or states, then the subject or source of these events, rather than she herself, is highlighted.

DISCUSSION

The findings indicate that the implicit context surrounding verbs clearly depends on the sex of the people involved. The initial speculation had been that male subjects might be seen as more causal than female subjects, resulting in more inferences about the agent of the sentence. While there was some tendency for

respondents to supply more inferences about a male sentence subject, the effect was not statistically significant. However, the gender of the object of the sentence did make a significant difference. When a female is on the receiving end of another's actions or feelings, then the sentence subject becomes salient.

The second effect of note concerns sentences with a female subject and a male object. Regardless of verb type, when the interacting dyad consists of a female agent and a male recipient, there are fewer inferences about the subject than in any other gender combination. In other words, a female agent recedes from causal view if the person she is acting on or has feelings about is male. The flip side of this effect is revealed in the proportion of inferences about the sentence object. When a female acts on a male or feels something about him, more inferences are drawn about him.

Together, these effects suggests a particularly subtle though impressive linguistic bias against women, a bias we call the *disappearing agent effect*. The data show that respondents believe not only that a female is less causal when her partner is male but that her role as recipient of others' actions or feelings is to make the person who acts or feels more central. Unfortunately, both outcomes are congruent with other societal practices that conspire to render women invisible. It will fall to future research to explore the generality and implications of this language effect, but for now there is new evidence that Virginia Woolf was right when she suggested that women's role was to reflect men's image back to them, and at twice its normal size.

NOTE

1 . This research was conducted in collaboration with Eugene Hahn, formerly of Boston College and now at the University of Texas at Austin.

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The silencing of women

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"Silencing" is a word with some of the most sinister undertones in the language, a word laden with political consequence. Americans think of it as the ultimate weapon of a totalitarian regime, the antithesis of democracy's "marketplace of ideas." We think of it, too, as necessarily conscious and deliberate, part of the armamentarium of public discourse, or rather of the chilling of public discourse.

Feminists understand it otherwise. Much has been written over the last fifteen years or so that argues that silencing—while indeed the weapon of the oppressor—plays a larger and deeper role than that of national politics. Silencing has been seen above all as an aspect of private communication, a way in which men as individuals reinforce and recreate their power—as individuals and as a gender-linked group—over women. A whole issue of *Discourse and Society* (2(2)) is devoted to important considerations of the process and its consequences.

It is unnecessary to remark, except by way of preamble, that women are silenced in conversation, regularly and often casually. There is no need to discuss, except briefly and in passing, the methods that have been identified as achieving that end in informal dyadic conversation: interrupting and non-response. I want to draw on that work and extend it here. (On these topics, cf. Fishman 1982; West & Zimmerman 1982; and Zimmerman & West 1975.)

As noted above, *general* silencing has been considered largely in its public manifestation; the silencing of *women* in particular, mostly as an epiphenomenon of private and intimate conversation. In this paper I want to suggest the blurring of those lines, moving from the work on the silencing of women in private to the manifestations, and larger consequences, of the silencing of women in public discourse. By "public" I mean that discourse in the context of, and with consequences relevant to, the world outside the home and relationships beyond those that are purely social; the language that is associated with membership in public institutions; language that is directed to, or used with reference to and designed to be understood by, those with whom the speaker has no pre-existing relationship, i.e., all members or at least a significant number of the members of a society or subculture.

I hope to continue the discussion of the functions and forms silencing takes and its consequences in terms of power allocation; and to extend the examination of the ways and means by which women are denied a voice in the public discourse sector. I will suggest that, if the techniques previously identified as creating voicelessness in private conversation can be shown to operate, or have analogues, in the communications of the public sphere, one comforting argument about the meaning and motives of the private forms of silencing becomes much harder to maintain. Because of the differences in form and function between public and private

discourse, the understanding of silencing as arising between members of two cultures each with good intentions (Maltz & Borker 1982; Tannen 1990) becomes untenable. Or more accurately, it is seen to be a reasonable partial analysis, but insufficient to account for all the behavior that we find; a second level of analysis is necessary for full understanding.

The dangerous consequences of private silencing are well recognized. With respect to public silencing, it is clear that in a society that considers itself egalitarian, with a political system that requires the full participation of all its citizens in order to be meaningful, the exclusion of women from that full participation makes a mockery of both of those comforting assumptions. It may seem extraordinary that this exclusion could go unremarked and uncorrected in this country. But women have until very recently been considered legal as well as actual nonpersons, so that the discrepancy between ideals and reality went unnoticed. The last twenty years have seen a steady increase in women's presence in the public sphere, a situation precipitating the reconsideration of the roles of men and women in private as well as public life—a nodal point in our consciousness as Americans and individuals, and one certain to spark a commensurate rise in feelings and acts of resentment by those who feel displaced. Overt and covert forms of public silencing from harassment to rape to "mere" unresponsiveness are, then, a sign of change.

Silencing is always political. To be silent is—literally or figuratively—to have no voice. To be voiceless is to have no "say" in what gets done, what happens to one, to have no representation. Recently it was brought home to all of us just what it means that 53% of the population is represented by 2% of the members of this nation's higher legislative body. Our revolutionary forebears said it right: Taxation without representation is tyranny.

To be deprived of speech is to be deprived of humanity itself—in one's own eyes and in the eyes of others. Speech is the capacity we consider definitively human. Not to speak, then, removes one from the category of human beings, and therefore, for other humans, from the "us" that we must treat as we would be treated. To dehumanize by depriving of language is to take the first step toward legitimating unequal treatment. So the silencing of women, in all its forms, is more than a convenience allowing men to enjoy conversation more: it is the basic tool by which political inequity is created, reinforced, and made to seem inevitable.

I have been using a lot of impersonal constructions. I have deliberately, for the most part, avoided imputing responsibility to any one party or group for women's silencing. It's true that in the informal dyads that have been studied, men play a predominant direct role in the silencing: the lion's share of interruption of women,[1] nonresponsiveness, and topic ignoring are the work of men. But women play a role in the process, too, silencing both themselves and other women; we are, all too often, complicit. While I think there are understandable reasons why this has been true, I also think we have to be answerable for it. And while I find that idea depressing, at the same time it is encouraging—it's easier to change ourselves, since we have so much ultimately to gain, than to change male behavior. Eventually that has to happen. But it never will until women present a united front.

Writers on these topics sometimes assume or create a dichotomy—false, like most—between social and psychological causes of women's exclusion. Too often,

to make matters worse, values are imputed: social explanations are "good," psychological "bad"—probably because the second is misunderstood as blaming the victim.[2] But here as elsewhere, we require both social and psychological understanding to explain any number of otherwise bewildering realities.

Seventy-five years ago, before women's suffrage, it might perhaps have been a reasonable hypothesis that women's subordinate status was directly and entirely the result of male/female power imbalance and men's usurpation of power. Without the vote, barred from most positions of public influence either legally or by tradition (mostly both), women in fact were powerless to change anything, and any attempt they made as individuals or as a group to effect change entailed great risks of many kinds. For a woman to achieve even minimal entree depended on the kindness of men. But over the last century, things have been changing, sometimes gradually, sometimes abruptly. While power is still far from equitably distributed, women now have access to many forms of direct influence, not the least the ballot box. We are significantly if not equally represented in the media and the professions, enough, at any rate, to have a potent voice if we as a group only choose to use it.

Therein lies one of the painful paradoxes of the women's movement, especially as contrasted with other forces for equalization such as the civil rights movement. If African Americans are about 12% of the population and women 53%, how are we to explain the greater political gains made by the former? Why did the Senate Judiciary Committee quail last October at the threat of being thought racist, while apparently comfortable with looking (and being) sexist? Why, to cite another example from the same scenario, did 70% of women claim not to believe Anita Hill? Why were there no women on the Judiciary Committee, and only two in the whole Senate? With our 53% plurality we might theoretically expect 100% female representation in Congress. Granting that this projection is both unrealistic and unfair, 2% seems on the face of it even more unrealistic and more unfair. But I don't think we can blame men, or society, alone for that sorry state of affairs. And if we continue to do so, nothing will change.

Realistically, we have to set the example because in the short run at least, we are the ones who stand to gain. As long as we are complicit in our own voicelessness, there is no incentive, neither fear nor shame, to make anyone else change. As a result of millennia of hearing misogynistic messages, and having no real alternative because all alternative voices were silenced, many if not most women have to some degree internalized a belief that women not only are without a voice, but should be, that speechlessness is a defining quality of womanhood, and to gain a voice is to lose female identity—the only identity they have. The fear of that loss of legitimate identity is psychological, internal, and often unconscious—and therefore impervious to changes in external political reality. We have the vote and could use it to elect true representatives. But thus far we have not, because most women are more comfortable entrusting their voices to men, and moreover, they see those women who have taken back their voices as not quite women and therefore not trustworthy. Women have the power to change things, but heretofore we have not used it, because psychologically we don't feel we can or should.[3] I have just used the words "heretofore" and "until recently." I will have more to say later about that. But by excluding or derogating psychological explanations, we preclude full

understanding of many problems.

As complex as the forces of silencing are, still more complex are the means of silencing. Two areas are relevant here: the relation between private and public methods and functions of silencing; and the strategies (as opposed to the tactics) of silencing.

Silencing is as ubiquitous in the public sphere of discourse as in the private, and essentially the same methods are used in each. Therefore arguments to the effect that private silencing tactics have no political intent or are merely the result of misunderstanding are flawed. Individuals engaging in private silencing techniques may not be fully conscious of what they are doing or how they are doing it, but both work toward the same goal.

It is sometimes proposed that the line between public and private discourse be obliterated (cf. Kramarae 1986). There is good reason to question the dichotomy: certainly the discourse of the public sphere seeps into the private (and probably vice versa as well, such as, for instance, in the private actions that prevented Senator Edward Kennedy's full public participation in the Thomas hearings). Certainly, especially today, we see as a favorite rhetorical strategy the blurring of public and private: the "great communicator" is the one whose public speaking style addresses each of us as though in an intimate tête-à-tête in our home. But that is mere blurring of lines; the categories themselves are still very much alive.

Public discourse is generally information-oriented (one of the rationalizations for keeping women out of it). This holds for every form, from election speeches[4] to classroom lectures to business meetings to courtroom interchange. In this it differs from the informal dyad, which is interaction-oriented. Further, public discourse normally creates a public record: people are held responsible for their public contributions more than their private; public contributions *count*, they are supposed to be remembered. In some types, the public record is created by the making of transcripts, minutes, or tapes; in others, it's less explicit, but participants are nonetheless expected to retain a better memory of what was said than in non-information-oriented talk. Finally, private discourse conventionally assumes that everyone has equal rights to a turn (though the reality is that some are more equal than others); in public discourse, participants earn that right by status or expertise: not everyone is entitled to it.

These characteristics are crucial for understanding the special forms and consequences of public, as opposed to private, silencing. One consequence is that it is preeminently in the public realm that the conversation analysts' basic rule, "One party at a time," or "No Gap, No Overlap (NGNO)" (cf. Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson 1974), is most essential, where violations of this rule are especially marked, and therefore, when they occur, are interpreted as having meaning and intent. NGNO can be understood as contributing to the success of discourse in two ways: in facilitating the transfer of information, and in avoiding violations of both positive and negative politeness (Brown & Levinson 1986). The latter will hold in both public and private types, but especially private, where interaction is the major consideration; but in public turn-taking discourse, violations of NGNO are doubly marked and doubly problematic, since both gaps and overlaps impede intelligibility. Public violations are still more marked when participants have approximately equal

professional/public power, and/or when the violative behavior is atypical in that context.

Consider a few examples in which in a public discourse format, NGNO is blatantly violated by nonresponse. These cases are particularly strong: interruption can always be explained as inadvertent, but failure to respond even minimally[5] cannot. And while both interruption and nonresponse are hurtful to the victim and destructive of self-esteem, nonresponse is worse. Interruption merely tells the interruptee that she has no right to the floor, and/or that what she is saying is less valuable than what someone else has to say. But nonresponsiveness explicitly denies the speaking status of the victim: it is as though she had not spoken, is a nonperson—indeed, nonexistent. More practically, interruptions both public and private can often be countered successfully.[6] But it is extraordinarily hard to elicit a response from someone who has opted not to give one. To demand it is to reveal one's lack of power, and to run the risk of being doubly ignored. Criticizing an interrupter can be effective because as children we were all warned not to interrupt, so we are apt to be abashed when caught at it as adults. But we are not told (except in strongly non-egalitarian situations, when the nonresponder is in the non-powerful position) that we must respond.

One example: About eight or nine years ago, one of my colleagues (male) was living with a female graduate student. While this in itself might be considered a private matter, that semester she was a teaching assistant in a course in which he was the instructor. I thought this situation might place the department and the university in legal jeopardy, and I broached this topic to the department chair, a man universally respected for his integrity and fine ethical sense. I was not, of course, expecting total agreement; I knew I was breaking the code of silence (or, as it might be called in another context, *omerta*) that protects ancient male university privilege to a male who was part of the system. I know he heard me: he gave the signs. But when I was finished, he said ... nothing. Nothing at all. Of course I blamed myself, as having told tales out of school (or in it), and no doubt ineptly at that. Note that—and this is another way in which public no-gap violation differs from private—I had to see his failure to speak as intentional: because the discourse was information-oriented, he couldn't claim to be not paying attention, or that his attention was distracted by the TV, the newspaper, getting a beer, etc. So I knew a message was being sent, and I sensed it, as I was meant to, as depersonalizing beyond mere criticism. I thought of the incident as an individual and unique encounter, the result of my having said or done something wholly beyond the bounds of good taste, until earlier this year I was presented with two other examples.

The second case belongs to the University of California at Berkeley as well. And if the first example was public because it was institutional, this one was such not only for that reason, but also because it occurred at a public forum, with many people present. Not surprisingly, the issue over which it occurred is the same as in the first case. After several years of research and reflection the Academic Senate Committee on the Status of Women and Minorities presented a detailed report to the Berkeley Academic Senate on student-faculty liaisons, concluding that they were problematic and ought to be discouraged. Again, male privilege was on the line.

Something that had been widely known but not publicly speakable had been uttered. The response again was nothing at all. The report was received "without comment."

Now this behavior would not be startling, except that the one thing academics would rather do than anything is talk—or better, argue. During the 1989 earthquake I was at a faculty meeting. As the building started to shake, my colleagues began to argue over (1) if it really was an earthquake and (2) if so, what to do about it. By the time the dispute was resolved, the crisis was over. So how can a highly controversial document be presented for the explicit consideration of the Academic Senate and receive no response at all? I submit that it cannot be for lack of something to say—rather, the silence of the august body, as Cicero put it in a slightly different context, was a shout. Only the most powerful of motives can silence the collective tongues of a body of academics, and indeed that motive was there: the protection of male privilege (which can only survive in silence).

I was further emboldened to see the no-gap violation as intentional and political when, at the end of a talk I gave last December, a woman asked: What do you do at a business meeting among equals, when you make a proposal and it is greeted by total silence?[7]

At that moment the scales fell from my eyes, and I saw public nonresponse as a potent form of silencing—especially useful as in the first two cases when male privilege is directly threatened, but always a subtle (and non-actionable) form of harassment: a statement that "Not only do you not belong here, woman: *you aren't here.*"

This discussion of the *how* suggests an examination of the *why*: what it is that the silencing of women, public and private, accomplishes that makes it so effective as a politico-psychological means of control. Basically, to silence is to achieve three ends:

(1) To silence is to appropriate to oneself a quintessentially human property: the ability to name and define self and environment.

It starts as early as Genesis, in which Adam's distinction from all the other creatures (including Eve) is exemplified by the fact that he gets to name them, that is, bring them under his control. To be denied the ability to name oneself or one's context is to be deprived of self-knowledge and full consciousness.

A chilling example is to be found in that favorite Shakespearean comedy, *The Taming of the Shrew.* In it we find a horrifying description and enactment of what the mid-twentieth century was to condemn as "brainwashing," when done by Asian Commies to American boys. But when Petruchio does it to Katharina, it's "taming," the means by which comedic reconciliation is achieved.

The game begins with their first encounter (Act II, Scene 1). In about 100 lines, he makes it clear that he has the right and the ability to define and name her. In the first twelve lines, he addresses or refers to her as "Kate" eleven times.

Petruchio. Good morrow, Kate—for that's thy name,
    I hear.
Katharina. Well have you heard, but something hard of hearing.
    They call me Katharine that do talk of me.

P.   You lie, in faith; for you are call'd plain Kate,
      And bonny Kate, and sometimes Kate the curst;
      But Kate, the prettiest Kate in Christendom,
      Kate of Kate Hall, my super-dainty Kate,
      For dainties are all Kates, and therefore, Kate,
      Take this of me, Kate of my consolation;
      Hearing thy mildness praised in every town,
      Thy virtues spoke of, and thy beauty sounded,
      Yet not so deeply as to thee belongs,
      Myself am moved to woo thee for my wife.

Not only does Petruchio implicitly appropriate to himself the right to choose her name, but the name he chooses is a diminutive (so he forces upon her a relation of intimacy, underscored by his shift halfway through from *you* to *thou*).

Of course, this is shocking; but that was then, and we are more evolved today: it can't happen here, or now.

Well, something rather similar can, and does. It isn't just that women's actual *names* are being appropriated (though that certainly happens), but the right to name what is most relevant to our interests is being eroded, in the arguments of the new right as exemplified by Neil Gilbert and Norman Podhoretz and their pet "feminist," Camille Paglia.

At issue is who gets to define important points of language:[8] what is "feminism," what is "good sex," what is "rape." The writings revolve around definitions, whether implicitly or explicitly. Even blatant floutings of the rules of logic—in violation of the male ethos—are justified for the cause.

For example: Neil Gilbert, a professor of social welfare at the University of California at Berkeley, is interested in taking back where it belongs the right to determine what constitutes rape—that is, wresting it out of the hands of the "radical feminists" whose definitions "do not square with human attitudes and experiences" (1991:59). A purportedly "scientific" examination of statistics that charges the feminists with the abandonment of scholarly objectivity in favor of a political agenda, the article itself is highly tendentious, urging redefinitions of the words in quotation marks. Most surprising for a social scientist, Gilbert assumes a perspective sharply at variance with current cognitive theory in insisting on a pure prototype definition of rape (cf. Rosch 1974): stranger, violent, weapon, etc. But it is emblematic of human cognitive ability to move from prototype to fuzzy cases. This Gilbert cannot do—at least not here. And yet he identifies *his* understanding as that consonant with "*human* attitudes and emotions," which in turn are opposed to those of "radical feminists," who are thus removed from humanity, and thus from defining power (at least).

Or take Camille Paglia (1991), who (in the sexual persona of a feminist) excoriates "feminists" as sex-haters because they have the temerity to criticize certain aspects of male sexual expression. Like Gilbert's, her argument hangs on a serious logical error: in her case, the exclusion of the middle. The implication is that either you believe (like Freud, for Paglia a model of modern science) that all sex is fun sex and good sex (as even Freud did not), or you are a creationist fuddy-

duddy killjoy. And even those of us who are comfortable with being bitches quiver at being called old-fashioned or not sexy.

Examples could be multiplied, but I think the point is made: definition is power. That brings us to the second rationale for silencing:

(2) To silence is to deprive of the ability to control one's environment by setting the agenda or making predictions, in other words, of the capacity to be and see oneself as rational, as having a coherent narrative. Much has been said, within many disciplines in recent years, of the essential link between understanding one's life as a coherent narrative and being competent and comfortable (cf. Spence 1986). Not to have this power is to exist in chaos, with "sense" made of one by someone else, according to their pleasure. A common manifestation of this aspect of silencing is the attempt to control interpretation. Whoever gets to tell me what I mean defines me, takes that power for coherency out of my hands and leaves me dependent on them for my sanity and indeed my very humanity.

Orthodox psychoanalysis is perhaps the most glaring example of overt interpretation used as a form of social and psychological control, especially (but by no means exclusively) when the analyst is male, the patient female. The situation is legitimated as well as exacerbated by its placement in the medical model. It is not surprising, then, that the analytic relationship, with its appeal to quasi-scientific authority, is a tempting metaphor to invoke in other situations where control by interpretation is a goal.[9]

Consider again the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas contretemps, and consider in particular the remarkable amount of psychiatric expertise demonstrated by committee members and witnesses alike, all for the purpose of "defining" Hill as crazy and therefore not worth listening to. Orrin Hatch suggested she was "fantasizing," Arlen Specter that she was "obsessed with revenge." John Doggett's consulting opinion was that the patient was "sexually obsessed," while still another (female) witness attributed her behavior to "transference." I thought it made for an interesting juxtaposition: on the one hand Anita Hill, telling her story with coherence and restraint, is diagnosed as the spinner of fantasies. On the other, John Doggett, a man if ever there was one of unprepossessing appearance and negative charisma, is allowed to go on at length about his irresistibility to women. Did anyone accuse him of "fantasizing"? We see here the powers of two heavily male institutions combining to preserve male privilege.

(3) To silence is to punish for speaking, or to deter from speaking what must not be said. Anita Hill was accused of vengefulness, but she was the one who almost lost her tenured position for speaking out of turn. Subpoenas were issued to Nina Totenberg and Timothy Phelps, the reporters who had the temerity to speak the unspeakable. From nearer home comes the interesting case of Diana Russell: invited earlier this year to deliver a prestigious lecture at the U. C. Berkeley School of Social Welfare, she let it be known that she would criticize a member of that department, Neil Gilbert. Immediately the invitation vanished. It wasn't exactly *rescinded*; rather, the dean claimed it had never been made. (But they foolishly left a paper trail, and the matter was ultimately rectified.)

It is no accident, I think, that many of these examples come from the very recent past. Indeed, we can look at a whole series of events over the last year or so

(Paglia's book; Gilbert's article; Podhoretz's article; the Thomas hearings; the Kennedy Smith trial; the Tyson trial) either as mainly depressing markers of oppression or as the harbingers of spring. Why the second? Many of them are forms of backlash, but at least sometimes backlash is beautiful.

The Hill/Thomas affair has received multiple interpretations both in the establishment media and in feminist discussion. The arguments involve a set of questions: Was the outcome a Good Thing or a Bad Thing for women? Does it change anything? And if so, for the better or the worse?

As I watched the hearings and their aftermath last fall, I experienced a series of responses. When the Judiciary Committee first agreed to hear Hill (with great reluctance), I cheered: finally there was some recognition that the Senate could not be counted on to represent their female constituency. But then, watching the distortions, the omissions, the assassinations, and finally the vote, my optimism vanished. The message to women was the old one: Lie low and shut up ... or else. But later still, thinking back over the truly bizarre nature of much of the proceedings, and particularly with the advantage of hindsight and seeing a few of the events between then and now, I believe that, overall, the Hill/Thomas hearings were a Good Thing for women, though the good may not be immediately and fully manifest.

Psychologists (starting with Freud [1923] 1961) argue that when people are pushed to the wall, they exacerbate their normal defensive strategies. The more desperate they become, the more they recycle old coping strategies, even though they are not appropriate, even though it makes them lose credibility. The more hysterical the response, the more—we can safely presume—threatened they feel. The danger may start out as imaginary, but the inappropriate responses frequently make it real.

In the Thomas hearings, the members of the Senate and the Judiciary Committee needed to represent themselves to their constituents as calm, reasonable, equitable, and even chivalrous people who could be trusted to do the right thing. What we saw hardly produced that picture:

— one dignified and very conservative senator (Orrin Hatch) invoking a work of prurient pulp fiction (*The Exorcist*) as though it had the authority of the *Congressional Record* and *DSM-III*.

— another distinguished senator, Arlen Specter, with a reputation as a thoughtful centrist, acting more like a grand inquisitor than an interrogator or even a prosecutor: demanding, insulting, demeaning, haranguing, browbeating, in ways that he, as a former Philadelphia district attorney, surely knew would get him cited for contempt in any well-run courtroom—behavior that has made him vulnerable in the general election (and given victory in the recent Democratic primary to a woman viewed as a dark horse who made Specter's conduct toward Hill a major point in her campaign).

— still another senator, Alan Simpson, one of the institution's best-liked and most-respected members, blustering in a manner reminiscent of Joseph R. McCarthy that he had in his hands a list of the unspeakable acts of Anita Hill—acts so unspeakable that they remained unspoken; a tactic that, according to a recent *New Yorker* profile (Newhouse 1992), has caused a precipitous decline in his credibility among both

colleagues and constituents.

— the aforementioned harassment of two reporters who had the temerity to be the conduit for the leak that permitted Hill to testify, culminating in the special prosecutor's subpoenaing of their telephone records; the resultant outcry caused the Senate (who had employed the prosecutor) to distance itself from him as fast as it could.

— and, also mentioned earlier, the abandonment by its strongest proponents (cf. the writings of Allan Bloom) of the forms of logical argumentation developed over several millennia.

— as if to illustrate that bizarrely exacerbated defenses lead only to defeat, the recent Illinois primary victory of Carol Moseley Braun over Alan Dixon, a Democrat who voted to confirm Thomas.

All of these reveal themselves by their extravagance and their damage to their perpetrators as acts of desperation, a final attempt to do *whatever it takes* (in the words of our First Rhetorician) to preserve male privilege. But the seams are showing, and things will never be back to Business as Usual. In their desperate attempt to silence women in the public sphere, the committee unwittingly unsilenced us forever. One ancient privilege that may have vanished forever as a result is the right of the powerful Not to Get It when It is inconvenient to Get. There was a great deal of post-Thomas/Hill commentary on the inability of men (and many women) to Get It about sexual harassment, and later, during the Kennedy-Smith trial, about rape. It was extraordinary to see this failure in intelligence blandly attributed by the media to so many persons whose public positions had to be the result of some intellectual acumen: we were not, after all, discussing the theory of special relativity or even the making of *pâté feuilleté* But it must be understood that there are none so deaf as those who will not Get It, and thence deduce that failure to Get It is usually, if not exactly consciously intended, certainly motivated. While failing to understand a communication or its context is almost always destructive to the powerless, choosing to Not Get It is usually perfectly safe for the powerful, and hence frequently used as a painless way of avoiding the necessity of recognizing a situation that gives them advantages at the expense of others.

I have discussed the ways and means by which women are kept silent in public and private, and suggested that public and private modes of silencing, and functions of silencing, are similar. I have suggested that this similarity makes more difficult a "two cultures, mutual misunderstanding" model of silencing in informal dyads, at least as a sole explanation. I have also suggested that, for psychological reasons, women are too often complicit in their silencing, and that until that ceases to be true, we cannot expect deep changes. I am hopeful that things are beginning to change, as evidenced by the various forms of desperation visible in public discourse. Each of these is to be sure an example of silencing, but each is at the same time an unsuccessful one. The silence is about to become deafening.

NOTES

1. Although James and Clarke's (this volume) review of the literature on this subject suggests that the role of men in interruption is less clear-cut than had been believed.

2. An equal and opposite error is made by Lacan and many of his French feminist followers, who attribute women's exclusion from discourse to the lack of a phallus, of which language is a symbolic equivalent. Thus women are defined as "silent" because physically and psychologically they are without the means to speak. These writers see language as a force by which the patriarchy oppresses those without power. While there is no question that language can work this way (as many if not all of the papers in this volume persuasively demonstrate), it is as much the case that language functions as a means of bringing to light and thereby removing the forces of repression (as the very existence of this collection persuasively demonstrates).

3. There remain real disadvantages for women in electoral politics, chief among them lack of money. But women have control of many family fortunes these days, and many women could make substantial contributions to female candidates—and at least until recently have not. This still requires explanation.

4. While political speeches tend to have a stronger interactional (i.e., persuasive) than informative component, what makes this discourse type problematic is the fact that it is presented as informative, but intended as persuasive. That creates the genre blurring that I have discussed (Lakoff 1990) as underlying abusive discourse.

5. It may be useful to distinguish here between *minimal* and *no* response. Minimal response includes brief nonverbal utterances like "uh-uh" or grunts; no response is, as the name implies, a total lack of recognition that a communication has occurred.

6. The neutralizing of interruptions has become a frequent gambit on public forums like "The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour," taking forms such as, "You had your turn, wait till I'm finished." These tactics are not easy, but they are possible.

7. I hate these "What to do?" questions, because they make me feel helpless. Yes, I can always think of ingenious comebacks—well, at least five minutes after they are useful, at any rate. But I feel more and more that giving people those suggestions does more harm than good. The ultimate riposte is heavily dependent on context: relations between participants, type of talk, personality of riposter and ripostee. So if my interlocutor follows my recipe, there's a good chance something untoward will happen, since I can't take account of all the environmental factors. And if she doesn't, she's apt to feel twice as bad, because she *knew* what to do, the Big Expert told her, but dumb her, she couldn't do it. So I think the only right answer in all such cases is: Understand that it's not your fault, they are up to something, don't let it get to you. Act when and as appropriate—but you must be the judge of that.

8. One can see the whole discussion of political correctness as precisely to that point: whether the implicit right to make language should remain with those who have always had that privilege; or whether that right can be explicitly appropriated as a means to equalizing power, by those who have not previously enjoyed that right.

9. The subtle invocation of psychotherapy as an agent of social control is not new. But the idea has spread in recent years from the therapeutic and legal professional communities to the culture at large. Evidence is prevalent in the conventions of television talk shows (e.g., Oprah and Donahue). It not infrequently happens on these programs that the guests reveal personal predilections in lifestyle that are at variance with the standards of the community. When this happens, almost invariably a member of the audience will address a query to the guest with the canonical form: "Have you seeked (sic) therapy?" This happens regardless of whether the guest has expressed distress or a need for help, suggesting that the apparent information-seeking question is, at a deeper level of speech-act analysis, a suggestion ("You ought to seek therapy"), still more deeply a criticism ("Your behavior is reprehensible and you need to get fixed").

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The status of the sexes: A view through language

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INTRODUCTION

This study proposes to explore the differential status ascribed to the sexes as it is reflected in the language we use. Many have made the connection between language and thought, or more specifically, the language one uses and the way in which one categorizes. The theory that the language spoken by a given people can affect the way in which they think was espoused by Whorf and Sapir in their "linguistic approach to thinking" (see Whorf 1964). This approach states that not only is language used to communicate thought but that it is an important part of the thought process itself. From this, Whorf proposes the idea of linguistic relativity, which states that

> users of markedly different grammars are pointed by their grammars toward different types of observations and different evaluations of externally similar acts of observation, and hence are not equivalent as observers but must arrive at somewhat different views of the world. (Carroll 1984:221).

Whorf's idea of linguistic relativity relies on two basic hypotheses: (1) Thought is dependent on language; therefore, (2) thought and one's perception of her or his environment will be influenced by the structure of the language she or he speaks. In other words, the structure of language colors the way its speakers perceive the world around them.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) add a new dimension, based on the use of metaphors, to the analysis of language. Their metaphor theory broadens the scope of cultural information that can be accessed through the examination of language. Many of the abstract concepts that are described through language become comprehensible through metaphorical extension or associations. Metaphors convey our experiences and shape our conceptual outlook of the world. Thus, according to Lakoff, the metaphors used in one's language contain more cultural information than the language's grammatical structure. Therefore, the associations one makes in referencing females or males can show the perception that one has toward each sex. On a social level, the metaphors that a speech community accepts or associates with the sexes can show the relative status that females and males have in that community.

Recent works have discussed the manner in which the sexes perceive one another. Phillips (1990) examines current attitudes toward females and males based upon the nicknames given them; Hort, Fagot, and Leinbach (1990) explore the societal stereotypical views toward females and males; Holland and Skinner (1987) discuss the "gender-marked types" that males and females use to refer to one

another; and Risch (1987) studies the derogatory terms ("taboo or dirty words") that female university students use to refer to men, in order to confront the idea that women are more prone to use standard/prestige forms of language. All of these studies reveal cultural attitudes toward females and males, and all with the exception of Hort et al (1990) investigate such attitudes through language.

Phillips (1990) finds that one manner of accessing current sex-role stereotypes is through the use of nicknames. "Since nicknames are more susceptible to innovation and loss, it seems reasonable to assume that they may be more reliable indicators of current societal attitudes," she reasons (1990:281). The dynamic nature of nicknames, then, reveals cultural information that more fixed aspects of the lexicon cannot. Phillips found that many of the differences between nicknames given to males and those given to females reflect "persistent stereotypes associated with each sex." Male nicknames were more often associated with our cultural view of masculinity, such as strength, largeness, hardness, and maturity. Female nicknames, on the other hand, reflected physical attributes, beauty, pleasantness, kindness, and goodness. In addition, Phillips found that males are more frequently the givers of nicknames, showing the power that males have in our society. She concludes, "[n]icknaming studies may well provide fertile ground for future research of the relationship between language and culture, since they reflect more current attitudes than do other, more stable areas of language" (1990:286)

In a similar vein, Holland and Skinner (1987) discuss "gender-marked types," the terms females and males use to refer to members of the opposite sex. Holland and Skinner's purpose was to describe the unspoken shared cultural knowledge their informants possess with regard to male-female relationships. Through interviews with college-age females and males, they examined how the knowledge of gender types of their informants is mentally organized. Participants were asked to (1) list types of females and males; (2) describe the different types; and (3) tell when someone would use such a term. Participants then compared and contrasted the terms compiled according to whatever criteria they felt were important.

Holland and Skinner posited that by determining the criteria by which their informants compared and contrasted these terms, they would be able to derive the basis of how females and males "type" one another. This cognitive-structure analysis determined that females type males based on three criteria: (1) "likely to use their position or attractiveness to females for selfish purposes; (2) ineffectual and unlikable; and/or (3) unusual in their sexual appetites." Males, however, typed females based upon: (1) "prestige as a (sexual) possession/companion; (2) tendency to be overdemanding and engulfing; and (3) sexiness" (1987:84)

Holland and Skinner found that this analysis, however, was not adequate because it did not take into account situational variables or roles involved in male-female relationships. Such relationships are an important aspect of the gender-marked types because the above-stated criteria do not allow for the "set of scenarios in which the prototypical male/female relationship is disrupted" (1987:103). Without accounting for such scenarios, Holland and Skinner could not determine why their informants would use certain gender types as insults and not others. They found that "[i]n typing a male, a female is typing others and herself. ...

Relationships between males and females reflect on both parties because of ... assumptions in the cultural model" (1987:104).

Hort et al. (1990) also dealt with stereotypes and the views of society toward the sexes. They found that (1) males are described more stereotypically than females, by both females and males; (2) males describe the ideal female in more androgynous and less stereotypic terms than they describe actual females; and (3) female views of how society perceives males were the most stereotypic. Hort et al. conclude that more rigid standards are applied to males in our society.

In her 1987 article, Risch confronts the issue of the preferential use of standard/prestige forms of language by women through a study of the derogatory terms that her group of young, middle-class, university females used in reference to men. Female subjects were asked in a questionnaire to report terms that they and their friends use to refer to men. Risch raises the question: "Is nonstandard speech really associated with masculinity, or is it more a signification of public versus private discourse?" (1987:358). One important feature of this study was the fact that males were asked to leave the room during the interviews and the interviewers were females, thus creating a "private" environment separate from males. Although Risch states that further research on the matter is required, this study "casts doubt on the general assumption that women are necessarily socially and linguistically conservative" (1987:358). Risch calls for studies to differentiate the derogatory terms that females use with other females and those terms employed by males with regard to females and other males.

PROPOSITION

Taking into account the aforementioned investigations, this study proposes to examine the terms that both females and males use in certain situations to refer to members of the same sex and of the opposite sex. The use of the innovative, unfixed terms that college-aged females and males use to refer to members of their sex and the opposite sex will, it is hoped, demonstrate the cultural views reflected through such terms and show how society ranks people based on their sex.

HYPOTHESES

I made the following hypotheses at the outset of the study:

1. The inequality between the sexes would be manifest in the gender-marked terms (both positive and derogatory) used by the sexes. This inequality would appear in both intra- and inter-sex descriptors. I hypothesized that (a) more derogatory comments would be made by males regarding females than by females regarding males; and (b) more derogatory terms would be made between females than between males.

2. Due to male stereotypes' being defined more rigidly (Hort et al. 1990) it was hypothesized that female/androgynous terms (terms reflecting characteristics outside of stereotypical male qualities) would be perceived as insults to males,

whereas terms that ascribe male/androgynous features to a female would not have the same effect.

METHODOLOGY

The informants employed in this study were taken from five undergraduate classes of native English-speaking students at Arizona State University. The informants consisted of 44 females and 44 males aged 17 through 24. All informants were unmarried and self-reported as heterosexual. Participants responded to a questionnaire and generated terms they would use to refer to members of the opposite sex as well as to members of the same sex for the following purposes: to insult, to compliment, and to describe someone as attractive or unattractive.

The terms given by the informants were examined for (1) metaphors employed to refer to one sex or the other and (2) differences in how females and males refer to members of the opposite sex versus members of their own sex. This study does not take into account alternative models of gender that may exist in different age, class, ethnic, and regional groups. Findings herein as to the status of females and males in the group investigated are not necessarily indicative of the views of other groups. However, the point is to show how roles are currently perceived in this particular group based upon the gender-marked terms this group utilizes.

FINDINGS

The 44 males generated 867 responses (38% of which referred to other males and 62% to females) and the 44 females generated 960 responses (42% of which referred to other females and 58% to males).

Among the terms collected in reference to insulting, the terms most frequently used to insult a female were ones which were based upon a female's sexual promiscuity. This was true for 77% of the insults given by females and 46% of those given by males. Overall, the terms most frequently used to insult males were terms which insulted a male's masculinity or implied that he was homosexual. This category accounts for 43% of the insults collected from males and 18% of those obtained from females. Among the insulting terms that females used to refer to men, the more common form of insult was to describe a male as exhibiting a lack of intelligence or socially unvalued behavior (22%).

With regard to the terms used for complimenting, the terms most frequently received in reference to females were those which refer to physical appearance (40% of compliments from females and 60% of those listed by males). Although this was the most common type of compliment in this category overall, again it is interesting to note that the most frequent response from females referred to personality traits (45%). The most common type of term used to compliment males again were terms related to physical appearance (43% by females and 11% by males).

Several similarities were found between the descriptors used in reference to males and those used in reference to females. Symmetrical uses involved terms associated with:

(1) Body parts: Different expletives used in conjunction with -*head*, *butt*-, and terms for the female and male genitals;

(2) Food descriptors: *sugar*, *sweet*, *delicious*, *honey bun*;

(3) Physical and personality attributes: *nice eyes*, *nice butt*, *friendly*, *honest*;

(4) lack of intelligence.

References that were asymmetrical in their treatment of the sexes were found in the following categories:

(5) terms associated with animals. Positive terms used included: female to male—*stud* (and its derivatives), *my whipped puppy*; male to female—*fox(y)*. The use of negative terms in this category, however, showed differential usage, as is seen in the following examples: female to male—*dog/dogface*; *cow*; *pig*; female to female—*dog*, *slam pig*, *cow*, *pig*; male to male—no terms associated with animals were utilized in descriptors used by males to describe other males; male to female—*cow*; *heifer*, *moose*, *hog*, *pig*, *bush pig*, *horse*, *dog*, *bowser*, *porker*, *skunk*.

(6) Terms referencing sexual promiscuity were used as an insult by both sexes. However, there appears to be an imbalance in the distribution of derogatory terms in this category. While males were termed *male whore* and *male slut*, there existed a plethora of such expressions used in reference to the sexual activity of females, e.g., *slut*, *whore*, *ho* (variant form of *whore*), *sleeze*, *hosebag*. It is also interesting to note in this category the informants' need to prefix the terms *whore* and *slut* with the word *male*, further indicating that such terms would refer to females without such a clarification.

(7) Another set of descriptors which were used only in reference to females were terms for dangerous things, e.g., *fire*, *witch*, *ball and chain*.

(8) Insults aimed at males included reference to males' mothers, thus insulting the male based on his mother's alleged marital status or level of promiscuity. Insults to females included no such reference.

(9) In complimenting a male or expressing that a male was attractive, females compared males to deities, e.g., *sex god*, *God incarnate*, *God's child*, *Nordic ice god.* No reciprocal use of terms was found by males with regard to females.

(10) Males used terms of friendship to compliment other males, whereas females did not.

(11) Roughly 70% of the 44 males in this study were unwilling to describe attractive males or stated that males did not verbally recognize other males as being attractive. Several informants who declined to give any descriptors in this category stated that they would not describe another male as attractive because they were not homosexual. One informant used the term *homo* as a descriptor in this category. Perhaps this can be attributed to males' fear of exhibiting a female or androgynous trait, which may be seen as exhibiting homosexual behavior.

(12) In insulting, males were found to assign male terms to females and vice versa (e.g., referring to a female as a *man*, and to a male as a *bitch*). This use by females was not found. Perhaps it is demonstrative of males' fear of being

categorized closer to the androgynous or female part of the continuum between the sexes.

(13) Whereas females did employ ethnic terms in the study (e.g., *JAP*, *guido*, *guidette*, *goat herder*), no such use was found on the part of males.

CONCLUSIONS

The disparity between the status of females relative to males in this segment of society can be seen through the associations made by the terms collected. This disparity is further emphasized by males' fear of showing androgynous or female behavior traits and their association of terms likening a person to the opposite gender as an insult.

As for the hypothesis that males would make more derogatory comments to females whereas females would be more derogatory toward other females, although this was found to be true, the percentage difference found was so negligible as to indicate that, at least for this study, this is not an issue.

The results of this study are based upon the class, age, economic, and educational levels of the informants used. Different degrees of variance would be found by changing any one of the variables relating to the population. However, these results show a tendency toward the deprecation and lower status position of the female in this segment of society.

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The politics of subordination:
Linguistic discourse in organizational hierarchies[1]

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INTRODUCTION

It is in the secretarial job that contradictions between the clerical and managerial strata in large organizations are most starkly revealed. Secretaries in this sense are particularly interesting because they occupy an intermediate position between the faceless anonymity of clerical women in the back office and the powerful men of the professional and managerial sector.[2] Secretaries work in close proximity to power, yet have no right to seek out or claim power in their own name. Their role is primarily that of confidant and conduit. They communicate information, transmit orders, and convey messages, but they wield no power to either make decisions or set policy.

However, unlike clerical women who are hidden away in the typing pool, the steno pool, or the word processing center, secretaries often know what is going on. Entrusted with confidential information, they are enjoined not to act upon what they know and not to reveal it. It is this combination of access to knowledge and power, coupled with a proscription against cultivating these things in their own name, or using them for themselves, that makes secretaries both theoretically interesting as well as organizationally problematic.

Organizations, especially white-collar bureaucracies like law firms, insurance companies, and universities, are composed of two hierarchies, a managerial and professional hierarchy and a secretarial or clerical hierarchy. While vast differentials of pay, power, and privilege separate the clerical and managerial hierarchies (Kanter 1977a), it is my contention that what really separates these two strata and keeps them separate are not simply differences in skill and responsibility, but differences in codes of behavior. Moreover, since these different codes of behavior are often tacit and unspoken, they are opaque to members of the opposite hierarchy. Here, of course, is where much of their holding power lies.

I call the rules that govern behavior in the clerical hierarchy *rules for subordination* and those that govern behavior in the managerial hierarchy *rules for upward mobility*. The purpose of this paper is to spell out differences between these two different codes of behavior and to describe how they help maintain the subordinate position of women at the bottom of organizational hierarchies.

DATA

The data I am using to describe the rules of subordination in the clerical hierarchy come from extensive, open-ended interviews I conducted with 62 female

secretaries and word-processing operators between 1980 and 1986 (Machung, forthcoming). I have also read advice manuals for secretaries (Duncan 1989; Krogfoss 1974:692-99) and have worked as both a secretary and data-entry operator myself.

Likewise I have culled the rules for upward mobility for managers from interviews I conducted with six managers employed by major multinational corporations in the San Francisco Bay Area; by working myself in administrative positions for three years and observing managers at work; and by reading biographies, ethnographies, and advice manuals for women and men in business (Cunningham 1984; Fisher 1989; Freeman 1990; Harragan 1977; Hennig & Jardim 1976; Kanter 1977a, 1977b, 1979; MacBroom 1986; MacKay 1988).

By elaborating how managerial and professional hierarchies work, advice manuals like *Games Mother Never Taught You* (Harragan 1977) or *The Managerial Woman* (Hennig & Jardim 1976) indirectly point out the rules for upward mobility that characterize professional and managerial hierarchies. What they do not point out are the parallel, but opposite, rules that govern subordination in the clerical hierarchy. Following, then, is a list comparing rules for subordination in the clerical hierarchy with rules for upward mobility in the managerial hierarchy.

TABLE 1. *Organizational codes of behavior*

The clerical hierarchy	The managerial hierarchy
Rules for subordination	*Rules for upward mobility*
1. Hide your talents.	1. Display your talents.
2. Hide your ambition.	2. Display your ambition.
3. Give credit upward.	3. Collect credit downward.
4. Focus on details.	4. Focus on goals.
5. Do it perfectly.	5. Do it better.
6. Keep silent.	6. Trade information.

RULES OF SUBORDINATION/RULES FOR UPWARD MOBILITY

Hide your talents/Display your talents

The first rule in organizational hierarchies is the rule to hide one's talents if one is a clerical worker and to display one's talents if one is a a professional or manager. The "logic" of organizational hierarchies (Acker 1989, 1990) dictates that those higher up be more competent and intelligent than those lower down and that they display that at work. The routine quality of many clerical jobs reinforces this logic by denying clericals much opportunity to develop special competencies, especially ones which are highly rewarded.[3] Moreover, the social perception that clerical work is *only* routine work inhibits bosses and secretaries alike from perceiving any special competencies secretaries may actually have.

Mary Leaman[4] was secretary to the head of a public-utility firm for ten years. When he became seriously ill, she did both his job and her job for two years, making it possible for him to continue to be the figurehead in charge of the

company. Then he died, a successor was hired to replace him, and she was demoted back to being "just a secretary." Nothing she had accomplished in that two-year period was recognized or rewarded. Despite this, she did acquire an enormous amount of knowledge and self-confidence. But she would never do anything like that again:

> Because I didn't gain anything out of it, other than helping him. Then he died and all you had was your say-so, that "I did this, and I did that, and I did something else." So I'm saying I would never do it again for what I went through emotionally to do that, and for what I didn't gain on the outside.

Assuming secretarial work involves little more than typing, filing, and answering phones, bosses sometimes also figure their secretary must not be especially talented or intelligent; otherwise she would be doing something else. Sometimes secretaries collude in this depiction of themselves because displaying their talents, intelligence, or competence would threaten their boss. Those with a master's or Ph.D. (and I interviewed several like this in the Bay Area) hid their degrees so as not to appear more educated than their bosses.

Others pretended to be less than they were. Cindy, for example, had been fired from several previous secretarial jobs for being a "bad apple" and an "insubordinate factor in the firm." But her new job as a word-processing operator gave her four days off a week—something she very much wanted. Determined to become a novelist, she needed the time, the income and the stability this new job provided. Not wanting to lose it, she discovered a trick that worked for her:

> I decided when you take this job, be a clown. When you're feeling emotional and want to express a feeling, be a clown about it, and you won't get judged so harshly by it. So I immediately called on some resources and displayed myself as a happy-go-lucky, scatter-brained woman. The attorneys immediately started calling me a "dizzy dame" and "dizzy broad," which I was intelligent enough this time not to get mad at as I usually do, and let it work for me the other way. In other words, when I get really emotional from sitting too long from working on a boring job, if I can jump up and act silly and run around and do crazy things, it releases my energy. I don't let them know that, or if I told them, they probably wouldn't understand anyway. But it's healthy for me.

In contrast, managers learn to seek out opportunities to display their skills and talents at work; unlike secretarial work, outstanding performance in the managerial labor force is highly rewarded with promotions and bonuses. Jim O'Brien, a senior vice-president for a Fortune 500 company, had saved his company several hundreds of thousands of dollars in the early 1980s by eliminating a number of positions within his division. Wanting to make his accomplishment known but only to those at the top, Jim sent a memo to a carefully selected set of senior executives explaining how in the long run saving money was more profitable for the firm than increasing sales. He redrafted that memo twenty-three different times. Very carefully he was devising a strategy about to whom he would make his accomplishments visible, and how.

Other managers spontaneously told me things they too had done to make their accomplishments at work visible. But not one secretary I interviewed had ever

considered how she might make her accomplishments at work visible. If anything, the secretaries I interviewed discounted the specialness of their achievements—"What I did, anybody could have done"; "It's just second nature."

Hide your ambition/Display your ambition

Secretaries also learn to hide their ambition at work. Not only do bosses not perceive ambition in their secretaries, but they often discourage those who are ambitious from moving up. The problem is simple: Promoting a good secretary costs bosses more than it gains them. Not only do bosses not want to lose the services of a good secretary, they want to avoid the trouble of replacing her. So in order to get along with their bosses, secretaries learn to hide their ambition.

Melinda Strom was a legal secretary who had worked for her boss, a senior partner in a leading law firm in downtown San Francisco, for over ten years. As much as she liked and respected him, she longed to be working more with people and less at a typewriter. A job as recruiting secretary had recently opened up in personnel and Melinda was greatly excited by this new opportunity. As the partner responsible for recruiting, her boss had the power to hire her into the new position. But he outright refused to do so. Once, years ago, she had followed her husband to Fresno for a year and he had not been able to find anybody as competent to replace her. Flattered both that he wanted her so much and frustrated that he would not promote her, Melinda "threatened" him: "I told him that if he didn't keep me busy enough, I'll apply anyway." But her threat carried no punch since he already kept her busy enough; that was not the problem.

Moreover, in the clerical labor force ambition is often counterposed against loyalty; bosses want loyal secretaries. Thus secretaries who feel ambitious are up against a double bind. If they display their ambition, they risk being perceived as disloyal, which threatens their job. But if they hide their ambition, they risk being perceived as timid, self-effacing, and unpromotable.

A secretary on the Berkeley campus, Jean, was thrilled by her new job offer. It was 1991 and she'd just been named undergraduate assistant for a larger, better-organized department on campus. It was an offer she couldn't refuse. The new job did not pay much more, but it gave her more autonomy and an identity of her own at work. Hearing she was leaving, one of the faculty in her old department stopped by. "Traitor!" he teased her. "He only meant it in jest," she defended him. But his comment raised her doubts: "Am I being disloyal to leave?"

In the managerial and professional ranks, however, ambition is perceived quite differently. Managers and professionals are expected to be ambitious and to express their ambition by wanting to move up. Characteristically, for example, candidates for managerial and professional positions are asked where they would like to be in five years; seldom, if ever, are secretaries asked the same question. Ambition in the managerial ranks thus is congruent with loyalty to larger organizational goals, but ambition in the secretarial ranks is discordant with the loyalty secretaries are expected to show to their bosses. In fact, while managers and professionals are evaluated on their ambition, secretaries are more likely to be evaluated on their friendliness, their cooperation, and their ability to get along with

others—but not on their ambition.

Give credit upward/Collect credit downward

The third rule of organizational hierarchies is the rule (or right) to claim credit for the work of one's subordinates. This rule enormously advantages bosses over secretaries. Simple arithmetic shows that the more subordinates one has, the more work one can claim credit for having done. But not only are secretaries not able to claim credit for the work of people below them, they are often expected to give credit upward. One secretary told me:

> You're talking to people who are told *not* to voice their opinions. "Don't talk back to the boss. If you have a good suggestion, make your boss think that he's the one that came up with the idea." That whole sort of attitude. It's changing, but it's still there very strong. You have to be careful about how you voice your opinions and be yourself.

Working at Berkeley in the spring of 1987, I observed one departmental secretary planning and orchestrating the entire graduation ceremony for her department. Theoretically, one of the faculty members was responsible for the event, but he wanted nothing to do with it. So she did it all—from certifying graduation requirements, to inviting parents and guest speakers, to planning the ceremony, locating a hall, designing the brochure, selecting the music, and organizing a reception afterward for several hundred guests. She even sent all the invitations out under his name—after signing for him. The brochure for the graduation was printed up with his name in bold type on the first page; hers was nowhere to be found. Essentially, he got to claim all the credit for the ceremony; her claims were silenced.

Events like these occur daily in bureaucracies across the country. Their very universality masks how common it is for secretaries not to be credited either with the skills their work requires or their accomplishments on the job. Through these two mechanisms—denial of skill and allocation of credit upward—many of the higher-level skills secretaries typically use on their jobs, like tact, diplomacy, and the ability to secure cooperation for a large project, are rendered organizationally invisible. To a secretary goes the work, to her boss goes the credit.

Focus on details/Focus on goals

Secretaries also learn to focus on the details of their job rather than larger organizational goals. Sometimes this is cited as yet another reason why they are not promotable; seemingly they lack the capacity to see the bigger picture. However, it is not the secretaries' job to keep their eyes on the ball, but rather to keep track of a myriad of details—airplane tickets, hotel reservations, postal fees, packaging rules—all the details, as Cindy Perkins described them, that "would drive anybody crazy."

Moreover, bosses often do not tell their secretary all that is going on. Excluded from meetings where policy is made, kept in the dark about upcoming decisions, many of the secretaries I interviewed felt they were actually expected *not* to

understand the larger context in which they worked. Given only detail work to perform, they became, of necessity, detail-conscious.[5] This after all was their job.

Trisha James, for example, worked as a secretary for an investment brokerage firm in the city. Each day the firm got several copies of *The Wall Street Journal*. Educated, with a B.A. in film, Trish was curious about the business world she now found herself in. So one day she asked one of the partners if she could bring a copy of the newspaper home with her. "Oh," he replied, "you mean for your fireplace?"

Managers, on the other hand, are taught not to focus on details but to focus on goals. Managers, in fact, succeed at their jobs to the extent to which they can set goals for themselves, make those goals visible, and get others to join in with them in accomplishing them. At a community college where I once worked, all managers from the president on down were required to present their goals publicly at a faculty-staff colloquium opening the school each year. Of course, no secretary was ever asked to stand up and present her goals for the coming year. Doing so would not only have looked silly, but it would have constituted a total breach of organizational etiquette. The ritual of the opening ceremony confirmed the obvious: Only presidents, deans, and business managers were expected to have organizational goals; secretaries were expected only to be able to carry out the details of their bosses' goals.

Do it perfectly/Do it better

The fifth rule of organizational hierarchies is the rule to do it perfectly if one is a clerical, or to do it better if one is a manager. Managers and professionals, in fact, often define success at work in terms of getting better at it. "Progress," the president of a small college once told me, "is the transformation of challenge into routine."

Secretaries, on the other hand, more often define job success in terms of not making a mistake. "Remember," Duncan warned executive assistants, "if anything goes wrong, *it's all your fault*" (1989:134, italics in original). Many of the secretaries and especially the word-processing operators I interviewed described themselves as "perfectionists" at work. The narrower, more limited, and more routinized the job, the more perfectionism is possible and desirable. Conversely, the more broadly defined the job, the more ambiguous and indeterminate are measures of job performance. Criteria for evaluating successful managers thus are vaguer than criteria for evaluating successful secretaries.

Once, for three long days, I typed an endless series of repetitious form letters for an attorney specializing in medical malpractice. My brain began to blur with the tedium of the work, and at one point I inadvertently changed her name. Slowly Irene Copeland grew into Irene K. Copeland. Irritated, the attorney called me, the new temp, into her office. "I'll sign them this time," she snapped, "but never again." Having faced similar reprimands in the past, secretaries learn to fear another one. "Doing it perfectly" protects them not only from error, but more importantly, from blame.

Mistakes, however, are endemic to work, managerial and professional as well

as clerical (Hughes 1971). But unlike secretaries, managers and professionals define success at work not in terms of getting everything right but in terms of doing better and improving their performance. Unlike secretaries, they expect to make mistakes and to learn from them. In fact, the ability to correct oneself in midstream often separates a successful from an unsuccessful manager. "You can't be a good manager," Jim O'Brien told me (and he would know, having risen into a senior managerial position himself),

> unless you have the theory. And you have to have some practice, you have to have some experience. You can't read the book and be a good manager. You have to apply that. And as you apply, you get better. You make some mistakes, but you just go on and make fewer and fewer mistakes each year. Hopefully you get better.

Keep silent/Trade information

In order to succeed at their jobs, secretaries lastly must learn how to handle powerlessness. Often they are promoted up the secretarial ranks on their ability to defer, tactfully and diplomatically, to those in power. Bosses, on the other hand, learn how to cultivate power and are promoted upward in the managerial hierarchy on their ability to acquire and manage it.

Managers have any number of mechanisms for cultivating power—doing a great job, developing a network of upwardly mobile peers and subordinates, and trading information—all of which are off limits to secretaries.

Take trading information as an example. Talk is the essence of the managerial job, the way that managers discuss tactics, build and cement alliances, solicit advice, and sell their programs. But secretaries are enjoined from trading information. It is only secretarial jobs, for example, which are labelled "confidential," never managerial or professional jobs. Secretaries, in fact, quickly learn that the only way to get access to confidential information is by promising to keep it secret. "*Secretary* comes from *secret*," several proudly told me, little sensing how this injunction against talking and sharing what they know constrained them from building alliances with others and hence from accumulating power in their own name.

Thus the primary way a secretary can accumulate power is by working for a powerful boss. As he comes to trust and depend upon his secretary, she can acquire substantial influence throughout the organization. But even that power is based not on her own structural position in the organizational hierarchy, but on her personal relationship with her boss.

But such dependency limits secretaries enormously. For as bosses come to depend upon their secretaries, they become less likely to want to let them go. "It's like getting a divorce when they leave," said one. "It's traumatic for them." The paradox is obvious: the more secretaries accumulate power by cultivating the dependency of one boss, the less likely he will promote her. Ironically, the very act of accumulating power in the secretarial ranks blocks secretaries from upward mobility. This is exactly the opposite of what managers experience.

DISCUSSION

Moving upward into managerial roles requires secretaries to learn new forms of behavior. As women move out of the secretarial hierarchy, they must learn to display their talents, ambitions, and achievements, take credit not only for their own work but for the work of subordinates, focus on goals rather than details, and acquire power for themselves. This is not easy to do and it requires much psychic reorganization. For this reason, women who move out of the secretarial ranks often experience this not as a simple promotion as a manager might, but as a radical break from their past. Managers talk about a promotion as a step up, much as one climbs a ladder rung by rung. But secretaries often use violent imagery and talk in terms of "busting out," "breaking out," or "leaping out" of the clerical ghetto.

What they are "busting" or "breaking out" of, I submit, are the organizational codes they learned as secretaries—codes that rewarded them as secretaries but will enormously disadvantage them as managers. Unlearning one set of rules and immediately learning another is quite difficult, especially when the codes are implicit, not explicit.

In a now-classic study, Broverman, Broverman, and Clarkson (1970) described how clinical psychologists perceived healthy adult women as passive, emotional, subjective people whose feelings were easily hurt. Healthy adult men, on the other hand, were seen as active, competitive, logical, and unemotional people who made decisions easily and enjoyed leadership roles.

Kanter's (1977a) picture of managers as "logical," "rational," and "unemotional" and secretaries as "emotional," "timid," "self-effacing," and "addicted to praise" parallels this culturally simplistic characterization of masculine and feminine roles. Logic, rationality, and lack of emotionality are conventionally associated with masculinity and the managerial hierarchy and are socially valued, while emotionality, dependence, and difficulty asserting oneself are associated with femininity and the clerical hierarchy and are socially devalued. Women who work within the clerical ghetto are expected to conform to these stereotypes and are ostracized if they deviate too far from them. In turn these expectations further serve to hold them within the clerical ghetto.

The rules for subordination that characterize secretarial work parallel norms for idealized femininity. They are not just codes for organizational behavior but codes for appropriate gender behavior as well. Traditional notions of masculinity and femininity that originate outside of organizations are thus reinforced by processes intrinsic to organizational dynamics. A widespread ideology that sees the legitimate place of women in support roles and men in "creative" or "managerial" roles in turn undergirds this practice of not seeing secretaries as fully promotable human beings. Analyzing how secretaries and bosses talk about their jobs reveals these nuances in how they are perceived by others, and in turn, come to perceive themselves.

NOTES

1. Thanks to Evelyn Nakano Glenn, Arlie Hochschild, Rachel Kahn-Hut, and Ron Rothbart for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

2. The professional and managerial and clerical hierarchies are each clearly stratified by gender. Thus in this paper I use masculine pronouns to refer to bosses and feminine pronouns to refer to secretaries. Despite the influx of women into managerial and professional jobs over the past two decades, the majority (56%) of managers and professionals today are still male; at the top 95% are male. Likewise, women continue to occupy most of the positions at the bottom; 80% of all clerical and 98% of all secretarial jobs, for example, are held by women (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1989:183-84).

3. "Whatever success they may have," wrote Kanter (1977b:51), referring to those in low-level jobs, "is seen as inherent in the position and in the organization surrounding it. Excellent performance on routine tasks may be valued, but it probably won't add to power."

4. I have changed the names and identifying characteristics of all my respondents to protect their identity.

5. Secretaries clearly are not the only ones who must keep track of an enormous number of details at work. So must many managers and professionals. Stockbrokers, for one, are even more attentive to details than secretaries (Fisher 1989). The difference between stockbrokers and secretaries is not their detail-consciousness; rather it is the value of those details. Those that stockbrokers take care of are easily worth hundreds of thousands of dollars, while those that secretaries take care of are considered almost worthless—unless not done.

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The effect of gender composition on group interaction

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INTRODUCTION

This study presents observations and analysis of two-, three-, and four-student groups engaged in scientific experiments about heat and temperature using real-time data collection and simulations of related everyday experiences. This research is part of the *Computer as a Lab Partner Curriculum Project*. This curriculum has gone through successive refinements based on research results (Linn & Songer 1991). Finding ways to promote group discussions about scientific ideas and strategies for promoting equitable participation by females are important goals of the curriculum project (Burbules & Linn 1991; Linn & Burbules in press). The *Computer as a Lab Partner Curriculum* has been designed to reach a diverse group of students (Linn & Songer 1991), including students who are at risk of doing poorly in science.

Girls have lower expected competence in science and mathematics classes and this difference increases in higher grade levels. In scientific problem-solving, Lockheed and Harris (1984) found boys to be perceived as more competent by fifth-graders, but not by fourth-graders.

Studies also show a decline in confidence for girls in science and mathematics classes. Eccles (1984) found that in elementary school, students have equal confidence in their mathematical ability, but males are much more confident by the time they are in high school. High-school girls showed less confidence, even when they were performing equally. National Assessment of Educational Progress (1988) also found that confidence levels in mathematics and science differed between groups of males and females. Grandy (1987) found elementary boys and girls are equally interested in science and mathematics, but by the end of high school only 20% of the girls, as contrasted to 40% of the boys, are interested in these fields.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Why is participation in small-group discussions important to learning and development? Piaget (1926) said that communication produces a need for the internal mental activity of confirming and checking one's thoughts. Vygotsky (1978) found that developmental processes at first operate when the child is interacting with people in her or his environment and in cooperation with her or his peers. As the students work with others at a level of understanding just above where they can work alone, interpersonal thought is transformed into intrapersonal

thought. How do we capitalize on Piaget's and Vygotsky's research to encourage students to organize their ideas, defend their positions, and reflect on and internalize new ideas?

In each of these theoretical views, social interaction is essential to learning. What determines the access that students have to the social interaction in the group? Cohen and Intili (1981) found that the amount of participation in group discussions is determined by status within the group. Cohen (1984) compared students with equal pretest scores on math and science concepts and found those students with high social status had more access to peer interaction. Lockheed and Harris (1984) found that low-status individuals are less likely to have their information used by high-status individuals in the group.

Characteristics other than competence in scientific understanding in the group may determine the status of the individual in the group. In their *Expectation States Theory* Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch (1972) explain that *diffuse status characteristics*, those characteristics that have no direct relevance to the ongoing task, can determine the status of the individual and the other students' expectations of competence. Being male automatically raised the status of the individual in the group. Linn and Burbules (in press) mention that group learning may reinforce sterotypes, biases, and views of science as a male domain.

How can the effects of status be reduced? Research by Cohen (1982) and Rosenholtz (1985) indicates that teaching students that all abilities in the group are important can reduce the effect of preexisting status. How does group composition and size affect the amount of dominance of males in the discussions? Which group compositions promote a more equitable interaction for females? Which group compositions promote a greater focus on scientific ideas rather than on status? What are the characteristics of the interaction of the group with the highest amount of discussion of scientific ideas and lowest focus on status?

RESEARCH SETTING AND METHODOLOGY

Twenty-two case studies were made of 51 subjects in 17 different randomly selected two-, three- and four-member groups. The different groups had no more than one student the same as any other group of the same size and composition. The students were enrolled in the fall semester of 1989 in Foothill Middle School. Each class period was about 55 minutes long. In carrying out real-time data experiments, students measured water temperature at frequent intervals with probes that were connected to computers. Data was displayed on a graph at the same time that changes were occurring in the experiment. Students also worked with computer simulations of naturally occurring problems.

Twenty-three groups—11 four-member groups, 5 three-member groups, and 7 two-member groups—were videotaped for approximately 15 to 55 minutes. The students made predictions and conclusions, described everyday life experiences, and constructed principles. Group compositions of *majority-male, all-female, all-male, majority-female*, and *equal-male-and-female* were analyzed for equality of interaction and types of comments. One two-person group was eliminated because

the recording was short and there were very few turns. Case studies of groups of the same size and gender composition and with two or more of the same members were averaged together to give 17 different groups. Conversations were coded by turns for each individual and the types of comments were recorded in eight different categories. Two categories, *status-seeking* and *on-task*, are discussed in this paper.

On-task comments are defined as those comments that are related to gaining understanding of scientific ideas or expressing scientific ideas in writing. The on-task category includes assertions related to understanding the experiment, supporting statements for the assertions, and comments about how to express ideas in the written product for the experiment. On-task comments are used by students as they collaborate to make predictions and conclusions, interpret data, construct principles, give everyday life examples, and publish summaries.

Status-seeking comments can be *self-promoting, defensive, insulting,* or *distracting*. Self-promoting comments are defined as comments in which students state either their capabilities relevant to the task or their association with things or activities that promote status in situations that are not academic. Students use these self-promoting comments to gain acceptance of their ideas or control of the procedure. Examples of relevant comments are *I got an A on the last lab* or *I've had a lot of experience with computers*. Irrelevant comments are such statements as *I got these awesome shoes* or *I'm good in sports*.

Defensive status-seeking comments are defined as insulting or self-promoting comments that students make after they have received an insult by another group member.

> B: No, not "we." You guys didn't do this. I did.
> → G 2: Yes, we did. ....
> B: God, you can't do anything right, can you?
> → G 2: No, you can't.

Insulting status-seeking comments are defined as negative comments about another person or anything related to that person. They are used to question the credibility of the other students' ideas, reduce their control of the experimental procedure, or divert their attention from the task. *Relevant insulting status-seeking* comments are about academic success or intelligence, such as *he doesn't have a brain*. *Irrelevant insulting status-seeking* comments about non-academic topics, such as the one given in the following example about physical-fitness scores, are used in reducing the targeted person's position and influence in the group.

> → B 3: What percent did you get? I got over a hundred on everything. What did you get, forty percent, fifty percent?
> → B 2: Fortieth percentile ((laughing)).
> B 1: He wouldn't let me take it.
> → B 2: Oh yeah, right.

Insulting status-seeking comments are also used to divert the attention of other group members from the task to gain attention or to hide lack of knowledge, as in the following case:

G 1:   What do we do now?
→ B: Your armpits smell bad.

Distracting status-seeking are defined as off-task comments, sounds, or provocative stories. These are also used to divert the group's attention away from the task or to block further discussion, as in the following example:

B: Temperature.
G 1:   Heat energy.
→ B: Uh, Uh, Uh ((noise continues for a brief period)).

RESULTS

Tables 1 through 5 show average percentages for members' total turns and the average percentages of their turns that are status-seeking or on-task comments for the majority-male, all-female, all-male, equal-male-and-female, and majority-female group compositions.

Majority-female groups

In the majority-female group composition the girls deferred to the boy. Students engaged in little discussion and the boy discouraged dissenting opinions. The boy averaged double the total turns of the girls and three times their percentage of status-seeking comments (Table 1; group composition is given in parentheses).

TABLE 1. *Percent of turns with status-seeking and on-task types of interaction*

Group composition	Avg % of total turns	Interaction	Avg % of turns
Boy (G/G/B), (G/G/B), (G/G/B)	54	Status-seeking	22
		On-task	48
Girls (G/G/B), (G/G/B), (G/G/B)	23	Status-seeking	6
		On-task	53
Boy (G/G/G/B), (G/G/G/B), (G/G/G/B)	41	Status-seeking	23
		On-task	47
Girls (G/G/G/B), (G/G/G/B), (G/G/G/B)	20	Status-seeking	10
		On-task	49
Boys in all groups		Status-seeking	23
		On-task	48
Girls in all groups		Status-seeking	8
		On-task	51

Majority-male groups

In the majority-male group composition (Table 2), a case study was made of four successive four-person groups with the same girl and some of the same boys. The boys ignored and insulted the girl. Her percent of total turns in the group progressively decreased to almost zero. Her percent of status-seeking comments increased and then decreased to zero.

TABLE 2. *Percent of turns with status-seeking and on-task types of interaction*

Group composition	Avg % of total turns	Interaction	Avg % of turns
Boy #1	61	Status-seeking	0
		On-task	91
Boy #2	30	Status-seeking	0
		On-task	100
Girl (B/B/G)	9	Status-seeking	20
		On-task	80
Boys (B/B/B/G)	28	Status-seeking	19
		On-task	46
Boy #1	44	Status-seeking	24
		On-task	56
Boy #2	35	Status-seeking	25
		On-task	54
Boy #3	6	Status-seeking	9
		On-task	29
Girl (B/B/B/G)	13	Status-seeking	25
		On-task	33
Boys in all groups		Status-seeking	12
		On-task	66
Girls in all groups		Status-seeking	23
		On-task	57

All-female groups

In the all-female two-person group composition (Table 3) the girls had an almost equal interaction, but they showed lack of confidence in understanding the experiment and difficulty even with basic procedures. The average for on-task comments in the all-female group composition was lower than the average for males or females in any other group composition.

TABLE 3. *Percent of turns with status-seeking and on-task types of interaction*

Group composition	Avg % of total turns	Interaction	Avg % of turns
Girls (G/G), (G/G)		Status-seeking	25
		On-task	44
Girl #1	55	Status-seeking	23
		On-task	34
Girl #2	45	Status-seeking	27
		On-task	53

Equal-male-and-female groups

Status-seeking comments were low and on-task comments were high for both males and females in equal-male-and-female groups. Although the seating arrangement, with one boy and one girl in front and the other two in back, was gender-equitable, the boy and girl in the back were often ignored and boy who was in the back had a lower proportion of on-task comments.

TABLE 4. *Percent of turns with status-seeking and on-task types of interaction*

Group composition	Avg % of total turns	Interaction	Avg % of turns
Boy (B/G)	50	Status-seeking	0
		On-task	48
Girl (B/G)	50	Status-seeking	0
		On-task	55
All boys (B/B/G/G), (B/B/G/G)	27	Status-seeking	18
		On-task	69
Boy #1	32	Status-seeking	11
		On-task	82
Boy #2	21	Status-seeking	26
		On-task	57
All girls (B/B/G/G), (B/B/G/G)	23	Status-seeking	7
		On-task	78
Girl #1	30	Status-seeking	3
		On-task	79
Girl #2	17	Status-seeking	11
		On-task	78
Boys for all groups		Status-seeking	14
		On-task	68
Girls for all groups		Status-seeking	6
		On-task	73

All-male groups

The all-male group composition was characterized by having a wide range in the percentage of turns between members within the group. The average difference between the boy with the highest percentage of the group's turns and the boy with the lowest percentage of turns increased with the size of the group. The latter averaged lowest for on-task turns and highest for status-seeking comments.

TABLE 5. *Percent of turns with status-seeking and on-task types of interaction*

Group composition	Avg % of total turns	Interaction	Avg % of turns
4 boys (B/B/B/B)		Status-seeking	21
		On-task	42
Boy #1	41	Status-seeking	15
		On-task	62
Boy #2	28	Status-seeking	22
		On-task	59
Boy #3	24	Status-seeking	32
		On-task	45
Boy #4	8	Status-seeking	64
		On-task	17
3 boys (B/B/B)		Status-seeking	23
		On-task	67
Boy #1	48	Status-seeking	30
		On-task	58
Boy #2	38	Status-seeking	13
		On-task	74
Boy #3	14	Status-seeking	27
		On-task	53
2 boys (B/B), (B/B)		Status-seeking	41
		On-task	18
Boy #1	63	Status-seeking	37
		On-task	39
Boy #2	38	Status-seeking	45
		On-task	17
Boys for all groups		Status-seeking	32
		On-task	46

Groups with high on-task and low status-seeking comments

For males, both the lowest average percentage for turns with status-seeking comments and the highest average percentage for turns with on-task comments were in the majority-male and equal-male-and-female group compositions (Table 6). For females, the average proportion of turns with on-task comments was highest and the average proportion of turns with status-seeking comments was lowest in the equal-male-and-female group composition. The girls' average

percentage for status-seeking comments was less than half that of the boys in equal-male-and-female groups.

TABLE 6. *Group compositions with high on-task and low status-seeking turns*

Group composition	Interaction	Avg % of turns
Boys (B/B/G), (B/B/B/G)	Status-seeking	12
	On-task	66
Girls (B/B/G), (B/B/B/G)	Status-seeking	23
	On-task	57
Boys (B/B/G/G), (B/B/G/G), (B/G)	Status-seeking	14
	On-task	68
Girls (B/B/G/G), (B/B/G/G), (B/G)	Status-seeking	6
	On-task	73

Status-seeking comments

For males in majority-male groups, status-seeking comments were mostly self-promoting or insulting comments that were exchanged by the two dominant boys.

> B 1: He's taking Algebra Two already. He's going to.
> → B 2: I know, so am I.
> → B 1: ((calls to another student)) You know to make it into Berkeley, you have to get an eight hundred on the SAT.
> G: Have you taken the SATs yet?
> B 1: No.
> → B 2: I have.
> → B 1: What did you get four hundred? No what did you get?

The boys also discouraged the girl's participation with insulting status-seeking comments.

> G: One group did use Saran wrap instead, where most of them used aluminum instead of wool.
> → B 1: Shut up.
> G: Who me?
> → B 1: Yeah.
> G: Why should I?
> → B 1: No, you butthead ...

In addition, the two most dominant boys made comments that excluded the girl from the group—*Too bad we can't pick our own groups, it would be a lot funner*—and blocked her participation in the group by discouraging her contributions in conversations about the experiment.

> G: You guys aren't even asking for my opinion, but then who cares.
> B 1: Okay, fine. What do you think?
> G: It will end around fifty something, forty forty-five (unintelligible).
> B 1: So right here.

> B 2: Fine, leave it.
> → B 1: This is medium. There is no way ((laughing)).
> B 2: No, up. No, down a little. Down, Down, Down a little. Down a little.
> G: Up.
> → B 1: She says up a little. All three, three against one.
> G: Just leave it, just leave it where it was.
> B 1: Right here, right.
> B 2: No, down a little.
> → B 1: (Speaking to Boy #3) She said yes, what do you say?
> G: I don't care.
> → B 1: I said right there. There it is three to one, decide.

For the female in the majority-male group, most of the status-seeking comments were defensive in response to being insulted or ignored by the males. In addition, she used distracting status-seeking comments to try to gain their attention and her own inclusion in the group.

In the equal-male-and-female group composition, there were no status-seeking comments in the two-person group composition and only a few status-seeking comments in the four-person group composition. The status-seeking comments were made primarily by the boy who was seated in the back. These were mostly distracting status-seeking comments that were used by the boy in the back to initiate discussions of off-task topics.

GROUP SIZE

The on-task comments were lowest for males and females in the two-person groups (Table 7). For males, the three-person group composition had the highest percent for on-task comments. For females, the on-task comments increased slightly with the size of the group. The range in average percentage of on-task comments for different sized mixed-gender groups was greater for boys with a 20% variation, while the girls' range was only 6%. For males and females the average percentage of status-seeking comments increased with group size.

Comparisons of the interaction for students in the front of the group with those in the back showed a much greater response to position change by males in types of comments and by females in number of turns. Boys in the back averaged about 20% higher for status-seeking comments and about 20% lower for on-task comments than the boys in the front. Girls in the back averaged only about 5% higher for status-seeking comments and 10% lower in on-task comments compared to the average for the girls in front. In the front, males had only 5% higher averages than females for both status-seeking comments and on-task comments than averages for females, but in the back the males' average was 20% higher for status-seeking and 10% lower for on-task comments. Males had about the same average percentage of turns in the front and the back, but the females' average was 10% lower in back.

TABLE 7. *Comparison of different sized mixed-gender group compositions*

Group composition	Avg % of total turns	Interaction	Avg % of turns
Boy, 2-person (B/G)	50	Status-seeking	0
		On-task	48
Girl, 2-person group	50	Status-seeking	0
		On-task	55
Boys, 3-person (B/G/G), (B/G/G), (B/G/G), (B/B/G)	51	Status-seeking	13
		On-task	67
Girls, 3-person group	21	Status-seeking	8
		On-task	57
Boy, (G/G/G/B), (G/G/G/B), (G/G/G/B), (G/B/B/B), (B/B/G/G), (B/B/G/G)	26	Status-seeking	20
		On-task	56
Girls, 4-person groups	20	Status-seeking	11
		On-task	61
Girls in front 3- & 4-person groups	25	Status-seeking	6
		On-task	62
Girls in back 3- & 4-person groups	15	Status-seeking	13
		On-task	51
Boys in front 3- & 4-person groups	38	Status-seeking	11
		On-task	67
Boys in back 3 & 4-person groups	39	Status-seeking	30
		On-task	44

Best case studies for on-task interaction

The four groups with the highest average of individual group members' on-task turns were, in descending order, case studies #21, #18, #13, and #1 (Table 8). The groups with the highest on-task comments included all of the three- and four-person mixed-gender compositions, except for the three boys/one girl composition. In all but one case there was little controversy. The only group that encouraged discussion and promoted expression of different points of view was case study #1. In this four-person majority-female group the students were seated in a row rather than in the usual two rows with two students in front and two students in back. The girl who had the highest percentage of the group's total turns promoted discussion by asking many questions about the experiment.

TABLE 8. *Percent of turns with status-seeking and on-task types of interaction*

Case study		Avg % of total turns	Interaction	Avg % of turns
#21	Boys	91	Status-seeking	0
(B/B/G)			On-task	96
	Girl	9	Status-seeking	20
			On-task	80
#18	Boy	47	Status-seeking	0
(B/G/G)			On-task	93
	Girls	53	Status-seeking	0
			On-task	81
#13	Boys	48	Status-seeking	1
(B/B/G/G)			On-task	82
	Girls	52	Status-seeking	2
			On-task	88
#1	Boy	28	Status-seeking	10
(B/G/G/G)			On-task	71
	Girls	82	Status-seeking	5
			On-task	86

On-task interaction

The four case studies with the lowest average for the individual group members' on-task turns were, in descending order, #4, #17, #16, and #19 (Table 9). The case studies included one group of three girls and one boy and three two-person groups, two all-male and one all-female. In case study #4, the students had no comments about understanding the experiment. The two girls in front had almost no status-seeking turns. Most of their comments were procedural. They were hampered by their lack of even basic understanding of computer operation. The girl that was sitting in the back responded to stories that the boy initiated as well as interacting with the girls.

→ G 1: What's the command key?
→ B: I don't know? Do you want me to ask him?
→ G 2: Hopefully we did this right? Or else I'm ... Oh, I don't feel well.
→ G 3: Neither do I.

The boy had over half of the group's turns and almost half of these were status-seeking. The boy tried to distract the girls with provocative stories until they finished the experiment. Then, although the girls complained, the boy decided to check their work.

→ B: Still we'll check everything quickly ...
→ B: I'm just double checking? Is there something wrong with it?

Case studies # 16, #17, and #19 were all real-time experiments. In case study #17, a two-boy group, there was an extremely low average of on-task comments. The boys discussed topics that were unrelated to the experiment but demonstrated their knowledge in areas of status outside the classroom. In case study #19, Boy #1 talks about his objects of status: *my parents gave me one hundred and seventy bucks and said go get some shoes by yourself.* In case study #16 the girls both lacked knowledge needed to do the experiment. They exchanged insulting status-seeking comments and tried to avoid doing the experiment.

> G 1: You can go get the stuff.
> G 2: No, no, I'm not.
> G 1: I don't want to get it. I've never gotten it before and I don't want to.
> G 2: I've never gotten it either.
> G 1: Then you go ...
> → G 2: You have Alzheimer's.((Girl #1 trips her)) Ouch, you did that on purpose.
> → G 1: Alzheimer's? If you have Alzheimer's, ha, ha, ha.
> G 2: Now tell me what to do.
> G 1: C'mon do it.
> G 2: What am I supposed to do?
> G 1: Put the probes in. Um.
> G 2: Both of them?
> G 1: Wait, ask (reference to a boy from another group). What are we supposed to do?
> B (from another group): I have no idea.
> G 1: How do you turn the red and the blue one on. Oh, God.
> B: Return, return.
> G 1: But I don't want the red one on.
> G 2: Oh, God.
> B: You're supposed to have both of them on.
> G 2: Are we doing this right? Are we doing this right?
> G 1: Kind of, semi, half-way.
> G 2: Aren't they both supposed to be cold?
> G 2: What are we doing? Look at this graph.
> G 1: I don't know what I did, but I did it (referring to computer operation).
> → G 2: You did it? ((sneering tone)).
> → G 1: Well gee, aren't you nice. Get away from me.

TABLE 9. *Percent of turns with status-seeking and on-task types of interaction*

Case study		Avg % of total turns	Interaction	Avg % of turns
#4 (B/G/G/G)	Boy	60	Status-seeking	40
			On-task	0
	Girls	41	Status-seeking	8
			On-task	0
#17 (B/B)	Boy	100	Status-seeking	58
			On-task	5
#16 (G/G)	Girls	100	Status-seeking	46
			On-task	30
#19 (B/B)	Boys	100	Status-seeking	24
			On-task	32

SUMMARY

The hypothesized result was correct: the female interaction in the group was most similar to that of males in groups with equal males and females and least similar in majority-female and majority-male group compositions. In the equal-male-and-female groups the percentage of on-task comments was highest and the percentage of status-seeking comments was lowest for females and males. However, in the four-person equal-male-and-female groups, students in the back of the group frequently had their ideas rejected or ignored. As predicted, the female was ignored in the majority-male group composition. The males averaged a much larger proportion of turns than females in the majority-male and majority-female groups. The lowest average percentage of turns with on-task comments for the girls were in the all-female two-person group composition. This was lower than the percentage of on-task turns for males or females in any other gender composition. Observations from case studies revealed the girls' lack of knowledge and their need for outside help.

Females in the back of three and four-person groups dropped in their average percentage of total turns compared to females in the front, while the males' average percentage stayed the same in the front and the back. Males in the back had about a 20% drop in the average for on-task comments along with a comparable increase in status-seeking comments. Females in the back averaged only 10% less than females in the front for the on-task comments. Status-seeking comments increased slightly for females in the back.

DISCUSSION

The results suggest that:
(1) the best group compositions for promoting on-task discussion and reducing status-seeking comments are
     (a) for female students, equal-male-and-female groups.
     (b) for male students, majority-male groups or equal-male-and-female groups.
(2) The results suggest that the two-person equal-male-and-female and the two-person all-female group compositions allow an equal proportion of turns for all students within the group.
(3) Sequential observations, one month apart, of the same female in four "similar" groups, with the same female for all groups and two of the same boys between groups, imply that the majority-male group's negative impact on the girl in discouraging her participation was progressive. In the first observation, she sat in front and participated equally in the discussion. Although she attempted to defend herself against insults and to gain recognition for her ideas, she became increasingly isolated from the group interaction with each successive observation.
(4) The type of conversation in the case study with the highest average on-task percentages suggests that the person who has the most turns in the group can

promote high on-task discussions by asking questions and eliciting the other members' ideas. In this group students discussed controversial ideas and used explanations rather than status-seeking comments to support their ideas.

(5) The results from case studies imply that the four-person group composition may allow some students to avoid learning the basic knowledge necessary for doing later experiments.

(6) The low on-task scores for the two-person group composition suggest that real-time data experiments elicit little on-task discussion during the data-collection period without structure to promote a focus on scientific ideas.

(7) The results from case study #1, a majority-female four-person group composition, suggest that the leader's behavior in the group has a strong influence on the group's interaction.

FURTHER STUDIES

One direction for further study is the effectiveness of the training of group leaders to elicit ideas, allow dissenting opinions in group discussions, and promote the use of evidence rather than status-seeking comments to support ideas. The use of ideas with supporting evidence and logic may reduce the need for students to use status-seeking comments interspersed between ideas about the experiment to promote their viewpoints.

More information is needed on the effect on poor students and females of the four-person group composition versus the two-person group composition. If students are in two-person groups throughout the semester they may participate more in the experiment and focus less on procedure and more on discussion of scientific ideas.

Finally, more studies are needed on the use of status-seeking comments in group interaction and their effect on different members of the group, particularly females. This will provide a better understanding of how to support members who are negatively affected.

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"I don't smile much anymore": Affect, gender, and the discourse of Pittsburgh police officers[1]

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GENDER AND THE WORKPLACE

One of the implicit assumptions evident in much sociolinguistic research on gender is that gender is an attribute of a person, but institutions are also often gendered in ways that delimit who can properly participate in them and/or how such participation can take place (see Gal 1991; Keller 1990; Scott 1988; Sherzer 1987). Workplaces are gendered both by the numerical predominance of one sex within them and by the cultural interpretations of given types of work which, in conjunction with cultural norms and interpretations of gender, dictate who is understood as best suited for different sorts of employment (so that, as Reskin and Roos (1990) illustrate, women are preferred as food servers in the United States because they are believed to be neater and to smile more). In the United States, work considered appropriate for women has traditionally been an extension of their work as mothers and wives, such as teaching, nursing, sewing, and cleaning. More recently this has included work like bank management, public relations, and systems analysis, for which women's reputed skill at interpersonal relationships and interpersonal communication is said to suit them (Reskin & Roos 1990:50-51). The passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1972 Equal Opportunity Act, however, has slowly opened up workplaces which previously excluded women and minorities (S. Martin 1980:11). Tracing the results of these hirings is important for understanding how women learn to integrate themselves successfully into previously all-male and masculine workplaces and how the workplaces adapt to this integration. Of particular interest to sociolinguists is how women adapt to styles and kinds of interaction not normally understood as feminine.

In this paper, I describe linguistic interactions within a workplace that has traditionally been defined as all-male and masculine—the police force—but which has recruited large numbers of women in the last fifteen years through a variety of affirmative-action measures. In 1975 a court injunction was issued to the city of Pittsburgh requiring each incoming police recruit class to be 25% black females, 25% white females, 25% black males, and 25% white males. Large movements of women into male-dominated workplaces are rare (historical examples include clerical workers, telegraph operators, bank tellers, and waitresses), and such movements are usually rapidly followed by the complete reversal of the gender-typing of the workplace (Reskin & Roos 1990:12-15). In Pittsburgh the quota-hiring system has led to a slow, steady increase of women and African Americans, so that now women and African Americans each compose approximately 25% of

the force (no separate figures are available to indicate what percentage of women are white and what percentage of women are black, nor are the categories of black and white broken down into male and female)—a larger percentage of female police officers than in any other major American city outside of Detroit (U.S. Department of Justice 1987a, 1987b).[2] This workplace thus provides a unique opportunity to consider whether gender differences in language exist between men and women when both participate in a community with masculine practices. In this paper, I begin by describing why police work has traditionally been considered men's work. I then develop a brief ethnographic fragment which concentrates on one attribute of this gendering: the non-projection of emotion. This cultural description will provide crucial context for the interpretation of two linguistic interactions: a female and male police officer each taking a report from an apparent victim of domestic assault. I close with a brief review of implications for the study of language and gender and for gender theory more generally.

THE GENDERING OF POLICE WORK

Policing has traditionally been viewed as men's work and, despite increasing numbers of women, is still so viewed by many citizens and by police officers, even by female police officers who consider themselves and other females very good at their work. The explanation for this goes beyond the historical and present numerical predominance of men in the job. Men's work is stereotypically associated with the outdoors, with strength, and with highly technical skills that involve mechanical or scientific knowledge. It is heavy, dirty, and dangerous and requires creativity, intelligence, responsibility, authority, and power. Women's work is stereotypically indoor, lighter, cleaner, safer, repetitive; it calls for dexterity rather than skill, has domestic associations, is tied to a certain work station, and often requires physical attractiveness and charm (Bradley 1989:9). Some of these characteristics are more important than others in determining the gender of a workplace and in determining how masculine or feminine a workplace is. Blue-collar jobs are generally considered more masculine than white-collar ones, and blue-collar jobs which require strength are considered more masculine than others. Susan Martin has suggested:

> ... for blue-collar men whose jobs often do not provide high incomes or great social prestige, other aspects of the work, including certain 'manly' features, take on enormous importance as a means through which they confirm their sex-role identity. Work that entails responsibility, control, use of a skill, initiative and which permits the use of strength and/or physical agility characteristic of males is highly valued not only for its own sake but for its symbolic significance. Similarly working in an 'all-male' environment reinforces the notion that they are doing 'men's work' and is a highly prized fringe benefit of a job. (1980:89)

In public representations and in police officers' minds, police work is defined by the situations in which police officers are required to exert physical force to keep the peace—separating combatants in a bar fight or a girlfriend and boyfriend in a domestic dispute, or wrestling a criminal into handcuffs. Male officers who do not

believe women should be on the job often cite women's inability to handle these situations. Female officers, while recognizing differences in physical ability, argue that on serious calls one rarely needs to act without backup and can cooperate with other officers to bring the situation under control. Female police officers also tend to distinguish between physical strength, which they agree they do not have, and institutional force, which they decidedly agree they do have. As one officer put it, "It's never just a fight between a man and a woman—it's a fight between a man and a *police officer*." Female police officers also note that there are some frightened, weak, do-nothing men on the job, a reply which suggests that women should not be regarded as a group, but rather as individuals, and which thus contests hegemonic interpretations of gender. The dark-blue uniform required for the job is also more masculine than feminine; it has a stripe down the seam on the outside of each leg, back pockets with top buttons, sharp pointed collars (rather than large round or squared ones), and ties and tie pins (rather than scarves or decorative pins). The gun belt is wide, heavy leather and carries the radio, nightstick, blackjack, and revolver or semi-automatic.[3] Bullet-proof vests square off body outlines, and hair has to be either short or pulled up above the collar. Most female police officers have been addressed as *sir*.

Also part of the gendering of police work are the emotional displays required by it. Police officers must often act tough, suspicious, distant, and uninvolved. I turn now to a closer investigation of this aspect of the work.

GENDER AND AFFECT AT WORK

The projection of emotion is a type of often uncompensated work shaped by the requirements of work structures within which individuals find themselves. Kanter (1977) shows how the patrimonial relationship that exists between boss and secretary requires and rewards the projection of emotion in the latter. The display of positive affect is one of the chief privileges of secretaries (who are not more concretely rewarded with large salaries, benefit packages, or promotional opportunities), one of their chief sources of power (as Kanter argues, "Whether or not [secretaries], as women, were intrinsically any more 'emotional' than men, they learned to display their emotions as a very useful way to get what they wanted" 1977:66), and one of their chief tasks (secretaries are expected to see to the comfort of bosses and guests, remember anniversaries and birthdays, take note of daily changes in dress, hair, and mood in those around them, and create a welcoming office environment). It is also one of secretaries' few avenues to professional advancement, since loyalty to and care for a particular boss can lead to promotion when that boss is promoted. In corporate workplaces there is a *division of emotional labor* in which the secretary comes to "feel for" the boss by caring for him and by doing his feeling for him (see Kanter 1977 for elaboration of this argument).

Hochschild (1983) shows how airlines train flight attendants in the projection of warmth, care, and cheerfulness, emotional traits which they then market to airline customers in commercials and advertisements which strive to establish that airplane cabins are as welcoming, comfortable, cozy, and safe as one's own living room.

Hochschild notes that over a third of all jobs are those involving emotional labor, especially service jobs, but while they form only one quarter of the jobs men do, they form over one half of those women do. When men are required to perform emotional labor, it is often the projection of negative emotion, such as threatening those who haven't paid corporate bills, as bill collectors do, or "acting crazier than they do," as police officers do.

AN ECONOMY OF AFFECT: EMOTIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF POLICING

The emotion work that policing exacts is quite different from that of typically feminine jobs. One young female rookie, formerly a teacher, describes how she adapted to workplace interactional norms:[4]

(1) (Do you think women who come on this job start to act in masculine ways?) umhm. un-huh. (Like what are some of the things you see?) Your language. I know mine, mine changes a lot from. *When I'm at work I I always feel like I have to be so* (.) *so like gruff you know.* (umhm) And normally I'm not like that. I'm usually kinda bitchy (Hhh) but I'm not like real (un-huh). Sometimes I try to be like such a hard ass. I *I don't smile as much.* I'm not saying that men, you know [that] that's a masculine trait (right). I think you um (.) you have to pick up maybe not necessarily fighting but techniques to subdue people or just hold them or whatever (un-huh) and I don't think that's naturally feminine either you know (un-huh). I think it's mostly language. You know (.) My mine's atrocious sometimes. I've toned it down a lot. *When I first started you know cause I worked with a lot of guys (umhm) it seemed like, they didn't may not even have swore but I felt like I had to almost like be tough or something around them you know (umhm). And that was my way of being tough.* (Is it like mostly profanity, or do you do it like with tone of voice or something?) Little bit of both. um Like I said I've toned down my profanity a lot. I just kinda use it to describe things now, like I don't call people names and stuff (un-huh-hh). But I don't know. Sometimes I try to like talk to people. Like I said about how black women were able to kinda command respect from people in the projects, I try to like pick up some of their their slang, either their slang or their tone something. Then I like I listen to myself sometimes. I'm like God I sound like you know (hhh) I sound like a HILL person [a person who lives in a largely black, largely poor area of Pittsburgh, known for having a large number of housing projects in a small area]. *And then I think I should just be able to be me. I shouldn't have to be everybody else.*

This police officer feels that her occupational persona is a mask: *I should just be able to be me—I shouldn't have to be everybody else.* This sort of alienation from the emotional labor required by a job was also widespread among the flight attendants interviewed by Hochschild: the ways that they were required to act had little to do with how they themselves felt. This woman's experience demonstrates that her occupational persona is shaped both by her interactions with the public and her perception of the expectations of other police officers. The result is that she smiles less, is gruffer and tougher, and that much of this behavior is done with language. When I asked her why smiling mattered she said that when people smile, they drop their guard. Letting down her guard means that someone can challenge, test, or hurt her.

Many officers believe that some sense of reserve or emotional distance is the only way to survive on the job; otherwise, it is too stressful. One female police officer who had been on the job for twelve years was describing the drinking problems among officers and the frequency of divorce and suicide. She described her reaction to seeing her first serious accident and her way of coping with this and other traumatic scenes:

(2) So my first dead body, which was one that was a girl that was very young, nineteen. She met this guy in this bar with her girlfriend, you could see her blouse had been moved and her bra was pulled up, and they had empty beer cans. Apparently there were two girls, because the second girl (uh) jumped out and she didn't get hurt at all. He speeded it up, when they realized what he was gonna do (umhm) the first girl jumps out of the Bronco and she's telling her friend, Jump! Jump! Well he pulls her back in and he speeds up and she's finally able to get out and she jumps and she hits her head on the on the uh on the railing. Split it open like a melon. (um) Just like if you took a watermelon and threw it down and it perforates, that's what her face head was. Rest of her body was like a broken little doll. And I had never seen there was all this blood. The lieutenant called me, he said okay okay kid this is your first (.) time for a dead body I want you to take a look at this. Think you can handle it? And I see this body covered up. And I see ALL this, this pool of blood came all the way down and made a huge pool at the end of the street. So much blood. And I said I don't know if I can handle it or not boss, I never seen one before. Said okay, said if you think you're gonna throw up, turn around and don't throw up on my shoes. I remember him saying that. DON'T THROW UP ON MY SHOES! So he pulls back the sheet and I look at this and I was SO: FASCINATED. I couldn't get over it. I couldn't stop looking at her. I walked around and looked and her eyeball was hanging out. I mean everything was all—I was TOTALLY fascinated and he said THAT'S ENOUGH. He said ARE YOU GETTING SICK? I said NO:! He said SOMETHING'S WRONG WITH YOU KID— he said YOU SEEN ENOUGH. He put the sheet back on her. After I went and got in the car and I sat there my stomach started to eew, heave-ho, started to heave a little bit, but I wouldn't let on. *That is when I looked and decided that was not a person.* That was a—they were no longer people if they were dead to me. I didn't get involv- think of them as people. I didn't think about her as having a family, as having a full life, you know, anything. *If I did it would kill me. So I didn't I never, I don't get emotionally involved. In anything. I just think—they're like clients. I don't get emotionally involved.* And I don't have nightmares. I know guys that have nightmares. That's because you take it PERSONALLY. You see the baby with the cigarette burns and you get all emotional. You can't do that. *You always have to be impartial. You can never allow your opinion— you can't you can't be opinionated. You are an impartial person.* So that's just the way I do it. And it works for me. I don't have to drink myself to sleep at night.

The expenditure of emotion on others, especially sympathy or empathy, is here understood as support lost for oneself and one's family. Emotion is a limited commodity and using it means losing it. Being impartial is also being professional, as doctors, lawyers, and coroners are with their clients.

In addition to dealing with traumatic incidents, officers often find themselves in situations in which seemingly innocuous calls suddenly turn into life-threatening ones. One officer described being called to pick up a nonviolent shoplifter who was quietly sitting in a security office. The officer was talking to the security

guards when the shoplifter, hearing that she was going to jail, suddenly pulled a knife out of an open desk drawer and lunged. Another officer was called to take a criminal-mischief report for some broken windows and discovered when she arrived on the scene that the windows had been shot out, and furthermore, that the gunman was in a crowd she had walked past on her way into the apartment. One officer who had arrested a drug dealer received a seemingly innocuous call to check an abandoned house. The man he had arrested had arranged a rug over a large hole in the second story, and the officer fell through. Police officers learn to be suspicious of even the most seemingly straightforward accounts and situations (Rubinstein 1973). Depending on the situation, this suspicion may manifest itself as emotional guardedness or anger.

The result of such experiences is the development of an occupationally conditioned *habitus*, which I will call an *economy of affect*. Habitus is the notion developed by Bourdieu to describe how experience structures interactional behavior, or in his own words, "a system of lasting transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions" (1977:82-3). It is "history turned nature," interactional experiences incorporated into memory to form the common sense with which people's expectations about and reactions to subsequent incidents are shaped.

The theoretical utility of the notion of habitus is that it adds a sense of interactional and social history to sociolinguistic discussions of style. Though sociolinguists have extensively studied the effect of addressee, particularly within the framework of accommodation theory (which argues that speakers attempt to converge with or diverge from the speech style of their addressee and situation; see Rickford & McNair-Knox, to appear, for a thorough review of the Anglo-American sociolinguistic literature on style), Bourdieu presents the most complete account of how the class position of a given speaker determines the styles of speech to which she has access, either through acquisition in the family or education in the schools. In particular, he discusses how access to standard language is controlled and restricted so that even should they want to, lower-class speakers do not have the experiences which would allow them to produce it. Most sociolinguistic studies try to explain a lower-class speaker's *ability* to style-shift to accommodate an upper-class speaker or more formal situation rather than the speaker's *inability* to produce certain valued forms of speech even if she wants to. Bourdieu's approach thus suggests the importance of incorporating a dimension of personal history which is conditioned by the social chances and training one has had. Further, he provides an explanation for why a person's discursive style might be slightly inappropriate for a given situation even if she is striving to accommodate: the experiences she has had haven't given her practice in producing the appropriate style or have conditioned her to produce a different style.

Although Bourdieu does acknowledge that linguistic value is determined primarily by the labor market, he tends to emphasize the role of family and school in establishing individuals' stylistic repertoires (see Woolard 1985 for a compelling critique of this position). Further, although he introduces his argument as if it extends to communicative competence more generally, he focuses on the acquisition

of and attachment of value to *standard* language. My revision of Bourdieu's notion of habitus is twofold: I focus more centrally on the role of the labor market in shaping adults' speech styles, and I consider occupationally conditioned norms for the appropriate expression of affect. The traumatic, dangerous, and hostile interactions which police officers regularly experience produce an *economy of affect*. By *economy* I mean to suggest the extent to which this style is shaped by officers' particular involvement in the labor market—not only that they are economical (in the sense of thrifty) in their expenditure of (especially positive) affect with citizens, but also that they understand the expenditure of positive affect in terms of a closed economy (a significant expenditure of sympathy or grief on others means that less is available for themselves). Police officers do express positive affect on the job, but they choose the situations in which they do so carefully, as if they were on a limited budget. They will often invest emotion where a payoff seems most likely: with children or with an individual clearly asking for help/recommendations. Some officers choose particular sorts of cases—crack addicts who are mothers, for example, or particular individuals such as a slightly retarded homeless woman—as the focus of their sympathy and attention. But most emphasize that they cannot serve as social workers and also do the job they are asked by their superiors and the public to do.[5] Because the set of experiences the police have had are quite different from that of most other citizens, there are often marked differences between a complainant's perception of the sort of reaction her/his predicament merits and that which the police officer's experiences have trained her or him to believe is appropriate or wise. Since the situations in which most complainants meet police officers are characterized for the former by high emotional intensity (fear, anger, grief), the businesslike way that officers set about taking their reports is likely to strike complainants as cold or heartless. The possibility for miscommunication is immanent in Western interpretations of *unemotional* as either calm and rational or withdrawn and alienated (Lutz 1986:289-90, 1990). That which police officers interpret as the first, citizens may interpret as the second.[6]

LEARNING NOT TO SMILE

Although psychological tests of police officers are devised to screen out candidates who are perceived as overly timid or overly aggressive, police officers are not selected for their ability to distance themselves emotionally from people. This ability is developed within interactions required by the job. The young female officer quoted above in excerpt 1 describes an incident in which she believes she may have smiled too much:

(3) Like the other week I had to take a report from [she names a company]. And uh one of their supervisors had gotten punched by an ex-employee. (umhm) I go down there, it it was about seven or eight in the evening, it wasn't real late or real early. I just went down there, I guess I was like real nonchalant, you know (umhm). I took the report and the information and stuff and I said well I'll get a warrant for the guy, as soon as I pick him up I'll let you know. He um he apparently got the impression that I didn't want to handle the case, and he called a friend and they called the

plainclothesmen and told them to take the case. Cause I'm like what do they want me to do, you know. *I was real you know I think I smiled down there and I was very friendly. Maybe they didn't WANT that. Maybe they wanted somebody who was a little more serious. We tend not to take things as seriously as the person who's making the report sees it. Well you take we take assault reports all the time. It's not a big deal. But it was a big deal for for this man I guess and for the boss and all that (.) I guess you just have to give the public whatever they want.*

The lesson the rookie learned in this interaction was that to behave in ways which deviate from how the public believes officers should act is to risk being perceived as unprofessional or incompetent. For officers, reports may be routine, but they cannot treat them as such. Disinterestedness can mask boredom and pass for seriousness or authoritativeness. That an economy of affect may be demanded by the public, given their understanding of the role of police, is embedded in the officer's last comment: *You just have to give the public whatever they want.*

The ways that public reactions shape police behavior were also made clear in the recent removal of one veteran officer from his regular beat. The beat is infamous for the large crowd of heroin addicts, dealers, and prostitutes that it attracts at all times of day, in all kinds of weather. This officer, a fundamentalist Christian, regularly requested the beat and spent much of his time trying to wheedle, preach, or bully the street's denizens into treatment programs, school, or jobs. He was acknowledged by other officers to have established a rapport with the people on the street. A reverend of a nearby church demanded his removal, arguing that he was "too friendly with the junkies" and that he should have been clearing them off the streets each day, not talking to them. The commander of the station responded, as most commanders do to such requests, and the veteran was replaced by a rookie who makes an arrest or two every day on some minor charge (often possession of drug paraphernalia). Many experienced officers believe that the antagonism this new officer has awakened on the street will create problems for him and other police officers. In this case, a police officer was reprimanded for not being tough enough.

Police officers learn to act like "tough cops" who limit their conversation to the formalities of the investigation because increased interaction offers further opportunities for excuses, arguments, complaints, or worse (Rubinstein 1973:264). If they cannot minimize the amount of interaction or contact, they can engage as little as possible—with terse comments, body positioned half-turned away, or lack of eye contact. Goffman (1971) notes that such behaviors are typical on buses or in elevators where passengers must come into close physical contact. Passengers carefully focus on scenery outside a bus window or on the floor indicator so as to preserve their own personal space and to prevent (further) intrusion on others (1971:30-32). Similar reactions are evident on the part of police when it is emotional rather than physical crowding which is at issue. Reducing the amount of interaction affords others some personal space in what is often an intrusively intimate, if necessary, interaction with a stranger.[7] Urban dwellers required to engage in unpleasant interactions with strangers often assume an unfriendly countenance and a brusque manner (Milgram 1988). Police officers are required to enter into many interactions that other city dwellers avoid, and their interactional

style seems to be an accentuation of that of other city dwellers rather than one that is qualitatively different.

I'M NOT A PERSON, I'M A POLICE OFFICER: FACELESSNESS IN FACE-TO-FACE INTERACTION

I turn now to a detailed consideration of two calls that officers I was accompanying on patrol responded to, both of which were described by the radio dispatcher as "violent domestic." By the time the police arrived on the scene the actors had fled and the police officers took assault reports. I attended the first call with an African American woman who had been on the force for twelve years, the second with an African American man who had been on for about a year. I chose these two incidents because their similarity makes a comparison of the two officers' behavior possible. Often calls are so different that comparison is impossible. I was not able to tape the first call, but was able to take detailed field notes while the officer herself was taking notes for the report. The second call was taped with a Sony TCD5M. The first call takes place in an affluent, largely white area of the city; the second takes place in one of the city's largely black housing projects.

Call #1

When the complainant saw the police car pulling up she came out of the house with blood dripping from her mouth down her chin. When the officer saw her, she simply said, "Oh." Once we went into the house the woman started telling her story. It was difficult at first to sort out what had happened. "The father of my daughter's son, he just got out of jail for threatening someone with a gun, he lives out there in a stolen car with stolen plates, his mother won't let him live there, but his father keeps getting him out, her daughter lives with her with the baby, I told him not to come back, I came out, he came towards me, I pushed, he punched me in the mouth." The woman repeated this story over and over. Gradually it became clear that her daughter's boyfriend had punched her when she asked him not to return to her house. The officer said very little aside from getting the woman's address, date of birth, and other information necessary for the incident report. The woman said over and over, "I don't know if I can have her [her daughter] back. I know nothing's gonna come of this. I don't know what to do. I don't know if she'll come back." The officer replied to none of this for the first fifteen minutes of the call, so that at one point the complainant even said in some frustration, "You don't say much." Not until all the necessary information had been obtained and the officer had moved to the door did she offer some advice: "Next time he comes back, call 911—that's an emergency. Call him in for trespassing, to prevent all this pushing, verbal confrontation. We'll be right here." The woman replied, "I don't know if she'll come back." The officer responded, "I've got a daughter too—she'll come back. How old is [daughter's name]." "19." "She'll do what she has to do." Woman: "I don't know if she'll be back." Officer: "She'll be back." As we were leaving, the daughter returned to the house and emphatically declared that her boyfriend did not punch her mother, that her grandmother had been trying to punch

her, but had hit her mother instead. Once we were back in the car the officer said rather bemusedly, "Grandma might have done it—she never did come out of the kitchen." She added, "See what I mean. I was on the mother's side, but you just don't know."

This episode characterizes several aspects of police-citizen interaction on report-taking calls. The officer is concentrating on obtaining the information needed for the incident report. She doesn't react with horror or sympathy, as other interactants might (and do).[8] In this case, the woman's remark that the police officer doesn't "say much" is a mitigated complaint that she doesn't say enough. Often, however, as the police officer is leaving, she or he will offer some advice or make a personal comment. These personal comments aren't always integrated into the rest of the interaction—they constitute a marked frame break (see Goffman 1977; Tannen 1984:23-7). Here the officer has already put away her notes for the incident report and moved from where she had been standing throughout the call to the doorsill, so that she is literally speaking from a different, liminal point of view when she offers her advice and says, "I have a daughter too." [9] The police officer's final, more personal comments, while removing some of the impersonality of the encounter, also, in their sharp separation from the interaction dictated by institutional requirements, serve to highlight the distinction between the two, between her reaction as a police officer and her reaction as a person.

Finally, we should note that the officer's need to suspend judgment, or remain impartial, means that she never ratifies the account of the complainant. She produces no back-channellers like *umhm* or *right* which could be interpreted either as "I'm listening" or "I agree." The return of the daughter at the end of the call with her own story reinforces the officer's belief that this is the appropriate strategy. In the incident report she includes both the mother's and the daughter's versions of what went on. A training tape which officers were shown on how to testify in a courtroom repeatedly emphasized that officers should be professionally impartial: present the facts, the narrator said, not your conclusions and not your opinions. You're a fact-finder, not a judge. These instructions should be seen less as directives for police behavior than as a distillation of officers' experiences of what works (compare excerpt 2 above) which is then encoded in their training.

Call #2

As the officer and I walked into the apartment building, a man saluted us, "Hi, how you doin'?" The police officer responded, continued upstairs, and immediately discovered that this man was the one who had assaulted the caller. Had this been a more dangerous situation, the officer would have unknowingly come face to face with someone desperate to escape. Experiences like these train officers to be wary of all people around the scene of even the most innocuous call. The assaulted woman proceeded to tell her story. The domestic dispute apparently took place after the woman, who had found out that she had contracted venereal disease, tried to talk to her longtime partner about it. She asked if he had been fooling around and asked him to seek treatment. He responded by punching her.

For me, as participant and observer, the most striking aspect of the subsequent exchange between the police officer and the woman was again the near-complete absence of responses, including back-channellers, to the complainant's ongoing description of the incident, her description of her feeling of betrayal, and especially to her direct, repeated questions as to whether she was right to feel this way (see excerpts 4, 5, 8, and 9). I was reluctant to respond, in part because I wanted to see how the officer would respond and in part because I didn't want to be perceived by the officer as interfering. Clearly the woman expected some response: more than once she waited for one through a long pause, or insistently repeated her question, sometimes eliciting a response from me (usually a barely audible back-channeller like *umhm* or *yes* produced after a noticeable delay, as in excerpts 6 through 9), sometimes not.

(4) Complainant: This is the point don't, if somebody care about you, DON'T HURT the people who care about you. (10.0) Okay I know. xx I have nobody now. (9.0)

(5) Complainant: I'm so good to him he never want for ANYthing and I'm gonna really—You understand? (5.0) I want something out of life. I thought I had it.

(6) Complainant: You know we just having I was sitting right there, he was sitting there and we just if you CARE about somebody, don't you think you can talk to them about situations? (2.0) (Bonnie: umhm)

(7) Complainant: When he knocked me down on the bed and stuff I don't even know how it happened. (.) I just can't believe it. (.) I just don't want my son over here. He'll tear him up. (2.0) It's (.) I just thought I had it MADE. (.) Ever love anybody? (Bonnie: [barely audible] umhm)

(8) Complainant: I mean that's what hurts, when you try to be honest with somebody, and they just gonna punch you in the face. You see this. You see it! (.) (Bonnie: umhm (.) I see it) (6.0)

(9) Complainant: I can't say that he's transmitting shit out there. I know what I caught. I know that I don't DEAL. (4.0) And it hurts. I was only trying to talk to him about that. "Oh you drunk bitch. You wanna talk shit." It's not fair. If I didn't care about him, you think I would TALK to him about it? (2.0) You think I would? (Bonnie: [barely audible] hm.)

During the interval when the police officer was taking the report (the first twenty minutes or so of the call), he produced no responses to the woman's questions. All his comments were guided by the script of the incident report. Sometimes this script led to interruptions of the woman's ongoing account, as in (10).

(10) Complainant: I mean I just wanted, I mean you go to the health depart-
Police officer [interrupts]: Spell your name for me.

In other instances, his response to her questions and remarks, while not actually interrupting her in midclause, still constituted an interruption because he failed to

respond to a question or abruptly changed the topic (Murray 1985:33-35), as in (11) and (12):

(11) Complainant: You know and all of a sudden he said old drunken bitch. I said what're you talking about. I said (.) we're together, we gotta help each other. You know?
Police officer: What's your date of birth?

(12) Complainant: I said something's going ON here. I said I'm gonna tell you what I'm gonna do for you. I'm gonna xxx. (.) xxx. I cannot—me, have disease [incredulously]. Now wouldn't you be honest if you got something for somebody (Bonnie: (.) umhm) and not be shooting drugs? I don't shoot drugs! I don't play it! I don't have it in my house! (6.0) And I hurt.
Police officer: What color was his pants?

These interruptions might be perceived as inattentiveness to the complainant's ongoing account. At one point it did become clear that the officer hadn't heard all that she had said. He asked what her relationship was with the actor at the point at which the report form dictates that question, though she had already told him. In at least one case, however, the officer's interruption was an attempt to accord the woman some privacy by preventing her from sharing personal and perhaps painful intimate details that he might not need to know for his report:

(13) Complainant: The point is, I tell you what this started from, xx he's been messing with other women and—
Police officer [interrupts]: Okay, just have a seat there.

That the officer also, in another role, would believe a response to the woman's questions would be appropriate, even necessary, was evident again in the frame break at the end of the call. Although throughout the call he had been seated across the room from the woman, head bent to his writing, at the end of the call he gathered his papers together, stood up, came over to her side of the room, told her he did indeed understand, and asked if she would be okay for the rest of the evening (14-15). This response can also be understood as a very belated production of a preferred second to the woman's repeated questions about whether he understood her pain.

(14) Complainant: Can you understand how that makes me feel?
Police officer: I understand. I understand perfectly how you feel.
Complainant: If you can't talk to somebody that you care about, about transmitting disease, then what is it.
Police officer: I understand exactly what you're saying. xx he had no reason to hit you either. Nope, I understand exactly what you're saying. You guys are grown, you should be able to sit down and talk-

(15) Police officer: Sure you're okay now, don't need anything?
Complainant: No no I'm all right.

This increased intimacy allows the woman to ask how he would react in a similar situation—to treat him, that is, as a man rather than a police officer:

(16) Complainant: You know, if I was your woman, and you was messing around (Police officer: I don't do) would you want me to tell you?
Police officer: No. [silent laughter]
Complainant: (3.0) No seriously.
Police officer: The reason why I'm laughing is because see I don't do that and I don't beat on women. I mean I you know it's it's not funny but I don't do that.
Complainant: It hurts. (.)
Police officer: I understand.
Complainant: You take someone into your heart like that, you know, I was in my glory. You know, that hurts. I'm hurting. (pause)
Police officer: Well if he's downstairs I'm taking him with me.

The officer's immediate response was to try to recreate emotional distance between himself and the complainant with quick laughter, a quick apology, and an insistence that he doesn't act like that. This is the only point where his speech contained any false starts. He quickly returned to his professional role by emphasizing the action he would take if he found the man lurking downstairs.

It is important to add that this officer when talking to me earlier had strongly emphasized that two things that really bothered him were men who beat women and adults who abused children. Although every officer talks about how difficult it is to see hurt, lost, and abandoned children, many of them have become impatient with domestic-violence calls, either because victims won't show up at the hearing once officers make the arrest or they do show up but won't press charges, or because the police are called in frequently and, in their view, unnecessarily. This officer, perhaps because he is a rookie, doesn't yet feel this way. Furthermore, he is perceived by other officers as caring and perceptive. "He listens," they say of him. Similarly, others said of the female police officer above, "She's good people." It isn't, then, any marked lack of compassion that produced these interactions. Police officers, male and female, will say, "When I'm in uniform, I'm not a woman/man—I'm a police officer." They mean to emphasize their lack of sexuality, but also that they have set aside personal lives, personal opinions, and personalities while they are on the job.

The linguistic devices used to remove traces of opinion and personality in written language—passive voice, substitution of *one* for *I*, etc.—have been widely studied (Biber & Finegan 1989; Chafe & Tannen 1987). Biber and Finegan (1989) call texts like newscasts, newspapers, professional letters, and official documents which are characterized by the absence of markers of affect and evidentiality "faceless" texts.[10] In popular usage, this sort of language is called *bureaucratese*. By and large, different linguistic resources are available in face-to-face interaction than in writing to prevent interaction from becoming too personal and to create impersonality. Some of these are the discourse-management techniques we have seen above: long silences, nonresponsiveness, interruptions, frame breaks, and nonproduction of preferred seconds in adjacency-pair sequences. Because both male and female officers have the same experiences and the same tasks, and because they interpret these tasks and experiences similarly, they resort to the same

linguistic style while taking reports—a sort of bureaucratese, or facelessness, in face-to-face interaction.[11]

OBJECTIVITY, MASCULINITY, AND CHANGING WORKPLACES

In many institutional settings (confessional booths, psychotherapy sessions, classrooms, bureaucratic interviews and job interviews, as well as in police reports) listeners expose themselves to an interlocutor who has the power to judge and act upon the account (see Foucault 1978:61-3; Gal 1991:175; Gumperz 1982; Sattel 1983). The ability to remain silent and require justification of behavior is a prerogative of the powerful. Inexpressivity can be used to make behavior appear to be the result of unemotional rationality in order to forestall challenges and questions.

That women who move into powerful and masculine institutions sometimes adopt the interactional behavior characteristic of these institutions might disappoint some feminists. But it seems clear that who we think can do certain jobs changes more rapidly than expectations about how those jobs should be done. The process by which women enter a masculine workplace necessarily includes some adoption, as well as adaptation, of institutional norms. The interesting question is not whether women adapt, but how. I have focused here on an interactional style that male and female police officers share, in part because I want to represent their work environment as they understand it, and one of the important ideologies which structure this workplace is that "it's us versus them" and "we all wear the blue." I also, however, focus on these similarities between the interactional styles of female and male police officers as a response to the extant literature on language and gender, which often begins by asking what the differences between men's and women's language are, and which, in its focus on women versus men, threatens to reify social differences in ways not so very different from sex-based essentialist theories. I argue here for a more flexible definition of gender and its effects on language use, one that accords speakers more agency to develop a speaking style based upon their occupational choices, personal histories, sexuality, lifestyles, and more. Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (to appear) have also recently urged scholars of language and gender to consider the complex array of interests and meanings that are attached to interaction within a given community of practice. Close attention to local meanings attached to interaction will produce a more dynamic view of gender and power relations because it can recognize the resources for challenges and change which are already available and used within every community. Although resistances to and reinterpretations of hegemonic interpretations of gender may be particularly evident in some settings—women doing "men's" work, or lesbians' and gay men's choices about how to project their own gender identities—they exist in every community.[12]

Because masculinity is not referentially (or directly) marked by behaviors and attitudes but is indexically linked to them (in mediated non-exclusive probabilistic ways; see Ochs 1991), female police officers can interpret behaviors that are normatively or frequently understood as masculine (like noninvolvement or emotional distance) as simply "the way we need to act to do our job" in a

professional way. In addition to exploiting this indexicality of gender, female police officers are also redefining masculinity and femininity. Female officers in attach less importance to appearance than do traditional versions of femininity (see Brownmiller 1984). Attention to appearance may even be understood as excessive attention to appearance, as when police officers, both male and female, dismiss some women ("those women with the long polished fingernails") as being unable to work the job. These women are dismissed as overly feminine. The redefinitions of masculinity and femininity that female police officers undertake (including their understanding of affect and objectivity) make it possible for them to think of police work as not incompatible with their own felt gender identities. In the end, such redefinitions could free women and men from the tyranny of the everlasting binary associations we find in our culture between masculine/objective/ rational/ strong/cultural and feminine/subjective/emotional/weak/natural. The implicit recognition of the historicity and indexicality of the link between masculinity and objectivity evident in female police officers' interpretations of their own behavior shows that indexicality can be exploited in ways that foster the integration of women into workplaces from which they were previously barred.

NOTES

2. I alternate between using *black* and *African American* here and elsewhere. Pittsburgh police officers of African American heritage almost universally refer to themselves as *black*, and citizens are also generally described by black and white officers as *black* or *white*. *African American*, however, has increasingly become the accepted term in academic references and other liberal sociopolitical contexts. This variation reflects linguistic and attitudinal change in progress.

3. Although carrying and using a gun is typed as a masculine activity in the West, a poster which female officers have up in one station (between the door to the cellblock and the door to their locker room) works to disrupt this. It has a picture of a frazzled-looking black cat with the text, "I have PMS ... and a gun. Any questions?" Someone has written "Fuck no" in pencil on the bottom of the poster. Though this statement plays into recent cultural interpretations of women with PMS as irrational and out of control (see E. Martin 1987), it also uses that stereotype to argue that women, too, can be threatening and forceful. Because one of the skills officers acknowledge as important is being able to "act crazier than they do," this is also a successful bid to be perceived as competent workers.

4. In all transcriptions, comments in parentheses are my questions or reactions. (.) indicates a pause of one second. Longer pauses are timed, so that (10.0) indicates a ten-second pause. A series of x's represent unintelligible speech. Hhh represents laughter. A colon (*so: funny*) represents a prolonged vowel. Capital letters represent increased volume (*I said DON'T DO THAT*). Italics in the transcriptions are my emphasis, not the speaker's.

5. Curiously, anger does not participate in the economy of affect in the same way that sympathy/empathy does. Anger is performed—"You just have to act crazier than they do"—in ways that are assumed to leave the inner person untouched. It is not a limited resource, but a dramatic mask. I will explore this in a later paper. Because the sociocultural study of affect is so recent, it isn't clear whether other Americans share police officers' understanding of positive affect as a limited resource. Several officers that I have patrolled with do refuse this understanding of how the production and use of emotion works. One is an officer with a college degree in the social sciences who, having grown up in a ghetto herself, believes that the criminal-justice system treats poor citizens inequitably, and she wants to try to change negative public perceptions of police officers. She works hard to be patient with citizens (even saying "I'm *more* patient than I used to be"—a marked contrast with other officers' beliefs about how they have changed), but she admits that this work takes its toll at home. She is less patient with her boyfriend, often needs time alone to recuperate from the job, and is concerned that their relationship is endangered. Here, the economy of affect is still closed, though the opinion about where the expenditure should take place is work rather than family and self. Another exception is a born-again Christian whose actions are governed by a metaphor of "The Lord shall replenish my cup." He is clearly still spending emotion, but he believes that he can tap into a limitless source of patient love. Emotion is still a commodity for him, but a limitless one.

6. Linguistic analyses which suggest that interactional differences between two groups within a single culture are analogous to cross-cultural interaction are often (rightly) critiqued for ignoring relations of power between the subcultural groups. One needs to ask whose interactional norms prevail when interpretations disagree (see Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, to appear, for a thoughtful review of the strengths and weaknesses of the dual-culture approach). The question of power is clearly a relevant one in police-citizen interaction. A cautionary note, however—as our knowledge grows about how conversational interaction proceeds, many different sorts of interaction have been subsumed under the dual-culture approach: men and women (Tannen 1990; Maltz & Borker 1982), New York Jews and Californians (Tannen 1984), and native-born and foreign-born British workers (Gumperz 1982). The question of power (whose interpretation prevails) has been raised for most of these. Nonetheless, the sorts of power wielded by police officers in interaction is only sanctioned to a limited extent by the society at large while that wielded by men is reinforced repeatedly in most societal institutions. The power of New York Jews interacting with other Americans is a source of their denigration in the wider culture. The texture of each of these sorts of interactions and the workings of power and different *kinds* of power in each requires considerable attention.

7. All police reports require officers to obtain information on complainant's age, address, employment, etc. One officer told me she had decided to stop asking about employment because it was none of her business. Other officers say the same about age, especially the age of women. One officer would, when he got to that part of the form, cup his hand around his mouth and drop his voice to a whisper as if asking for secret information. The woman would usually laugh and then tell him. In asking men about their marital status he would say, "Married or smart" (sometimes eliciting a laugh and sometimes not). Officers are also sometimes uncomfortable with asking for information on missing persons—including information on scars hidden by clothing and on circumcision.

8. In many cases medics and police officers are asked to respond together to scenes that involve both crime and injury. The difference between their reactions to victims is telling. Medics bustle around with a steady stream of questions and reassurances, administering medical assistance. Officers stand back, moving forward to obtain information as necessary and when possible. When I asked one officer why one accident victim who had just emerged seemingly unhurt from an overturned vehicle was being placed on a backboard with a neck brace by medics, he shrugged, "That's them, they're always fluttering around." Medics' role is feminized when compared with the police officers: their ministrations are perceived as overly solicitous.

9. Occasionally a complainant will explicitly ask for these personal comments. One woman, pregnant and recently beaten up by her boyfriend, had refused to allow a female police officer to take a report. Instead she asked the officer what she should do. The officer at first demurred,

saying she didn't offer advice, but the woman persisted: "Take off your uniform, just for a minute—what would you do?" The officer finally replied, "No one hits me. I get paid to get hit—that's all." Again this incident reveals that personal comments are not perceived as coming from the police officer but from the person inside the uniform.

10. That Finegan and Biber's "faceless stance" category also includes such widely different genres as mystery fiction, humor, biographies, and face-to-face conversations indicates that some considerable refinement of the category is necessary before it can be adequately described, let alone explained. Though broadly based quantitative studies like theirs are useful for indicating genres where the production of negative or positive affect are more prevalent, the explanation of why affect, or a particular sort of affect, does or does not occur in a particular genre can only be derived from a thick description (see Geertz 1973; Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, to appear) of the social situations in which it occurs and the uses to which it is put.

11. The extent to which men or women might tend to economize more on affect is, of course, a relevant question here, but one that is extremely difficult to answer. The situations experienced by the different officers are so varied that it is difficult to make the appropriate comparisons.

12. The recent interest in feminist circles in the study of gender ambiguity and crossover gendering (see Butler 1990; Devor 1989; Epstein & Straub 1991; Garber 1991) marks a new era in feminist thought, which is characterized by a movement away from earlier feminist attempts to celebrate woman and establish what she is towards an attempt to explore the malleability of gender. The rapidly growing field of lesbian and gay studies, in addition to raising its own questions about constructions of heterosexism, homophobia, and sexual identity, also raises important questions about the flexibility of gender identity.

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The Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas cross-examination discourse: Variation in gap length

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INTRODUCTION

In this paper I will present my work on the phenomenon of interspeaker gap length, known as *wait time* in the legal literature. I postulate that interspeaker gap length may reflect important power dimensions within a discourse, and may be used in different ways to legitimize, acknowledge, support, or cast doubt on the statements of the previous speaker. Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974) specifically predict a drive towards the minimization of both gap and overlap in any conversational setting. As a formal model for the organization of turn-taking, this idealization is inadequate in that it is culture-specific and abstracts out gender and power, factors that are invariably present in everyday interactions and whose effects continue to be ignored within mainstream linguistic theory.

In order to focus on the possibility of a power dimension in interspeaker gap length, I chose as my corpus gap-length data from the October 1991 cross-examinations of Anita Hill and Clarence Thomas. These cross-examinations were conducted by members of the U.S. Senate and took place as part of the hearing process for Thomas' eventual confirmation to the U.S. Supreme Court. Because I was interested in what gap length might reflect about interlocutor attitudes and power relations with respect to different speakers, I selected for this study the comparison of gap instances occurring only after statements made by Hill and Thomas, where the gaps immediately precede further senatorial comment or questions.

The data were taken from speech excerpts chosen on the basis of their well-formedness within the legal discourse structure. Because this rigid structure has established turn-taking procedures, I considered gaps caused by confusion over documents or turn-taking infelicitous and chose only gaps that followed each other within continuous streams of exchange. The total sample size was 49 gaps for Hill and 46 gaps for Thomas. I recorded these excerpts in computerized digital form and used a phonetic analysis package called Xwaves to measure the gap lengths given to each subject. Also coded were related discourse-internal factors, divided into three parts: those that occurred in the questioning prior to the gap (pre-gap), in the corresponding answer by Hill or Thomas immediately preceding the gap, and in statements made by senators after the gap (post-gap). Pre-gap factors include yes/no-type questions, statement-type questions, and tag questions; the actual answer by Hill or Thomas was coded for whether or not it was a concise, short answer. Post-gap factors coded were deferential acknowledgements and changes of topic.

The factors discussed above were chosen because of their usefulness in determining the power balance in the discourse. Yes/no and statement questions can be used to "paint a picture" of the actions being discussed, introducing potentially erroneous presuppositions and allowing little opportunity for clarification. Tag questions I assume to be similar to statements, since they are uttered from a position of power, and not as a result of "linguistic insecurity," as previous analyses claim. I hypothesize that the conciseness of the response by Hill or Thomas is an indicator of the amount of explanation that was needed to clarify their points, so that the longer the response, the more difficulty they encountered in having their position understood. Furthermore, I take overt acknowledgements by senators to be a type of backchannel response in a discourse structure which explicitly rules out conversational backchannels of the type normally licensed in conversation. Finally, a change of topic is one of the most easily spotted power markers in discourse, for the choice of which topics are initiated and followed up quite often belongs to the powerful party.

My central hypothesis in this study is that a relatively longer gap is often allowed after a statement from a more powerful or respected person. Many sociolinguistic studies have shown that interruptions pervasively prevent women from creating and maintaining the reality of discourse in the home, at work, in the classroom, and on the streets. Just as less powerful persons are more often interrupted because of their tenuous hold on the power of discourse, so are they given a shorter gap. Common sayings such as "Let my words rest" or "Don't talk back to me" illustrate this dynamic, showing that it is only the member of a group in power who can access the discourse freely, make other people listen, or prevent them from taking the floor.

RESULTS

(1)   The mean gap length for Hill was 1.047 seconds, while for Thomas it was 1.386 seconds (significant at $P < 0.05$ on a 1-tailed t-test).

This result is most meaningful when combined with an analysis of the power dynamics of this discourse. The strategies that I am interested in include allowing the weight of the words to "sink in" through longer gaps; firing rapid questions (leaving shorter gaps) in succession to eclipse the previous statement and give the person questioned little time to think. Answers that are problematic may be more rapidly followed by a change of topic to draw attention away, while tag and yes/no questions can be used to elicit responses or construct misleading contexts.

(2)   Thomas was asked more yes/no-type questions than Hill (53% versus 37% of questions asked). Of these, Hill gave fewer short or monosyllabic answers relative to long answers than Thomas ($p < 0.05$, chi-square = 3.882).

TABLE 1. *Monosyllabic answers in response to yes/no questions*

	Hill	Thomas
y/n, mono	4	13
y/n, !mono	14	12

I would explain this result by saying that Thomas faced an environment favoring an effortless explanation, that is to say a short answer, much more often than Hill did. Only 16% of questions directed toward Hill elicited a short answer, whereas 30% of Thomas' questions involved some kind of simple assertion or denial of the validity of the previous utterance.

(3) The mean gap length that Democrats allowed after Hill's utterances is significantly lower than that allowed for Thomas (p < 0.005).

TABLE 2. *Mean gap length allowed by Democrats and Republicans*

	Hill	Thomas	
Democrats	.94	1.72	(p < 0.005)
Republicans	1.19	1.15	not sig: P(t < T)= .55

My interpretation of the surprising statistical insignificance of Republican data is that it reflects their political strategy. For political and social reasons the Republican senators were prevented from coaching Thomas beforehand (he was used to a lot of coaching as a result of the three months of hearings that he had already been through). Thus it was in their interest to set up the discourse so that not only could Hill not get the floor very frequently, but Thomas would have to say as little as possible. Everyone, however, saw this investigation process as extremely invasive to the male-dominated hierarchy in government. I believe that even Democrats, with their lack of an organized strategy for defending Hill, were threatened by the situation and participated in the undermining of her testimony, as evidenced by the shorter gaps that they gave to Hill.

(4) While in a cross-examination environment, it is reasonable to expect to be pressed for detailed explanation and therefore not to have a favorable environment for monosyllabic or short answers. Most of my data confirmed this (generally mono < !mono), with the one statistically significant exception of Thomas being asked yes/no questions not followed by a change of topic, where his mono answer rate was very high (p < 0.01, chi-square = 20.774).

TABLE 3. *Monosyllabic answer rate of Thomas*

	mono	!mono
!COT, y/n, Thomas	13	9
All others combined	9	64

(5) In this type of discourse, one would expect to find a continuity of topic such that participants might engage the same topic for several clauses. Most results in the data confirmed COT < !COT, save for the statistically significant phenomenon of Hill's answers to yes/no questions which she answered briefly, and after which the topic was always changed (p < 0.01, chi-square = 9.992).

TABLE 4. *Change of topic after Hill's response*

	COT	!COT
y/n, mono, Hill	4	0
all others combined	24	67

(6) Hill encountered relatively more "statement" type questions than Thomas (27% versus 17% of their respective totals). Thomas' !mono answers were followed by an overt acknowledgment of his position 50% of the time. Hill, on the other hand, received no acknowledgments, but rather a change of topic in 46% of follow-up queries by Senators.

DISCUSSION

The interaction of several different factors in the formation of each gap makes it difficult to determine the exact cause of statistically significant correlations in the data. There are several relevant observations to be made: in general, Clarence Thomas spoke at a slower overall rate, took longer turns, and gave himself much longer internal pauses than did Anita Hill. His experience as a judge may well have contributed to the ponderousness of his speech style, with much rhetorical questioning and repetition of arguments. Adopting a speech style which is perceived as powerful allowed him to subvert the position in which he was placed. Hill, however, did not have that option. Her linguistic and discourse resources were heavily taxed, partly because of the structure of cross-examination and partly because many of her statements were either strongly challenged or discounted through a lack of acknowledgement or change of topic. Furthermore, I believe she could not focus on the construction of her image as a speaker because she was too busy defending herself against character assassination and misinterpretation. It is likely that her strategy involved keeping as calm as possible to avoid potential charges of "hysteria."

As noted by Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (to appear), further interaction in the discourse is that of speakers' respective roles as legal, gendered, and social individuals. In bringing forth harassment charges Hill was intrinsically constructed as female. She was the witness and Thomas the defendant; she was making all the claims and he had nothing to offer but denial. It is not surprising, then, that in stating his argument he created a discourse to subvert what he perceived to be an antagonistic process by utilizing a rhetorical style appropriate to judicial assertion of authority. Her role, however, was truly that of someone being cross-examined, someone who is not in control of the conversation, being led blindfolded to different areas by the changes of topic initiated by the questioners.

In the context of gap (and other discourse phenomena) this analysis is significant. Gaudio (1991) maintains that the interpretation of discourse phenomena should be construed not as a static entity but as a shifting, emergent practice. In this way one recognizes that speakers are continually changing their stances and relationships, and creating their linguistic, social, and gendered selves simultaneously through structures that are normative within their communities. Similarly, they may subvert these norms or transform them to create new linguistic resources. In order to do more effective studies on this phenomenon and its relationship to power, one must consider methodological factors and avoid analytical pitfalls. This particular study has the following drawbacks: Because this was not a experiment, I had no control over turn-taking, the number of speakers, or the length of their participation. My sample is not representative of everyone who was involved in the hearings, and some of my speakers took turns much longer than others. This necessarily prevents me from generalizing this interpretation of gap length to different situations. These statistical correlations may point to patterns valid only for this particular discourse, where most of the participants were lawyers by training, each one with a specific agenda, sensitive to being exposed through television. It is tempting to arrive at simple, elegant explanations of discourse phenomena and to discount inconsistencies as exceptions which can be rationalized. This is what we as academics have been trained to do. As Deborah Cameron's (1985) critique of research on tag questions shows, it is important to recognize that many linguistic practices cannot be reduced to tautological statements: "If a woman does more or less of linguistic feature x, it must mean that it denotes powerlessness because women are powerless in the social discourse." This is simply the post-facto interpretation of data based on what we know about power relationships in that particular context. The multiple interpretations of the hitherto unexplored phenomenon of interspeaker gap length do not show that this phenomenon is meaningless; rather, they suggest that it is multifaceted, serving many functions; and this points us towards further research in this area.

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"We've all got to go one day, eh":
Powerlessness and solidarity in the functions of a New Zealand tag[1]

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INTRODUCTION

Hedges and tags have traditionally been associated with both powerlessness (O'Barr & Atkins 1980) and women's speech (e.g., Lakoff 1975; McMillan, Clifton, McGrath, & Gale 1977; Preisler 1986) in English. They have been characterized as signals of the speaker's epistemic or psychological uncertainty. More recently, however, research has drawn attention to the fact that this negative interpretation of hedges and tags stems from a male perspective and interpretive bias, and some researchers have challenged these interpretations (Cameron 1985; Holmes 1984, 1988). Closer investigation of the way tags and hedges in general function in women's speech has forced us to consider them in terms of positive politeness norms (Brown & Levinson 1987), rather than as purely negative politeness strategies or signals of uncertainty (e.g., Cameron, McAlinden, & O'Leary 1988; Holmes 1984, 1988a, 1988b, 1990; Meyerhoff, in press).

This paper looks at the distribution and function of an invariant clause-final tag, *eh*, which commonly occurs in informal New Zealand English (NZE). Similar tag forms homophonous with *eh* occur in other varieties of English—including Guernsey English, which makes extremely high use of it (Pauline Barbé, personal communication) and Canadian English (Gibson 1974)— but any claims about the function of *eh* forwarded here are only intended to apply to *eh* as it is used in New Zealand. It is possible that it functions somewhat differently in other varieties of English. Though I will continue to use the term *tag* to describe *eh* in this paper, it is worth noting that *tag* is in some ways an unfortunate term, implying as it does that the tokens it represents are not central to the meaning of the utterance. Several studies of tags, e.g., *you know* (Holmes 1986), have shown that the meaning of a tag can actually be pivotal to the meaning of the whole utterance. Research on tags has been characterized by some of the methodological flaws and biases already outlined. This has resulted in their superficial classification as markers of tentativeness or uncertainty. Research into their *use*, as opposed to their stereotypes, has shown that they more often function as an in-group marker or marker of solidarity. I will argue that this is the primary function of *eh* in New Zealand speech.

METHODOLOGY: THE PORIRUA PROJECT

This paper is based on data from the Porirua Project, made available to me by the Department of Linguistics, Victoria University of Wellington (Holmes, Bell, & Boyce 1991). I have based my analyses of *eh* on occurrences found in the free conversation of interviews conducted as part of a social-dialect survey of Porirua City. Porirua is a small, largely working-class (WC) city close to the New Zealand capital. These data are drawn from the speech of 60 WC speakers who were contacted by means of "friend-of-a-friend" networking (cf. Milroy 1980). The sample was balanced for sex (30 women and 30 men), age (20 x 20 - 29-year-olds, 20 x 40 - 49-year-olds, and 20 x 70 + -year-olds), and ethnicity (30 Maori—indigenous Polynesians of New Zealand; and 30 Pakeha—Europeans, usually of British descent).

IMAGES OF *EH* IN NEW ZEALAND SOCIETY

There are a number of easily accessed stereotypes about the use of *eh* in NZE. Popular wisdom has it that *eh* is a marker of (i) Maori and women's speech, (ii) younger speakers, and (iii) speaker uncertainty. There is a clear link between Maori and women: both are lower status, out-of-power groups in urban New Zealand society. If New Zealand really deserves its self-applied epithet "God's Own Country," there would seem to be strong evidence that God is white and male. It is interesting to consider whether younger speakers of NZE are also relatively out-of-power. There may be a link between these speakers and the first group. The third stereotype has, I believe, partly reflected and partly acted as a justification for the generally negative evaluation of *eh*. This stereotype is, however, at odds with both the apparent function of *eh* and the intonation pattern associated with it, as we shall see in the next section.

RESULTS

A somewhat crude measure called the *eh index* was devised in order to be able to compare speakers' use of *eh*. The *eh* index for each respondent was calculated by totaling the number of tokens of *eh* in that person's free conversation and dividing this by the number of minutes of free speech. The number was then multiplied by 100 so as not to be working with small figures. I am aware that objections can be made to the nature of this measure; however, until we have a better understanding of where *eh* can and cannot occur, and a better measure can be forwarded, I am satisfied that it represents a fair picture of different respondents' speech patterns. The Porirua Project interviewers played a deliberately passive role during the conversations, so timings do largely represent the conversation of the interviewee. Thus, in the following tables, the higher the *eh* index, the

more *eh* can be said to be characteristic of the speech of that speaker, or group of speakers.

Sex and ethnicity as factors in use of eh

Use of *eh* is popularly associated with Maori speakers and women of any ethnic group in New Zealand. I suggested that this was an interesting amalgam, as both groups represent out-of-power members of New Zealand society. As Figure 1 shows, there is a slight indication that speaker sex is a factor influencing use of *eh*—it seems to be a little more common in men's speech (*eh* index of 24.5) than in women's speech (*eh* index of 18).

Ethnicity, however, appears to be a much more significant factor. Figure 1 also shows that Maori (*eh* index 35) use *eh* considerably more frequently than do Pakeha (*eh* index 7.5).

FIGURE 1: *Eh* indices (sex and ethnicity)

When we consider the effects of ethnicity and speaker sex together, as shown in Table 1, we can see that the data strongly suggest that the greater use of *eh* in men's speech should probably be intepreted as an effect of the very high *eh* index of Maori men, i.e., ethnicity seems to be an stronger correlate of *eh* use in NZE than speaker sex alone. *Eh* use seems to be a characteristic of speakers of NZE who are clearly part of a WC, out-of-power sector of the speech community. We will see that the ties between out-of-power members of the New Zealand speech community manifested by *eh* use are reinforced by the findings for age.

TABLE 1. *Use of* eh *in free speech of working class speakers from Porirua by sex and ethnicity*

Respondent	No.	*eh* (no.)	Minutes	*eh* index
Maori females	15	60	244	24.6
Pakeha females	15	30	265	11.3
Maori males	15	147	323.5	45.4
Pakeha males	15	8	228.75	3.5

Age as a factor in use of eh

Table 2 provides qualified support for the popular notion that *eh* is a characteristic of younger New Zealanders' speech. There is a noticeable decrease in *eh* use between speakers in their 40s (*eh* index 31) and speakers in their 70s (*eh* index 5). A little surprising, though, is the finding that speakers in their 20s and 40s have very similar rates of *eh* use in conversation.

TABLE 2. *Use of* eh *by age*

| Age	No.	*eh* s	Minutes	*eh* index
Young	20	97	325	29.8
Middle	20	132	428.5	30.8
Old	20	16	319.75	5.0

However, these figures mask a great deal more information. It becomes clear by looking at Figure 2 that, just as the cross-effects for sex and ethnicity provided important insights into patterns of speech use in this community, the interplay between all three non-linguistic variables (age, sex, and ethnicity) sheds needed light on what otherwise might appear to be a straightforward case of age-graded change in progress.

Figure 2 reveals that the extent of age-grading in *eh* use is more dramatic for Pakeha than it is for Maori. While older Maori respondents used *eh* less often in their free conversation than younger Maori, the differences are proportionally less extreme than the differences between the oldest and the youngest Pakeha speakers. It also reveals that *eh* use among the Maori members of the speech community appears to be being followed quite aggressively by another relatively powerless group in the speech community, i.e., young Pakeha females (*eh* index 27).

FIGURE 2: Use of *eh* by age and ethnicity[2]

This makes some unproblematic conclusions possible. Maori men are clearly the prime users of *eh*, though it is also a common characteristic of Maori women's speech. It appears that we have evidence for claiming that *eh* is a marker of in-group solidarity, to the extent that it is a marker used widely within one ethnic group. Since this ethnic group is, generally speaking, a low-status, out-of-power minority in New Zealand society, and if *eh* is a marker of in-group identity (i.e., a positive politeness marker) for this group, it seems quite possible that the negative evaluations of *eh* reflect the societal norm-makers' generally negative evaluation of the groups of which *eh* is most characteristic. On the other hand, if *eh* is an in-group ethnic marker for Maori speakers,[3] a less easily answered question remains. Why do young Pakeha women appear to be modeling their speech on (a) the speech of a different ethnic group, and, more importantly, (b) the speech of what most New Zealanders would agree is an even less powerful, and even less prestigious social group than their own?

I believe that the answer to this question lies to a large extent in the nature of the main function of *eh*, i.e., as a positive politeness strategy. Women's speech has often been shown to be more concerned than men's speech with attending to the positive politeness and affiliation needs of all the participants in a conversation. This is manifested in a number of ways, including greater use of positive politeness particles or strategies such as hedging. Young Pakeha women, I would suggest, being already sensitive to the need to attend to positive politeness goals of conversation, have been very willing to borrow a positive politeness strategy used widely by the Maori members of their speech community, especially since they have considerable contact with each other. Most of the young Pakeha women interviewed lived with or were married to Maori or Pacific Island men.

FUNCTIONAL TYPOLOGY OF *EH*

So far I have talked about *eh* as an in-group, positive politeness marker, but I have supported this claim only by drawing inferences from its marked distribution within and across different social groups. However, there is also evidence in support of this interpretation from the role *eh* plays in discourse.

Eh appears to be used to satisfy five basic functions in conversation, which vary in the extent to which they signal a speaker's epistemic certainty. It is possible to use *eh* as a marker when the speaker is completely certain about the truth of what they are saying, and at the other end of the continuum, it is possible to use *eh* as a marker that signals that the speaker requires the interlocutor to provide them with some factual or informational verification. Examples of all five functions as found in the conversations used can be arranged in order of increasing speaker uncertainty.

To signal common ground or beliefs held by the interlocutors (including truisms)

This was a moderately common function. Clearly, a rational speaker does not have any doubt about the truth of their utterance when they say, as a young Maori woman did, *oh we've all got to go one day eh*, and it is nonsense to suggest that there is any speaker uncertainty at an epistemic level in these cases. A much more reasonable interpretation, I believe, is that the speaker was attempting to draw her interlocutor into a process of collaborative narrative-building, by marking a point at which her narrative turns on the acceptance of a shared belief. In this case, acceptance would be universal, but obviously there are occasions where, depending on the interlocutors, the kind of knowledge that is assumed to be common ground will vary.

To mark the focal point in a narrative

Sometimes this constituted an immediate rephrasing of the speaker's own prior utterance. This function also appeared to be relatively frequently associated with *eh*, and as above, it is hard to argue that *eh* in these contexts signals any speaker uncertainty about the truth of the statement with which it occurs. When one young Maori man, in telling the interviewer about some of his work experiences as an electrician, said, *and we went to this guy's house pretty rich eh nice big townhouse*, he was not questioning the fact that the house he went to was a rich person's house. Since it was his story, it would make no sense for him to be seeking qualitative input from his interlocutor. In fact, as the subsequent amplification *nice big townhouse* of his first statement suggests, it is more likely that *eh* signals the fact that he was paying attention to his interlocutor. *Eh* and the amplification can both

be seen as attempts to check and then sufficiently identify the nature of his referent. Similarly, when the same man was later talking about the granite panels attached to the sides of highrise buildings, and said,[4] *jeez they're freaky man + unreal + it's not stuck on with much eh*, it again seems likely that the main function of *eh*, like the rephrasing *it's not stuck on with much*, was to attend to the interlocutor's continued involvement in and understanding of the narrative. In short, both the function of signaling shared knowledge and the function of marking focal points in a narrative have very little to do with speaker uncertainty. It is difficult, if not irrational, to argue that speakers are in a position of epistemic uncertainty in such cases. If there is any uncertainty in these functions, it is of an entirely interpersonal and affective nature.

To signal an attempt to establish common ground between interlocutors

This function was most frequently associated with the use of *eh*. It contrasts with the previous two functions because when *eh* is used to mark an attempt to establish or locate common ground between interlocutors, there is, by definition, a greater degree of speaker uncertainty to begin with. It is crucial, however, to recognize that even in these cases, the uncertainty is not epistemic uncertainty. To be sure, there is a sense in which one can argue that the speaker lacks factual knowledge about whether they share common ground with their interlocutor, but this is metaknowledge which I believe is tangential to the discourse event. The crux of any speaker uncertainty continues to be interpersonal; that is, it is an uncertainty about the nature of shared knowledge and beliefs between the speaker and interlocutor. The use of *eh* with this function serves either to reinforce an existing relationship or to strengthen or arrest a developing one—it helps to define an acceptable level of intimacy and imposition.

This can clearly be seen in the function of *eh* in a conversation with a young Pakeha woman when she asks the interviewer, *yeah one of the girls—oh you know Lara Perry eh*. The check on shared knowledge defines the speaker and hearer as co-members of a group within the community, determines how much shared knowledge the narrator can subsequently draw on in her story, and brings the interlocutors somewhat closer together. Its functions are primarily interpersonal and affiliative. This function of *eh* was not restricted to discrete facts or beliefs. It sometimes can be seen to interact with the presentation of evaluative information. A middle-aged Maori man described his cautious relationship with some of his neighbors by saying, *I'm afraid to walk in the house eh they might have a three-oh-three pointing at me*. By placing *eh* after his evaluation of his neighbors *I'm afraid*, he appears to be seeking to establish whether his interlocutor would also evaluate the situation in the same way, i.e., would also be scared to go near them. Establishing a shared belief or conclusion in this case allows the speaker to continue self-revelations of this sort without threat to his positive face. Thus, this very common use of *eh*

can again be seen to be primarily concerned with interpersonal goals, rather than with epistemic uncertainty.

To recheck or reestablish common ground held by interlocutors

A much less common function served by *eh* was as a means of rechecking common ground the interlocutors had already established. This function is quite distinct from the previous three because it introduces a far greater degree of speaker uncertainty into the utterance than we have so far seen. When a middle-aged Maori woman, in the middle of a very long narrative about how her nontraditional medicines helped her through a serious illness said, *yet I hadn't passed out I'm sure it was my homeopathic remedies eh,* the overall effect was considerably more uncertain than in other cases. The speaker had already checked whether the interviewer was prepared to accept the effectiveness of homeopathy (and the latter had indicated she did), so a further check is highly marked. Clearly, by rechecking there is an implication that either the speaker didn't believe the interlocutor really did share her opinion, or that she had not been attending to the interlocutor's responses, both of which constitute threats to both interlocutors' positive face needs. In either case, the speaker's rechecking introduces a considerable degree of uncertainty at least at the interpersonal level, and possibly also at an ideational level.

To seek factual verification from the interlocutor

It is extremely uncommon to find *eh* being used as a signal of genuine epistemic uncertainty. Occasionally it functions as a means of eliciting verification of a fact that the speaker is unsure about. One elderly Maori woman was trying to work out the age of one of her children, Bunny, in the course of her conversation. She said, *[Bunny was born] nineteen forty-two so he's he's um forty-eight + eh Bunny,* where *eh Bunny* (meaning 'is that how old Bunny would be?') was directed at the interviewer.

Figure 3 shows the relative frequencies of these functions of *eh* in the conversation of all interviewees according to sex and ethnicity. Overwhelmingly, *eh* is used when the speaker is attempting to establish common ground with the interlocutor. Along with the important affiliative orientation of the first two functions, these results seem to support my assertion that *eh* is first and foremost a positive politeness marker in NZE.

Further evidence, if required, that *eh* does not signal speaker uncertainty lies in the fact that unlike most questioning strategies in English, *eh* is uttered with falling intonation. There is also generally an absence of audible feedback from the interlocutor, which suggests that interlocutors are not treating *eh* like a genuine question, i.e., it is not interpreted as the signal of a gap in the speaker's epistemic system. In other words, *eh* is no more a signal of uncertainty than other tags are. The fact that *eh* is often interpreted negatively, as a marker of a speaker's uncertainty, may tell us far more

about the way New Zealand society evaluates the out-of-power users of this particular tag—Maori and young women—than it does about the way the tag really functions in their speech. An effective way of maintaining a power imbalance is often to ridicule or negatively stereotype characteristic behavior or speech of the out-of-power group.

FIGURE 3: Functions of *eh* in conversation by sex and ethnicity
(MF = Maori female, PF = Pakeha female, MM = Maori male, PM = Pakeha males)

CONCLUSION

A number of previous studies have found that women are generally more concerned than men are with satisfying the affiliative and cooperative needs of conversation. The results of these studies have questioned the essentially male point of view that women's speech styles reflect impoverished or deficient psychological or cognitive states.

This study has shown that in Porirua, the invariant tag *eh* is clearly a characteristic of the Maori speech community. It seems most likely that in this community, it functions as an affiliative, in-group, positive politeness marker. Pakeha women may have recognized the positive politeness function that *eh* has served in the Maori community and, I would suggest, are adding it to their existing repertoire of positive politeness markers and strategies. In this way, they may be leading a change within the Pakeha speech community. *Eh* is a marker which, as yet, is largely restricted to the speech of out-of-power groups in New Zealand society, i.e., Maori and women. I have suggested that negative evaluations of *eh* by many New

Zealanders and the fact that *eh* is associated with speaker uncertainty are a consequence of who uses *eh*. Negative evaluations of Maori and women affect evaluations of their speech characteristics. One question which has not been addressed here is whether the fact that two out-of-power groups are using a positive politeness marker considerably more than the highest prestige group, i.e., Pakeha men, is significant socially. I believe it is. It is much more important for out-of-power groups in a dominant Anglo culture to have markers of identity and solidarity than it is for more prestigious and powerful groups. For out-of-power groups, solidarity becomes much more important, and attention to others has its own rewards. It becomes easy to see why women and, as this study shows, Maori feel a need to establish their own mechanisms of in-group control and responsibility.

NOTES

1. I would like to thank the Department of Linguistics, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, for their help in the initial stages of this project. In particular, thanks are due to Janet Holmes, Allan Bell, and Mary Boyce for permission to use data from the Porirua Project.
2. Figure 2 shows the pro-rated indices for only four Maori women in their 40s. I have discussed in more detail elsewhere (Meyerhoff, forthcoming) the rationale and effects of omitting one speaker from this count.
3. I have elsewhere (Meyerhoff, forthcoming) discussed its similarities to the tag *ne* which occurs in Maori and suggested that *ne* might the source of, or support for, *eh* in the English of New Zealand Maori.
4. A + signals a noticeable pause.

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Rape, race, and responsibility:
a graffiti-text political discourse

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This paper examines a graffiti text taken from the wall of a women's bathroom stall. My purpose is to discern the development and import of the discourse. I consider the pragmatic effect of certain forms within a portion of the text. I also specify some of the assumptions of shared knowledge that allow topic and comment structure to proceed through the use of implicature. The assumptions of shared knowledge depend on discourses of another kind, which are shaped by political conflicts.

The term *discourse* is used in two main ways by investigators of language use. By *a discourse* sociolinguists have meant a collection of sequential linguistic structures above the clause level, in a linguistic performance (see Brown & Yule 1983; Gumperz 1982; Stubbs 1988; Todd & Fisher 1988). Some other students of language—philosophers and students of literature, for instance—have meant by the term a body of knowledge informing language use, and informing it differently depending on users' social situations and identities (see Foucault 1977, 1980, 1981; Macdonell 1986; Pêcheux 1982). In examining the graffiti text here I am interested in drawing these two concepts of discourse toward each other. I want to describe how bodies of common political knowledge are reflected in choices of linguistic forms used to elaborate conflict. Informing the bathroom-stall text are issues concerning rape, women and sex, race, community responsibility, and other matters.

In September, 1986, four University of California at Berkeley football players were accused of raping an eighteen-year-old undergraduate, a Chinese American woman, in a housing co-op. She did not press charges against them at the time but wanted to do so about a month later. It was known on campus that some or all of the four football players were African American and that they were not being legally prosecuted. In the same fall semester, against expectations, the Berkeley football team won the Big Game, the Thanksgiving game against Stanford University.

During that season a graffiti discourse about the rape began on a stall wall of the women's bathroom in the first floor of Wheeler Hall, a large, central, busy building of classrooms and offices; the discourse continued through the spring semester, 1987.

The language-use situation of a woman's-room graffiti text is peculiarly characterized. It is a situation of public access that at the same time is known to admit only females, and women can comment anonymously to other unknown women. Diverse audience and lack of vulnerability are at the same time guaranteed to any writer. An *advice-giving* genre of women's bathroom graffiti has been

identified that depends on these guarantees. There is another genre in the same setting, the political confrontation.

The Wheeler women's-room text as it existed in May, 1987, was traced on a large gridded sheet and treated as a map of an archaeological site subjected to lateral stratigraphical analysis. It was possible to determine the chronological deposition of remarks along five routes. Figure 1 gives transcription of all the graffiti, arranged in their apparent sequences in different series. Figure 2 maps the graffiti as they appeared on the wall. There are 36 separate remarks. The main text is composed of three series of comments, (a), (b), and (c), each of which begins with the first graffito, *The Big Game = The Big Scam. Boo U.C. Rapists!* There are two other series, (d) and (e), which begin with metacomments on the main text.

Forms of several pragmatic types occur frequently in the text. There are 26 rhetorical questions of direct and indirect interrogative forms appearing in 16 of the 36 graffiti. The text contains no real queries for information, just questions for which the writer assumes she and both the addressee and the reader share knowledge that will allow only for the same answer. This expected answer makes the writer's point through implication, forcing the addressee or reader herself to carry forward the writer's agenda. An example is (a2), *Isn't the law innocent until proven guilty, or does that apply only to non-violent suspects?* There is recurrent use of phrasal flags that I will call *disagreement flags*, such as *Oh fuck you* in (c4.1), and *of course not!* in (b6.4), which always signal conflict with the addressee or hypothetical opponent; these often begin a writer's comment. Thirteen of these disagreement flags occur in 10 comments. There is graphic paralanguage—word-circling, multiple underlining, multiple punctuation marks, and emphatic use of capital letters—as in (e1) *OBSESSED W/RAPE OR WHAT?* Fifteen remarks contain graphic paralanguage. The paralanguage functions to emphasize conflict; the expression of disagreement itself is part of the import of the comments.

Ten of the comments contain statements that acknowledge a perspective different from the writer's. I discern two types. There are mitigating remarks, which always appear at the end of a writer's graffito, such as in (a2) *(And I'm not saying this problem made it acceptable.)* . I believe these statements anticipate misinterpretation by readers that will align the writer wrongly in a political debate. There are also *yes, but* statements, which appear at the beginning of a writer's comment, such as in (c4) *No one's saying she deserved to be raped—but. ...* These introduce the writer's disagreement with a previous writer's statement, instigating the reconstruction of conflict in the discourse each time they are used.

In the discussion of series (b) that follows I point out the pragmatic effect of certain forms, identify some assumptions of shared knowledge that allow implicature to work, note changes of topic and focus, and specify some of the political-discourse issues that inform the construction of this portion of the text. Series (b) begins with remark (1), as do series (a) and (c). The writer of (1) assumes shared knowledge of the alleged rape and its aftermath. In the first clause, predication is expressed with the graphic substitute for a copula verb, the equals sign. Juxtaposition of the two sentences implies the association of the rape incident with the team and, further, with the celebration of the Big Win. Implicit in the

remark are the claims that there was a rape and that, since partying football players were the rapists, the team and the university have some measure of responsibility in the matter. Comment (1) introduces the topic of the rape.

(a)-(c)

(a b c)1. The Big Game = The Big Scam. Boo U.C. Rapists!		
a2. That rape involved 2 clashing cultures. We need to know more about each other culturally in order to understand each other's actions. (And I'm not saying this problem made it acceptable.)	**b2.** She enjoyed having sex with 4 football players.	**c2.** Excuse me, but there was no trial. Isn't the law innocent until proven guilty, or does that apply only to non-violent suspects? I'm a feminist, but not a vigilante—
a3. It's very true that there were cultural differences at work in this incident, but I just wonder why the people responsible for bringing those guys here didn't make sure that they understand <u>ours</u>. If they are going to live in our culture, they have to live by our customs—If someone let a Bengal Tiger lose on Telegraph and he killed someone, it would be easy to say that the tiger was only reacting as he would have in the jungle, and therefore he couldn't be blamed for murder— —— (cont.) But does that excuse the moron who opened the cage? (If those "imported" football players can't act civilized, send them back where they came from!)	**b3.** Amen to you. I don't know whether you're a sister or not. but Amen. I heard she made herself a scapegoat. It was 1 girl with 4 football players in a room getting drunk. What was she doing in there with them by herself and EVERYbody's drunk. get <u>ReaL</u>! They say she was down for what she got and then when word got out that she was a superfreak she dreamed it was rape. A MONTH LATER??? BE REAL !!!! Anyway, if it was rape, why didn't anyone hear her scream? Dwight Derby is very quiet. Once again I say Get REAL !!!!	**c3.1.** Excuse me, but they "apologized". If they didn't do it, what did they apologize for? **c3.2.** You're no feminist. **c3.3.** Wake up! 4 guys raped a woman and <u>got away with it</u>. and you're worried about the football team's reputation. Believe me, they have the one they deserve.

a	b	c
a4.1. They did. And took advantage of it. **a4.2.** What is our culture? I don't want to be part of a culture/society that says Rape is OK.	**b4.1.** did it occur to you 1) her mouth could have been stuffed or covered 2) she was too terrified 3) she was too outraged/shamed (it's possible) **b4.2.** What an attitude. If you're mugged and you didn't scream does that make it any less a crime? **b4.3.** They say? Male they say? **b4.4.** There is a connection between alchobol and sexual violence—Carrie Nation knew this!	**c4.1.** (c3.3) Oh fuck you—four guys are not the whole team! Don't make the team scapegoats. **c4.2.** (c3.3) How could the team have stopped the rape?
	b5. (b4.4) You fucking bitch! Does that mean if I want to have a drink—share a few laughs w/some friends that I can't complain if they rape me?	**c5.1.** (c4.1) I agree. People generalize too much. **c5.2.** (c4.1) Don't make an innocent girl a scapegoat—next time it'll be <u>you</u>, or your <u>best friend</u>, or your <u>sister</u>, or your <u>daughter</u>! * 1/4 of all women will have sex forced upon them at some point in their life....
	b6.1. good. **b6.2.** What it means is Don't get so drunk you're an easy target. **b6.3.** No. It means y **b6.4.** ofcourse not! It means we women should be aware of how drugs and alchobol bring out violence, and be smart. rape is never the victim's fault.	**c6.** (c5.2) Bitch! Perhaps that's true, but will it be by a Cal Football Player? Get Real! Any <u>Man</u> can rape!
	b7.1. (b6.2) Getting drunk should be safe. There should be NO DANGER. **b7.2.** (b6.2) That's <u>one</u> means of prevention. Another's <u>conviction</u> and <u>punishment</u> of those who RAPE! **b7.3.** (b6.4) We. should be aware, but <u>so should they</u>! **b7.4.** (b6.4) So why are we dropping the issue?	

(d)

> **d1.** You women all talk as if the only thing a woman has of value in the world is her virginity/sexuality Is sex so sacred for   and a   not for   ? Is the stigma associated with screwing 4 guys at once equivalent to rape? Maybe <u>she</u> did wake up the next day and couldn't live with last night's decision. I believe it was her choice to be drunk as hell w/4 macho jerks. (And I mean choice not fault.
>
> **d2.**]women[
>   ]other[
>   ]and not the[
>   no one Deserves
>   to be raped
>
> **d3.** right on. why is everyone so quick to blame the victim?
>
> **d4.** No one's saying she deserved to be raped—but noone deservs to be wrongly accused of a crime even rape—either! Especially when they are presemed guilty by the community without even a trial. (since there wasn't enough evidence to have one)—who deserves that ?? Read your consitiution lately?
>
> **d5.** Who decided that there wasn't enough evidence. And was he right? I don't think so!

(e)

> **e1.** OBSESSED W/RAPE OR WHAT?
>
> **e2.** your not? why writing?

FIGURE 1(a)-(e): *Text of the graffiti discourse. Three series of remarks, (a), (b), (c) follow from the first graffito. Series (d) and (e) are positioned above (a), (b), and (c).*

Graffito (b2), *She enjoyed having sex with 4 football players,* assumes knowledge not only of the alleged rape events but also of the fact that the claim of rape is not officially validated. The items *enjoyed*, *sex*, and the phrase *4 football players* suggest several things: the team members are not to be jeered at—and they have been jeered at by the previous writer; rather, the players' behavior was earlier celebrated by the woman who now claims, falsely, to have been raped. (I will name this woman Everywoman.) Further implications are that football players are naturally a sexual treat and that Everywoman has a large sexual appetite, since she had sex with four of them at one party. This remark turns the focus from the team and the alleged rapists to the woman. The discourse of this series in the text becomes defined here as an argument about whether or not the incident was rape and who is responsible for wrongdoing. This remains the matter contended for two more strata of text.

Remark (b3) begins with an agreement flag, *Amen to you.* This is followed shortly by use of the word *sister* and another *Amen.* The writer is signaling more than agreement with the previous commenter. She is identifying herself as African American, or at least as a woman of color. The writer assumes shared knowledge that allows correct interpretation of these cues and, importantly, comprehension of the relevance of race. She goes on to make a case against the rape claim in which she accuses Everywoman of acting out of drunkenness in the incident, projecting a delayed shame onto the football players, and being the sexual Other, a *Superfreak.*

FIGURE 2: *Map of the text. Arrows and other deictics as found on wall. Broken-line arrow connects the two parts of graffito (a3).*

The writer employs three rhetorical questions. Along with each one she supplies information or hearsay in aid of her point. She inquires why Everywoman was drunk in a room with the players; she asks a hypothetical debate opponent if a claim made a month after the incident is credible; and she asks why, if rape was going on, no screams were heard in quiet Dwight Derby. There is an assumption behind this question that the victim is able and has a responsibility to resist loudly and immediately when threatened. Following each question this commenter displays a disagreement flag accompanied by graphic paralanguage: *get ReaL! BE REAL!!!! Get REAL!!!* The writer is not arguing with the previous commenter but with anyone who defends Everywoman's claim. The flags imply that a realistic, non-gullible attitude requires certain conclusions: that Everywoman asked for it, wanted it, and later lied about it.

The fourth stratum of series (b) is composed of four remarks, all expressing conflict with the stance of the (b3) writer. The first two, (b4.1) and (b4.2), are

responses to the previous writer's claim that the rape allegation is false because Everywoman was not heard to scream. (b4.1) answers (b3)'s question with another. There is implicature in the form itself of opposing one question to another, making the point that the first question's answer is not necessarily that Everywoman didn't scream because she was not being raped. The writer implies that the previous commenter is *not* realistic; it should have occurred to her that there are real impediments to resistance. On the whole, though, the writer of (b4.1) does not make claims by implicature. She appears to assume little shared knowledge and expresses herself in clarity mode by enumerating three possible reasons for not screaming. Projecting her opponent's incredulity, she appends to her comment the assertion that even shame can inhibit loud resistance. The commenter in (b4.2) begins her remark with a disagreement flag that, like (b4.1)'s question form, implies that the writer's thinking in the previous stratum is not clear. The writer here also asks a rhetorical question, treating the final (b3) question as one that truly requires an answer. These two stratum (4) writers present the arguments of the case that for rape, as for other violent crimes, the victim should not have to have made a commotion for her claim of violation to be believed.

Remark (b4.3) also takes question form. The previous stratum's writer relies on authority other than her own and presents it as a report of hearsay, *They say she was down for what she got.* ... This evokes the (b4.3) query that implies that male authority represents male interests and that these contradict female interests. A further implication is that the writer in the previous stratum trusts the wrong sources of information.

The arrow of remark (b4.4) points to the word *drunk* in stratum 3. The writer of (b3) has connected drinking and sex, using this to blame Everywoman for the gang rape. The (b4.4) commenter asserts a connection between drinking and violence.

The stratum-(4) writers represent feminist voices speaking out of anti-rape consciousness. The (b4) comments collectively deflect responsibility and blame away from Everywoman. In the very act of pushing the pointed finger away from her the writers bring about a change of topic. By chance arrangement, these remarks descend on the wall in order of increasing generality of logical subject. The actor in the first is still the particular Everywoman whose "mouth may have been stuffed"; the actor in the next, the addressee or a generic *you* who could get mugged; the actor in the next, the generalized male source of some blame-the-victim hearsay; and the subject of the last remark is an abstract relationship, *a connection between alcohol and sexual violence.* After this, series (b) continues with a response only to the last graffito of (b4). The discourse is no longer about the alleged rape of the particular Everywoman.

The writer of (b5) begins with a hostile disagreement flag, *You fucking bitch!* She understands—misunderstands, I think—the writer of (b4.4) to be implying that a woman in a situation of social drinking is responsible for sexual violence if it occurs. This writer poses a question the effect of which depends on the shared evaluation that social drinking is innocent behavior, sharing "a few laughs with some friends." Given this evaluation the writer can expect the addressee or a reader to answer that if "friends" (!) rape the drinker, she has not forfeited her right to

complain. The larger implicit claim is that social drinking does not legitimately place responsibility for rape prevention on potential victims.

In this remark and the ones that follow I hear voices of young, mainly heterosexual women under pressure. The topic becomes responsibility for sexual violence within drinking situations; this topic holds for strata (5), (6), and (7). The debate has shifted from argument about whether the incident involving Everywoman was rape or regretted sex to whether individual women, on the one hand, or a group, including men, on the other, are responsible for the prevention and punishment of sexual violence.

Stratum (b6) is composed of four remarks. The first is simply an agreement flag. The other three commenters disagree with writer (b5), each one formally responding to the rhetorical question of graffito (b5) as if it were a real request for information. The use of this device itself implies that the response that the commenter in (b5) elicits does not settle the matter. There are two logical parts to the propositions in (b6.2) and (b6.4), made explicit in the latter remark: given x, *drugs and alcohol bring out violence* (b6.4), then y, *be smart* (b6.4), or *Don't get so drunk you're an easy target* (b6.2). Responsibility is on individual members of the vulnerable group. Writers of (b6.2) and (b6.4) both assume shared knowledge of women's special vulnerability in social-drinking situations. These remarks, while voicing a difference with the writer of (b5), are not in conflict with that writer in the same way the writer of (b2) opposes (1), for instance; the (b6) remarks are educational. The (b6.4) commenter ends with a mitigating statement showing comprehension of (b5)'s point of view and claiming it as her own.

Stratum (6) has no graphic paralanguage. Stratum (7), by contrast, contains capital letters in the first remark, underlining in the second and third. These remarks are not educational but confrontational. The first two remarks of stratum (b7) argue with the comment in (b6.2). In (b7.1) the writer makes explicit a claim closely related to writer (b5)'s implicit claim that drinking women are not responsible for rape prevention: *There should be NO DANGER.* The modal verb registers a protest and an insistence. The writer implies that the writer of (b6.2) is wrongly focusing on the drinking behavior of individual women. The stance taken by the writer of (b7.2) is similar. She constructs a *yes, but* statement, using underlining to emphasize contrast in her two-clause topic-and-comment remark. The new information is that conviction and punishment of rapists is a means of rape prevention. She implies that action against the rapists is a better solution than women's modification of their own social drinking. Comment (b7.3), addressed to the writer of (b6.4), is also a (yes, but) structure. This structure and the use of underlining suggests that *they*, men, as opposed to *we*, women, are responsible for consciousness about the violence men commit under the influence of drugs and alcohol. In (b7) the focus changes. Three of the remarks in this stratum deflect responsibility from women, as the comments in (b4) deflected blame from Everywoman.

The question of (b7.4), addressed to the writer of (b6.4), abruptly returns the discourse to the first topic, the specific rape of Everywoman. With this final graffito of series (b) the general question of responsibility for rape and the specific question of Everywoman's claim are joined. *Dropping the issue* has to refer to the

fact that the football players were not criminally charged and were minimally sanctioned by the university.

In this series a number of issues inform discourse development. The initiating comment introduces the issue of group responsibility for individual members' behavior. Is an institution responsible for prevention or punishment of members' wrongdoings? The related matter of individual responsibility for self-protection informs the (b3) graffito and continues to background the debate throughout the rest of the text. In this text the group in question has various identities: the football team, a party group, the legal system or community at large—but also the gender castes, the *we* of women and the *they* of men. Group responsibility and identity questions associate with the issue of victim-blame for rape.

The issue of the connection between alcohol and violence also appears in the background of comment (b3) and continues to inform the rest of the debate of series (b). The development of the graffiti argument partly depends on the tension between two things: a known effect of alcohol, and the entrenched dependence of social situations—ordinary partying—on alcohol. On the one hand, female vulnerability is enhanced by this dependence; on the other, temperance is associated with parental and institutional restraint that undermines the personal liberation of young adults.

The issue that consistently and most significantly informs the entire discourse, including series (b), is the sexist terror of rape. With (b2) the dependent issue of the dismissal of women's rape claims becomes salient. Such dismissal is licensed by the view that rape is sex, not violence, and is in fact female-solicited sex. Such a view further allows the assertion that women enjoy rape. A related matter, which itself connects to the question of group responsibility, is gender-associated interest. With an echo question, *They say?*, elaborated with *Male they say?*, the writer of (b4.3) foregrounds the political-discourse information that men, as the gender caste representing the rapists and the one much less vulnerable to rape, have gender interests liable to be in contradiction to those of women.

Graffito (b3) is informed by the issue of racism, specifically by a body of knowledge associated with the political discourse on racism: the history of accusations of rape made against Black men, resulting in unfair trials (if any trials), long incarceration, or murder. The image of the lynching tree appears behind graffito (b3).

Compare, briefly, the graffito (a3), which is, by accident of graffiti construction, the complement to (b3). The writer of (a3) asks why Berkeley football recruiters don't take responsibility for resocializing "those guys" whom she goes on to compare to jungle cats turned loose to kill on Telegraph Avenue near the university. The racism clearly informing this comment allows the writer to make the football players entirely Other: first culturally alien, then as she develops her theme, wild and nonhuman. This commenter is protesting the behavior of the players, the rapists; she is resisting the sexist terror of rape, but her resistance is racist. The writer of (b3) makes the raped woman Other, the drunken, sexual *superfreak*. The writer denies the claim of rape in order to defend against an accusation that is evocative of racist history and necessarily racist, to some extent, in its effect in the present; but this resistance to racism is sexist. There is a real

contradiction here, a meta issue of racist terror in relation to sexist terror that is not resolvable in the isolation of any one instance of discourse. The political discourse concerning racism over the last four decades has resolved that accusations of rape made against Black men serve racism. The political discourse concerning rape over the last two decades has resolved that the dismissal of accusations of rape made by women serves misogyny. In a particular instance of alleged rape in which an African American man is accused of the crime, it cannot be the case both that the accusation is false and that the claim of rape is true.

The debate-forum graffiti depend on the existence of these issues in political discourse. The issues inform the text structure in this way: the pithy comments made anonymously to strangers assume shared knowledge. Given the shared knowledge, implicature will work well; writers use implicature to make their claims. Not by accident, recurring linguistic structures are ones with strong pragmatic effect: rhetorical questions, two-clause *yes-but* statements, phrasal disagreement flags, and graphic paralanguage substituting for emphatic intonation. These function to maintain the discourse of conflict.

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Camille Paglia and the anti-feminist backlash: Assessing discursive strategies

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INTRODUCTION

I will begin by humorously positioning myself under the sign of Tawanda the Avenger, a defiant female figure from the recent film "Fried Green Tomatoes," who challenges male privilege and doles out retribution to feckless abusers. Evelyn, the film's meek heroine, experiences a sudden and empowering epiphany when she realizes that she has the option to fight back against her own victimization. Compliance turns to retaliation when two younger women steal her parking spot and are rude to Evelyn, who at first is reduced to tears. Yelling out, "Tawanda the Avenger," Evelyn suddenly decides to take action and gleefully smashes into the empty, parked car of her offenders. It is with the transformation of the mild, self-effacing Evelyn into the retaliatory guerrilla that I like to self-consciously characterize this critique.

Ostensibly, this article discusses Camille Paglia's attack on American feminism as it is articulated in her book *Sexual Personae* (1990), in numerous approving articles and interviews scattered throughout the mainstream press, and in various disapproving ones coming from the alternative press. A focus on Paglia's attack provides a nice opportunity to consider both the uneven and peculiar reception of her ideas and the modes and sources of her power in the violence of her rhetorical strategies. It also provides a venue to spell out a more elaborate definition of power than may be standard among linguists.

My concern here is not precisely to discuss why I think Paglia is bad. Even the briefest of glances at her arguments reveals poor scholarship and bizarre illogic, as this excerpt from a *New York Magazine* interview amply reveals (Stanfill 1991). The following citation offers an ordinary sample of her outrageousness. Paglia declares:

> To advance civilization means causing the destruction of nature—men chop all the trees down, they get the metals out of the ground, they forge them. Men are impelled from the hearthfire, away from woman—"Get away from her, for Christ's sake. Get away from the suffocating emotionalism of women."
>
> Everything here—every single damn thing here, okay, from the silverware to the network that has brought the food to the table—this whole thing is a creation of men. And the feminists are really deluded, with their heads up their ass, if they don't know this. (1991:28)

I'll gladly take up the gauntlet Paglia throws down. My concern is to put forward the most powerful line of defense. However, toward that end, I suggest that we reconsider some common responses to Paglia. Many direct an elitist

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discourse at her which argues that she isn't really an accredited scholar, despite her Yale Ph.D., due to her unprestigious position at Philadelphia College of the Performing Arts. To this I would say that her position inside or outside of the academy is not of interest to us, and neither is her distinctly unacademic prose style.

Also, both the approving and the disapproving presses have demonstrated a disturbing tendency to depict Paglia with both sexist and bestial metaphors. Frequent mention is made of her unhappy sex life and of an animal rapacity for rare steak. One bizarre article published in *Harper's Magazine* was set "in the private Tasting Room of New York City's Le Bernardin restaurant—a small, glass room located inside the kitchen of Chef Gilbert Le Coze" (1991:45). The article presents a mealtime conversational debate between Paglia and Neil Postman, a doomsaying, anti-pop cultural critic. The dialogue is both structured and interrupted by floating fragments of italicized text, announcing each course of an elaborate seven-course meal. Paglia and Postman don't discuss the food, but by implication their appetites accommodate the meal. And in speaking of Paglia's heavy press coverage, B. Ruby Rich quips that Paglia is featured both nationally and internationally "in the dailies of Italy, Japan, Holland—or whichever country's journalist is currently making the pilgrimage to Ruth's Chris Steak House in Philadelphia, where most every story has Paglia devouring rare steaks at their expense, firing off soundbites between her bites of red meat" (1991:29).

Surely we don't want to suggest that the real problem with our opponent is that she may need a good fuck or that she is either omnivorous or carnivorous. In a similar vein, interviewers tend to rely on metaphors of monstrosity or madness to describe her. When Susie Bright recalls her first meeting with Paglia for her *Out/Look* magazine interview she describes Paglia as a lunatic: "I was speaking at Giovanni's Room bookstore in Philadelphia to a small attentive audience, when suddenly this bag lady jumped out of her seat, waving her arms as if she was hailing the last cab at Grand Central, and yelled, 'I am your *only* friend in academia'" (1992:9; original emphasis). Vampire metaphors also occur with almost clichéd regularity. It is explicit in Rich's *Village Voice* discussion of Paglia as a "media vampire" and it resonates in Francesca Stanfill's *New York Magazine* description of Paglia's teeth as "long and pearly."

Paglia herself engages these discourses of monstrosity and madness. Speaking of herself, she tells Martha Duffy in a *Time* magazine profile (entitled "The Bête Noire of Feminism") that her father had "created a monster he couldn't control" (1992:62). Paula Chin quotes Paglia in *People* as follows: "'I'm like a jack-in-the-box—*whaack!* Like a vampire out of the grave after 20 years of isolation and neglect,' she says. 'You see, Italians, we invented the vendetta. People have dishonored me. I want revenge'" (1992:129). In the same interview, Paglia also uses the madness metaphor. Chin writes, " ... Paglia admits years often pass between affairs. She accepts that aloneness as the price of brilliance. 'I'm a deviation—from the sexual and the human norm,' she says. 'There's a fine line between creativity and insanity, and I'm right on the edge" (1992:129). It's difficult to make sense of the fact that Paglia puts these blatantly sexist discourses and metaphors in place with respect to herself. Obviously, in part this is just an occurrence of the plain old phenomenon of internalized oppression. But in

addition, as Paglia seems to be saying to Chin, it also appears to be part of her invention of herself as a hero.

One thing that these varied discourses have in common is that bestiality, corporeality, monstrosity, and madness are all signs for irrationality. The use of these depictions serves a variety of purposes. First of all for her opposition, these discourses strategically discredit Paglia by characterizing her as unworthy of our attention. It says, "She's irrational, so ignore her." We may well want to ignore her, but since Paglia is on the attack and her voice is being broadcast throughout the media as the anti-PC pundit of the hour, it hardly seems advisable not to defend our interests and not to challenge her distortions. And for those voicing staunch and supportive agreement of Paglia who rely on these problematic depictions, it seems that these discourses allow for a certain disavowal which masks an actual endorsement of Paglia's extreme position. For example, the Duffy piece in *Time* is very positive in tone, while claiming to be so only indirectly. Duffy writes that "Paglia articulates positions that many people of both genders seem to want to hear these days. To them feminism has gone quite far enough, and they like *Personae's* neoconservative cultural message ... " (1992:62). Furthermore, even for her supportive press, the irrationality disclaimer also voices an anxiety towards Paglia's aggressive stances.

This anxiety derives from the fact that as a woman Paglia is a problem. Even as her being female and claiming to be feminist legitimates her attack on feminism, the self-contradiction of her misogyny poses a logical problem. If women are too stupidly bound to nature to participate in the masculine world of culture and intellectual discourse, what is Paglia doing there? In part, monstrosity functions to suggest that Paglia is not really a woman. Paglia's supportive press can't undermine her if she is to be effectively deployed in the role of the expert in support of an anti-feminist agenda. Yet Paglia's anomalous status within her own discourse makes her equally problematic to underwrite. So, as a sign, Paglia exceeds their ability to control and contain her representation in terms that undermine the moments when her own strategies coincide with the maintenance of patriarchal privilege. After all, it is this agenda that is getting all the press. But it is precisely her status as a woman, ex-lesbian, and (past) feminist that makes her what Rich calls "a shiny new weapon in the hands of the right" (1991:30). There is an illogic to her speaking as a monstrous woman that should disqualify her expert status.

Paglia attempts to defuse the illogic by inventing herself. In interview after interview, she explains that she doesn't identify as a woman and that lesbians don't like her because she is so masculine (the implication being that all [real?] lesbians hate men). The following quote offers a long but particularly choice example of Paglia's mythic self-invention. She tells Rich:

> I had identified totally with men, I didn't think of myself as a girl, but suddenly my body got very female. It's almost like, at puberty, I fell in love with myself. If I didn't have such a female body, I think that my whole ability to identify with my own gender would be missing. That was the only thing that anchored me in the female gender. Fortunately for me, in that period there were no transsexual surgeries.... I would have been obsessed with that; I would have thought, "I'm a man! And I have to change my body to become a man!" God knows what I would have done. But as it happens, it wasn't available for me

to fantasize about. For years I felt like that. Only my periods and this very auto-erotic body keep me identifying with the female gender. I like to say that, at puberty, the man in me fell in love with the woman in me, and it's been the love affair of the century ever since (1991:30).

We will return to the uses of this heroic lone gun later. However, what makes Paglia's strange and potent blend of rhetoric interesting is the extent to which it operates on a variety of different levels, taking advantage of the empowerment and mobility offered by multiple, partial, and contradictory positions. These forms of knowledge (or constructions of truth) and the effects of these discursive activities ought to be questioned. Paglia relies on doublespeak, and ultimately anyone using doublespeak cannot be engaged in terms of logic or coherence.

We might want to give up the attempt to quibble over accuracy and logical coherence and discuss other sources of persuasive power. I was struck by an idea suggested by Leslie Savan in her media column in the *Village Voice*, wherein she discusses some of the assumptions evident in the rhetorical strategies used by the public-relation imagemakers who produce presidential advertisements. Savan argues that the persuasive power exercised by negative ads derives not so much from facts or even lies, but from their capacity to establish a mood. ("Okay, so we're going to fight dirty.") Paglia sets the mood in such a way that the legitimate terrain of the discussion is forcefully constrained.

However, I still think the obviousness and truth value of Paglia's terms can and should be contested and hence her constraints rejected. For example, her use of the term *nature*, as in the key nature/culture couplet, is not the neutral truth that she claims it to be. Donna Haraway writes:

> "Our" relations with "nature" might be imagined as a social engagement with a being who is neither "it," "you," "thou," "he," "she," nor "they" in relation to "us." The pronouns embedded in sentences about contestations for what may count as nature are themselves political tools, expressing hopes, fears, and contradictory histories. Grammar is politics by other means. (1991:3)

So despite Paglia's assertions that artistic and intellectual work should be unsullied by political agendas, it is evident that there is no outside to politics when it comes to speaking. To argue that truths are constructed is not so much to say that there is no truth but to require that we treat the constructions of our truths extremely seriously. So, how do we play?

We must reject her tactics and not allow Paglia to set the terms of the debate. To have to rehash that tired old debate connecting women to nature and men to culture is already to have ceded vital territory. And it is not that Paglia is aggressive that is monstrous, but rather it is her arguments themselves that are reprehensible. Pathologizing the intellection of female academics by dismissing it as some sort of hysterical transference of excessive appetites is particularly self-contradictory for feminists. Haven't we been opposing this kind of trivialization long enough to know better? We have to employ more appropriate tactics.

THE POWER OF DISCOURSE AND THE VIOLENCE OF REPRESENTATION

To even begin to speak of her power, I must first discuss my own, or to put it better, the power that we have in common. I locate that power in discourse, as the term is used by those of us doing cultural criticism. Following the arguments developed by Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse in the introduction to their book *The Violence of Representation* (1989), we are looking at the power of the name and of representation, or from an inverse perspective the power of silence and suppression. Citing Derrida, Teresa de Lauretis writes of this type of violence, "To name ... such is the originary violence of language which consists in inscribing within a difference, in classifying, in suspending the vocative absolute" (1989:253). Part of this violence adheres both in the loss of self-sameness, which is the gap that is opened between a sign and its meaning, and in the fitting in or the subsuming of something unique into a system or under a category. The necessary glossing involves a suppression that we call violent.

This type of violence has become an increasingly important mode of domination for our culture. Power, in this discussion, is deeply inflected with the analysis of Michel Foucault. De Lauretis explains Foucault's definition of the term in this way: "Far from being an agency of repression, power is a productive force that weaves through the social body as a network of discourses and generates simultaneously forms of knowledge and forms of subjectivity or what we call social subjects" (1989:242). In speaking of intellectuals and power, or of the role and critique of intellectuals, it is simple to see how they produce forms of knowledge and therefore then to critique their productions. What is less obvious is how forms of subjectivity are produced and critiqued. I think this idea is more intuitively acceptable if we think of it in terms of criticizing how we imagine the self. What we take the self to be has been a historically volatile and contested concept. But I will return to the question of the forms of subjectivity endorsed by Paglia shortly. Underscoring the previous point about the imbrication of power with the production of forms of knowledge, Armstrong and Tennenhouse explain:

> As American academics at this moment in history, we feel it is somehow dishonest to speak of power and violence as something that belongs to the police, to the military, something that belongs to and is practiced by someone somewhere else. For clearly the subtler modalities of modern culture, usually classified as non-political, keep most of us in line, just as they designate specific "others" as the appropriate objects of violence. (1989:4)

According to this argument, the emergence or application of a name invokes or affirms classification, a process whose job it is to establish categories, taxonomies, and hierarchies. The proper identity which is marked by a name emerges as an act of differentiation; names construct difference. There are two levels to this critique, which we can characterize in terms of content and form. First, for content, this requires that we think for a moment about the power located in acts of representation, whether they be intellectual or artistic.

Armstrong and Tennenhouse use the example of Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre* to expound their theory of the violence of representation and of the power of discourse.

> Do not think for a moment that we are using Brontë's *Jane Eyre* because "she" allows us to view our discourse from a subordinated position and to speak on behalf of the racial, social, or sexual victim. On the contrary, we find Brontë's novel particularly useful because it exemplifies the other (feminine) half of liberal discourse. As such, it clearly demonstrates how such discourse, closely akin to literary criticism in this respect, suppresses all manner of differences by representing them as Otherness—that which one cannot be and still be part of the culture. (1989:3-4)

Second, Armstrong and Tennenhouse address this critique at the level of form by observing de Lauretis's key argument that "the discourse of theory, whatever its ideological bent, constitutes a form of violence in its own right in so far as it maintains a form of domination—[in de Lauretis's own words] 'that of the male or male-sexed subject'" (1989:3). According to de Lauretis, to speak or to exert violence is to occupy a subject position that is always already coded as masculine. While the subject of violence, regardless of gender, is coded as masculine, de Lauretis writes, "The discourse of the sciences of man constructs the object as female and the female as object. This, I suggest, is its rhetoric of violence ... " (1989:253). Hence, on the most basic epistemological level, the binary couplet of subject and object is determinately gendered. This is not to say that this is necessarily so, but rather that it has been conventionally established. But we need to look further at the development of this notion of the subject, because we have not yet addressed the full scope of its violence.

FEMINISM AND THE MEANINGS OF DIFFERENCE

Let me pause here to offer my understanding of Paglia's nemesis: feminism. My vision of feminism involves a double emphasis on addressing oppression against women and undertaking the profoundly more subtle task of examining the order of a social world that constructs itself hierarchically. The aspects of feminism that most excite me involve a fundamental re-valuation of the meaning of difference. This is where feminism at its most expansive connects resistance to women's oppression with other struggles against oppression.

It is at the discrete gestures that treat multiplicity or difference as a problem to be solved, synthesized, or suppressed that this type of critique is aimed, because the effects of that intangible assumption create and support actual harm. And it is in this mode that feminism is such a threatening and powerful form of critique of the conservatism for which Paglia seeks to establish privilege and mastery.

I will elaborate what I mean by difference by borrowing from Haraway's well-known essay "A Manifesto for Cyborgs." She explains:

> [C]ertain dualisms have been persistent in Western traditions; they have all been systemic to the logics and practices of domination of women, people of colour, nature, workers, animals—in short, domination of all constituted as others, whose task is to mirror the self. Chief among these troubling dualisms are self/other, mind/body,

culture/nature, male/female, civilized/primitive, reality/appearance, whole/part, agent/resource, maker/made, active/passive, right/wrong, truth/illusion, total/partial, God/man. (1991:177)

The same gesture that distinguishes these binary couplets teaches us to interpret their differences hierarchically. One term is always better, the other is abject. Again and again, Paglia trots out a huge array of binaries. Primary among these is the pair man/woman. Paglia sets up the gender pair as the paradigm for all others. Mostly, she is attempting to secure in place basic fundamental truths about the world that are as epistemologically insupportable as they are ideologically dangerous. She charges anyone opposing the "truth" of these binary oppositions with stupidity and effeminacy, advocating a return to the intellectual days before these assumptions were questioned. Paglia writes in *Image* magazine:

I now address the graduate students. This is a time of enormous opportunity for you. ... Conformism and empty pieties dominate academe. Rebel. Do not read Lacan, Derrida and Foucault, and treat as insignificant nothings those that still prate of them. ... Charge yourself with the high ideal of scholarship, connecting you to Alexandria and to the devoted, distinguished scholars who came before you. When you build on learning, you build on rock. You become greater by a humility toward great things. (1991:16-17)

It is no wonder that Paglia attacks these French philosophers; they are the ones who have criticized most powerfully the epistemic flaws of this kind of binary thinking as well as its complicity with the logic of oppression. Hélène Cixous demonstrates a historical application of the metaphysical assumption of binarism nicely in the following anecdote:

Today I know from experience that one cannot imagine what an Algerian French girl was; you have to have been it, to have gone through it. To have seen 'Frenchmen' at the 'height' of imperialist blindness, behaving in a country that was inhabited by humans as if it were peopled by nonbeings, born-slaves. I learned everything from this first spectacle: I saw how the white (French), superior, plutocratic, civilized world founded its power on the repression of populations who had suddenly become 'invisible,' like proletarians, immigrant workers, minorities who are not the right 'color.' Women. Invisible as humans. But, of course, perceived as tools—dirty, stupid, lazy, underhanded, etc. Thanks to some annihilating magic. I saw that the great, noble, 'advanced' countries established themselves by expelling what was 'strange'; excluding it but not dismissing it; enslaving it. A commonplace gesture of History: there have to be *two* races—the masters and the slaves (1986:70; original emphasis).

It is for this extremely particular history that Paglia advocates humility, because she applauds the creation of masters that the West has produced so abundantly. Following a Nazi interpretation of Nietzsche, Paglia argues that any criticism of the greatness of our mastery is an advocacy of a plebian, slave mentality. As far as Paglia is concerned, life's a bitch and we are the master race ... uhh, culture.

FORMS OF SUBJECTIVITY

Keeping in mind de Lauretis's imperative that we understand that to speak is to assume a violent position marked as masculine because it is powerful, Armstrong and Tennenhouse hold that

Our own model of culture is implicated in the very form of power it sets about to critique: a model of culture that is constructed around the viewpoint of a specific gender, class, and race of people. Like Jane [Eyre], we tend to think of ourselves as outside the field of power, or at least we write about "it" as if it were "out there." That is to say, we situate ourselves in a "female" position relative to the discourse of law, finance, technology, and political policy. From such a position, one may presume to speak both as one of those excluded from the dominant discourse and for those so excluded. By doing so, we would argue, is no more legitimate than Jane Eyre's claim to victim status. Within liberal discourse, what might be called the male and female positions are represented as if they could contain all other differences. By implication, then, we will be tracing the history of our own authority along with that of the modern subject (1989:10).

Armstrong and Tennenhouse's use of Jane Eyre as an exemplar of the power of discourse elaborates a productive critique of Paglia's own strategies. They explain, "We have used Brontë's novel to explain what we mean by the violence of representation because this violence appears there in its most benign, defensive, and nearly invisible form—a power one can use without even calling it such" (1989:9).

Armstrong and Tennenhouse argue that when Brontë intentionally produced a heroine lacking "money, status, family, good looks, good fortune or even a pleasant disposition" (1989:6), she made something "out of nothing at all—that is to say, making a self out of itself. In such a project, violence is an essential element" (1989:6).

Like Jane Eyre, Paglia claims to invent herself as out of nothing, to have earned her heroic status by virtue of being a "triumphant underdog." Paglia constantly identifies herself with the working class. She tells *People*, "I teach working-class people, so I'm more in touch with culture" (Chin 1992:127). But as Rich points out, Paglia's parents are in fact middle-class. So why the subterfuge as to her class origins? It's consistent with her self-portrayal as a lone voice from outside the "center." Paglia's emphasis on her class, ethnic, and sexual affiliations accredit her as a voice from the margin, someone excluded from power. The articulation and affirmation of a profound inner self fabricates a notion of subjectivity that is a primary modality of violence in *Jane Eyre* as well as in Paglia's texts and testimony. Armstrong and Tennenhouse argue regarding Jane Eyre:

To understand the legacy of such a heroine and the magic she holds for readers today, Foucault implies, we have to identify a second modality of violence. Jane describes an obstacle in her path as a weight holding her down, if not in fact an act of violence against the self, and readers respond by rooting for her emancipation. So attached to the novel's heroine, we neglect to see how her descriptive power becomes a mode of violence in its own right. But in fact it does, as Jane reconstructs the universe around the polarities of Self and Other (1989:6-7).

Paglia overcomes all other modes of identity by depicting everyone else as lacking (if nothing else, in worth). This is her move, designating as has-beens and ideologues all those feminists and lesbians who remain in the positions through which Paglia has already passed and found defective. Armstrong and Tennenhouse assert:

> [Jane's] status as an exemplary subject, like her authority as a narrator, depends entirely on her claim to a kind of truth which can only be made from a position of powerlessness. By creating such an unlovely heroine and subjecting her to one form of harassment after another, Brontë demonstrates the power of words alone. Indeed, she demonstrates that words are all the more powerful for being alone. Only when they appear to come from a position outside the field of power do they appear to speak for everyone. If Jane is always the victim, one tends to assume her power is nothing other than that of pure goodness and truth (1989:8).

Paglia operates with the same strategy. She constantly and even gleefully presents herself as an outsider. She mentions twenty years of neglect in the *People* interview. We should recall the genesis of that "neglect." Paglia started out with a job at Bennington College, a well-regarded institution, and she lost that job after beating up a student. This incident resonates with her comments about the necessity to separate politics from art. She tells *New York Magazine* that if Picasso had machine-gunned down an entire row of grandmothers, it wouldn't affect her opinion of his art. That's all well and fine, but if I were doing the hiring at an academic institution any job candidate's merit would not rest solely on the content of their work. Someone who resorts to violence would hardly be considered an ideal candidate. This says nothing about her intellectual credentials. But to argue that her behavior toward students is irrelevant to her position in the academy is implicitly to advocate irresponsibility. Higher education has taken this stance, at least institutionally, with regard to sexual harassment. Yet Paglia insists on calling herself the victim here (even while she authorizes the construction of victims). This opinion is seconded by her former dissertation advisor, Harold Bloom, who argues that Paglia is the victim of ostracization. He says ruefully in the *New York Magazine* article, "Camille will never be politically correct, and they will blackball her everywhere" (1991:30). This lends an innocence to her discourse which enables her to deny its power. Further, such an innocence is used to legitimate her attack on feminism as defensive retaliation.

Yet as Rich writes:

> She is so bent on attacking "victimology" ... that she can't see any victims at all. It's doubtful that Paglia would understand what Randall Kennedy meant by "vulnerable people" in his *Nation* assessment of those whom Thurgood Marshall sought to protect with the Constitution. Paglia's myopia leads to a different credo, something like "I am, therefore you are not." She's a punitive deity for an age of blame. (1991:32)

And how can our punitive deity even speak of ostracization when she expresses a constant contempt for any ideals of community or social responsibility? Paglia is quite explicit about this contempt. She tells Steven Petrow in an interview published in *Outweek*, "I despise the idea of community—period. I'm coming out

of a world of Oscar Wilde, who believed in the anti-PC voice. That's the gay legacy: the independent voice. As an artist, you have no social responsibility" (1991:76). Rich maintains that "Paglia is filled with a dread of the body politic, horrified that she might belong to any identifiable group, driven to represent herself as the eternal one-of-a-kind" (1991:31).

CONCLUSION

To speak of discursive power is not to call on the problematic category of pure truth. We do not attempt to use that category because to do so would make an implicit claim to speak as a neutral commentator. And if Paglia doesn't get to make such a claim, than neither do we. To call Paglia violent is not sufficient for at least two reasons that I have argued in this paper. On the one hand, participation in discourse is necessarily violent. As Armstrong and Tennenhouse say, "To regard certain practices as violent is never to see them just as they are. It is always to take a position for or against them ... " (1989:9). And on the other hand, they also remind us that "to renounce theory, as some have attempted to do, is outrageously cynical" (1989:25).

As critics of post-structuralism often mention in disappointment or disapproval, this view isn't necessarily liberating. Such a position must constantly be produced and refined, but to make struggle rather than something like a final solution—with all of the ominous resonance that the term indicates—the goal is to draw attention to the resources we need to muster and constantly lend in order to construct a culture we would live by.

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The masculine pronouns as generic: A view from the child

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Although the issue of whether or not words such as *he* and *him* truly are generic pronouns goes back to well over a century ago, the controversy is alive and well with no clearly foreseeable resolution. Generations of children have grown up in the midst of the debate and the discussions have taken place around them, but with a few notable exceptions their own attitudes towards and reactions to these pronouns—which are, incidentally, extremely frequent in children's literature—have not been given much consideration. The following is one such example, taken from *The Children's Golden Book of Manners*:

(1) When you are visiting a friend, be sure to greet his mother.

Presumably this dictum was to hold whether it was a male or a female friend that a child was visiting, and yet only the masculine genitive *his* is used.

In this study, my goal was to examine the reactions and attitudes of those only just acquiring language and to discover perhaps the naissance of, for instance, the gender-specific reactions toward the "generic" masculine (I am comfortable calling them gender-specific, because as I will show below, there are direct correspondences to adult gender-specific reactions). It also seems important to address these issues with language acquisition kept at the forefront of discussions such as those found in Pauwels (1990) regarding sexism and language planning, and so I will be addressing that below as well. (I will not review the previous work that has been done in providing evidence for the fact that adults do not find the masculine "generic" to be truly generic, as I assume familiarity with at least some of that work, but interested readers may refer to Bem & Bem 1973; Hamilton 1985; and Harvard Linguistics Faculty 1971).

The subjects for this study were 88 children between the ages of three and eight who were either in a day-care center in Santa Barbara or students in a first- and second-grade class at an Isla Vista elementary school. Although 88 children participated in the study, my results are based on the responses of 78 of them (I will discuss the remaining ten below), so that there were 40 girls and 38 boys. (Originally the children were separated into two groups according to age, but since age did not prove to be a significant factor, I have grouped them together in the result tables below.)

Each child heard only one version of either (2a) or (2b), so the variables were number, gender, and animacy for both the full NPs and the pronouns:

(2a) A baby monkey may look tiny, but he/she/it is actually very strong. When he/she/it goes for a ride through the jungle, he/she/it can cling very tightly to

his/her/its mother's back.

(2b) A newborn baby may look tiny, but she/he is actually very strong. She/he can cling very tightly to her/his rattle, or to her/his mother's finger.

The interviews were conducted one on one with me and were tape-recorded. After the children had heard the passage, I asked them if they could imagine the main character in the story and invited them to give that character a name. If the name was ambiguous for gender, like *Wild Thing* or *Jumper*, I asked them if it was a boy's name or a girl's name. Then I asked them if *Julie* would be a good name for the character, and if they rejected it I asked them why. Finally, I asked the children if they had heard me say *he*, *she*, or *it*, and if they knew what those terms meant, specifically noting whether the children said the words meant 'boy' or 'girl' or both.

The results of my study are found in Tables 1 through 3. The image rows of the tables correspond to the naming activity, and the explanation row corresponds to the questions that followed.

TABLE 1. *Masculine pronouns*

		Males		Females		Total	
Image	M	94%	(N=15)	38%	(6)	66%	(21)
	F	6	(1)	62	(10)	34	(11)
Explanation	M	94	(15)	50	(8)	72	(23)
	B	6	(1)	50	(8)	28	(9)

M = male only   F = female only   B = both

TABLE 2. *Neutral pronouns*

		Males		Females		Total	
Image	M	65%	(11)	28%	(5)	46%	(16)
	F	35	(6)	72	(13)	54	(19)
Explanation	M	6	(1)	11	(2)	9	(3)
	B	94	(16)	89	(16)	91	(32)

M = male only   F = female only   B = both

TABLE 3. *Feminine pronouns*

		Males		Females		Total	
Image	M	40%	(N=2)	0		18%	(N=2)
	F	60	(3)	100		82	(9)
Explanation	M	40	(2)	0		18	(2)
	B	60	(3)	100		82	(9)

M = male only   F = female only   B = both

I would now like to examine some of these results, to see if they suggest anything about the "genericness" of the maculine forms. If we first examine the results found in Table 1, we see that in fact two-thirds of the children imaged a male character and almost three-fourths stated that *he* and *him* refer to boys only. But a closer look will reveal that it is a disproportionate number of boys that are responsible for this. Ninety-four percent both imaged male characters and stated that *he* and *his* was just for boys. At first it may be tempting to attribute this to the natural egocentricity of children—they immediately think of themselves as the characters. But this is an unacceptable explanation for two reasons. First of all, we don't find this pattern with the girls: over a third of them imaged a male. Secondly, Table 2 reports the results of the passages using neutral pronouns such as the third-person plural. In these cases, we find results that are much closer to ideal—about 50% imaged female characters and 50% imaged males. If we look at the male and female columns, we see that boys are imaging more males and girls are imaging more females, which is closer to the results that would correspond to the egocentricity hypothesis.

What then is responsible for the results in Table 1? Nilsen (1977) has suggested that part of the problem is that the rules involved in extending masculine pronouns to "generic" usages are two different types of rules for boys and girls. She refers to the the Type 1 and Type 2 rules offered in Labov (1969):

(3a). Type 1

She's going to the store.
but
*I don't know where she's.

(3b). Type 2 (prescriptive)

Don't say "ain't."

Thus, Nilsen suggests that extending the referents of a pronoun that is very much a part of a boy's grammar system should be easy, and nothing need be added to the system (in fact, one of the boys in my study that heard the feminine passage stated that he had "never heard that word before," so that the addition of pronouns to a grammar may occur much later). But as Nilsen suggests, it may not even be the case that females are added to the list of referents for boys, but that the idea of *masculine* is extended to all referents not obviously female, and it is this hypothesis that my data seem to support, especially when the masculine pronouns are present.

For girls, however, the rule needed would be a Type 2 rule: girls do not need to extend the referent, but to add an additional word to their system. My data show that little girls as young as three or four are already grappling with this issue: if they want to feel included, then they must add this pronoun to their grammars. As work by Wendy Martyna has shown, in adults the situation is quite similar. Men tend to visualize males (themselves, often) in sentences using what she called "neutral" nouns like *person* and *human*, while 90% of adult females report no images at all (and the remaining 10% report visualizing males—an issue I touch on

below).

As Table 1 shows, however, half of the little girls haven't done this yet, and it is this set that is perhaps the most troublesome. The little girls in this set gave several answers that I find disturbing: they said things like, "It says *he* because the mommy has to carry the baby girl monkeys," and "Girls are not that strong." So this set of little girls in my study have in a sense already given up—they have decided that the books and television shows around them that use *he* and *him* do not include them, and it is not entirely clear that they will ever acquire a Type 2 rule that will allow them to feel included.

It is for these reasons that papers such as Pauwels (1990) must be given serious consideration. In this work, Pauwels suggests that sexist language is rarely taken as an issue for language planning, but that in fact it is a prime candidate for language-planning discussions. I would like to use this study to address some of the issues she has discussed with regard to stages of language planning. The first stage she mentions is the identification or "fact-finding" stage. There have, as I mentioned above, been myriad studies that have provided evidence for the fact that the masculine generic is sexist, and the present study can be included among them.

It is the next two stages for which the present study may have the largest implications. The second stage that Pauwels lists is the implementation stage: in other words, who is best equipped to implement changes, and where would it do the most good? I think this study clearly demonstrates that publishers of children's materials need to be made explicitly aware of the fact that the books and materials that they create are not interpreted as they may think they are (specifically, that boys and girls are not looking at them the same way), and that if they genuinely want the interpretations that animals and humans can be male *or* female, then the practice of referring to all humans or animals with the masculine forms must be stopped. Perceptual discrepancies, as this study shows, begin at an extremely early age, and therefore must be halted just as early.

The third stage that Pauwels lists is the evaluation of alternatives, and it is in this area that I am willing to make several suggestions based on the results of this study. Pauwels states that both the "viability" and "the social effectiveness" of the alternatives must be taken into consideration, and that merely providing a set of choices for people is not necessarily a valuable thing to do. She provides a convincing argument, based on viability, against the creation of a new pronoun; I will not review it here. There are persistent valid arguments against *he or she*, of which the most common is that it takes too long to write and read it, and the problem with *s/he* is that it is difficult to say.

The alternative then is singular they, and I find this acceptable for several reasons. First of all, as many linguists have stated, it is already a part of people's grammars. But for this next argument, I borrow terminologies and ideas from Silverstein (1985). Silverstein offers the following three categories: formal, notional, and differential reference to, found in Table 4.

TABLE 4. *Adapted from Silverstein (1985)*

Differential reference to	Notional	Formal
Small creature	Thing	NEUTER
Man	Male	MASCULINE
Plurality (for "group")	Plural	THIRD-PERSON "SINGULAR"

I have included row one as an example; row two is Silverstein's suggestion for the formal category MASCULINE. I will not go into a discussion of how this leads to the ideological notions behind he and *him*, as that can be found in Silverstein (1985), but instead I will offer my own interpretation of how a THIRD-PERSON "SINGULAR" might look. I would like to suggest that the differential reference and notional columns make *they* the most attractive choice. *They* is notionally plural and differentially refers to a plurality (whether we choose to call it singular or not), and I would argue that this is exactly what we want in order to have speakers and hearers image females in addition to males when all humans are the intended referent. That is, the underlying plurality of the third-person plural forms (again, whether they are said to be singular or not) may force language users to visualize a group instead of an individual, and in fact most of the uses of the generic are addressed to a group:

(4) Everyone who took the exam should come and get their answer sheet.

As various linguists have shown, when people visualize an individual, it is most likely to be male. Perhaps females would be more likely to be included in a group, and this is a possibility that should be tested. I had indications of this in this study. When I asked the children about *they* and *them*, I received answers such as, "It means a bunch of people, boys and girls," and "Both baby boy monkeys and baby girl monkeys." (Admittedly I didn't use *they* and *them* in the singular sense. However, I don't think this would have affected the results; it would be interesting to find out.)

One last interesting finding from the present study regards the use of the feminine pronouns. Notice that there were significantly fewer subjects whose results were reported in this section. The first reason is that no one has claimed that the feminine is generic, but the second reason is that of the 10 children mentioned in the beginning of the paper whose results weren't used, 6 of them were from this group, and 5 of these were boys. The reason why their responses had to be excluded was because the use of the feminine pronoun seemed to cause a kind of mental block, so that the children weren't able to concentrate on the rest of the task. One little boy kept repeating, for instance, "I have muscles, too. See, I have muscles." I would suggest that this result is, however, a good thing and should be used to its fullest advantage. It is good, in other words, to use only feminine pronouns now and then, to circumvent what Stanley (1977) and others in the *ideologically committed group* (Silverstein 1985) have termed the "invisibility of women."

To sum up then, this study showed that children pattern much the same as

adults with regard to interpretations of the generic masculine, in that females tend to interpret it as truly generic while males tend to interpret it as exclusively masculine. Publishers need to be made aware of the fact that the children's books that they produce are not interpreted in the same way by both sexes. And finally, I suggest that the singular *they* is the best alternative for the generic masculine for both cognitive and social reasons.

I hope that this study has shown that the invisiblility of women begins at an extremely young age and that continued use of the masculine forms as generic is a contributor to that effect.

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Mothers' role in the everyday reconstruction of "Father knows best" [1]

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INTRODUCTION

No institution is more important to the instantiation, creation, and socialization of gender identity than the family. During a child's first two years of life, more learning takes place in general than in any subsequent comparable period of time, including the learning of fundamental cultural notions of female and male identities (Cole & Cole 1989; Freud [1921] 1949; Kohlberg 1966). Children develop understandings of what it means to be female or male in part from observing the actions of adults and in part from others' expectations concerning how female and male children themselves are to act (Dunn 1984; Goodwin 1990; Maccoby & Jacklin 1974; Schieffelin 1990).

For several years, we have been observing and analyzing language socialization in American families, focusing especially on dinnertime communication patterns. Our attention has been captured by the pervasiveness and importance of collaborative narrative activity (i.e., co-narration) as a locus of socialization (Ochs, Smith, & Taylor 1989; Ochs & Taylor 1992a, 1992b; Ochs, Taylor, Rudolph, & Smith 1992). We see narrative activity as a linguistic medium for constituting the family as well as different identities within a family. In the present study, we examine how family narrative practices instantiate the gender-relevant family identities of mother and father, husband and wife. We argue that narrative practices of all family members, especially those of women as mothers and wives, play an important role in instantiating what we might call a "Father-knows-best" dynamic in the family. Within this dynamic, the father is typically set up—through his own and others' recurrent narrative practices—as primary audience, judge, and critic of family members' actions, thoughts, feelings, and conditions either as a narrative protagonist (acting in the past) or as a co-narrator (acting in the present). We tend to associate the "Father-knows-best" ideology with a pre-feminist, presumably passé 1950s conceptualization of idyllic domestic order that was popularized and concretized by the television program of the same name. Our appropriation of this title is intended to suggest that the ideology persists in the everyday narrative practices of post-feminist American families in the 1990s.

DATABASE

This study analyzes the dinnertime narratives of seven two-parent families who reside in Southern California. All seven families are English-speaking, European American, and earned over $40,000 a year during the 1987-89 period in which the study was conducted. Each family had a five-year-old child who had at least one older sibling. Two fieldworkers video- and audiotaped each family twice; fieldworkers left the camera on a tripod and absented themselves during dinner activity. The data base comprises a total of 100 narratives (reports and stories) told during 13 dinners where both parents were present.

NARRATIVE INSTANTIATION OF GENDER ROLES IN THE FAMILY

To understand the family narrative practices that (re)create the "Father-knows-best" dynamic, we need to look at how specific narrative roles are differentially assumed by specific family members. Because the dinner interactions that we are examining involve at least four family participants, each participant potentially instantiates more than one family role, i.e., women as mothers and wives, men as fathers and husbands, girls as daughters and sisters, boys as sons and brothers. For simplicity in presenting our findings in the tables below, we will refer throughout to women as *mothers*, men as *fathers*, and boys and girls as *children*, recognizing that at any one moment each may be constructing more than one family identity.

We have identified the following narrative roles as relevant to the construction of gender identities within families: protagonist, introducer (elicitor or initial teller), primary recipient, problematizer, and problematizee. Below we define each of these roles and show the extent to which each narrative role is assumed by particular family members.

Protagonist

A *protagonist* is here defined as a leading or principal character in a narrative. Protagonist is an important role with respect to the "Father-knows-best" dynamic in that it presents an individual as a topic for comment by family members. While being a protagonist puts one's narrative actions, conditions, thoughts, and feelings on the table as a focus of attention, this attention is not always an advantage given that protagonists' actions, etc. are not only open to praise but also exposed to familial scrutiny and possible sanction. Our concern is with those narratives such as (1) where the protagonist is a co-present family member, in this case five-year-old Jodie:[2]

(1)   "Jodie's TB Shots Report" (excerpt)

    m = mother (Patricia)

    f = father (Dan)
    o = Oren (7;5)
    j = Jodie (5;0)

m: *((to Jodie))* =oh:: you know what? You wanna tell Daddy what happened to you today?=

f: *((looking up and off))* =Tell me everything that happened from the moment you went in - until:
            [
j: I got a sho:t=
f: =EH *((gasping))* what? *((frowning))*
j: I got a sho::t
          [
f: no
    (0.4) *((Dan begins shaking head no))*
f: couldn't be
j: (yeah) *((with upward nod toward Dan))*
       [
o: (a) TV test? - TV test? Mommy?
m: *((nods yes))* - mhm
j: and a sho:t
f: *((to Jodie))* (what did you go to the uh::) *((to Patricia))* Did you go to the ?animal hospital?
m: .hh - no:?.
f: (where/what)
j: I just went to the doctor and I got a shot
f: *((shaking head no))* I don't believe it
j: ri:lly::

This example is illustrative of our finding, displayed in Table 1, that children were the preferred protagonists of dinnertime narratives in our corpus:

TABLE 1. *Family-member protagonists: Who were the preferred family-member protagonists in the 100 narratives?*

5-year-old child	33	Mother	28
Older sibling	31	Father	24
Younger sibling	8		
Children	72 >	Parents	52

Here we see that of 124 family-member protagonists in the 100 narratives told, 72 (or 58%) of them are co-present children. An important question to ask in light of the vulnerability of protagonists to familial scrutiny is the extent to which each family member assumes this role through their own initiative as opposed to having this role imposed on them through the elicitations and initiations of other family members. To address this issue, we consider next how narratives about family members were introduced.

Introducer

The narrative role of *introducer* is here defined as the co-narrator who makes the first move to open a narrative, either by elicitation or by direct initiation. We define these two introducer roles as follows: the *elicitor* is a co-narrator who asks that a narrative be told. In (1) above, Jodie's mother assumes this role and in so doing introduces the narrative. The *initial teller* is a co-narrator who expresses the first declarative proposition about a narrative event. In (1), Jodie assumes this role but because her mother has elicited her involvement Jodie is not the narrative introducer. In unelicited narratives such as (2), the initial teller (here, the mother) is the narrative introducer:

(2)   "Broken Chair Story"
       m   =   mother (Molly)
       f   =   father (Patrick)
       j   =   Josh (7;10)
       r   =   Ronnie (4;11)

During dinner preparation, as Molly brings Ronnie a spoon to open a can of Nestlé's Quik, she scoots Ronnie's chair in to the table.

m: (Oh) this chair? broke - today
                   [
                   ((microwave? buzzer goes off))
f: I? know
((*Molly heads back toward kitchen, stops by Josh's chair; Josh begins looking at Ronnie's chair and under table*))
m: No:: I mean it rea:?lly broke today
                   [
                   I? know
f: I know?
m: Oh you knew that it was split?
f: yeah?,
m: The whole wood('s) split?
f: yeah,
m: Oh did you do it?
(0.4)
f: I don't know if I did? it but I saw that it wa:?s=
                   [
m: (oh)
((*Josh goes under table to inspect chairs*))
r?: (   )
     =[
m: yeah I sat down? in it and the whole thing split so I - ((*bending over as if to indicate where on chair*))   I tie:d
                   [
f: ((*somewhat bratty intonation*))   That's (a) rea:l si:gn? that you need to go on a di:?et.
r?: ((*going under table too*)) (where)
m: hh ((*grinning as she rises from stooped position next to Josh's chair on side facing Patrick*))
r?: (where where where)=

j: =Mi:ne? broke?
m: I fixed it - (I tied   )
                   [
r?:   (mi:ne?)=
j?: =(I'm not gonna sit on that chair)

The role of introducer is one that we see to be pivotal in controlling narrative activity. The introducer nominates narrative topics, thus proposing who is to be the focus of attention (i.e., protagonist), what aspects of their lives are to be narrated, and when narration is to begin. Thus, in (1) Jodie's mother directs the family's attention to Jodie at a particular moment in the dinner, suggesting that there is a narrative to be told and circumscribing the boundaries of that narrative. In addition, the introducer controls who is to initiate the narrative, either self-selecting, as in (2), or nominating a co-narrator, as in (1). Finally, introducers also exert control in that they explicitly or implicitly select certain co-narrator(s) to be primary recipients of the narrative (see the section on this role below). In both examples above, mother as introducer selects father as primary recipient. Table 2 displays our findings regarding family preference patterns for who introduces narratives at dinnertime:

TABLE 2. *Narrative introducers: Which family members introduced these 100 narratives (either by elicitation or by direct initiation)?*

Mother	39	Older sibling	18
Father	32	5-year-old child	9
		Younger sibling	2
Parents	71	> Children	29

While the majority of the protagonists were children, we see here that 71% of all narratives were introduced by parents. To understand the degree to which specific family-member protagonists were "vulnerable" to introduction by others, we turn to the protagonist-introducer interaction patterns found in Table 3:

TABLE 3. *Who introduces whom?: To what extent did family members introduce the narratives about themselves as opposed to having them introduced by others?*

Protagonist (# of narratives)	Who introduces (elicits or initiates)		
	Self	Other	(Which other)
Children (72)	33.3% <	66.7%	M = 34.7%
			F = 19.4%
			Sib = 12.5%
Mother (28)	53.6% >	46.4%	F = 35.7%
			Ch = 10.7%
Father (24)	54.2% >	45.8%	M = 33.3%
			Ch = 12.5%

Here we see that on the one hand all family members are vulnerable to having narratives about themselves introduced by others; moreover, there is relative parity between parents in this respect: mothers/wives are no more and no less vulnerable to this type of narrative control than are fathers/husbands. On the other hand, there is a striking asymmetry displayed in this table, not between mothers and fathers but between parents and children. Only one-third of all narratives about children were introduced by the child-protagonists themselves; rather, mothers were the chief introducers (34.7%) of narratives about children. We suggest that for mothers the role of introducer is appropriated as a locus of narrative control over children. Mothers are largely responsible for determining which children and which aspects of children's lives are subject to dinnertime narrative examination—and when and how such narration takes place.

Primary recipient

The narrative role of *primary recipient* is here defined as the co-narrator(s) to whom a narrative is predominantly oriented. This role is a powerful one in that it entitles the family member who assumes it to evaluate the narrative actions, thoughts, feelings, and conditions of family members as protagonists and/or as narrators. Anyone who recurrently occupies this position is instantiated as "family judge." As noted earlier, the introducer is critical to the assignment of primary recipient. In some cases, as in (1) and (2), the introducer designates another family member to be primary recipient; in other cases, as in (3), an introducer may select her- or himself:

(3) "Lucy's Swim Team Report" (excerpt)
f = father
l = Lucy (9;7)

f: (Your) mother said you were thinking of uh: - getting on the swim team?
l: ((nods yes once emphatically))
    (1.0)
f: ((nods yes)) - (good) ...

Our findings as to who was preferred for the role of primary recipient are displayed in Table 4:

TABLE 4. *Primary recipients: Which family members were most often selected (by self or other co-narrator) to be the primary recipients of these 100 narratives?*

Father	55	5-year-old child	10
Mother	40	Older sibling	9
		Younger sibling	2
Parents	95	> Children	21

Not surprising but nevertheless striking is the privileging of parents as primary recipients of dinnertime narratives. Out of a total of 116 designated primary recipients for the 100 narratives in our corpus, parents assumed that role 82% of the time (95 instances). Seen together with the findings of Tables 1 through 3, the overall pattern suggests a fundamental asymmetry in family narrative activity whereby children's lives are told to parents but by and large parents do not address their lives to their children. Within this privileging of parents, fathers are favored over mothers. While fathers often position themselves as primary recipients through their own elicitation of narratives, in some families mothers regularly nominate fathers as primary recipients through their narrative introductions such as in (1): *You wanna tell Daddy what happened to you today?*

This preference for fathers as primary recipients is partly accounted for by the fact that the father is often the person at the dinner table who knows least about children's daily lives. Typically, even those women who work outside the home arrive home earlier than their husbands and have more opportunity prior to dinnertime to hear about the events in their children's days. However, there are several reasons to see that lack of knowledge is an inadequate account for fathers' prominence as primary recipients. First, in two of the thirteen dinners in our corpus, where mothers knew less about their children's experiences that day than did fathers, we did not observe fathers nominating mothers as primary recipients of narratives about children (i.e., we did not find fathers saying, "Tell Mommy about ... "). This absence suggests that it is not simply lack of knowledge that determines primary-recipient selection. Second, child initiators oriented more narratives to mothers than to fathers in spite of the mothers' generally greater prior knowledge of children's lives. This finding is seen in Table 5, which shows the preferred recipients of the narratives initiated by each family member:

TABLE 5. *Who addresses whom?: Who was the primary recipient of the narratives initiated by each family member?*

Initiator	Primary recipient		
Mother (39)	Father (33) >	Children (10) >	Self (2)
Children (36)	Mother (22) ≥	Father (19) >	Sibling (3)
Father (25)	Mother (16) >	Children (6) >	Self (3)

This table indicates that it is not children, then, who account for the relatively strong showing of fathers as primary recipients, despite mothers' classic "Tell Daddy ... " elicitations. Rather, it is mothers (as initiators, in addition to their role in eliciting children to initiate toward fathers) who are largely responsible for putting fathers in this position. Mothers initiated twice as many narratives oriented toward fathers (33) as fathers initiated toward mothers (16).

We have noted above that narrative introducers exert control by designating primary recipients, but here we emphasize that at the same time, such a designation passes control (the power to evaluate, reframe, etc.) to the co-narrator who assumes

the role of primary recipient. This role is potentially critical to the narrative reconstruction of "Father knows best," given the opportunity it affords co-narrators to take on a panopticon-like role (Bentham 1791 in Foucault 1979). *Panopticon* refers to an 'all-seeing eye' or monitoring gaze that keeps subjects under the constant purview of the panopticon (e.g., a prison guard in a watchtower). We suggest that a narrative similarly exposes a protagonist to the surveillance of other co-narrators, especially to the scrutiny of the designated primary recipient (see Ochs & Taylor 1992b).

Tables 1 through 5 present an overall picture of the way in which narrative activity serves to put mothers, fathers, and children into a politics of asymmetry. In the family context, issues of gender and power cannot be looked at as simply dyadic, e.g., men versus women as haves versus have-nots. Rather, women and men manifest asymmetries of power not only dyadically as spouses but also triadically as mothers and fathers with children. While there are interesting observations here regarding women versus men (e.g., women tend to raise narrative topics, men tend to be positioned—often by women—to evaluate them), these apparently gender-based distinctions are part of a triadic interaction wherein children are often the subjects of narrative moves. Control exerted by both women and men is not limited to control over one another, but particularly encompasses and impacts children.

Problematizer/problematizee

The narrative role of *problematizer* is here defined as the co-narrator who renders an action, condition, thought, or feeling of a protagonist or co-narrator problematic or possibly problematic. The role of *problematizee* is defined as the co-narrator whose action, condition, thought, or feeling is rendered problematic or possibly problematic.

An action, condition, thought, or feeling may be problematized on several grounds. For example, it may be treated as *untrue*, *incredible*, or *doubtful*, as when in (1) the father problematizes Jodie's narrative with mock disbelief (*no, couldn't be*, and *I don't believe it*). In other cases, the action, etc. is problematized because it has or had *negative ramifications* (e.g., it is deemed *thoughtless* or *perilous*), as when in (2) Molly implicitly problematizes her husband as thoughtless for not warning her about the broken chair (*Oh you knew that it was split?*). We also see in (2) how an action, etc. may be problematized on other grounds, namely as a *sign of incompetence*. When Patrick indicts his wife's weight as the cause of the chair's breaking, he is implicitly problematizing her for lack of self-control (*That's (a) rea:l si:gn? that you need to go on a di:?et.*). In (4), Patrick again problematizes his wife, this time as a too-lenient boss and thus as incompetent in her workplace as well as in her personal life:

(4) "Molly's Job Story" (excerpt)

    m =   mother (Molly)
    f =   father (Patrick)

Near the end of a story about Molly's hiring a new assistant at work:

f: ((eating dessert)) Well - I certainly think that - you're a- you know you're a fair bo?ss - You've been working there how long?
m: Fifteen years in June ((as she scrapes dishes at kitchen sink))
f: Fifteen years - and you got a guy ((turns to look directly at Molly as he continues)) that's been workin there a few weeks? and you do (it what) the way he wants.
m: hh ((laughs))
(0.6) ((Patrick smiles slightly?, then turns back to eating his dessert))
m: It's not a matter of my doin it the way he: wa:nts - it does help that I'm getting more work done It's just that I'm workin too hard? I don't wanta work so hard
f: ((rolls chair around to face Molly halfway)) Well - you're the bo:ss It's up to you to set the standards

A further grounds for problematizing is on the basis that an action, thought, feeling, or condition is *out-of-bounds*, e.g., *unfair, rude, excessive*. In (5), Dan problematizes his wife for her wasteful consumption (*You had a dress right?, (Doesn't that sound like a - helluva/total) - waste?*) and for her lack of consideration toward his mother (*Why did you let my mom get you something (that you) ... , Oh she just got it for you?*):

(5) "Patricia's Dress Story" (Round 2 of two-round story)

    m = mother (Patricia)
    f = father (Dan)

Round 2 ((begins after Patricia hangs up phone and sits at table))

f: So as you were saying?
m: (What was I/As I was) saying ((turning abruptly to face Dan)) What was I telling you
f: I ?don't? know
m: oh about the ?dress?
f: (the) dress
(1.2) ((Patricia is drinking water; Dan looks at her, then back at his plate, then at her again))
f: You had a dress right?
m: ((slightly nodding yes once)) Your mother (bought me it/wanted me to) - (My mother didn't like it)
(0.4) ((facing Dan, Patricia tilts head slightly, as if to say, "What could I do?"))
f: ((shaking head no once)) You're kidding
m: no
f: You gonna return it?
m: No you can't return it - it wasn't too expensive - it was from Loehmann's
(0.8)
m: so what I'll probably do? - is wear it to the dinner the night before - when we go to the (Marriott)?
(1.8) ((Dan turns head away from Patricia with a grimace, as if he is debating whether he is being conned, then turns back and looks off))
f: (Doesn't that sound) like a - (helluva/total) - w:aste?
m: no?:
f: no

m: ((with hands out, shaking head no)) It wasn't even that expensive
(1.2)
m: ((shaking head no, facing Dan)) even if it were a complete waste
(0.4) ((Dan looks down at plate, bobs head to right and to left as if weighing logic, not convinced))
m: but it's not. ((looking away from Dan))
(0.6) ((Patricia looks outside, then back to Dan))
m: (but the one) my mom got me is grea:t -
              [
             ((Dan picks food off son's plate next to him))
m: It's (attractive-looking/a practical dress)
f: ((gesturing with palm up, quizzical)) (Well why did) you have - Why did you let my mom get you something (that you-)
m: Your mo:ther bought it - I hh-
f: Oh she just got it for you?
m: ((nodding yes)) (yeah)
f: You weren't there?
m: I was there (and your mother said "No no It's great Let me buy it for you") - I didn't ask her to buy it for me?
(5.0) ((kids outside talking; Dan is eating more food off son's plate))
f: So they're fighting over who gets you things?
m: ((nods yes slightly)) - ((smiling to Dan)) tch - (cuz I'm/sounds) so wonderful
(9.0) ((Patricia turns to look outside; she blows her nose))

In the 100 narratives in our corpus, exactly 50 of them involved someone problematizing a family member at the dinner table. Table 6 displays which family members tended most often to take on the very powerful role of problematizer and whom they tended to target:

TABLE 6. *Problematizer versus problematizee: Which family members tended to be problematizers and which tended to be problematizees?*

	Problematizer		Problematizee
Father	116	>	67
Mother	80	=	84
Children	33	<	78
	—		—
	229		229
	F > M > Ch		M > Ch > F

Here we see that our above illustrations of problematizing (Examples 1, 2, 4, and 5)—wherein fathers were the problematizers—are representative of a significant overall finding that fathers assumed this role 50% as often as mothers and 3.5 times as often as children. Fathers are thus narratively defined much more often as problematizers than as problematizees, while mothers are as often problematizees as problematizers, and children are narratively defined predominantly as problematizees. In fathers' preeminence in this role we see a narrative instantiation of "Father knows best." Table 6 evidences one manifestation

of this ideology, namely "Father problematizes most."
Table 7 displays which family members were targeted by problematizers:

TABLE 7. *Who problematizes whom?: Who was the preferred target of each family member in their role as problematizer?*

Problematizer	Problematizee		
Father (116)	Mother	(67)	= 57.8%
	Child	(39)	= 33.6%
	Self	(10)	= 8.6%
Mother (80)	Father	(42)	= 52.5%
	Child	(28)	= 35.0%
	Self	(10)	= 12.5%
Children (33)	Father	(15)	= 45.5%
	Sibling	(9)	= 27.3%
	Mother	(7)	= 21.2%
	Self	(2)	= 6.1%

This table shows that the bulk of narrative problematizing occurred between spouses. Of the 84 problematizings of mothers (seen in Table 6), Table 7 shows that 67 (or 80%) of them came from their husbands. In fact, we see here that the targeting of women by husbands represents the largest category of problematizings in our corpus of narratives. While women also problematized spouses, men did so 60% as often, and in addition to this overall quantitative difference were differences in the nature of women's versus men's problematizations. Table 8 reveals a distinction in spouses' use of two domains of problematizing: problematizing of someone's actions, thoughts, feelings, or conditions (in the past) as a protagonist, and problematizing of someone's comments (in the present) as a co-narrator. The latter category includes counter-problematizing in self-defense as a response to an "attack" from a prior problematizer (here, the spouse):

TABLE 8. *Cross-spouse problematizing: To what extent did wives and husbands problematize their spouse's behavior as protagonists versus problematizing their spouse's dinnertime comments on narrative events?*

Problematizer of spouse	Focus of spouse-problematizing	
	As protagonist	As co-narrator
Husband (67)	53.7% (36)	46.3% (31)
Wife (42)	33.3% (14)	66.7% (28)

Table 8 indicates that husbands criticized the actions, thoughts, feelings, and conditions of wives as protagonists far more often than wives problematized husbands (36 times versus 14 times). Figuring largely in husbands' problematizing of wives as protagonists is the targeting of the wife on grounds of incompetence, as

exemplified in (4), "Molly's Job Story." In our corpus, wives did not problematize husbands on the basis of incompetence as protagonists; in fact, wives relatively infrequently problematized their spouses as protagonists at all but rather problematized the latter's remarks in the course of dinnertime narrative activity. Much of wives' problematizing of their husbands was of the counter-problematizing type, either in self-defense or in defense of their children. In other words, fathers would target what mothers had done in reported events and then mothers, as co-narrators, would refute the fathers' comments. Men's problematizing was of the type "You shouldn't have done X," while women's problematizing was more a form of resistance, a way to say, "No, that's not the way it happened," "Your interpretation is wrong," "You don't see the context," etc. One implication of this pattern is that women, because they are mostly targeted for their past actions, etc. as protagonists, may get the impression that they cannot *do* anything right (and may wind up defending past actions, as seen in the "Molly's Job" and "Patricia's Dress" stories), whereas men, because they are targeted more for their comments, may get the impression that they can't *say* anything right.

Fathers' preeminence as problematizers is further seen in the fact that they problematized their spouses over a much wider range of narrative topics than did mothers. Mothers' actions, conditions, thoughts, and feelings were open to fathers' criticism in narratives about not just childcare, recreation, and meal preparation, but even their professional lives. Narratives about the men's work days, however, were exceedingly rare and virtually never problematized. This asymmetry, wherein fathers have or are given "problematizing rights" over a wider domain of their spouses' experiences than are mothers, further exemplifies how narrative activity at dinner may instantiate and socialize a "Father-knows-best" world view.

Given this strong evidence of fathers' presumption to quantitative and qualitative dominance as problematizers par excellence, an important issue to raise is the extent to which fathers' prominence as problematizers is related to—or can be accounted for by—fathers' role as primary recipients. We look in Table 9 to see to what extent being primary recipient might account for being problematizer as well:

TABLE 9. *Recipients as problematizers: To what extent was the role of problematizer a function of being primary recipient?*

Primary recipient	Problematizer			
	Father	Mother	Children	Total
Father (55)	86 (1.6)*	54	15	155 (2.8)*
Mother (40)	24	22 (.55)*	17	63 (1.6)*
Children (21)	6	4	1 (.05)*	11 (0.5)*
	116	80	33	229

* Asterisked figures in parentheses represent an average number of problematizings per narrative; e.g., fathers problematized 86 times across 55 narratives in which they were primary recipient, or 1.6 times per narrative.

Clearly there is a strong link between fathers' being chief problematizers and preferred primary recipients: 86 of their 116 problematizings occurred when they were primary recipients of the narrative. However, several other findings in Table 9 suggest that primary recipientship is an incomplete account of assumption of the role of problematizer. First, fathers are exploiting the primary recipient role to problematize to a far greater extent than any other family member. While fathers as primary recipients problematized a family member 1.6 times per narrative, mothers as primary recipients did so only 0.55 times per narrative, and children only 0.05 times per narrative. Thus, recipient status alone is not sufficient to account for the practice of problematizing. An important element is the response of each family member as primary recipient: fathers display, or perhaps are allowed to display, a predilection for panopticon-like problematizing which is not characteristic of other family members. This pattern suggests a conceptualization of recipientship which differentiates mothers, fathers, and children, perhaps involving differential entitlements to problematize, with fathers in privileged positions.

Table 9 also provides other bases for questioning the notion that being primary recipient might account for being a problematizer. For one thing, fathers problematized more often than mothers even when mothers were the primary recipients (24 versus 22 times). Furthermore, looking across the top line of Table 9, we see that the total amount of problematizing went up when the father was primary recipient. Of the 229 problematizings in the corpus, 155 occurred when the father was primary recipient, averaging 2.8 problematizings per narrative, considerably more than when either the mother or the children were primary recipients (1.6 per narrative and 0.5 per narrative, respectively). As already suggested in the discussion of Table 8, this heightened level of overall problematization occurred largely because the father's problematizing of the mother prompted a rise in her own problematizing of him, with the result that mothers problematized much more often when fathers were primary recipients (54 times) than when mothers themselves were primary recipients (only 22 times). These findings suggest that the explanation that the primary recipient becomes problematizer is too simplistic an account; rather, our findings suggest that something in the nature and practice of the family role of father (the ideology that "Father knows best") is turning up in the narrative role of problematizer, something which goes beyond, though it is augmented by, recipientship status.

Because an important issue we are pursuing here is mothers' role in establishing a "Father-knows-best" (e.g., "Father-problematizes-most") dynamic at the family dinner table and because we have seen that mothers' most notable narrative role is that of introducer, we examine the introducer-problematizer relationship in Table 10 to discover in particular the extent to which fathers' problematizings occurred in narratives introduced by mothers:

TABLE 10. *Introducer/problematizer interaction: How was being a problematizer related to who introduced the narrative?*

Introducer	# of narratives problematized	Problematizer			
		Father	Mother	Children	Total
Mother (39)	24	72 (1.8)*	55 (1.4)*	6	133 (3.4)*
Father (32)	14	38 (1.2)*	15 (0.5)*	12	65 (2.0)*
Children (29)	12	6	10	15 (0.5)*	31 (1.1)*
	50	116	80	33	229

* Asterisked figures in parentheses represent an average number of problematizings per narrative.

Table 10 provides evidence that mothers' introductions may indeed trigger fathers' problematizations. First, note that when mothers introduce narratives, problematizing in general is more prevalent than when fathers or children are introducers. Out of 39 narratives introduced by mothers, 24 (or 62%) included at least one instance of problematizing by a family member; in contrast, only 14 of the narratives (44%) introduced by fathers and 12 (41%) by children evidenced problematizing of a family member. In addition, in narratives introduced by mothers, family members were problematized 3.4 times per narrative, considerably more than for narratives introduced by fathers (2.0) or children (1.1). Second, Table 10 indicates that the majority of fathers' problematizings (72 out of 116) occurred in narratives introduced by mothers. Fathers problematized other family members 1.8 times per narrative in narratives introduced by mothers, i.e., even more times per narrative than when fathers were primary recipients (1.6, as seen in Table 9). Furthermore, fathers problematized more often in narratives introduced by mothers than in narratives they introduced themselves (1.2 times per narrative). This high number of problematizations in narratives introduced by one's spouse is not matched by mothers: mothers problematized only 0.5 times per narrative in narratives introduced by fathers. Thus, we see an asymmetrical pattern wherein mothers' raising a topic seems to promote fathers' problematizing but not the reverse. Finally, in Table 11, we consider the impact of mothers' introductions on family members as *targets* of problematization, particularly the extent to which a mother is problematized by family members in the course of a narrative she herself has introduced:

TABLE 11. *Introducer/problematizee interaction: How was being a target of problematizing related to who introduced the narrative?*

Introducer	Problematizee			
	Mother	Children	Father	Total
Mother (39)	63 (1.6)*	32 (0.8)*	38 (1.0)*	133
Father (32)	15 (0.5)*	28 (0.9)*	22 (0.7)*	65
Children (29)	6 (0.2)*	18 (0.6)*	7 (0.2)*	31
	84	78	67	229

* Asterisked figures in parentheses represent average problematizings per narrative.

Here is striking evidence that mothers may be setting themselves up for problematization. Mothers were problematized most often in the very narratives they introduced: of the 84 instances where the mother was targeted, 63 (or 75%) occurred in narrative activity she herself instigated. On average, mothers were targeted 1.6 times per narrative in the narratives they introduced. These figures contrast markedly with those for fathers: out of 67 targetings of fathers, only 22 (or 33%) occurred in narratives they themselves had introduced; in these narratives, they were targeted an average of only 0.7 times per narrative. These findings suggest that mothers are especially vulnerable to exposing themselves to criticism, particularly from fathers, and thus may be "shooting themselves in the foot" by bringing up narratives in the first place, as illustrated in (2), the "Broken Chair Story," where Molly's designation (i.e., control) of narrative topic and primary recipient boomerangs in an explicit attack on her weight. In (1), "Jodie's TB Shots Report," we also see how mothers' introductions can expose their children to problematization from fathers.

CONCLUSION

Synthesizing these findings, we can construe a commonplace scenario of narrative activity at family dinners in which (a) mothers introduce narratives (about themselves and their children) that set up fathers as primary recipients (and implicitly sanction them as evaluators of others' actions, thoughts, conditions, and feelings); (b) fathers turn such opportunity spaces into forums for problematizing, with mothers themselves as their chief targets, very often on grounds of incompetence; and (c) mothers respond in defense of themselves and their children via counter-problematizing of fathers' evaluative comments. In (a), we see mothers' narrative locus of power; in (b), however, we see that such exercise of power is ephemeral and may even be self-destructive by giving fathers a platform for monitoring and judging wives and children. In (c), we see mothers' attempts to reclaim control over the narratives they originally put on the table. In conclusion, we suggest that "Father knows best"—a sociohistorically and politically rooted gender ideology that has been explicitly and implicitly contested in recent years—is alive and well and in considerable evidence at the family dinner table, jointly constituted and recreated each interactional moment through the narrative practices of both mothers and fathers. In this paper, we hope to have raised awareness of the degree to which women as wives and mothers contribute to a "Father-knows-best" ideology through their own recurrent narrative practices.

NOTES

investigator Elinor Ochs, research assistants Patrick Gonzales, Sally Jacoby, and Carolyn Taylor.)
2. All family-member names used in the transcript excerpts and throughout this paper are pseudonyms. Transcription conventions are those of conversation analysis (cf. Schenkein 1978) with some modifications, notably the use of double question marks as in example 1, *Did you go to the ?animal hospital?*, to show rising plus stressed intonation on the word(s) bounded by the questions marks.

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Clarence Thomas and the survival of sexual harassment

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The publicity surrounding the Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill case is an interesting example of the co-optation of the vocabulary of an oppositional discourse. Co-optation functions to take advantage of the fact that the vocabulary of the co-opted language is recognizable and elicits powerful emotional responses. However, with the issue of co-optation a shift occurs in what sorts of issues should elicit such responses. In an interview with *People* magazine on November 11, 1991, Virginia Thomas reclaims the voice of victim on behalf of Clarence Thomas. She claims the role of victim for him. In this interview, there is a shift from sexual harassment or sexual violence eliciting such emotional responses to the accusation of sexual harassment eliciting such responses.

Here is a case where the issue of sexual harassment has been politicized or problematized. Women have always been fighting sexual harassment, yet as a subordinate group they have never had the power to politicize the issue in the same way that a relatively small number of white men were able to do in a matter of days during the hearings. Likewise, black women have not been able to politicize the issue of harassment in the same way that Virginia Thomas is able to do as a white woman married to a black man. Virginia Thomas is able effectively to argue the victimization and innocence of Clarence Thomas through the aura of wifery and the privilege she has as a white woman.

The *People* interview is what Valerie Smith, in her essay "Split Affinities: The Case of Interracial Rape," has called a "bordercase," an issue that

> challenges the binary logic that governs the social and intellectual systems within which we live and work. ... "bordercases" are precisely those issues that problematize easy assumptions about racial and/or sexual difference, particularly insofar as they demonstrate the interaction between race and gender. (1990:272)

This article in *People* is a specific arena of contestation and intersection of race and gender. There are many discourses that are operational in the shaping of this bordercase. First, both Clarence Thomas and Anita Hill are black, while Virginia Thomas is white. Each is surrounded and constructed by certain stereotypes and discourses. Valerie Smith argues that white women have been constructed as "the forbidden fruit, the untouchable property, the ultimate symbol of white male power" (1990:273). She also argues that accusations of interracial rape were used to legitimate lynching and other forms of random violence against black men. As white women are constructed as the forbidden fruit and black men as rapists, black women are constructed as sexually promiscuous. She says, "The same ideology that protected white male property rights by constructing black males as rapists, constructed black women as sexually voracious. If black women were understood

always to be available and willing, then the rape of a black woman becomes a contradiction in terms" (190:275). Angela Davis, in *Women, Race, and Class*, writes:

> The fictional image of Black man as rapist has always strengthened its inseparable companion: the image of the Black woman as chronically promiscuous. For once the notion is accepted that Black men harbor irresistible and animal-like sexual urges, the entire race is invested with bestiality. ... Viewed as "loose women" and whores, Black women's cries of rape would necessarily lack legitimacy. (1983:182)

The sexual harassment of a black woman, by either a white or a black man, will also be a contradiction in terms and any such claim or accusation of harassment will lack legitimacy.

There is a differential value of women's bodies in a society such as ours. Angela Davis argues that rape laws were originally framed to protect the property of white men, i.e., to protect the forbidden fruit that is white woman. Because white women's bodies are constructed as pure and chaste, these bodies are considered more valuable than those that are constructed as being invested with bestiality. Valerie Smith says that "crimes against less-valuable women—women of color, working class women, and lesbians, for example—mean less or mean differently than those against white women from the middle and upper classes" (1990:276). As there is this differential value of women's bodies, there is also a differential value of women's voices. A black woman's voice used to accuse any man of harassment will lack authority and legitimacy. But a white woman's voice used to defend a black man accused of sexual harassment will carry authority.

Another set of discourses that is operational in this bordercase are those discourses that surround and create the values of marriage and the sanctity of the family. Virginia Thomas is a married woman who is defending the character of her husband while Anita Hill is an unmarried woman. The majority of the pictures in the article are of the Thomases' two-storied wood-frame house in Kingstowne, Virginia. The reader is presented with visual images of Clarence and Virginia Thomas sitting together on a couch reading a bible or sitting together on the floor looking at what appears to be a photo album. Virginia and Clarence Thomas present themselves as a family invested with certain traditional values. By focusing on Virginia the wife, we also focus on Clarence Thomas as the husband and family man. Anita Hill, on the other hand, is not married. She is a single working woman with a career that is important to her. She cannot wrap herself in the aura of wifery as Virginia Thomas does. Because she is a single woman, her life and the choices she has made are open to a variety of speculations and judgments from which Virginia Thomas is immune. Why hasn't Anita Hill married? Is there something wrong with her? Why doesn't she want to be a mother? Why does she put her career first? Implicit in each of these questions is a judgment that Anita Hill isn't as valuable as Virginia Thomas because she is not fulfilling the expectations of a woman to be a wife, a mother, or both. Anita Hill is constructed as less valuable in a double sense—she is both a black woman and an unmarried woman.

Having set out some of the discourses that are operational and surround the interview, I want now to focus on its actual text. The cover story of this issue of

People is the exclusive story of how Virginia Thomas and her husband Clarence were able to survive the Senate confirmation hearings and the charges of sexual harassment. The headline on the cover of the magazine screams, "HOW WE SURVIVED." What is particularly interesting and quite horrifying is the language used in the article. The language has been completely co-opted from those groups of women and feminists who have been fighting for years to bring the issues of sexual abuse and sexual violence to light. This *People* magazine article is a study in the co-optation of a vocabulary of an oppositional discourse. An examination of how the language is used in the article makes clear that the appropriation of language works in such a way as to change what is fundamentally at issue.

The story itself is filled with all the right language for use when discussing issues of sexual abuse or violence: *breaking silence, speaking out, surviving, empowerment,* and *telling her story*. These words and phrases have been particularly powerful for women who have been sexually abused or harassed. The term *survivor* is a relatively new word in our vocabulary. Laura Davis, in *The Courage to Heal Workbook*, says:

> The word "survivor" refers to adults who were sexually abused as children. This is a conscious choice. Much of the early literature on abuse referred exclusively to the "victims" of abuse. In *The Courage to Heal* we decided to use the word "survivor" because it gives more of a sense of strength and empowerment. "Victims" are the abused children who are murdered, who commit suicide, who end up in the back wards of hospitals. (1990:3)

Another phrase that is found in the literature about sexual abuse is *healing process*. The healing process happens in certain recognizable stages which do not take place in any particular order. There are some universal themes, according to Davis, that do emerge: "deciding to heal, remembering the abuse, believing it happened, knowing it wasn't your fault, getting in touch with anger and grief, talking about the abuse, and finally, moving on" (1990:3). Breaking silence and speaking about the dirty and shameful thing that happened to you is essential. Breaking silence is about you telling your own story. Getting the secret into the light of day is imperative to overcoming the shame. It is shame that keeps people silent.

Being in this healing process is extremely difficult, but it can also be incredibly empowering. Instead of letting a dirty secret control you and affect every aspect of your life, you can take control of your life and break the awful patterns that have kept you subordinate, devastated, and incapacitated. The survivor is a woman who has been sexually abused or harassed but who has started on this healing process which will empower her.

In the *People* interview, we are confronted with the same phrases that run throughout the literature on sexual abuse. The meanings and messages in the magazine article are radically different from the meanings and messages that are found in *The Courage to Heal* or *I Never Told Anyone: Writing by Women Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse*. But this very same vocabulary has been co-opted by Virginia Thomas and by a highly popular weekly magazine. The story that Virginia and Clarence Thomas have to tell is not like any of the stories in *I Never Told Anyone*. Clarence and Virginia Thomas are survivors of the

accusations of sexual harassment. They are speaking out and telling the story of their ordeal of having been accused. All of a sudden, Clarence and Virginia Thomas are the survivors. Anita Hill is in the picture only as either a vindictive frustrated borderline crazy woman or as a mere political pawn.

It is worthwhile to look at some of the quotations from the story in order to see how the language is appropriated and how this appropriation causes the shift to perceiving and constructing Clarence Thomas as the victim. Virginia Thomas says at one point, "I want to tell people about what we went through, even if Clarence can't" (108). People who have been badly abused often lose their ability to communicate or to talk about what happened because it was so traumatic. Virginia Thomas is implying that what happened to Clarence Thomas was so traumatic that he has lost his voice. The trauma is that Clarence Thomas was *accused* of harassment. What is erased are the traumatic effects that harassment had on Anita Hill. The trauma suffered by Anita Hill is no longer the issue. The traumatic effects that result from harassment are not those suffered by the one harassed but those that result from having been accused of harassment.

Valerie Smith and Angela Davis have argued that black women's cries of rape or harassment lack legitimacy and that it is contradictory to say that a woman who is always sexually available can be raped. Because Anita Hill as a black woman is constructed in this way, there are no traumatic effects. The argument would be that Anita Hill cannot suffer from the traumatic effects of something that could never happen to her.

Virginia Thomas also says of Clarence, "I could tell he was killing himself inside, searching to figure out why she would do this" (110). Later she says, "I don't think he wanted to see this person he had a great deal of admiration for saying these things" (112). Many times in instances of sexual abuse or sexual violence, the abuser is someone who is known and trusted by the abused. The one who is abused is left to question herself—what did I do to bring this about? When the abuser is someone who is loved or trusted by the victim, the abuse becomes a more complex issue because there may be some "positive" or "good" feelings that are connected to the abuse. Maybe the only time the child received any attention was during abuse. Maybe the child sought out the affection or closeness that in some sense felt good. Maybe the abuser was an important and admired person in our life. We cannot bring ourselves to believe that someone so important to us would do anything to hurt us.

Clarence Thomas is wondering this same thing about Anita Hill—how could someone he so greatly admired commit such an awful deed against him? Clarence Thomas is left to question himself about how Anita Hill could possibly make an accusation of sexual harassment. Anita Hill becomes the one who has betrayed the trust; it is she who has committed an unspeakable act.

Virginia Thomas says that Clarence Thomas is a man who is completely intolerant of sexual harassment. She discloses in the interview that she herself was sexually harassed at work and that she has dealt with what happened to her. It is ironic that these therapeutic discourses are used to articulate an understanding of Clarence Thomas's experiences when Virginia Thomas has herself been harassed. She says:

What makes this whole Anita Hill thing so bizarre is that I was once sexually harassed at work—before I met Clarence. And for what that man did to me, I think Clarence could have killed him. It wasn't verbal harassment, it was physical. It was something that I had put way down in the recesses of my mind, but to Clarence it was so disgusting, something that always bothered him when I told him. ... How could all this happen to a man who is so intolerant of sexual harassment? (110-11)

Virginia Thomas represents Clarence Thomas as a man outraged by the notion of any woman's being sexually harassed. She seems to be arguing that it would be impossible for a man so intolerant of sexual harassment to be a harasser—that Clarence Thomas is not like those other men who tolerate sexual harassment or who themselves harass. She also offers her opinions on Anita Hill: "And what's scary about her allegations is that they remind me of the movie 'Fatal Attraction' or, in her case, what I call the fatal assistant. In my heart, I always believed she was probably someone in love with my husband and never got what she wanted" (111). Virginia Thomas, by alluding to the movie "Fatal Attraction" and apparently to the character played by Glenn Close, portrays Anita Hill as a vindictive crazy woman who will go to any lengths to get the man she cannot have. (This interpretation of the Glenn Close character would probably be the one made by the vast majority of the people who saw the movie. It was certainly how the movie was promoted.) In the movie, the character played by Michael Douglas becomes the victim who is stalked by an irrational (and therefore less than fully human) woman. Virginia Thomas characterizes Anita Hill as the same sort of crazy irrational woman bent on revenge. Anita Hill is not fully rational and she is blinded by jealousy, frustration, or both. As the Glenn Close character goes after the innocent family man, Anita Hill goes after Clarence Thomas, who is now represented as the victim of a crazy woman's accusations and actions.

When describing the day when Clarence Thomas was to read his statement to the congressional committee, Virginia Thomas says that "we went in loaded for bear because we were angry and empowered" (112). Naomi Scheman, in her essay "Anger and the Politics of Naming" (1980), discusses how women can come to learn that they are angry or have been angry. Learning to name your anger or saying, "I'm angry. I'm not premenstrual. I'm not being overly sensitive or hysterical. I am not imagining things. I'm angry," is an empowering experience, especially for women who have not been able to recognize and express their anger in productive ways. Marilyn Frye, in "A Note on Anger" (1983), discusses the lack of uptake of women's anger. Women's anger is not taken seriously, especially in those realms that are beyond the domestic. And even in the domestic realm, only in certain areas of the house is a woman's anger acceptable. Being angry about a situation is making a judgment about it. Being angry is taking the power and privilege of saying, "I have been wronged in some way."

Clarence Thomas was angered and his anger was empowering him. It seems to me that men's anger has always been about power—exercising it, expressing it, reinforcing it. But Clarence Thomas has been disempowered by these charges of sexual harassment; he has been abused, battered, and raked over the coals by these unfair allegations. Clarence Thomas is angry that he has been so badly wronged.

His anger motivates him. His anger empowers him and carries authority. The anger that is at issue in sexual harassment now is the anger of the accused at having been accused. Anita Hill's anger at having been harassed is not the anger at issue.

Virginia Thomas ends the exclusive interview with *People* magazine with:

> I am coming forward to thank everyone who believed in Clarence ... I also hope we have set a new low, that Americans in their outrage can say, "No, there is a level at which it is disgusting, horrible, and wrong." And if the Senate's not going to stand up for what is right and wrong, then American people have to. Enough is enough. (116)

What is the outrage concerned with? I do not deny that Clarence Thomas was right to be outraged by what he called electronic lynching. Virginia Thomas, and all of us, ought to be angered by this as well. He was absolutely right to rail against the stereotype of black male as rapist. But as Valerie Smith and Angela Davis have argued, there is a companion stereotype to black male as rapist and that is black woman as promiscuous, as having a less valuable body than a white woman. These stereotypes invest the black race with bestiality, and Clarence Thomas was right to be naming and fighting against them. But in the process of fighting against the stereotype of black men, the stereotype of black women was reinforced. As a man, Clarence Thomas has the authority and anger to say, "I am not like that." As a white woman who is married to Clarence Thomas, Virginia Thomas has the authority and privilege to say, "Clarence is not like that." But Anita Hill's voice to define herself apart from the stereotype is either absent or silenced.

Virginia Thomas says that she hopes that we have set a new low and that we cannot sink any further. Yes, Virginia, I hope that this exclusive interview in *People* has set the lowest of lows.

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Gender-dependent pitch levels:
A comparative study in Japanese and English[1]

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INTRODUCTION

Anatomy, psychology, and pitch

There are anatomically based differences between the female and male voice. There are differences, for example, in the size of the vocal tract, which result in different pitches.[2] Men typically have larger vocal tracts with longer vocal cords and thus produce sounds that are lower in pitch than those produced by women. However, linguists have observed that the gap in terms of pitch levels between the genders is greater than what would be expected from the difference in the size of their vocal tracts alone (e.g., Mattingly 1966; Sachs, Lieberman, & Erikson 1973). The Japanese language provides an interesting research ground with respect to pitch phenomena that go beyond biological expectations because the dichotomy between women's and men's language is far more salient than in many other languages. The purpose of this study is to explore questions related to gender variations in pitch in Japanese and to shed some light on the role that cultural expectations play in determining pitch. More specifically, it attempts to show that Japanese females use a higher pitch when they speak in Japanese than when they speak in English and to give a sociolinguistic interpretation to the findings.

The notion that the most noticeable difference between adult female and male speech is the pitch of the voice cannot be doubted. It is usually not difficult to distinguish speech produced by a female from that produced by a male based on acoustic differences. Obviously, there are anatomically based differences that contribute to the production of relatively different pitches between the two sexes. The pitch is controlled by the larynx and is proportional to the frequency of the vibration of the vocal cords. The greater the frequency, the higher the pitch, and the smaller the frequency, the lower the pitch. Generally, men have longer vocal cords which vibrate more slowly and thus produce lower frequencies. Females, having shorter vocal cords, which produce a higher frequency, have voices higher in pitch. In this paper, the focus is on determining whether perceived sex variations in Japanese pitch can be demonstrated mechanically.

It has been claimed by scholars that neither females nor males utilize the full range of pitch they are capable of producing in speech (Mattingly 1966; Sachs et al, 1973). As early as 1966, Mattingly claimed that the acoustic differences between the adult female and the adult male voice cannot be accounted for by anatomical differences alone. In addition, there have been several studies displaying the differences between physiologically and sociologically determined pitch. Sachs et

al., who had their subjects listen to the recorded speech of female and male children, state that their subjects were able to tell the sex of children based on acoustic differences. There was no physical basis for female and male children necessarily producing different pitches because they were deliberately matched for size and they had not yet reached secondary sexual dimorphism. They speculated that "the children could be learning culturally determined patterns that are viewed as appropriate for each sex" (1973:80). The results of these studies clearly indicate that the acoustic differences between female and male voices cannot be completely explained by the physiological differences.

Female and male speech in Japanese

The distinguishing characteristics of female and male speech in the Japanese language have been studied by various scholars. Shibamoto states that "linguists characterize Japanese as special by virtue of having a 'true' women's language" (1985:171). This idea is elaborated by others (e.g., Reynolds 1986) who contend that women's language and men's language are psychologically quite real to the Japanese because the Japanese language has many sex-exclusive or almost sex-exclusive differences. Given that Japanese makes syntactic and lexical distinctions between female and male language to a greater degree than many other languages, it can be speculated that the same kind of distinction also occurs in pitch phenomena.

HYPOTHESIS

I hypothesize that native Japanese speakers modify their pitch level when speaking in Japanese relative to when they speak in English: specifically, Japanese females will tend to raise their pitch when speaking their native language, but not when speaking English. The problem is to separate anatomical factors from other factors such as attitudes and reactions toward the stereotyped expectation. However, using crosscultural data such as two languages can shed some light on the question. Additionally, the notion of Loveday (1986) that instrumental measurement of fundamental frequency, the frequency of the fundamental tone, is strongly associated with psychological perception of pitch, and the well-known finding, reported by Onishi (1981), among others, that fundamental frequency determines the pitch of a sound, were followed concerning the relationship between instrumental measurement of pitch and the psychological perception of pitch. The purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis on the basis of empirical data. I measured the fundamental frequencies of native speakers of Japanese (female and male) speaking in both languages. The findings supported the hypothesis: female subjects used significantly higher pitch when speaking in Japanese than in English.

METHOD

Subjects

All subjects for this experiment were native speakers of Japanese who were students of the University of Hawaii at Manoa during the time of the study. The subjects consisted of six females and six males. Their ages ranged from 21 to 31: 22 to 29 for females and 21 to 31 for males.[3] According to Curry (1940), the voice change occurs between 14 and 18 years of age; therefore, the male subjects were assumed to be past the stage of voice change.

Material

Subjects were asked to read ten English sentences and ten Japanese sentences. The English sentences were taken from the chapter concerning intonation patterns in *A Course in Phonetics* (Ladefoged 1982). The sentences chosen were used in the book to show differences in pitch and intonation contour in English. The Japanese sentences were the Japanese equivalents of the above (the translations were my own). Both the English sentences and the Japanese translations can be found in the appendix. The subjects were assured that the experiment was not designed to evaluate their English-speaking ability. They were asked to attempt to produce the sentences as naturally as possible.[4] Recordings took place at the phonetics laboratory at the University of Hawaii at Manoa.

The fundamental frequency of each individual's voice was measured by Visi-pitch 6087DS, which was manufactured by Kay Elemetrics Corp., Pine Brook, New Jersey.

RESULTS

The data shown in Table 1 indicate each speaker's overall frequency in Japanese and in English. One overall pitch level per speaker per language was obtained by calculating an average of the three highest points in a sentence and averaging them among ten sentences. Various statistical tests were performed in order to support inferences concerning average frequency both within groups (females and male groups independently) and across groups (between female and male groups).

Table 2 shows the difference in highest frequency, that is, the Japanese highest frequency minus the English highest frequency, for each individual. The range of overall frequency of each individual is indicated in Table 3.

TABLE 1. *Overall frequency (Hz)*

Subjects	English		Japanese	
	Highest	Lowest	Highest	Lowest
F1	260	151	276	175
F2	270	243	289	179
F3	231	178	256	177
F4	267	180	294	186
F5	230	160	269	175
F6	252	142	300	194
M1	136	85	128	83
M2	155	101	160	101
M3	124	109	133	100
M4	198	121	204	122
M5	148	113	142	110
M6	141	110	138	110

TABLE 2. *Difference in highest frequency (Hz)*

Japanese minus English			
F1	16	M1	-8
F2	19	M2	5
F3	25	M3	9
F4	27	M4	6
F5	39	M5	-6
F6	49	M6	-3

TABLE 3. *Range (Hz)*

	English	Japanese		English	Japanese
F1	109	101	M1	51	45
F2	27	10	M2	54	59
F3	53	79	M3	15	33
F4	87	108	M4	77	82
F5	70	94	M5	35	32
F6	110	106	M6	31	28

Statistics are given in Table 4, and the results of the statistical tests are summarized in Table 5. The tests are at a 95% certainty level.[5] The testing for statistical significance was done by following the procedures in *Elementary Applied Statistics* (Lentner 1972). The results of the tests are as follows:

TABLE 4. *Statistics (Hz)*

	Female	Male
Average df	29.0	0.5
Standard deviation	12.3	7.1

TABLE 5. *Results (95% certainty level)*

Participants	Results
Females	For females, the average frequency is at least 19 Hz. greater when speaking Japanese than English (df > 19 Hz).
Males	For males, there is no evidence that the average frequency is different across the two languages (df = 0).
dfm/dff	The df for females was at least 17 Hz greater than the df for males (dff—dfm > 17 Hz).

It is clear from the results of the experiment that female subjects employ higher pitch when they speak Japanese relative to the pitch used when speaking English. All of the female subjects employed a significantly higher pitch level when speaking in Japanese than when speaking in English. The differences in frequency between Japanese and English range from 19 Hz in the case of F1 to 48 Hz in the case of F6. In addition, the difference in highest and lowest pitch level within a language shows a different pattern. The range of pitch level in Japanese is much greater than that in English. On the other hand, the results in male subjects are somewhat mixed. For instance, subjects M1, M5, and M6 employed higher pitch and the other subjects employed lower pitch when speaking Japanese. However, the overall differences for male subjects are statistically insignificant. Based on casual observation, my impression had been that Japanese males generally employ lower pitch when they speak in Japanese; however, this point was not confirmed by my data.

DISCUSSION

The meaning of feminine pitch in Japanese

Assuming that subjects in this study are representative of native speakers of Japanese, there are a few things that can be said concerning the results. In order to understand why Japanese females employ higher overall average fundamental frequency when they speak their native language, the terms *sex* and *gender* must be distinguished. *The International Encyclopedia of Sociology* differentiates the two terms as follows: "Sex refers to biological males and females distinguished by reproductive organs. Gender refers to feminine and masculine attributes and social roles." It is clear from the results of this study that the differences in overall pitch levels cannot be adequately explained solely in terms of sex differences. Researchers have already attempted to explain the exaggerated gap between female

and male voices. McConnell-Ginet, for example, states that "intonation ... may well prove to be the chief linguistic expression of femininity and masculinity" (1978:542). Also, in a study of contrasting pitch in effeminate and masculine voices in American males, it was found that the voice which was perceived as effeminate had a wider pitch range than the voice which was perceived as masculine (Terango 1966). In addition, Moonwomon (1985) found that her heterosexual female subjects employed higher and also wider pitch range compared to their homosexual counterparts.

A conclusion may be that people modify their pitch in order to convey a particular image or to conform to stereotyped expectations prescribed by their society. In different societies, different values may be assigned to different pitches based on expectations and attitudes concerning the relationship between pitch and its significance for the speaker—and/or her or his gender—in the society. Each culture determines what is the appropriate pitch range for each gender; therefore, what is appropriate for the people of one culture may not be appropriate for the people of another. The differences in pitch between the two languages observed in this study may well reflect the conceptualization of gender roles in Japanese society. As noted by Pharr, in Japanese society the distinction between gender roles is sharper than in Western societies. Women have long been accorded a lower status than men and until the Second World War were expected to "show deference to men of their own as well as higher classes through the use of polite language and honorific forms of address, bowing more deeply than men, walking behind their husbands in public and in numerous other ways deferring to men" (1976:306).

It seems to follow that Japanese females adopt higher pitch in order to convey the impression of femininity when speaking in Japanese; however, this remains to be proven. The social expectation that the female should be *onna-rashiku* 'womanly' is much greater in the Japanese culture. A female speaker of Japanese is socialized in all behavioral patterns—linguistic and paralinguistic—to display a higher level of femininity. It seems that their socialization process extends into the use of their native language, where pitch has become another way to display a higher level of femininity. To conform to Japanese society's ideal of femininity is so crucially important for a female speaker that the feminine pattern of behavior becomes part of her personality. Displaying femininity is an automatic process in most cases. Controlling the larynx to produce higher-pitched sound may be a part of that automatic process. In view of the general trait that the gender-role distinction is sharper in Japanese society than in American culture, the fact that Japanese females use conspicuously higher pitch in speaking Japanese is not difficult to understand, but that does not explain why this phenomenon does not transfer over to their English speech. It can be speculated that when they speak Japanese, they tend to conform to the expectations of the Japanese culture whereas perhaps when they speak English they are free from those expectations.

Male speakers of Japanese

As for native speakers of Japanese who are male, pitch does not shift significantly across the two languages studied; it does not necessarily lower when they speak Japanese. There may be more than one reason for this. One of the reasons may be that they use the lowest level of pitch possible from the size of their vocal tract when they speak both Japanese and English because high pitch is stigmatized for male speakers in both societies. Another consideration may be that in Japanese society male gender is viewed as "unmarked"; therefore, Japanese males do not utilize pitch as a mode to separate themselves from the other gender. Japanese males may simply let Japanese females do the job of distinguishing themselves from the "unmarked" gender.

CONCLUSION

In this study, I have attempted to investigate the pitch of native speakers of Japanese across language and gender and to place the results in a sociolinguistic perspective. The hypothesis that female native speakers of Japanese employ higher relative pitches when speaking in Japanese than in English was supported by this study. From the data obtained, it was clear that Japanese females employ significantly higher pitch levels whereas Japanese males do not show a similar pattern. Speaking a different language apparently did not have any significant effect on male pitch variation. These findings are in accordance with the theory that the differences in overall pitch level cannot be adequately explained solely by the sex-differences. In Japanese society, the distinction between gender roles is sharper than in Western society. Society expects females to speak *onna-rashiku* 'womanly' and use *onna kotoba* 'women's language', which includes "feminine" pitch as well as "feminine" patterns at other linguistic levels.

FURTHER STUDIES

In this study, I have focused on the acoustic nature of speech; however, the twofold characteristic of speech, production and perception, should not be ignored. I am incorporating auditory phonetics, perception of pitch, into this study, and elaborating Loveday's (1986) notion of the relation between fundamental frequency and psychological perception of pitch. More precisely, I would like to answer the question: what intrinsic value does the feminine pitch of Japanese have in relation to its social structure? I am in the process of testing the psychological perception of pitch using matched-guise tests similar to those used by Labov (1968). I would also like to test JND, just-noticeable difference, of pitch in relation to the hearer's attitude concerning the notion of femininity and masculinity as a social identity. It has been claimed that intonation expresses a speaker's emotion and attitude toward the situation or toward the hearer (Ladd 1978), and that it can also express social identity (Crystal 1987). Since intonation, or patterns of pitch, involves fundamental frequency as well as other prosodic features, it can be speculated that pitch itself can also convey paralinguistic features such as those mentioned above. This small study is indicative of the importance of cross-cultural research and of the role that paralinguistic factors play in shaping language conventions.

APPENDIX

(1) *English sentences and Japanese translations*
    The girl gave the money to her father.
    He wanted to go to Germany.
    Is water a liquid?
    Do you want some coffee?
    Do you take cream in your coffee?
    Where did you put the paper?
    Give me some apples, oranges, and peaches.
    His name is Peter.
    I think so.
    How are you?
    Onna no ko wa otoosan ni okane o ageta.
    Kare wa doitsu e ikitakatta.
    Mizu wa ekitai desu ka.
    Koohii ikaga desu ka.
    Kohii ni kuriimu ireru.
    Shinbun o doko ni oita.
    Ringo to orenji to momo o kudasai.
    Kare no na wa piitaa desu.
    Soo omoimasu.
    Ogenki desu ka.

(2) *Terms and abbreviations*
    fe   =   frequency in English
    fj   =   frequency in Japanese
    avg   =   average of fundamental frequency
    df   =   difference in fundamental frequency
    dff   =   difference in fundamental frequency in females
    dfm   =   difference in fundamental frequency in males

NOTES

1. This project would not have been possible without guidance and instruction from Dr. Katsue Reynolds of the Department of East Asian Languages and Literature and Dr. Iovanna Condax of the Department of Linguistics, University of Hawaii at Manoa. I would like to thank Eric Shortt, a Ph.D. student in the Department of Linguistics, who helped me with the statistical analysis of the data. I would also like to thank the informants for taking the time to read sentences when they had numerous assignments of their own to complete.

2. For the sake of simplifying the argument, I have decided not to distinguish objective and acoustic notions of fundamental frequency and subjective and auditory notions of pitch.

3. The average age was 25.7 for female subjects and 25.8 for male subjects.

4. The artificial nature of this kind of experiment was not overlooked; however, the difficulty of gathering data which consisted of the same semantic content, and the impossibility of recording natural conversation of a quality which would permit the data to be measured by a pitch meter, forced me to modify the methodology to be less natural than if data were based on natural conversation.

5. An inference is valid unless the particular data set is one which would appear only once in 20 experiments.

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Less feminine speech among young Japanese females[1]

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INTRODUCTION

Japanese norms of behavior have traditionally been highly gendered. The Japanese language has also been characterized by distinct male and female speech registers, and descriptions of male and female speech differences are abundant in the literature (e.g. Ide 1979; Shibamoto 1985; Mizutani & Mizutani 1987; Ide & McGloin 1991; Smith 1992). The most commonly cited differences between male and female speech concern self-reference and address terms, sentence-final particles, vocabulary, pitch range, and intonation. In addition to these differences, Shibamoto (1985, 1991), based on an analysis of naturalistic speech data, demonstrates that male and female speech also differ syntactically with regard to the ellipsis of subject nominals, word order, and the ellipsis of case particles, among other features.

Recently, however, anecdotal evidence suggests that many young Japanese women are using less feminine, or more masculine, speech patterns. For example, Ellen Rudolph writes in the *New York Times*:

> There are other signs of change, particularly among younger Japanese [women]. Suzuko Nishihara [an administrator at the National Language Institute in Tokyo] said that her two college-age daughters use more neutral, less polite and even mildly masculine forms of speech. Instead of ending their sentences with the feminine *wa yo*, they use *da yo* (the masculine form) when they are speaking with their classmates, male or female. Toward their elders, they end their verbs with *-masu* instead of the more polite *gozaimasu*. (Sept. 1, 1991)

In relation to such anecdotal descriptions, this paper examines three issues: (1) To what extent do young Japanese women use a speech style traditionally regarded as masculine? (2) How does their speech style differ from the speech style of older women? (3) Why do they use a "masculine" speech style? The present study, our first attempt to investigate these questions, is a relatively small-scale analysis based on a limited sample. Nonetheless, the variations we detected in Japanese female speech suggest that the common gender-based categorization *female register*, as opposed to *male register*, may be too simplistic to describe contemporary usage. (Throughout this paper, the terms *male speech style* and *female speech style* are used to refer to the traditional stereotypes. See the section "Procedure and analysis" below for further discussion.)

METHOD

Subjects

A total of 14 middle-class Japanese women participated as subjects. They were divided into three age groups: Group A—seven female students, ages 18 to 23; Group B—three homemakers, ages 27 to 34; and Group C—four females, ages 45 to 57. All the subjects in Group A are students from Japan studying in Fresno, California.[2] The three subjects in Group B are homemakers living in Fresno: one is the wife of a graduate student, the other two are wives of Japanese businessmen. All the subjects in Groups A and B came to America no more than 18 months before the time of the data collection (1991-92). All four subjects in Group C are married and are professionals. Two of them are residents of Tokyo (Speakers 3 and 4); the other two are U.S. residents (Speakers 1 and 2), one of whom came to America 19 years ago, the other 12 years ago.[3] All the subjects spoke standard Japanese in the recorded conversations. Except for two (in Group A), they are all from Tokyo or its vicinity.

Procedure and analysis

The data consist of nine tape-recorded informal conversations between close friends in the same age group.[4] (In one conversation in Group C, the two participants—Speakers 3 and 4—are sisters.) We asked the subjects to tape-record their *oshaberi* 'chat' with their close friends. No topics for conversation were specified.

We chose to use conversational data rather than administer interviews for two reasons. First, our major interest is in sentence-final forms, and it is particularly in familiar conversation, not in formal conversation, that male-female differences appear most clearly with regard to sentence-final forms. Second, as the article in the *New York Times* indicates, it seems that young females use a male speech style mainly with their close peers, but not with older people or in formal situations.

Because speakers tend to be most conscious of the tape-recorder at the start, we ignored the first few minutes of each conversation. The rest of each conversation was transcribed to obtain 130 consecutive sentence tokens for each speaker. Such tokens do not include the following types of sentences or fragments: (1) interrupted or incomplete sentences; (2) neutral interrogative sentences (e.g., *Iku?* 'Are (you) going?'); (3) fillers (e.g., *A soo* 'Is that right?'); (4) direct and indirect quotations, except for the direct quotations of the speaker's own speech; and (5) expressions repeated for emphasis (e.g., *Takai, takai* "Expensive, expensive'). Most interrogative sentences are neutral, as are many fillers, and these neutral forms were excluded because their inclusion would have skewed the data for participants who tended to be listeners and asked questions and used fillers frequently. Further, we did not consider dependent clauses unless they were used sentence-finally with semantic completeness. In the case of the so-called right dislocation (of a phrase or clause), the final form of the sentence in the original word order was considered, since it is the part that receives gender marking.

The sentence tokens were analyzed with regard to their sentence-final forms as well as other characteristics (e.g., lexical items and pronunciation) that are traditionally considered masculine. Each sentence-final form was identified as feminine, neutral, or masculine. Feminine forms are those traditionally considered to be used primarily by women; masculine forms by men; and neutral forms by both men and women. This identification was based mainly on the classification given in the literature (e.g., Mizutani & Mizutani 1987; Shibamoto 1985). For the forms for which classification was not available in the literature, we made our own judgments, making reference to men's and women's conversational data.

The following list, though not exhaustive, exemplifies the classification. This classification, however, is by no means absolute, and not all Japanese speakers (especially younger ones) will agree with it completely. Feminine and masculine forms were further subdivided into strongly feminine (e.g., *wa*, *wa yo*) or strongly masculine forms (e.g., *zo*, *ze*) and moderately feminine (e.g., *no*) or moderately masculine forms (e.g., *da*). Those forms that are traditionally considered to be used exclusively by women or by men are classified respectively as strongly feminine or strongly masculine forms. In the following list, the forms marked as SF are strongly feminine forms, and those marked as SM are strongly masculine forms. The forms that have no marking are moderately feminine or masculine forms.

Feminine forms

a. The sentence-final particle *wa* for mild emphasis (SF). (*Wa* here has high sustained intonation.)
   Iku wa.   '(I) am going'.
   Oishii wa.   '(It) is delicious'.
b. The particle *wa* followed by *ne*, *yo*, or *yo ne* (SF)
   Iku wa ne.   '(I)'m going, you know'.
   Iku wa yo.   '(I)'m going, I tell you'.
   Iku wa yo ne.   '(You) are going, right?'
c. The particle *wa* preceded by *da* or *datta* (SF)
   Ashita da wa.   '(It)'s tomorrow'.
   Kinoo datta wa.   '(It) was yesterday'.
d. The particle *wa* preceded by *da* or *datta* and followed by *ne*, *yo*, or *yo ne* (SF)
   Ashita da wa ne.   '(It)'s tomorrow, isn't it?'
   Ashita datta wa yo. '(It)'s tomorrow, I tell you'.
   Kinoo datta wa yo ne. '(It) was yesterday, wasn't it?'
e. The particle *yo* attached after a noun or *na*-adjective (SF). (*Yo* here has high sustained intonation.)
   Ashita yo.   '(It)'s tomorrow, I tell you'.
f. The particle *ne* after a noun or adjective
   Ashita ne.   '(It)'s tomorrow, isn't it?'
g. The particle *no* after a noun or *na*-adjective in a statement (SF)
   Kiree na no.   'It is that (it)'s pretty'.
   Ashita na no.   'It is that (it)'s tomorrow'.
h. The particle *no* after a plain form of a verb or *i*-adjective in a statement
   Iku no.   'It is that (I)'m going'.
   Oishii no.   'It is that (it)'s delicious'.

i. The particle *no* followed by *ne*, *yo*, *yo ne* (SF)
   Ashita na no ne.   'It's that (it)'s tomorrow, isn't it?'
   Ashita na no yo.   'It's that (it)'s tomorrow, I tell you'.
   Ashita na no yo ne. 'It's that (it)'s tomorrow, right?'
j. The particle *ne* after the *te*-form of verbs of requesting
   Chotto matte ne.   'Wait for a moment, would you?'
k. The auxiliary *desho(o)* for expressing probability or for seeking agreement or confirmation.
   Iku deshoo.   '(He) will probably go./(You) are going, aren't (you)?'
   Ashita desho.   '(It) is probably tomorrow./(It)'s tomorrow, right?'
l. The form *kashira* 'I wonder' (SF)
   Kuru kashira.   'I wonder if (he) is coming'.

Masculine forms

a. The particles *zo* and *ze* (SM)
   Iku ze.   '(I)'m going, I tell you'.
   Iku zo.   'Look, (I)'m going'.
b. The particle *yo* attached after the plain form of a verb or *i*-adjective
   Iku yo.   '(I)'m going, I tell you'.
c. The auxiliary *da* ending for nouns and *na*-adjectives
   Ashita da.   '(It)'s tomorrow'.
   Kiree da.   '(It)'s pretty'.
d. The auxiliary *da* followed by *yo*, *ne*, or *yo ne*
   Ashita da ne.   '(It)'s tomorrow, isn't it?'
   Ashita da yo.   '(It)'s tomorrow, I tell you'.
   Ashita da yo ne.   '(It)'s tomorrow, right?'
e. The auxiliary *n da*
   Kiree na n da.   'It is that (it)'s pretty'.
   Ashita na n da.   'It is that (it)'s tomorrow'.
   Iku n da.   'It is that (I)'m going'.
f. The auxiliary *n da* followed by *ne*, *yo*, or *yo ne*
   Ashita na n da ne.   'It's that (it)'s tomorrow, isn't it?'
   Ashita na n da yo.   'It's that (it)'s tomorrow, I tell you'.
   Ashita na n da yo ne. 'It's that (it)'s tomorrow, right?/I tell you'.
g. The plain imperative form of a verb by itself or followed by *yo* (SM)
   Ike.   'Go'.
   Ike yo.   'Go, I'm telling you'.
h. The particle *na* or *na yo* for a negative command (SM)
   Iku na.   'Don't go'.
   Iku na yo.   'Don't go, I'm telling you'.
i. The auxiliary *daro(o)* for expressing probability or for seeking agreement or confirmation
   Iku daroo.   '(He) will probably go./(You) are going, aren't (you)?'
   Ashita daro.   '(It) is probably tomorrow./(It)'s tomorrow, right?'
j. The particle *na* for eliciting agreement (SM)
   Atsui na.   'It's hot, isn't it?'
k. The phonological form *ee* instead of *ai* and *oi* (SM)
   Shiranee. (*Shiranai.*) '(I) don't know'.
   Sugee.   (*Sugoi.*)   '(It)'s awesome'.
l. The form *ka yo* for expressing defiance or criticism (SM)
   Shiranai no ka yo.   'Don't (you) know (that)?!'
m. The form *-oo ka* for an invitation or offer
   Ikoo ka.   'Shall (we/I) go?'

Neutral forms

a. The plain form of verbs and *i*-adjectives
    Iku.   '(I)'m going'.
    Itta.   '(I) went'.
    Oishii.   '(It)'s delicious'.
    Oishikatta.   '(It) was delicious'.
b. The base of *na*-adjectives or nouns alone. (This is regarded as a feminine form by Mizutani & Mizutani 1987.)
    Kiree.   '(It)'s pretty'.
    Ashita.   '(It)'s tomorrow'.
c. The particle *yo* followed by *ne* for seeking agreement
    Iku yo ne.   '(You) are going, right?'
    Oishii yo ne.   '(It)'s delicious, right?'
d. The particle *ne* after the plain form of verb or *i*-adjective. (This is regarded as a masculine form by Mizutani & Mizutani 1987.)
    Iku ne.   '(You) are going, aren't (you)?'
    Oishii ne.   '(It)'s delicious, isn't it?'
e. The particle *mon* for mild explanatory assertion
    Iku mon.   'It is that (I)'m going'.
    Oishii mon.   'It is that (it)'s delicious'.
f. The particle *wa* for mild assertion (with a falling intonation)
    Oishii wa.   '(It)'s delicious'.
g. The *te*-form of verbs for request
    Chotto matte.   'Wait for a moment'.
h. The negative auxiliary *ja nai* for mild assertion or seeking agreement
    Ashita ja nai.   '(It)'s tomorrow, isn't it?'
    Oishii ja nai.   '(It)'s delicious, don't you think?'
i. The form *jan* for mild assertion or seeking agreement
    Ashita jan.   '(It)'s tomorrow, isn't it?'
    Oishii jan.   '(It)'s delicious, don't you think?'
j. The form *ka na* 'I wonder'. (This is regarded as a masculine form by Mizutani & Mizutani 1987.)
    Iku ka na.   '(I) wonder if (he) is going'.
k. The quotative marker *datte* and *tte* as a final form
    Oishii n datte.   '(It)'s delicious, I hear'.

After identifying the style of each sentence token as strongly or moderately feminine, strongly or moderately masculine, or neutral, we tallied the total number of sentence tokens in each style for each speaker, and then for each age group, and finally calculated the percentages of each style for each speaker and group.

RESULTS

Sentence-final forms

Our analysis shows clear group differences in the use of gendered sentence-final forms. Although individual differences were quite large, in general the youngest age group (Group A) used the fewest feminine forms and the most masculine forms, while the oldest age group (Group C) used the most feminine

forms and the fewest masculine forms. As shown in Table 1, Group A used masculine forms twice as often as they used feminine forms, while Groups B and C used feminine forms more frequently than masculine forms.

TABLE 1. *Use of gendered sentence-final forms for Groups A, B, and C*

	Group A (ages 18-23)		Group B (ages 27-34)		Group C (ages 45-57)	
Feminine forms	130	(14%)	94	(24%)	261	(50%)
Neutral forms	514	(57%)	242	(62%)	227	(44%)
Masculine forms	266	(29%)	54	(14%)	32	(6%)
Total	910	(100%)	390	(100%)	520	(100%)
Strongly feminine	36	(4%)	45	(12%)	144	(28%)
Strongly masculine	45	(5%)	0	(0%)	0	(0%)

Moreover, the strongly feminine forms were used least frequently by Group A (4%) and most frequently by Group C (28%) (see Table 1). Indeed, members of the youngest group never used the well-known feminine particle *wa*, while all but one member of Groups B and C used it 4 to 11 times (for a total of 15 times for Group B and 22 times for Group C). Similarly, the well-known feminine ending *kashira* 'I wonder' was used only once in Group A, but 16 times in Group C; in Group B it was used only twice. Examples of the use of the strongly feminine *wa* and *kashira* by the speakers in Groups B and C are given in (1) through (7).

(1) *Hansee shiteru wa watashi.* (SP 2-Group B)
    regret/reconsider I
    'I regret (that I said that)'.
(2) *Demo itai   wa yo nee.* (SP 3-Group B)
    but   painful
    'But (it)'s painful, isn't it?'
(3) *Sonna koto yaranai wa yo.* (SP 1-Group C)
    such thing do-Neg
    '(I) don't do such a thing'.
(4) *Kore no ne,   moo chotto hiroi   to ii wa ne.* (SP 2-Group C)
    this Gen Part more a-little spacious if nice
    'If (it)'s a little bit more spacious than this, it would be nice, don't you think?'
(5) *Zenzen chigau   tte   itteta   wa yo.* (SP 3-Group C)
    totally different Comp say-Pst
    '(They) said (it)'s totally different'.
(6) *Soo na no   kashira ne.* (SP 3-Group C)
    so Cop Nom wonder
    'I wonder (if that) is so'.
(7) *Are wa   honto ni ari no   nakama   na no   kashira.* (SP 4-Group C)
    that Topic really ant Gen group/kind Cop Nom wonder
    'I wonder if that is really a kind of ant'.

Strongly masculine forms, on the other hand, were occasionally used in Group A (5%), but never used in the two older groups. The following are examples of strongly masculine forms used by Group A.

(8) *Ki ni suru zo.* (SP 1)
mind/care
'(You) will mind (it)'.
(9) *Wa, maji ka yo.* (SP 1)
wow serious Q
'Wow, are (you) serious?'
(10) *Fuzaken na.* (SP 2)
kid don't
'Be serious'.
(11) *Yabai zo, sore.* (SP 3)
worrisome/risky that
'That worries (me)'.
(12) *Kitanee yo, omae.* (SP 4)
dirty you
'You are dirty'.
(13) *Atashi sonna hanashi shita koto nai zo.* (SP 7)
I such story do-Pst Comp Neg
'I never said such a thing'.

Individual differences in the use of gendered sentence-final forms are shown in Tables 2, 3, and 4.

TABLE 2. *Use (in %) of gendered sentence-final forms for individual speakers in Group A*

	SP 1	SP 2	SP 3	SP 4	SP 5	SP 6	SP 7	All	Range
FF	8%	24%	16%	11%	18%	17%	7%	14%	7-24%
NF	63	50	50	53	46	66	67	57	46-67
MF	29	26	34	36	36	17	26	29	17-36
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	----
SFF	2	5	5	2	3	11	0	4	0-11
SMF	12	1	3	0	5	5	9	5	0-12

SP = speaker; FF = feminine forms; NF = neutral forms; MF = masculine forms; SFF = strongly feminine forms; SMF =strongly masculine forms

TABLE 3. *Use (in %) of gendered sentence-final forms for individual speakers in Group B*

	SP 1	SP 2	SP 3	All	Range
FF	21%	30%	22%	24%	21-30%
NF	69	55	62	62	55-69
MF	10	15	17	14	10-17
Total	100	100	101	100	—
SFF	9	14	12	12	9-14
SMF	0	0	0	0	0

SP = speaker; FF = feminine forms; NF = neutral forms; MF = masculine forms; SFF = strongly feminine forms; SMF = strongly masculine forms

TABLE 4. *Use (in %) of gendered sentence-final forms for individual speakers in Group C*

	SP 1	SP 2	SP 3	SP 4	All	Range
FF	50%	70%	55%	24%	50%	24-70%
NF	44	29	42	61	44	29-61
MF	6	1	3	15	6	1-15
Total	100	100	100	100	100	—
SFF	28	37	34	12	28	12-37
SMF	0	0	0	0	0	0

SP = speaker; FF = feminine forms; NF = neutral forms; MF = masculine forms; SFF = strongly feminine forms; SMF = strongly masculine forms

Although some of the ranges are quite broad, most speakers in Group A more or less fit the group's pattern, with all but one subject (SP 6) using more masculine forms than feminine forms. (Speaker 2 used both feminine and masculine forms quite frequently.) In contrast, three speakers (1, 2, 3) in Group C exhibited similar highly feminine styles. Speaker 4, who spoke with Speaker 3, used a much less feminine style, but she still used feminine forms more often than masculine forms (24% versus 15%).

Strongly masculine expressions other than sentence-final forms

In addition to sentence-final forms, the subjects in Group A, but not those in Groups B and C, also used other forms (e.g., lexical items and pronunciation) that are commonly marked as strongly masculine or vulgar. Examples from speakers in Group A are given in (14) through (19): *kuu* 'eat' in *kucchau* in (14), *umai* 'delicious/good' in (15), *babaa* 'old women' in (16), and *omae* 'you' in (17).

(14) *Zettai kucchau yo.* (SP 1)
definitely eat
'(You) will definitely eat (them), I tell you'.
(15) (drinking tea: SP 3)
Un, umai.
oh delicious/good
'Oh, (it)'s good'.
(16) *Babaa tachi ga /?/ yonin shika oyoge nai n da zo mitai na.* (SP 5)
old-woman Pl Sbj four-people only swim-can Neg Nom Cop Part like/seem
'Old women ... It's like that only four people can swim here'.
(17) *Omae, urusai n da yo tte.* (SP 7)
you be-quiet Nom Cop Part Comp
'You, be quiet (I would say)'.

The pronunciation *ee* in place of *ai* and *oi*, which is generally considered vulgar, was occasionally used by some subjects in Group A. (This pronunciation was included in the sentence-final forms since it is most commonly used in the final position.) For example, in (18) *wakannee* is used in place of *wakaranai*; in (19) *yasukunee* is used instead of *yasukunaii*; see also example (12).

(18) *Wakannee, dare da   yo, sore   to ka   itte*. (SP 7)
      know-Neg who Cop Part that   or-something say
      '(I) said "(I) don't know, who is that?" or something'.

(19) *Sonna yasukunee   daro?* (SP 1)
      so   cheap-Neg   isn't it
      '(It)'s not that cheap, is it?'

Qualified strongly masculine expressions

It is noteworthy that when subjects used a strongly masculine expression, they often qualified the expression by delivering it in a joking manner accompanied by giggling or by some other sort of hedge, as shown in examples (20) through (22), all from subjects in Group A, as well as in earlier examples (16) through (18).

(20) *Honto doke yo to   omottee*. (SP 5)
      really move Part Comp think
      '(I) thought, Move it'.
(21) *Tomodachi tte   yuu mon o shiranai   no   ka yo mitai na*. (SP 6)
      friend   Comp called thing Obj know-Neg Comp Q Part like/seem
      'It's like, "Don't (you) know things called friends?" '
(22) *Sore gurai ka yo   tte   kanji*. (SP 7)
      that extent Q Part Comp feeling/like
      'It's like, "Is that all?" '

These hedges are either quotative expressions (e.g., (17), (18), and (20)) or equivocating devices (e.g., *mitai na* in (16) and (21) and *kanji* in (22)).

DISCUSSION

Although our sample was small and mostly limited to Japanese women living abroad, the results reveal the heterogeneity of contemporary Japanese female speech. (Casual observations suggest that similar wide variations exist in female speech in Tokyo.) The style of many subjects in the present study, particularly those in the youngest age group, hardly fits the traditional stereotype of Japanese women's speech style as far as the use of sentence-final forms is concerned. These variations suggest that the common gender-based categorization *female language* is too simplistic to capture fully actual language practice. In order to account for such variations, one must consider social factors other than gender.

As our results indicate, age is one such important factor: the youngest group used more masculine forms than feminine forms and very few strongly feminine forms, a pattern exactly opposite that used by the two older groups. Further, all the subjects in the youngest group used moderately masculine sentence-final forms quite frequently (24%), which suggests that they view these forms as neutral and have integrated them into their natural speech style. In other words, for these young speakers, the traditional classification of gendered sentence-final forms is not appropriate.

The youngest group, but not the other two groups, also used strongly masculine forms on occasion, though less frequently than the moderately masculine forms. As described earlier, these strongly masculine forms were often used with some qualification, suggesting that the speakers were not wholly comfortable with such forms. We interviewed some of the subjects after the recording and asked when and why they use strongly masculine expressions. They explained that they use strongly masculine expressions mainly with close peers, but not with "outsiders," particularly not with members of the older generation. Typically, they use these expressions to make their conversation more interesting, fun, and spirited. It seems that the usage enhances solidarity, identifying the speakers as members of a particular social group—i.e., young unmarried student peers.[5]

In the interview, some subjects pointed out that young women change their speech style once they graduate from college and start working. Marital status may also affect a woman's choice of gendered style and may in part explain some of the stylistic differences we observed between the speakers in Group B, all of whom were married, and the younger, unmarried speakers in Group A. Furthermore, the individual differences within each age group in the present study suggest that factors such as family background, occupation, and personality may also affect women's speech styles. It is also possible that a woman's style changes depending on the degree of intimacy between her and her interlocutor.

Individual differences were quite pronounced among the subjects in Group C, the oldest group. Casual observations indicate that many speakers in this age group deviate from the feminine stereotype in their speech style, using moderately masculine forms quite frequently, as did Speaker 4 in Group C. Such usage seems more common among women in certain occupations, such as merchants and farmers, and, as Kitagawa (1977:292) notes, the gender "distinction in speech style in Japan has been more of an urban phenomenon than a rural one." This difference, Kitagawa posits, "is presumably due in part to the fact that, particularly in farming communities, women constitute an important labor force, and thus are not as dependent on men as their urban counterparts." Thus, it seems that the stereotype commonly known as the Japanese women's speech register is a construct based on the speech style of traditional women in the white-collar middle and upper-middle classes in Tokyo (who are speakers of standard Japanese).[6]

The foregoing discussion suggests that the gendered speech styles of all-female groups and of individual women result from composites of various social factors relating to identity and relations. To put it differently, the choice of a gendered style can be considered a means of constructing identity and relations. The analysis given in this study also calls for a reexamination of the function of the stereotypical feminine speech style, which has been regarded as an indicator of femininity, powerlessness, coquetry, and the like. However, the use of such a style may also hold other meanings, such as the lack of youthfulness, the lack of solidarity or relative formality, or a certain type of personality.

In addition to synchronic variation, the present study also raises questions concerning diachronic variation: How common is the use of masculine forms by young Japanese females? Is it only a temporary or local phenomenon, or does it reflect lasting changes in gender roles in Japanese society? It is often pointed out

that young Japanese females today are becoming more assertive and stronger. Do the stylistic differences among the age cohorts in this study reflect this social change over time? More specifically, what are we to make of the pervasive use of moderately masculine forms and the restricted use of strongly masculine forms among young Japanese women? All these issues call for further study of variations in Japanese female speech.

NOTES

1. This paper was partly supported by a California State University research grant. We would like to thank our subjects for their cooperation in recording conversations.
2. Six of them are students at California State University, Fresno, and one is a high-school student in Fresno.
3. The mixture of residences among the subjects in Group C partly reflects the availability of subjects, but also the possibility that long-term stay in the United States may have effects on speech.
4. There are five conversations involving Group A, one involving Group B, and three involving Group C. Not all the participants in the conversations were included in the analysis for the following reasons: two participants in one of Group A's conversations (i.e., the conversation with Speaker A) were males; some of the participants uttered less than 130 sentences; one participant in one conversation in Group A and one participant in two conversations in Group C are the authors of the present paper.
5. It is possible that only a certain kind of female uses a strongly masculine style, forming a subgroup among young females. One 19-year-old subject (Speaker 4) who did not use any strongly masculine forms said that there were two kinds of girls at her high school in Tokyo, those who used "rough language" and those who didn't. She also said that girls in the former group were nonconformists—e.g., they dyed their hair and smoked. However, in the present study all members of Group A except Speaker 4 used strongly masculine forms at least once, and these subjects did not appear to be nonconformists of this sort.
6. For example, Speaker 2 in Group C used the most highly feminine style, according to the stereotype. She grew up in an upper-middle-class family in Tokyo and graduated from a prestigious university for women from the upper-middle class. Social-class differences, however, do not seem to account for differences in the styles of Speakers 3 and 4 in Group C. These two speakers are sisters who were raised in a middle-class family and now live in the same city near Tokyo.

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A recent development in *caki*, a second-person pronoun in Korean[1]

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INTRODUCTION

It is not uncommon in the history of Korean for pronouns to develop and disappear. In present-day Korean as well, a third-person nondeictic pronoun *tangsin* is disappearing while a second-person pronoun *caki* is developing. This study investigates the recent development of the second-person pronoun *caki* in Korean, an instance of which occurs in (1).

(1) *caki*-to Inho-lul manna-ass-e?
     you-also   -Acc met-Q
     'Did you also meet Inho?'

This new second-person pronoun can be used between two young lovers, between young married couples, and between two women,[2] but it has not been fully acknowledged as a second-person pronoun to my knowledge.

Caki can be used where second-person pronouns are used in other languages. Nevertheless, whether it is a pronoun or not is controversial, since (a) in Korean, not only second-person pronouns but also address terms can be used where second-person pronouns are used in languages like English, as illustrated in (2a) and (2b); and (b) *caki* in particular can function as an address term, as illustrated in (3).

(2) a. Kim-kwun, *caney*-to Inho-lul manna-ass-na?
        LN-Mr.   you-also   -Acc met-Q
        'Mr. Kim, did you also meet Inho?'
    b. Kim_i-kwun, Kim_i-kwun-to Inho-lul manna-ass-na?
        LN-Mr.   LN-Mr.-also   -Acc met-Q
        (Lit. 'Mr. Kim_i, did Mr. Kim_i also meet Inho?')
        'Mr. Kim, did you also meet Inho?'

(3) *caki*(-ya), na onul *caki* emeni manna-ass-e
     caki-ya I today your mother met
     '*Caki-ya*, I met your mother today'.
     (Note: -*ya* = the intimate address particle)[3]

In (2a), a second-person pronoun *caney* is used in the subject position, whereas in (2b), where the subscribed i's mean that the referents of the two Kims are identical, the address term *Kim-kwun* ('Mr. Kim') is used in the same position. In (3), the first *caki* is used as an address term.

The present study examines restrictions on the use of the Korean second-person pronouns and characterizes each second-person pronoun in terms of both the power and solidarity semantics contra the traditional characterization of them in terms of the power semantic only. It argues that *caki* in (1) and (3) is a second-person pronoun. It also discusses what social factors contribute to the development of the second-person pronoun *caki*.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE KOREAN SECOND-PERSON PRONOUNS[4]

Korean has two or more forms of singular pronouns in each person. There are two first-person pronouns: *ce* (humble form) and *na* (plain form). In the third-person, although there is no pronoun comparable to the English *she* or *he*, there are several nondeictic pronouns such as *ce* (derogatory form), *caki/casin* (plain form), and *tangsin* (honorific form).[5] As for the second person, *ne*, *caney*, and *tangsin* are generally recognized as its members.[6] Although there are two or more forms for each person, they are not frequently used. Instead, the zero pronoun is frequently used, as illustrated in a conversation between A and B in (4).

(4) a. A: Ø eti ka-ni?   'Where are *you* going?'
       where go-Q
    b. B: Ø hakkyo ka   '*I* am going to school'.
       school go
    c. A: Ø Inho-lul po-ass-ni? 'Have *you* seen Inho?'
       -Acc saw-Q
    d. B: Ø Ø mos po-ass-e   '*I* haven't seen him'.
       not saw

In (4a), (b) and (c), the subjects are not expressed, and in (4d), neither the subject nor the direct object is expressed. The Korean zero pronoun cannot be identified by agreement features but can be recovered from the context. There are cases, however, in which phonologically realized elements are required structurally. Since delimiters such as *-man* ('only') and *-to* ('also') have to have hosting elements, whenever there is a delimiter the zero pronoun cannot be used, so that phonologically realized elements are required, as illustrated in (5a) and (b).

(5) a. (ne) Inho-lul manna-ass-ni?
       you -Acc met-Q
       'Did you meet Inho?'
    b. ne-to/*Ø-to   Inho-lul manna-ass-ni?
       you-also/Ø-also -Acc met-Q
       'Did you also meet Inho?'

The zero pronoun has an important function in Korean. When an appropriate pronoun or address term is not available, speakers use the zero pronoun in order to avoid a commitment to the relationship between themselves and their addressee. This function of the zero pronoun is similar to the use of the English *you* as "the uncommitted omnibus *you*,' which is discussed in Brown and Ford (1964). Since the analysis of the function of the zero pronoun is not a direct concern of this study,

I will concentrate in what follows on phonologically realized elements.

Although there are several forms of second-person pronouns, they cannot cover the whole range of addressees. When the addressee is superior to the speaker, there is no appropriate second-person pronoun available in Korean.[7] In such a dyad, the subordinate speaker uses address terms for the superior addressee where second-person pronouns are used in other languages, as illustrated in (6a) and (b).

(6) a. *emeni, {ne, caney, tangsin}-to Inho-lul manna-si-ess-eyo?
       Mother {you}-also   -Acc met-(Hon)-Q
       (lit., 'Mother, did you also meet Inho?')
    b. emeni, emeni(-kkeyse)-to   Inho-lul manna-si-ess-eyo?
       Mother Mother(-Hon.Nom)-also -Acc met-(Hon)-Q
       (lit., 'Mother, did Mother also meet Inho?')
       'Mother, did Mother also meet Inho?'

When the speaker is equal or superior to the addressee, the choice of a second-person pronoun is quite complicated depending on the degree of intimacy. Generally speaking, second-person pronouns are used when the interlocutors are on intimate terms. Otherwise, address terms are used or at least preferred where second-person pronouns are used in other languages.

The second-person pronouns *ne* and *caney* can be used for addressees who are equal or subordinate to the speaker. They differ in that (a) *ne* conveys intimacy, whereas *caney* conveys politeness; (b) *caney* can only be used for adult male addressees, whereas *ne* does not have such restrictions; and (c) *caney* can alternate with address terms as illustrated in (7a) and (b), whereas *ne* in general cannot, as illustrated in (8a) and (b).

(7) a. Kim-kwun, *caney*-to Inho-lul manna-ass-na?
       LN-Mr.   you-also   -Acc met-Q
       'Mr. Kim, did you also meet Inho?'
    b. Kim$_i$-kwun, Kim$_i$-kwun-to Inho-lul manna-ass-na?
       LN-Mr.   LN-Mr.-also   -Acc met-Q
       (lit., 'Mr. Kim$_i$, did Mr. Kim$_i$ also meet Inho?')
       'Mr. Kim, did you also meet Inho?'

(8) a. Inho-ya, *ne*-to Mina-lul manna-ass-ni?
       FN-*ya* you-also   -Acc met-Q
       'Inho, did you also meet Mina?'
    b. *Inho$_i$-ya, Inho$_i$-to Mina-lul manna-ass-ni?[8]
       FN-*ya* FN-also   -Acc met-Q
       (lit., 'Inho, did Inho also meet Mina?')

The second-person pronoun *tangsin* is rarely used in present-day Korean except between husband and wife, who usually use *tangsin* as their reciprocal second-person pronoun. Dong Jae Lee (1975) reported that *tangsin* did not exist at all in his speech and in the speech of many of the people whom he had interviewed. Although its use is decreasing, *tangsin* is still used reciprocally between equal members of a dyad whose relationship is less intimate than those who use *caney*. *Tangsin* is typically used by speakers aged approximately 35 and above. Except for

the use between husband and wife, *tangsin* cannot be used by female speakers nor toward female addressees. Among the three second-person pronouns discussed above, *tangsin* is used when the relationship between the interlocutors is distant compared to *ne* and *caney*. Since when the interlocutors are not on intimate terms, address terms are used or at least preferred where second-person pronouns are used in other languages, the distant second-person pronoun *tangsin* seems to be rarely used.[9]

These second-person pronouns are traditionally characterized only in terms of the power semantic. According to Hyen-Pay Choi in the most well-known Korean reference grammar, *ne* is "extremely disrespectful form," *caney* is "disrespectful form," and *tangsin* is "extremely respectful form" (1987:236-37). This characterization of the Korean second-person pronouns is quite misleading. Since there is no appropriate second-person pronoun for the superior addressee, it is not correct to label *tangsin* as "extremely respectful form." In addition, when two very intimate friends use *ne* reciprocally, they use it not because they greatly disrespect each other, but because they are on very intimate terms. Even when *ne* is used non-reciprocally to the subordinate addressee, the relationship between the interlocutors has to be intimate.

Both *ne* and *caney* can be used toward an addressee who is equal or subordinate to the speaker. *Ne* conveys intimacy, while *caney* conveys politeness, so that it would be appropriate to call *ne* the intimate second-person pronoun and *caney* the polite second-person pronoun. *Tangsin* can be used reciprocally in a symmetrical dyad. Since it is used when the interlocutors are on distant terms compared to *ne* and *caney*, it would be appropriate to call it the distant second-person pronoun.

THE SECOND-PERSON PRONOUN *CAKI*

The word *caki* in (9a), (b), and (c) is used where second-person pronouns can be used in other languages.

(9) a. *caki*-to Inho-lul manna-ass-e?
     you-also   -Acc met-Q
     'Did you also meet Inho?'

  b. ce pwun-i   *caki* apeci-ya?
     that person-Nom your father-be-Q
     'Is that person over there your father?'

  c. Inho-ka ecey   *caki*-lul po-ass-tay
     -Nom yesterday you-Acc see-Past-Evidential
     '(Inho/Someone told me that) Inho saw you yesterday'.

But whether it is a pronoun or an address term is not clear, since (a) in Korean not only second-person pronouns but also address terms can be used where second-person pronouns are used\ in other languages; and (b) *caki* can function as an address term, as mentioned earlier. This section will show that *caki* in (9) is a second-person pronoun.

Since the fifteenth century, written records of Korean show a recurring pattern of development of new forms of pronouns.[10] Fifteenth-century Korean had a

single first-person pronoun *na*; two second-person pronouns *ne* (plain form) and *kutuy* (polite form); and two third-person nondeictic pronouns *ce* (plain form) and *cakya* (honorific form). While the third-person nondeictic honorific pronoun *cakya* was losing its honorific status and disappearing in the sixteenth century, two other third-person nondeictic pronouns *tangsin* and *caki* were introduced (via borrowing from Chinese) into the Korean pronominal system. The fifteenth-century binary distinction of the third-person nondeictic pronouns between *ce* and *cakya* changed into a three-way distinction at the end of the sixteenth century: *ce* (derogatory form), *cakya/caki* (plain form), and *tangsin* (honorific form).[11]

The third-person nondeictic pronouns *ce* and *tangsin* were borrowed as first-person pronoun and second-person pronoun respectively, while maintaining their status in the honorific system. The word *ce* therefore can be used either as a third-person nondeictic pronoun as in (10a), or as a first-person pronoun as in (10b).

(10) a. Inho-nun *cey*-ka   iki-ess-ta-ko sayngkakha-ko iss-ta
       -Top be-Nom won-that   think
       'Inho thinks that he won'.

   b. *ce*-nun *cey*-ka iki-ess-ta-ko sayngkakha-ass-eyo
       I-Top I-Nom won-that   thought
       'I thought that I won'.

The word *tangsin* can be used either as a third-person nondeictic pronoun as in (11a), or as a second-person pronoun as in (11b).

(11) a. halapeci-kkeyse Inho-lul *tangsin* pang-ulo teyliko ka-si-ess-ta.
       GrandF-Hon.Nom -Acc his   room-to took (Hon)
       'Grandfather took Inho to his room'.

   b. Kim Inho-ssi, *tangsin*-to ku salam manna-ass-e?
       LN FN-*ssi*   you-also the person met-Q
       'Mr. Inho Kim, did you also meet him?'
       (Note: -*ssi* = the distant address particle)

The word *caney*, which is a second-person pronoun in present-day Korean, was used in Middle Korean either as an adverbial or as a third-person nondeictic pronoun as is the word *susulo* in present-day Korean, as illustrated in (12a) and (b).

(12) a. Inho-nun *susulo*   caki calmos-ul incengha-ass-ta
       -Top by-himself his mistake-Acc acknowledged
       'Inho acknowledged his mistake by himself'.
       (Note: Although *susulo* is glossed as 'by himself', it is an adverb.)

   b. Inho-nun *susulo*-uy nolyek-ulo sengkongha-ass-ta
       -Top self-Gen efforts-Ins succeeded
       'Inho succeeded through his own efforts'.

Although *caney* functioned as a third-person nondeictic pronoun, it never developed fully as a nondeictic pronoun. However, it has been used as a second-person pronoun since the seventeenth century.

Clearly, some first- and second-person pronouns developed from the third-

person nondeictic pronouns. Let us examine the word *caki* in question. *Caki* has been used as a third-person nondeictic pronoun, as illustrated in (13), since the end of the sixteenth century.

(13) Inho-nun ecey   *caki* cha-lul phal-ass-ta
       -Top yesterday his   car-Acc sold
       'Inho sold his car yesterday'.

If the same word *caki* is used where second-person pronouns are used in other languages as in (14), it would be a second-person pronoun rather than an address term, since the development of its use as a second-person pronoun is exactly parallel to the development of the second-person pronoun *tangsin* from its third-person nondeictic use.

(14) *caki*-to Inho-lul manna-ass-e
       you-also   -Acc met
       'Did you also meet Inho?'

It is also similar to the development of the second-person pronoun *caney* from its third-person nondeictic use. The development of some first- and second-person pronouns is schematically represented in Table 1.

TABLE 1. *The development of some first- and second-person pronouns*

Power semantic	First-person deictic	Third-person deictic		Second-person deictic
High		*ttangsin*	—>	*tangsin*
Mid	*na*	*(caney)*	—>	*caney*
		caki	—>	*caki*
		casin		
Low	*ce* <—	*œ*		*ne*

In this table, the labels *high*, *mid*, and *low* are interpreted differently in different persons, although they reflect characteristics of pronouns in the power dimension. In the first person, *mid* means plain and *low* means humble. In the second person, *high* means distant, *mid* means plain, and *low* means intimate. In the third person, *high* means honorific, *mid* means plain, and *low* means derogatory.

Caki can be used as an address term, as illustrated in (15).

(15) *caki*(-ya), na caki emeni manna-ass-e
       you-ya   I   your mother met
       '*Caki*(-ya), I met your mother'.

The use of *caki* as an address term, however, does not mean that it is not a second-person pronoun. It rather shows a parallel to the use of the second-person pronoun *caney* as an address term, as illustrated in (16).

(16) *caney, caney*-to onul chaykpang-ey ka-l ke-n-ka?
       you   you-also today bookstore-to go-Fut
       '*Caney* , will you go to a bookstore, too?'

Therefore, the use of *caki* as an address term does not detract from the claim that it is a second-person pronoun.

The second-person pronoun *caki* also has restrictions in its use in both the power and solidarity dimensions. It can be used reciprocally between young lovers, young married couples, and women in a symmetrical dyad; and nonreciprocally for the subordinate addressee in an asymmetrical dyad of two women. Between friends or acquaintances of different sexes, address terms are usually used where second-person pronouns are used in other languages, although some people use the intimate second-person pronoun *ne*. Between lovers, on the other hand, *caki* can be used. Married couples typically use *tangsin* between themselves. Some young married couples, however, use *caki* between themselves. Between two women *ne* can be used if they are on intimate terms. Otherwise, when *caki* was not a second-person pronoun, speakers used address terms as replacements for second-person pronouns, whereas they now can use either *caki* or address terms. *Caki* is not as intimate as *ne* nor as distant as address terms.

The use of this new second-person pronoun *caki* between two women is parallel in both power and solidarity dimensions to *caney* as used between two men. They both convey politeness and are used for adult addressees. Therefore, it would be appropriate to call *caki* a "polite second-person pronoun," since *caney* is characterized in the earlier discussion as a polite second-person pronoun. A difference between *caki* and *caney* is the age of their users. Those who use *caki* are a little bit younger than those who use *caney*. And there is no upper limitation on the age of speakers who use *caney*, whereas elderly women do not use *caki*.

SOCIAL CONTEXTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECOND-PERSON PRONOUN *CAKI*

The order of development of *caki* as a second-person pronoun is from between young lovers, to between young married couples, to between two women. The use of *caki* between young lovers has been noted in passing by some scholars like Kim (1984:64), Yang (1986:64), and Chang (1984: 36) in their studies of the nondeictic use of *caki*. However, the use of *caki* between two women has not been mentioned in the literature to my knowledge. Those young lovers who use *caki* between themselves continue to use it even after they marry, although *tangsin* is the standard second-person pronoun between husband and wife. I have observed that when young married couples use *caki* between themselves, their parents criticize them for doing so. The use of *caki* between two women is the most recent development. Some Korean women consultants told me that as recently as a few years ago, *caki* did not sound natural when other women used it toward them. However, they said that they themselves have now adopted *caki* and use it for some of their women addressees.

The social context in which *caki* as used between young couples develops is

different from that in which *caki* as used between two women develops. The relationships between women and men in traditional Korean society which continued until the recent past are indicated by the cliché *nam-nye chil sey pwu-tongsek*, which means that women and men should not get along with each other from the age of seven on. Even now, almost all Korean middle and high schools are exclusively girls' or boys' schools. There are also many women's universities in Korea. These institutional characteristics reflect the realities of relationships between Korean women and men.

In such a social context, young women and men's chances to become acquainted are generally limited until after graduating from high school. When they become acquainted, they typically address each other with the address form (LN)-FN-*ssi*, which can be used for distant friends or acquaintances if the interlocutors are of the same sex. This address form does not allow any existing second-person pronoun if it is used between women and men. Some individuals who are in love with each other might feel that the use of the distant address form (LN)-FN-*ssi* as the replacement of the second-person pronoun is not appropriate to convey their intimate relationship, since address terms are used not only for attracting the attention of the intended addressee but also for reinforcing the relationship between the interlocutors. This latter function of address terms can be well demonstrated by the frequent use of address terms in utterance-final position. Address terms in utterance-final position are usually used as a device for reinforcing the relationships between the interlocutors rather than for attracting the attention of the intended addressee. Therefore, such people seem to start using *caki* as their reciprocal second-person pronoun. Since this new second-person pronoun *caki* can also function as an address term, as mentioned earlier, these speakers can do without the distant address form (LN)-FN-*ssi*, which they may feel to be inappropriate for their relationship.

What is particularly interesting in this development of *caki* as a second-person pronoun is that when speakers need a new second-person pronoun they use the recurring pattern of development of pronouns from third-person nondeictic pronouns to first- or second-person pronouns, although a couple of centuries have lapsed since the pattern was last used.

The extension of the use of *caki* from between young lovers to between young married couples seems to be due to two factors. First, those young lovers who use *caki* between themselves simply continue to use it even after they marry. Second, the implications of *tangsin*, which is typically used between husband and wife, have changed. In the past, *tangsin* conveyed politeness, whereas in present-day Korean it indicates that the relationship between the interlocutors is comparatively distant.[12] A similar semantic change can be observed in the noun suffix *ssi*. According to Chang-Yel Choi (1986) and Ye (1984), *-ssi* was used to express politeness or respect toward the referents of the stem noun, e.g., *ace-ssi* ('uncle'). In present-day Korean, however, *-ssi*, when it is attached to names used as address terms, indicates that the relationship between the interlocutors is distant. When it is attached to last names, it even becomes derogatory.

In traditional Korean society where husband and wife were supposed to be negatively polite to each other rather than using camaraderie in their verbal

behavior,[13] the polite form of the second-person pronoun, *tangsin*, would fit the culturally defined marriage relationship. At present, however, Korean society is changing from its traditional form, which was more sensitive to the power semantic, to a new form that is more sensitive to the solidarity semantic (cf. Brown and Gilman (1960) on power and solidarity semantics). This social change is exemplified by the reduced number of speech levels and the popularity of the intimate ending form *-e/a-yo* over the formal ending form *(su)pnita* (see Suh (1980) for detailed statistical analysis). In the changing Korean society, some innovative individuals who might feel *tangsin* is no longer appropriate for use between husband and wife have begun the use of *caki* in this context.

While young couples use *caki* to convey intimacy, its use between two women is somewhat different. In traditional Korean society, women's activities were restricted in most cases to those based in the home, and the geographical scope of their activities was also restricted in most cases to women's own villages. Most of the people with whom women interacted were close ingroup members.

In Korea, there is little problem in deciding hierarchical relationships among close ingroup members. While in the United States people tend to mask differences in power for the sake of solidarity, in Korea people tend to make differences in power clear for the sake of solidarity; that is, in Korea the more intimate the relationship between two people, the more they are ready to form a hierarchical relationship (see Park (ms.) for discussion of these aspects). If two people are on intimate terms, an age difference of one year, for example, is enough for them to form a hierarchical relationship. Between two men on intimate terms, e.g., if one is twenty-four years old and the other twenty-five years old, the junior addresses the senior with the kinship term *hyeng* ('elder brother from male'), although they are not brothers. The senior addresses the junior with the intimate address form FN-*ya*. In this case, the senior uses the intimate second-person pronoun *ne* for the junior, whereas the junior uses the address term *hyeng* as the replacement for the second-person pronoun. If two people are not on intimate terms, on the other hand, they may not form a hierarchical relationship, even when there is several years' difference in their ages. They may address each other with the distant address form (LN)-FN-*ssi*. If so, they use the address terms reciprocally as replacements for the second-person pronoun.

In traditional Korean society, the relationship between two women who interacted with each other was intimate in most cases. Their relative status in the power dimension was also clear. Since when the social relationship of a dyad is not vague in both the power and solidarity dimensions there is little problem in selecting address terms and second-person pronouns, women in dyads in the past would have been able to choose appropriate terms.

In the recent history of Korea, there has been a great social mobilization, and especially a shift of population from the countryside to large cities. The social relationships between city-dwellers are no longer the same as those between villagers. In addition, women's activities are no longer restricted to the home. Modern women actively participate in social activities far beyond those of traditional village women. These social changes diversified relationships between women. Now women may have a large number of female interlocutors whom they might

address with the distant address form (LN)-FN-*ssi*, which was rare in the past.

Women who feel that the relationship between themselves and their female addressee is neither so close as to justify the intimate address form FN-*ya* and its co-occurring second-person pronoun *ne*, nor so distant as to require the distant intimate address form (LN)-FN-*ssi*, began to use the second-person pronoun *caki*. A similar development of a women's second-person pronoun among Korean-Americans in Hawaii is reported in Dong-Jae Lee (1975). In Hawaii, Korean-American women use the English word *you* as a second-person pronoun among themselves, as in (17).

(17)   *You*-to party ka-l-lay?
        you-also party go-Fut
        'Do you intend to go to the party, too?'
        (from D. Lee (1976))

Since *caki* can also function as an address term, as mentioned earlier, women can make do without address terms if the relationship between themselves and their female addressee is uncertain. The use of *caki* between women is increasing, whereas the use of the comparable men's second-person pronoun *caney* is decreasing.

CONCLUSION

This study has examined general characteristics of the Korean second-person pronouns and in particular the development of a second-person pronoun *caki*. Korean uses either second-person pronouns or address terms where second-person pronouns are used in other languages. There is no appropriate second-person pronoun available in Korean for the superior addressee in an asymmetrical dyad. While the traditional way to characterize second-person pronouns is mainly in terms of the power semantic, this study characterizes the second-person pronouns in terms of both the power and solidarity semantics. In present-day Korean, what is more crucial in using second-person pronouns is the consideration of the solidarity relationships between the interlocutors, although their power relationships also impose restrictions on the use of second-person pronouns.

This study also makes some speculations on what social contexts cause the development of a new second-person pronoun *caki*. Since language would not exist without society, it is very natural that elements of social deixis (cf. Fillmore 1975) such as speech levels, address terms, and second-person pronouns show responses to the change of the semantics of the society. There was a radical change in the Korean pronominal system in the sixteenth century, when Korean society underwent a social change due to a long-term war with Japan. Recently, Korean society also underwent a change from its traditional form, which was more sensitive to the power semantic, to a new form that is more sensitive to the solidarity semantic. I believe this social change is causing the development of the second-person pronoun *caki*. What is particularly interesting in this development is that the pattern of development is parallel to the recurring pattern of development of pronouns in the history of Korean, although several centuries have lapsed since the

pattern was last used.

NOTES

1 .   I would like to thank Jim Long for comments.

2 .   This description of the use of the second-person pronoun *caki* is only an approximation. A more accurate characterization of its use will be presented below.

3 .   See Park (ms.) for the semantics of address particles.

4 .   In what follows, discussion of pronouns is restricted to singular forms, since the distinction between singular and plural forms is not directly relevant to this study.

5 .   Since the so-called third-person pronoun *ku*, which is comparable to the English *he*, is not a full-fledged pronoun in that it can only be used in certain types of written Korean such as novels or translations, I do not treat it as a third-person pronoun. The third-person pronouns *ce*, *caki/casin*, and *tangsin* are generally called reflexives. I argue in Park (1991) that they are not reflexives but nondeictic pronouns ("endophoric" pronouns in Halliday and Hasan's (1976) terms). Since the terminology is not crucial in this paper, I will use the term *nondeictic* for the third-person pronouns.

6 .   In addition to these three forms, *kutay* is also listed as a second-person pronoun by some scholars such as Hyen-Pay Choi (1987:236). Since it can only be used in poetic expressions, as pointed out by Lee and Im (1988:240), I will exclude it in the following discussion of the Korean second-person pronouns.

7 .   Such a hierarchical relationship within a dyad does not refer to any conceivable hierarchical relationships in the real world, such as age differences. It refers to what is reflected in the verbal behavior of people. For example, although two interlocutors are of different ages, they are not in a hierarchical relationship if they address each other with the same address form.

8 .   Sentence (8b) is acceptable if *Inho* refers to a small child. Otherwise, it is not acceptable. When an adult is speaking to a small child, somewhat different rules apply. To a small child, for example, a mother can say *Mom is coming* in the sense of *I am coming*.

9 .   In the preceding discussion of the use of and restrictions on the second-person pronouns, I assumed a normal situation in which the interlocutors are cooperative. In non-cooperative situations such as a fight or a quarrel, however, they are used quite differently from what I have discussed above.

1 0 .   For details of historical aspects of the Korean pronouns, see Ahn (1963, 1965); Kim (1984); S. Lee (1981); and Yu (1971).

1 1 .   The labels of these nondeictic pronouns are based on their function in present-day Korean.

1 2 .   Since pronouns have been characterized only in terms of the power semantic, it is difficult to know what implications they had in the past in the solidarity dimension.

1 3 .   For negative and positive politeness, see Brown and Levinson (1987) and Lakoff (1973).

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The social construction of sexual realities in heterosexual women's and men's erotic texts

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INTRODUCTION

Men and women engage with different erotic worlds, if the language of their erotic texts is any indication. Erotica oriented to a heterosexual female audience embeds sexuality in a lush fantasy world: sex is a passionate part of complicated and dramatic relationships whose development forms the core of the narrative. In contrast, erotica geared toward heterosexual males focuses on sex acts to the exclusion of such relationships; indeed, almost to the exclusion of any narrative context whatsoever.

This paper analyzes a number of erotic texts from the predominant genres of women's and men's erotica. We compare erotic romances with a selection of "adult" publications clearly oriented to a heterosexual male audience. These range from periodicals such as *Penthouse Forum* to X-rated Harlequin-type novels with such telling serial names as Blue Moon publications. The nature and location of our samples alone reveal the extent to which the two audiences differ with respect to their erotic preferences: While women can find their erotic reading material in any North American bookstore, men must turn to clearly marked and frequently stigmatized "adult" areas in bookstores or convenience stores to purchase theirs.[1] In fact, the erotic nature of a particular sub-genre of women's romances is an open secret (Thurston 1987). The differences between women's and men's erotica do not just extend to the nature of the texts involved but encompass their production and distribution processes as well.

A comprehensive account of the social construction of sexuality ought to attend to these dimensions. Our study is only a first step in such an enterprise, and focuses on textual differences. Through two key questions about the nature of erotic representations, we attempt to unravel the erotic preferences of the women and men who constitute the mass audiences of our erotic corpus. These are: (1) What are the differences between the print environments within which sexual encounters occur? and (2) How are these sexual encounters portrayed? As shall become clear, answering these questions uncovers a number of intriguing differences in the way that women and men approach erotic experiences.

BACKGROUND

Our motivating perspective is that erotic texts, as powerful channels of popular culture, play a major role in the reproduction of women's and men's sexuality. Such texts show the power of language in the social construction of reality. They reverberate with epistemological lessons about how men and women are to experience their sexuality. We agree with Stimpson and Person that "public production and reproduction, social structures and sexuality, are linked as irrevocably as the brain and our five senses" (1980:2). The role of language in this "public production and reproduction" has never been studied in its own right.

Gee (1990) provides a comprehensive overview of the interaction of language and larger social systems, each of which has its own way of doing, valuing, and believing. Gee calls these networks "Discourses," emphasizing the capital "D" to highlight the important role language plays in social systems. Such Discourses can be broad or extremely specialized, and a speaker is necessarily allied with multiple, overlapping Discourses at any given time. Indeed, we may consider women's and men's erotic genres as Discourses in themselves. They are expressions of discourse communities, and are powerful socializing agents for potential new members. Gee also reiterates the Bakhtin circle's contention that the many Discourses with which different groups and members are allied and through which they interact with each other are frequently in conflict with one another. Discourses are not neutral. Language is not simply a communicative tool. As emphasized particularly in postmodernist textual analysis, the word always "is half someone else's" (Bakhtin 1981:294), and appropriating discourse patterns for one's own use means wrestling with a sediment of meanings imparted by former uses.

Women's romances challenge the pervasive and long standing unilateral arrangement in which "men look at women while women watch themselves being looked at" (Berger 1973:47), which is said to alienate women from their own sexuality.[2] Yet at the same time, they do so by appropriating many of the tropes elaborated by earlier erotic traditions, touching off inter- and intratextual conflicts which offer a great deal of insight into an emerging mainstream erotic current for women. Our findings support previous conclusions that women are predisposed toward verbal activities. Women's erotica exploits and exults in language. Sexual activity is luxuriously described and embedded in equally luxurious and long-winded stories that often strain credibility. In contrast, men show a clear preference for a style that mimics the terse and graphic nature of their visual erotica, which form a dominant and certainly mass-produced textual style. Women's texts have only one visual element, the unmistakably erotic cover, whereas explicit pictorials and advertisements are integrated into the context of men's erotic readings.

These contrasting trends are so pervasive as to indicate strong prescriptivism on the part of the genres. They are geared to two distinct readerships, and further investigation reveals quite a bit about each audience.[3] For one thing, the women's corpus discloses that its readership is not simply interested in developing parallel forms of a hitherto forbidden erotic domain, but rather that women are generating their own unique style.

METHODS

Data collection

A two-step strategy was adopted to identify and collect a representative sample of texts. We turned to women and men informants as one major source of expertise. Our women informants were most helpful in identifying specific, widely read authors. For men, in contrast, authors were less relevant than specific titles of serial publications.

We essentially asked one key question: What does the average woman or man read for erotic enjoyment? The sales figures of specific authors were quite telling for erotic women's fiction. Every one of the texts we selected for our corpus is a bestseller, and we can thus be quite confident that it was well-read. In contrast, men's texts left open the possibility that no reading was going on. All our male experts, however, assured us that specific sections of the serial publications they listed were eagerly awaited reading staples of such male bastions as the U.S. Navy.

The second step in selecting a representative corpus involved going to both mainstream and adult stores for a visual spot check of available titles. The spot check and suggested author/serial list appeared congruent, and we purchased a selection of texts. These are summarized in Tables 1 and 2 below. All of them were read in their entirety, and specific sections were then targeted for more detailed analysis. For the novels, targeted passages were all sex scenes. For the men's periodicals, we indicate the specific texts that provided the source material for our micro-analysis.

TABLE 1. *Data sources for women's texts: all romance novels, 1 serial-type*

Author	Publication date	Title
Shirlee Busbee	1991	*Whisper to Me of Love*
Jude Deveraux	1990	*Mountain Laurel*
Julie Garwood	1991	*The Prize*
Roberta Gellis	1988/90	*Masques of Gold*
Joanna Lindsey	1990	*Warrior's Woman*
Bertrice Small	1990	*The Spitfire*
Fayrene Preston	1991	*Satan's Angel* (Loveswept Serial Publ.)

TABLE 2. *Data sources for men's texts: 5 periodicals, 2 serial-type novels*

Magazine	Publication date	Article title
Playboy	1991	"My life with Joanne Christiansen" (Short story by Mark Alpert)
Playboy	1991	"Adviser" (Anonymous letters)
Penthouse	1991	*Forum* (Anonymous letters)
Penthouse	1991	*Hot Talk* (Anonymous letters)
Penthouse	1991	*Variations* (Anonymous letters)
Blue Moon-Victorian	1991	*Tropic of Venus* (Anonymous author)
Masquerade Books	1990	*Memoirs of Madeleine* (Anon. author)

Data analysis

There were two interrelated focal areas of interest: print environment and representations of actual sex acts. We essentially wanted to know the contexts in which sexual experiences occurred as well as how they were portrayed.

For women's texts, this involved reading the entire novels in order to identify relevant passages and to ascertain the narrative and literary conventions within which they were embedded. The sex scenes in men's texts seemed initially decontextualized in that they lacked substantial narrative development. However, we recognized that print-environment includes extraliterary, even extralinguistic dimensions, such as number of pages, narrative length, graphic conventions, and advertisements which mimic typical pictorial displays in the better-known visual erotic style of men's periodicals. We decided to attend to these dimensions as well as to their possible interaction with verbal text.

Once the investigative focus narrowed to the actual representations of sex acts, we examined stylistic variation. Even a cursory reading makes it clear that systematic stylistic differences existed across the two groups of texts. More systematic analyses of lexical, syntactic, and narrative choices within and across 220-word samples from each text were undertaken to determine which linguistic choices contributed to the observed register variation. These microlevel analyses also made it possible to evaluate stylistic consistency for each group of text.

Our final investigative technique was adapted from the work of Ochs, Taylor, Rudolph, and Smith (1992) on narrative structure, itself a modification of earlier work on story grammar. Given the prominent role of narrative voice in instantiating the prototypically female and male-oriented erotic styles, it seemed likely that other narrative elements would emerge as key indicators of both stylistic variation and erotic preferences. We focused on the distribution of three story-grammar elements in particular—representations of actions, experiences, and internal responses—in narrations of erotic climax. This was done by assigning clauses to one of the three representation types for the duration of the experience.

FINDINGS

General print environment

When we compare the general print environment within which sex scenes occur, some interesting differences between the men's and women's texts arise. In women's texts, the print environment consists of long, drawn-out, involved stories, often with glamorous and Gothic elements. Typical characters might include kings and queens, fighter pilots, or other romantic figures, and there is often a tone of mystery and suspense; for example, a key character might have a dual identity, and a good many plot complications are derived from that fact. In contrast, men's texts are frankly sex-centered. Periodicals consist of a mix of erotic text, visual features such as pictorials, advertisements for sexual services, and some articles of general interest.[4] In the case of the novels, the plots tend to be skeletal, mostly serving to move the story from one sexual situation into the next.

In women's texts, the principal characters are well-developed, while in men's, the only substantial character development is that of the narrators of the novels, and their characterization remains relatively superficial. There is little description of other characters, except for the ubiquitous physical descriptions of female participants in the sex scenes. This is true of both the periodicals and the novels, as the following two excerpts show:

> Annette's black hair reached to the middle of her back. She had nice, firm, handful-size tits, with big, dark-brown, pierced nipples. There was hardly any body fat on her at all. She was curvy but nicely lean. (*Forum*:56)

> I could have kissed every inch of Judith's slim legs as they moved so easily at first. Her lips were lightly parted and she breathed easily. Her silk briefs were elastic tight, and I saw how the leather prow of the bicycle saddle pressed between her lusciously developed cunt-lips. How, I wonder, can a woman ride such a contraption and still keep her virtue? From the rear I observed the tight silk as it shaped the demure nymph-cheeks of Judith Terry's bottom, gently rounded by her efforts. (*Tropic of Venus*:160)

This difference most likely is due to the differing requirements of each group of texts. The relative wealth of both characters and character development contributes to the complicated stories that are such an integral part of romance novels, whereas the preference for almost immediate sexual experimentation appears to inhibit other narrative elements in men's erotica.

As we have already hinted above, narrative voice emerged as one key distinguishing feature in our corpus. Women's texts usually employ an omniscient narrator, while men's texts are generally narrated in the first person, most often by an anonymous narrator confessing his/her sexual experimentation. The use of an omniscient narrator seems to heighten the romantic or Gothic tone of the romance novels, while the *de rigueur* first-person voice of the men's texts lends these a "true crime" quality reminiscent of the string of reality shows that have recently become popular on TV. In other words, the narrative stance observed in women's texts underscores their fantasy quality while that of the men's texts invokes the illusion of reality. This finding hints at a very interesting dialectic between fantasy and reality for male readers, where a fantasy has to appear real in order to be satisfying.

Our first impression was that the women's texts were rich in context, while the men's lacked context. However, this generalization did not accurately capture the nature of the print environment in the latter group. Women's texts contain more *verbal* context, with richer stories and more developed characters. In contrast, the print environment of the men's texts—at least in periodicals—is couched in the context of pictorials and advertisements, usually for phone sex. In fact, the advertisements in men's periodicals are so numerous and explicit, they might be considered part of the text. Our informants indicate that ads and pictorials are certainly part of the attraction of the magazines. One could say that the erotic material, together with the other elements of the entire magazine, form a multi-media text with a distinct tilt towards visual representation; and as shall become clear below, that tilt is even carried into the very language of male-oriented erotica.

An additional striking feature of the men's texts, including the novels, was their propensity to offer specific directions to the reader. Depending on their particular sexual interests, readers can peruse a table of contents and decide what portions of the book or magazine to turn to. This seems consistent with the widespread observation that male readers prefer to get to their specific sexual interests quickly. The directions included at the beginning of most periodicals and one of the novels give them the means to find what kind of sex they want to read about quickly; moreover, once they turn to the directed page, sexual activity begins right away. Our informants confirmed that this kind of expediency is indeed a priority of male readers of erotic texts.

A further difference has to do with the way sex itself is portrayed. Men's texts seem obsessed with the messiness of sex; indeed, they often describe ejaculation in graphically gleeful detail, while such prosaic matters are left notably undiscussed in women's texts. One of the men's texts contained the following passage:

> I shot hot streams of milky come while she continued her manipulations. The first spurt went into her mouth. Next she aimed my tool at each of her tits in succession. Each one got a direct hit on the nipple. She then placed my cock between her tits, pushed them together to surround my cock, and rapidly moved them up and down. My cock continued to ejaculate wads of viscous liquid which now struck her in the chin and neck. (*Hot Talk*:63)

Consider, in contrast, the following typical excerpt from one of the women's texts:

> She stuck her tongue in his ear and he slammed into her with such blinding force, that for a second she couldn't see as she saw bright white light and her body rocked in tremors. It was minutes later that she was able to breathe again, and she could feel Ring's heart thudding against her breast. He took a few steps backward with Maddie locked around him, then he knelt with her, pried her legs from his waist, smiled at Maddie's groan when their connection was broken, then lay down on the floor, Maddie held securely to him. (Deveraux:272)

In addition, men's texts tend to focus on sexual variety: Group sex, anal sex, and voyeurism figure prominently, and several positions are often assumed in one encounter. Women's texts, on the other hand, present the sex act in a more prototypical and traditional way: Intercourse and simultaneous orgasm reign supreme, with oral sex the only consistent source of sexual variety.[5]

Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, there are significant differences between the proportion of print dedicated to sex scenes: In women's texts, percentages range from roughly 3% to 9%, while in men's, percentages range from 27% to 100%, with most texts devoting 75% to 95% of print to depicting sexual encounters. Again, this appears to be a function of the characteristic mixture of elements preferred by each group of erotica readers: complicated and glamorous stories for women, frank and variegated sexual encounters for men. The proportion of print dedicated to sexual encounters for each text in our corpus is summarized in Table 3 below:

TABLE 3. *Proportion of print dedicated to representations of sex acts*

Women's texts	Total words	Sex xcenes		Men's texts	Total words	Sex xcenes	
Busbee	179,000	9,700	5.4%	*Playboy*-Fic.	4,100	1,100	27%
Deveraux	90,000	2,900	3.2%	*Playboy*-Adv.	3,000	800	27%
Garwood	112,000	5,400	4.8%	*Forum*	37,000	28,400	77%
Gellis	196,000	7,200	3.7%	*Hot Talk*	37,000	27,800	75%
Lindsey	102,000	5,400	6.3%	*Variations*	31,000	31,000	100%
Preston	44,000	3,900	8.7%	*Memoirs*	55,000	52,000	94%
Small	183,000	16,400	9%	*Venus*	66,000	62,000	94%

Representations of sexual encounters

Generally speaking, representations of sex acts mirror the preferences found in the print environment. They are embedded in grand scenes for women's texts while they have an immediate, graphic quality in men's texts. Scenes tend to go on for pages in the romance novels, and each erotic act elicits elaborate description, whereas the same activity would merit a sentence, and rarely more than a paragraph, in our male-oriented sample. In fact, most of the sex scenes in the latter were written up in the form of anonymous letters detailing some unusual sexual experiences, and most of these letters tended to be relatively short. Something like the slow seductive build-up typical of romance-novel sex scenes could thus be reduced to: "We relaxed in my bedroom with our clothes on for some time when we arrived at my place. After a while we had built up the motivation to have raw, hungry sex" (*Forum*:64). This reduction can hence be explained as much by the general textual conventions of romance- versus letter-writing as by any direct relationship between text and erotic preference, and a lengthening of sorts does occur in the two novels that form part of our men's corpus. Moreover, the latter samples shared a number of microlinguistic features with the women's corpus.

Our microlinguistic analysis exploited a few well-known measures of text variation in order to identify the source and the consistency of language differences in our corpus. As we have already indicated, even a cursory reading of the corpus indicated striking register differences between the women's and men's texts. A focused analysis could help determine the precise source of this variation. In keeping with widely practiced conventions from written discourse analysis (cf. Patthey 1988) we formulated two hypotheses, one focusing on lexical, the other on syntactic variation as a possible source of the observed register differences.

Below are the actual hypotheses, the results of our quantitative testing, and an overview of our findings in Table 3. We settled on simple t-tests as an adequate means of hypothesis testing, using a matched collection of equivalent textual excerpts as the basis of all quantitative comparisons. One roughly 220-word passage anchored by the occurrence of an orgasm was pulled from each text. This assured equivalency of action and theme in our excerpts, and allowed for a comparison of purely linguistic variation.

Hypothesis 1:	Women's texts exhibit greater lexical variety than men's texts.
Measures:	Type/token ratio (T/T) and word length (WL)

Confirmed with men's novels for WL (t = -3.048, p < .05), but not for T/T (t = -1.623, .05 < p < 1) Confirmed for both measures if men's novels are excluded (T/T t=-3.636, p<.05; WL t = -3.21, p < .05).

| Hypothesis 2: | Women's texts exhibit greater sentential complexity. |
| Measure: | Sentence length (SenL) |

Not confirmed with novels included or excluded (t = -1.071, p > .1; t = -1.514, p > .1)

TABLE 4. *Overview of lexical and sentential measures in textual samples*

W's texts	T/T	WL	SenL	M's texts	T/T	WL	SenL
Busbee	.5940	5.98	33.42	*Playboy*-Fic	.4529	5.13	13.12
Deveraux	.5600	5.39	17.31	*Playboy*-Adv	.5363	5.34	16.92
Garwood	.5509	5.66	*9.82	*Forum*	.4935	4.80	13.00
Gellis	.5794	5.41	19.42	*Hot Talk*	.5540	5.13	13.06
Lindsey	.5417	5.32	30.00	*Variations*	.5046	5.43	15.57
Preston	.5890	5.77	13.69	*Memoirs*	*.6150	5.44	18.00
Small	.5780	5.65	18.17	*Venus*	*.5833	5.38	25.11
Means	.5700	5.60	20.26	Means	.5340	5.22	16.40

* Outliers

A number of interesting observations can be gleaned from this quantitative work-up. The one hypothesis that was confirmed indicates that lexical differences constitute the main differentiating dimension in the present data. This was certainly the case impressionistically; women's texts used a vocabulary to suit the Gothic or romantic fantasy being constructed, while men's language could be likened to "locker-room talk," again a style consistent with the textual conventions within which that erotica was embedded. The fact that our second hypothesis was not confirmed is somewhat surprising considering the mean differences in sentence length between the two sets of data. This is most likely due to two factors: the fact that the men's novels consistently resembled the romances, and the fact that one of the romances had the shortest mean sentence length in the entire corpus. While that second factor simply represents one outlying observation, we feel that the first may represent a trend. By our present indicators, the men's corpus appears to split into two distinct styles: one used in the periodical literature, the other in the novels, and possibly in other more literary erotica like erotic short stories.[6] However, as our previous analysis has already established, this is only true in the microlinguistic sense. On other dimensions, men's texts were found to be quite unitary.

On the whole, these results point to a need for qualitative discourse analysis. Some of our observations no doubt capture either stylistic requirements or audience preferences, or, most likely, an interaction of the two. Qualitative discourse analysis is the only means by which to get at these underlying dimensions.

Qualitative findings

Given the key role of lexical choices in establishing the different erotic styles of our corpus, we start our qualitative analysis by focusing on these choices. A striking difference between women's and men's texts lies in the terminology used to depict sexual organs in representations of sex acts. We chose to compare these because they were one easy equivalent feature to track across our entire corpus and because they seemed to capture the essence of the differences between groups.

Women's texts represent the sex organs metaphorically; for example, they might refer to a woman's vagina as *the silken heat* or *the seemingly endless depths of her*. The penis is often portrayed as the very essence of masculinity: *manhood*, *maleness*, and *manroot* are commonly used. Men's texts, on the other hand, tend to use more literal, "locker-room"-type terminology, such as *cunt, cock, prick*, and *pussy*. At times, however, men's texts, particularly the novels, refer to genitalia metaphorically: *cunt's little sentinel, sweet honeypot, magic wand*, and *love-rod*. Though such metaphoric use in our corpus generally occurred in the novels, one periodical—*Penthouse Hot Talk*—exhibited this as well. The metaphors found there were more literally physical than those found in the novels; we discovered such terms as *heat-seeking missile, pole*, and *massive meat*.

Indeed, this reflects a general trend in which women's texts tend to romanticize depictions of genitalia while men's texts objectify them. Women's texts tend to personify sexual organs, making them transcend their status as organs into representations of the essence of the character. Consider, for example, this excerpt from Busbee: "In one frenzied movement he buried himself deeply within her" (256). Similarly, Garwood writes: "She'd taken all of him inside her" (323). Men's texts, in contrast, focus on the organs in a manner analogous to a close-up photo: "Her expert cunt-muscles gripped my shaft firmly" (*Forum:*58). Tables 5 and 6 give a representative overview of the words found in our corpus:

TABLE 5. *Lexical variety used for* vagina *and* penis *in women's texts*

Terms	Examples
area/spot:	that same achingly sensitive area; her most sensitive spot;
flesh:	the highly sensitized flesh; the silken flesh;
heat:	the heat; the silken heat; the sweet heat;
fabric/sheath:	the soft, silken sheath of her; her tight, warm sheath; the satiny clasp; innocent silken casing;
others:	the sharp ache; a soft, warm bed; the seemingly endless depths of her; her love cave; her femaleness; the empty nest; nether lips; her Venus mont; her woman's passage; forbidden zone.
manhood:	his manhood; his maleness; his manroot; his standing man; the sheer rigid bulk of his manhood;
flesh:	his aching flesh; the hard flesh; his swollen flesh;
member:	his rigid member; the throbbing force of his achingly full member;
shaft:	his shaft; swollen shaft; his bulging shaft;
hardness/size:	his hardness; swollen hardness; his hard arousal; the size and heat of him;
others:	his hard throbbing length; the swollen length of him; Master Cockrobin; a rod; the tip of his arousal; sword

TABLE 6. *Lexical variety used for* vagina *and* penis *in men's texts*

Terms	Examples
high frequency:	pussy; cunt; crotch;
others:	box; cunny; clitty; cunt's little sentinel; cleft of nether lips; dripping pit; fertile furrow; fox hole; sweet honeypot; tiny hard nodule; love-box; love pouch; creamy love-hole; tiny knob; twat; pulsating wet slit; tunnel; vagina.
high frequency:	cock; crotch; dick; prick;
others:	growing bulge; hard steady bulge; hard male flesh; hard on; hot rod; knob; love-rod; lightning pole; massive meat; manhood; member; heat-seeking missile; penis; prong; pole; throbbing prick; pulsating prick; shaft; magic wand.

Tables 5 and 6 also capture one final consistent difference between women's and men's texts. The distribution pattern of lexical choices was quite distinct. Men's texts used a few words over and over, but also exhibited much creativity. In fact, we found a dizzying array of words, and this seemed to be the one area in which men's texts exulted in verbal play and possibility. Women's texts manifested neither high-frequency use nor much creativity in their lexical choices.

Our final qualitative analysis concentrates on narrative voice, a textual element that consistently indexed diverging stances between the two groups of erotic texts in our corpus. Women's texts privileged omniscient narration, a form that allows equal access to the feelings and responses of all, but especially its lead female and male characters; men's texts privileged first-person narration, a point of view that tended to favor the actions and experiences of the protagonists. Modifying earlier work on the elements of narration (cf. Ochs et al. 1992), we examine the distribution of three of these elements in particular—representations of actions, experiences, and internal responses—in narrations of erotic climax. Essentially, this coding scheme assigns clauses to one of these three groups based on whether it narrates a character action, an experience such as a feeling or sensation, or an internal response, which has a more cognitive and less immediately visceral tone than the preceding.[7]

The results of this analysis were quite striking. It uncovered a differentiating dimension between the two groups of texts in our corpus that is both consistent and revealing. On the whole, women's narrations of erotic climax devoted around 70% of total words recounting experiences and internal responses, whereas men's narrations devoted 80% of theirs to actions. Tables 7 and 8 below give an illustrative and coded sampling of three women's and three men's narrations. In each case, we start with one of the most extreme cases of gender-related divergences, a narration that has little action in the case of the women's texts, and nothing but action in the case of the men's texts, and then move to progressively more convergent examples.[8]

TABLE 7. *Proportion of text dedicated to* action, experience, *and internal response in three women's narratives of erotic climax* [9]

Ecstasy already spiraling up through her body from the moment he entered her, Morgana moved wildly beneath him, *wanting him to drive into her, wanting his fiercest possession.* Her mouth against his, she pleaded huskily, "Oh, please ... please love me!" She heard his guttural exclamation, almost a growl of assent, then nothing as his big body slammed into hers again and again, sending such an inferno of dazzling ecstasy exploding through her *that she thought she would faint from the joy of it.*

With savage satisfaction, Royce felt the pulsations that racked her, and freed now to find his own pleasure, *in a frenzy to reach that desperately longed-for peak,* he plunged more frantically into the velvety heat of her body. A second later, *making no effort to hide the delight her body gave him,* she shuddered violently and moaned softly as he found his own delirious release. (Busbee:314)
Distribution of words: Act.: 39 (26%)   Exp.: 64 (43%)   *Int. Resp.:* 45 (30%)

Knowing he couldn't hold off his completion much longer, he slipped his hand between them and stoked her, then captured her sounds of passion with his mouth, *unbearably stimulated by them.* Suddenly, she stiffened, and he felt her contractions begin, gently squeezing him, *not so gently driving him beyond sanity.*

Gripped by savageness he had never known, he raised up and pumped powerfully into her, once, twice, and a third time. Then his own body convulsed, and violent shudders racked him as he emptied himself into her. (Preston:114)
Distribution of words: Act.: 41 (47%)   Exp.: 27 (31%)   *Int. Resp.:* 19 (22%)

Arabella almost purred her approval as he probed once more into her yet tender sheath, moving rhythmically upon her with careful, measured strokes which soon set her whimpering with frustration, *for the manroot she had feared too large but minutes ago now seemed not large enough.* (Small:180)
Distribution of words: Act.: 15 (33%)   Exp.: 10 (22%)   *Int. Resp.:* 21 (45%)

TABLE 8: *Proportion of text dedicated to* action, experience, *and internal response in three men's narratives of erotic climax*

I shot hot streams of milky come while she continued her manipulations. The first spurt went into her mouth. Next she aimed my tool at each of her tits in succession. Each one got a direct hit on the nipple. She then placed my cock between her tits, pushed them together to surround my cock and rapidly moved them up and down. My cock continued to ejaculate wads of viscous liquid which now struck her in the chin and neck. (*Hot Talk*:63)
Distribution of words: Act.: 80 (100%)   Exp.: 0 (0%)   *Int. Resp.:* 0 (0%)

Now I was ready to fuck. As I was preparing my cock for its grand entrance, Annette whispered "Fuck me hard, stud. Real hard," in my ear. So I thrust with one powerful stroke. Her expert cunt-muscles gripped my shaft firmly. She released a heavy sigh from her throat and wrapped her legs around my back. *I was ready for an intense orgasm,* but I wanted to hold on for a while longer. I started pumping her slowly, *enjoying the wonderful sensations,* looking down at my cock, pulling almost all the way out and then pushing in up to my balls. ... I shot my load deep inside her creamy cunt, then collapsed on top of her. (*Forum*:58)
Distribution of words: Act.: 92 (79%)   Exp.: 7 (6%)   *Int. Resp.:* 17 (15%)

She took my cock down her throat slowly, sort of teasingly. *I was too horny to tease her back. I just wanted action.* My tongue was passionately darting in and out of her sweet honey-pot. I was trying to give her as much pleasure <u>as she was giving me</u>. (*Hot Talk*:20)

Distribution of words: Act.: 32 (65%)   <u>Exp.</u>: 5 (11%) *Int. Resp.*: 12 (24%)

These results suggest at least one promising way to characterize a fundamental difference between women's and men's erotica: The former revel in the experience of sexual pleasure and devote most of their textual resources to recounting that experience and the reaction it brings forth; the latter are more preoccupied with the actions leading to and indexing sexual pleasure. With women's texts, we enter into the experience through the feelings and reactions of its leading characters; with men's, through the actions taken to bring about and display pleasure. In brief, one could be called an experience-centered, the other a performance-centered style.

These narrative orientations are reminiscent of the contrasting preference for a verbal versus a visual style found in the two erotic traditions. The former invite the reader to get swept up in the emotion and visceral experience of sexual pleasure, whereas the latter displays sexual acts and orgasmic responses as if on a verbal screen. These differing orientations hint at fundamentally different readership preferences which no doubt color the entire textual structure of the two erotic streams. It appears that women's erotica is particularly satisfying when it is involving and personal, two requirements which can be met through interesting stories and characters. In contrast, men's erotica is more satisfying when it generates a thrilling sense of adventure and experimentation, with the unknown—whether in the form of a mysterious stranger or sexual practice—as a primary source of ever more variegated sexual adventures.

CONCLUSION

In keeping with the rest of this analysis, many of our conclusions are quite preliminary. In fact, our findings raise a host of questions about the interaction between the stylistic divergences observed and the social, psychological, and gender dynamics underlying and generating our corpus.

It certainly appears to be the case that the unique stylistic features of our women's corpus express the emerging erotic preferences of a female readership. For perhaps the first time, women are appropriating the verbal means of cultural production to create their alternative erotic current, and through it they perhaps are finding the means to voice their alternative sexual reality. In saying this, we echo Thursten's (1987) conclusion after her pioneering research in this area. Furthermore, compare our findings to one recent article on an emerging stream of videoerotica targeted to a women audience:

Candida Royal's *Urban Heat* differs from the typical adult film scenario in several ways: the woman initiates the contact; there is prolonged foreplay in which the man pleasures the woman; there are no close-ups of commingling genitalia; and, above all, we do not witness that trademark of traditional porn flicks—the Vesuvian eruption of the man's orgasm. (Gould:144)

Like the audience of this new video style, the one targeted by our romance corpus shows a distinct preference for pleasurable experience and shies away from the messy realities leading to that experience.

Women's erotica is different from men's erotica. It privileges a different erotic voice, one that cannot simply be reduced to an inverted model of men's erotica. One question this raises is the extent to which that textual voice represents the actual erotic preferences of the many different readerships comprised by women. A second question is how compatible the two voices uncovered here are. The seemingly unchanging themes in our corpus of male erotica would seem to perpetuate a bicultural, uneasy coexistence. The projected ideal men and women in the two strands do not appear very compatible, for instance. Whether some common ground between the two might emerge in other areas, however, is essentially an empirical question.

In fact, it is our opinion that none of the questions raised by our findings can really be answered without further empirical research. Much of what has been said and written about men's erotica and its influence on both male readers and female personhood has not been empirically well-grounded. An analysis of women's erotica, meanwhile, has only become possible presently, with the recent historical emergence of such texts. Even our own corpus falls short in several respects. We made a conscious decision to start with the most clearly gendered genres in order to establish the parameters of divergence, in order to get as clear a picture as possible of what women and men like to read for their erotic enjoyment. We would now like to turn our attention to several textual strands that either do not have this clearly established and gendered readership, or that do not have the same explicitly erotic *raison d'être* as our current corpus. For instance, the novels of Danielle Steele and Jackie Collins represent a possible contemporary equivalent of our romance corpus, and a number of popular thrillers and adventure novels read mainly by men feature a prominent erotic component. It is possible that these streams represent areas of convergence between women's and men's erotica, or, alternatively, that they represent yet more stylistic possibilities. Only further study will tell.

NOTES

1. One issue that needs to be addressed immediately is our choice to exclude *Playgirl* from our sample, and thus from our comparison. We selected texts with an established and gendered mass readership, and with a history--whether covert or overt--of erotic appeal as *reading*. *Playgirl* does not have the wide, loyal, and regular readership enjoyed by erotic romances. Moreover, *Playgirl* could be characterized as an inversion of the male model of erotic texts, and this throws its status as female erotica somewhat in doubt. In style and content, it mimics the male erotic periodical literature and is not found particularly appealing by any of our romance-reading informants. It is conceivable that we could add *Playgirl* to our analysis at a later date and compare the erotic reading material in it to our findings.

2. For an excellent review of various feminist analyses of the issue, see Hall, this volume.

3. We do not wish to suggest a one-to-one relationship between the thoughts and ideals expressed in the erotic text and those of the texts' presumed audience. These texts are complex products mediating a host of Discourses in the process of generating their own. Sexual preferences

and sexual fantasies clearly interact with prevalent ideologies about sexual conduct, yielding conflicted, sometimes contradictory, often fascinating results.

4. We need to point out, however, that even general-interest articles dealt with sexual topics, such as birth control or the HIV epidemic. The only exception to this rule was *Playboy*.

5. There was one exception to this rule in our corpus, a story in which some sadomasochism and one ménage-à-trois appeared. This romance was also the one with the greatest proportion of print dedicated to sex scenes, and appears to represent the most daring fringe of the genre.

6. One way to pursue this point further in the future might be to examine the lexical and sentential qualities of some of the better-known literary erotica, like Anaïs Nin's short stories.

7. Coding was by no means easy, given the interrelated nature of our three categories. Several cases required some discussion, others were repeatedly re-analyzed, but in the end, we arrived at essentially satisfactory codings.

8. It is interesting to note that the final, most convergent examples in each case come from texts that are in some sense unusual: In the case of the women's corpus, it comes from the most adventuresome and least traditional romance, in the case of the men's, it comes from a letter about a "shy guy."

9. Roman type indicates an action, underlining an experience, and italics an internal response.

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Gender displays among family and friends: Taking the role of another

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INTRODUCTION: LANGUAGE, IDENTITY, ROLES, AND ACTIONS IN SOCIOLINGUISTIC INTERVIEWS

Studies of language and social interaction often suggest that identities of self and other are locally situated. A single identity is not maintained throughout an extended period of time; instead, different facets of identity may be highlighted or submerged. This dynamic view of identity suggests that what people take one another "to be" is open to intentional manipulation by self and to interpersonal negotiation between self and other. Such processes produce variation not only during the course of a lifetime or a phase of life, but also during the course of a single interaction and its various speech activities. Many studies of the language used during sociolinguistic interviews, however, assume that informants (the people using that language) have stable social identities that can be coded in terms of discrete, static categories. In earlier work of my own, for example, I described several of my informants as follows: "Henry and Zelda are a middle-aged couple. … Irene is Zelda and Henry's younger next-door neighbor" (Schiffrin 1987:46). Although gender identities are implicit in these descriptions (through informants' names), I made other facets of social identity much more explicit: I described Henry and Zelda's age (*middle-aged*) and their relationship (*couple*); similarly, I described Irene's age in relation to the others (*younger*) and her relationship with the others (*neighbor*). In more recent work (Schiffrin 1992, forthcoming a), I have begun to question the stability of these identities and to examine how they are actively constructed and revealed even during sociolinguistic interviews. The identities that emerge during such occasions are just as situated as those that emerge during other occasions: people continually locate and relocate themselves in different sectors of their social worlds, continually defining and redefining themselves and their relationships with others.

An important part of identity is located in what sociologists call *social roles*. Learning the specific cluster of behaviors normatively expected of one who occupies a particular social position (Goffman 1961) is critical to the process of socialization into a specific community. As argued by George Herbert Mead (1934), this process is made possible by the symbolic resources provided through language and evidence of shared meanings provided during communication. To oversimplify a great deal, we learn the standards of normative behavior by observing how others respond to us, anticipating another's response, and incorporating a kind of generalized response into our own repertoire of actions and meanings. Although this process is critical to the emergence of communicative

competence (as well as the development of a self), it hardly ends once we are socialized. Not only is much of what we say explicitly or implicitly oriented toward reception by a hearer, but in addition we often continue to display an awareness of norms and standards in the way we use language and the way we interact with others.

In this paper, I analyze a set of interactional moves through which participants *take the role of another*: participants speak for others, speak about others, and prompt others to speak for themselves. In each case, one person (A) says something in line with A's definition of what is normatively expected (or obligatory) for incumbents of B's position. The way we take another's role can vary a great deal during a variety of activity types: such variation reveals the identities we attribute to both ourselves and others.

A brief example is (1), in which I am a sociolinguistic interviewer who is asking an informant (Irene) with whom she discusses her problems. Another informant (Zelda) is also present, but she is not explicitly addressed in this particular interchange.[1]

(1)

Debby:	(a)	How 'bout you Irene?
Irene:	(b)	What?
Debby:	(c)	Who would you-=
Zelda:	(d)	Who would you [discuss it with?
Debby:	(e)	=[if you had a hard day who would you complain to?
Zelda:	(f)	Jayhhhhh
Irene:	(g)	Uh:: I don't know.
	(h)	Depending on what- what the problem really was, I might talk to a friend easier.

My question (*How 'bout you Irene* (a)) is clearly addressed to Irene and it is Irene who asks for clarification (*What?* (b)), which I then begin to provide (*Who would you-* (c)). Zelda takes my role as questioner (*Who would you discuss it with?* (d)) as I also continue in my own role (*if you had a hard day who would you complain to?* (e)). Zelda then takes Irene's role as respondent (*Jayhhhhh* (f)) as Irene also continues in her own role, providing a response (*Uh:: I don't know. Depending on what- what the problem really was. I might talk to a friend easier.* (g)-(h)) that disagrees (but in a mitigated way) with Zelda's.

As suggested by (1), taking the role of another allows one person (Zelda) to issue a next-utterance from what is thought to be another's interactional position. Analysis of acts such as these thus provides an opportunity to see what one person (the person taking another's role) deems to be appropriate action from another (the person whose role is being taken). Who takes whose role and, just as importantly, the way one person takes the other's role also display definitions of self, other, and self-other relationship.

The inherent indexicality of these moves and their relationship to participants' own notions of norms for speaking make analyses of them very useful for our understanding of the relationship between language and gender. Much recent scholarship has focused on the silencing of women in public life (Gal 1991; Lakoff,

this volume). Although taking the role of another can have a similar silencing effect in private life, it can also be a collaborative act that conveys mutual support and shared responsibility for meaning. These two effects might be associated with communicative practices and goals often said to arise from gender: a silencing effect seems consistent with the idea that men approach conversation as an opportunity to negotiate status, while a supportive effect seems consistent with the idea that women emphasize connections and similarities (e.g., Gilligan 1982; Tannen 1990). As we see, however, people take others' roles in very particular interactional contexts and they can do so in a variety of ways; furthermore, they also take others' roles in ways that reflect other facets of their relationship (e.g., as spouses, as friends) and other dimensions of their social status (e.g., age). Thus, analysis of this act can provide detailed insights into ongoing displays and attributions of identities and how they are contextualized in talk.

I focus here on the ways that the three people mentioned initially—Henry, Zelda, and Irene—take each other's roles during sociolinguistic interviews. I draw upon examples from five interviews, about five hours of speech.[2] I begin in the next section by introducing the different participation statuses involved in taking the role of another. In the subsequent section, I present the different interactional moves through which participants take one another's role, illustrating and discussing each move and some of the different ways that the moves can be enacted. The final section compares the qualitative discussion with quantitative data and summarizes.

PARTICIPATION FRAMEWORKS AND STATUSES

A participation framework is the set of positions which individuals within perceptual range of an utterance may take in relation to that utterance (Goffman 1981:3). Four positions, or participation statuses, are important to the interactional move whereby one person takes the role of another: *animator*, *figure*, *author*, and *principal*. Although these positions can be filled by different people, what is important for our purposes is how a single individual can alternate among these positions during the course of her or his own talk, and how particular speech activities can reveal the relevance of these different participation statuses.

An *animator* is that aspect of self involved in the actual physical production of talk, "the talking machine, a body engaged in acoustic activity ... an individual active in the role of utterance production" (Goffman 1981:144). Self-repairs, for example, highlight the role of animator as one who monitors and adjusts the production of sounds and their intended meanings. A *figure* is that aspect of self displayed through talk. Stories, for example, present particular images of self through the construction and rendition of events and reactions to events. An *author* is responsible for the content of talk, "someone who has selected the sentiments that are being expressed" (Goffman 1981:144). When speakers report their own prior words, they are at once animator and author of what is being reported, but when speakers report another's prior words, they assign the authorial role to the original source of those words. A *principal* is "someone whose position is established by the words that are spoken, someone whose beliefs have been told, someone who is

committed to what the words say" (Goffman 1981:144). We typically assume that speakers believe the content of their own statements, such that evidence to the contrary is expected to be explicitly marked, e.g., by explicitly framing a statement as a joke, or by changes in grammatical mood.

As I have suggested through my examples above, different speech activities can highlight different participation statuses: self-repairs reveal an animator, stories reveal a figure, reported speech reveals an author, assertions reveal a principal. Taking the role of another is an act particularly interesting in this regard: responsibility for an utterance is divided between two people, with one person assigning different participation statuses to both self and other. The next section shows the different ways that this can be accomplished.

TAKING THE ROLE OF ANOTHER

In this section, I present the specific interactional moves through which participants take one another's role. Although in a moment I will illustrate and discuss each move and some of the different ways that they can be enacted, it will be helpful first to summarize how Zelda, Henry, and Irene took others' roles during the interviews. (The interviewer—myself in four interviews, Sally Boyd in one—is also included as someone whose role is taken; the interviewer never took others' roles.)

TABLE 1. *How participants take another's role*

	Speaks for	Speaks about	Prompts	Total
Zelda	13	23	10	46
Henry	4	14	7	25
Irene	2	8	0	10

Zelda is clearly the most involved in taking others' roles; Irene, the least involved. One reason for this may be that Irene is not present during all five interviews. Note, however, that Henry is not consistently present either; he nevertheless takes others' roles more than Irene. Thus Irene may take others' roles less often because she is younger or because of her relationship with the others (see the concluding section below). More interesting for our purposes (and less dependent on amount of speech per se) is the particular moves by which the participants take others' roles, and how, when, and to what effect each participant does so.

Speaking for another

Speaking for another is a move whereby one speaker (A) animates another's (B's) utterance to a third party (C) in an interactional slot sequentially relevant to B and C (Schiffrin, forthcoming b). In terms of Goffman's participation framework, A animates a message for a co-present author/principal B to C.

As we saw in Table 1, Zelda spoke for others more often than either Henry or Irene did. Zelda typically spoke for another within the interview frame itself, i.e., she either asked questions for me or answered questions addressed to others (as in (1)). Because these contributions fit precisely into the question/answer structure, they did not alter either the interview format or the dominant participant alignments.

Zelda also spoke for others during arguments, however, and here her contributions did make subtle adjustments in participant role in ways that reflected her solidarity with different participants. Zelda and Irene sometimes argued with Henry, for example, about women's roles inside and outside the family. During such arguments, Zelda and Irene were aligned opposite Henry, and Zelda would speak for Irene in ways that bypassed her solidarity with her husband, emphasizing instead her mutual stance with her neighbor concerning issues that affected them both as women. But when Zelda and Henry argued with Irene over issues that affected them as a couple, Zelda would speak for Henry in ways indicating a solidarity that paralleled the relationship being defended. In (2), for example, Henry disagrees with Irene's claim that Henry was not able to accept his father's second marriage.

(2)

Irene:	(a)	That was a different circumstance though.
	(b)	You did not- *you* wouldn't- haven't accepted *anybody* that your father married
	(c)	cause you didn't really- none of you [felt that that he should've married=
Henry:	(d)	[Yes I did. No:
Irene:		=again.
	(e)	I don't agree with [you.
Henry:	(f)	[These were-=
Zelda:	(g)	[Yes he would've accepted it!
	(h)	[Yes he would!
Henry:	(i)	=[these: were- [these were-
Irene:	(j)	[Oh Zelda come on!
Zelda:	(k)	Yes they would!
Henry:	(l)	Yes I would! Yes I would!

Henry initially defends himself by directly contradicting (*yes I did* (d)) Irene's charge that he didn't feel that his father "should've married again" (c). It is while Irene is disagreeing with Henry (*I don't agree with you* (e)) that Henry and Zelda both begin to counter Irene's challenge, Henry with *these were-* (f) and Zelda with a defense (*Yes he would've accepted it!* (g)) of Irene's more specifically directed attack on Henry (*you wouldn't ...* (b)). Although Henry continues to defend himself (i), Zelda also continues to speak for Henry (h) and it is Zelda to whom Irene responds (*Oh Zelda come on!* (j)). The fact that Irene redirects her remarks to Zelda shows that Zelda has created and gained entry into a participant role in which she is allied with Henry. Henry incorporates Zelda's defense (repeating *Yes I would!* (l)) for his own use, replicating not only her words, but her "contradicting" intonation (mid-rise followed by slight final fall at the end). Although Henry is still defending himself, the form and content of his defense is completely immersed in Zelda's strategy. Thus, Zelda's speech for Henry does not change the participant

structure—Irene is still the accuser, Henry the defendant—but it does redefine the way those participant roles are enacted.

Henry spoke for others in the interviews less than Zelda did (four times, compared to Zelda's 13), mostly during arguments in which Henry and Zelda defended to Irene the correctness of family decisions and actions. The link between speech for another and topic suggests that this act can display one's relationship or identity: Henry and Zelda spoke for each other as spouses during arguments in which their version of an experience portraying them as a close family was challenged by Irene; Zelda spoke for Irene during arguments with Henry about women's rights and responsibilities.

Speaking about another

Speaking about another is a move whereby B is a figure (i.e., is referred to through a third-person pronoun) in an utterance animated and authored by A and presented to C in an interactional slot that may (or may not) be sequentially relevant to the exchange between B and C. Although speaking for another, discussed in the previous section, can also involve third-person reference (as in Zelda's *yes he would* in (2)), what differentiates these two moves is the nature of responsibility for the content of the utterance and participation in the interchange: when A speaks for B, B is assumed as author and/or principal in a specific interactional slot, but when A speaks about B, neither B's commitment nor involvement can be assumed.

Speaking about another was the most frequent means by which all the participants took others' roles: Zelda did so 23 out of 46 times, Henry, 14 out of 25 times, and Irene, eight out of 10 times. Participants' speech about others sometimes had the same functions as their speech for others. Zelda, for example, spoke about others both within the interview frame itself (e.g., providing other-clarifications for me in my role as interviewer even if I had not identified a repairable), and in defense of Henry against Irene.

Speaking for another also had another function: metacommunication about the interaction or interactants. In (3), for example, I am recapitulating for Irene (who has just re-entered the room) a conversation with Henry that took place during her absence. During that conversation, Henry told me about the problems of interfaith relationships.

(3)

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Debby:  (a)  What also happened was that I said that I had uh a boyfriend who's not
             Jewish who - w- and we've talked about getting married.
Henry:  (b)  I don't want t'be the instrument of breaking you up.
        (c)  [It's you- your life=
Zelda:  (d)  [hhhhhhShe's goin' with him five=
Henry:  (e)  =[hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh
Zelda:       =[yearshhHenry!
        (f)  Hey Irene, she's goin' with him for five years, she'll come in here one time.
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After I summarize my own contribution to the prior conversation (a), Henry verbally removes himself from a position of influence over my life ((b)-(c)). It is

then that Zelda speaks about me, first directing her remarks to Henry (*She's goin' with him five years Henry!* (d)) and then to Irene (*Hey Irene, she's goin' with him for five years* (f)). Although both remarks maintain the switch in position taken by Henry himself (i.e., that he is not really able to influence my life), they also reframe Henry's remarks and the key of the exchange: Zelda begins with laughter (d) and Henry interrupts his own lecture style (*It's you- your life* (c)) to laugh with Zelda. Thus, Zelda's speech about me not only provides a metacommunicative commentary on the interaction (i.e., that Henry's lecture cannot be taken seriously), but it temporarily alters the participant alignments of talk.

Speaking about another also provides metacommunicative commentary focusing specifically on actions from, rather than interaction between, specific participants. Such commentary either continues or alters ongoing definitions of what is being said. Speech from Zelda, Henry, and Irene about others all supported the content of others' assertions, primarily through the addition of descriptive background, e.g., during a story by Henry about his brother, Zelda said, "He has a lot of love"; during a disagreement between Irene and Henry, Henry said, "She don't agree with me." But all three participants also spoke for another in ways that reframed others' actions, typically as non-serious. In fact, this was almost the only way that Irene took others' roles, and when she did, it was usually Henry who was spoken about in this way: *She never gets out of here because he talks so much!, Is he a pig!, You're gonna get him on that one!* Although these comments are critical in content, their key (i.e., their tone, their metamessage) is sociable (Schiffrin 1984). Furthermore, like the speech about others that maintained the key of others' remarks, these comments did not alter the dominant participation framework of ongoing talk. Thus, although Irene makes the three comments about Henry noted above, Henry continues to talk to me, Henry continues to eat the cake, and I continue to ask Henry a provocative question.

Prompting another to speak

Prompting another to speak is a move whereby A gets B to animate an utterance consistent with A's intentions (A is author and principal) and with A's definition of which interactional slot is sequentially relevant. Both Henry and Zelda prompt others to speak (Irene does not do this at all) but they do so in radically different ways. Examples (4) and (5) illustrate. (Fuller discussion is in Schiffrin, forthcoming b.)

(4)

```
Debby:  (a)  Yeh, who d'y'go bowling with?
Irene:  (b)  My next-door neighbors.
        (c)  We have a team in the summer we bowl.
        (d)  Every summer [they- husband and=
Zelda:  (e)                [Tell her who you=
Irene:       =[wife
Zelda:       =[bowl with.
Irene:  (f)  Who we bowl with.
Zelda:  (g)  D- y'know the teams.
```

Irene: (h) Oh. Wha'd'y'mean [the kids?
Zelda: (i)   [The kids.
Irene: (j) Oh yeh, this year the kids have their own team.

Zelda's *Tell her who you bowl with* (e) inserts her into what had thus far been a question/answer exchange between me and Irene: Zelda's role is somewhat like that of a monitor of the exchange who is assessing the adequacy of the answer and prompting Irene to animate what she herself has "in mind" as a suitable answer to the question. In terms of participant alignments, then, Zelda is taking a role not previously provided for her. She continues to prompt Irene (D- *y'know the teams* (g)); in addition to appealing to shared knowledge with *y'know* (Schiffrin 1987), she broadens the reference to *the teams*. Although Irene shows recognition with *oh* (Schiffrin 1987) and becomes more explicit (she refers to *the kids* (h)), she maintains Zelda's role as prompter of information by asking for Zelda's confirmation (*Wha'd'y'mean the kids?*). Zelda has already begun to provide her own explicit meaning (*The kids* (i)) which Irene not only repeats (j), but also marks (with *oh yeh*) as information inserted into the slot created by Zelda's prompting. Thus, Zelda prompts Irene by allowing her to share responsibility for information and eventually to take over her own authorship within the ongoing question/answer exchange. Put another way, although Zelda takes a role previously allocated to Irene, the way she does so actually eases Irene back into her own role.

Henry also prompts Irene, but he does so in such a way as to remove her authorial role and to redefine the structure of the exchange in which she has previously had a more dominant role. Prior to (5), I have been asking Irene with whom she is friendly. Here Irene is telling me how infrequently she sees her childhood friends.

(5)

Irene: (a) I keep in touch with them y'know I go to their affairs, but I don't *see* them
             that often. One lives in Jersey and one lives up in the Northeast.
Debby: (b) Umhmm.
Henry: (c) Tell her about the [girl you were real=
Irene: (d)   [But
Henry: (e) =close:, you were raised, and they got money, and they don't know you.
Irene: (f) Who? Barbara? Oh. Well ...
Henry: (g) Well she wants t'know!
Zelda: (h) Yeh but she's friends with her.
Irene: (i) I talk to her occasion[ally,=
Henry: (j)   [Yeh but=
Irene: (k) =[but eh: she: she: has moved to
Henry: =[tell the way it is.=
Irene: (l) =[Brookside and they have a whole new=
Henry: (m) =[She wants t'know. She wants t'know.
Irene: =circle of eh: [friends. Y'know.]
Debby: (n)   [Yeh. Got   ] snobbish.

Following his initial directive to Irene (*Tell her ...* (c)), Henry lists four events, recapitulating the experience that he wants Irene to report. Thus, Henry is "telling" Irene the answer, i.e., transferring information to her. Following the failure of

Henry's expansions to elicit the desired information, Henry brings in an external justification for his persistent prompting: he couples a renewed imperative (*Yeh but tell the way it is.* (j)) with repeated assertions that I want the information that he is after (*She wants t'know* (m)). Note, then, that Henry begins to speak about me: he uses me as an external validation for his own actions. Henry thus brings me back into the conversation, but with an altered role—as an addressed recipient—and the way he reevokes this role alters the agenda from the one I had established to one that he is directing.

The information that Irene eventually presents (*I talk to her occasionally, but eh: she: she: has moved to Brookside and they have a whole new circle of eh: friends* (i)-(l)) seems to be what Henry has been after. (It is after Irene's short story that Henry presents a more general theme (*Money makes a difference* (o), *Money's important to a lot of people* (q)) that he has reiterated numerous times during our interviews.) Yet Henry continues to prompt Irene during her story, and it is only after I present the "point" of the story (*Got snobbish* (n)) that Henry states his own theme. Thus, Henry's prompting continues until he is sure that what he had in mind has been not only said (animated by Irene) but also heard in a way consistent with the general theme that he is putting forth. Henry has done more than alter his footing in relation to Irene: he has shifted the structure of the discourse from a question/answer dialogue to a discussion of a general moral issue of which he is in control and to which he can orient his interlocutors.

In sum, (4) and (5) suggest that when Zelda prompted Irene, she did so as a way of building solidarity through positive politeness; Henry's use of this move gained control of participants' next moves and reoriented the direction of talk. Put another way, Zelda's prompts were inclusive and reinforcing: they allowed participants to continue their prior, relatively active, roles. Not only were Henry's realignments more divisive, but he also pursued them more completely, and they created more radical shifts in participant structure.

SUMMARY: WHO DOES WHAT?

I suggested initially that analysis of how speakers take others' roles provides an opportunity to see what one person deems to be appropriate action from another; it can thus provide insights into ongoing attributions of gender identities and how they are contextualized in talk.

The examples discussed suggest that Henry, Zelda, and Irene take others' roles in ways that display both the explicit identities and relationships that I had explicitly attributed to them (e.g., "married couple") and the implicit identities that I had assumed for them ("male," "female"). We saw, for example, that Zelda spoke for Henry when Irene challenged matters concerning their domestic harmony (reflecting the identity "married couple"), but that Zelda also spoke for Irene when Henry challenged matters having to do with their rights and responsibilities as women. We also saw that Zelda took others' roles in ways that did not alter the dominant participant alignments: for example, although Zelda frequently asked questions for me and provided answers for Irene, she fit those actions into the question/answer frame and transferred responsibility back to the initial author of the moves. Henry,

on the other hand, sought to redefine the participant structure more dramatically and did so in ways that sometimes removed from others their role as author of their own words. Although all three participants spoke about others in ways that either maintained or redefined the prior definition of what was said, almost the only time that Irene did take others' roles was when she spoke about Henry in ways that sought to redefine the key of some of his more overtly competitive ways of speaking. Differences such as these suggest that it is not only what people do when talking with one another, but very specifically how and when they do so, that displays who they are and who they take others to be.

The qualitative nature of much of my discussion in this paper reflects the need to consider the specific details of how and when people take others' roles. Nevertheless, it is also possible to use quantitative analyses to search for overall trends.[3] To this end, Tables 2, 3, and 4 show the different ways that participants take others' roles according to the social categories of gender (Table 2) and age (Table 3), and the social relationships of friend, spouse, and outsider (Table 4).

TABLE 2. *Gender and taking another's role*

	M → F	F → M	F → F	Total
Speak for	4	3	12	19
Speak about	14	13	18	45
Prompt	7	3	7	17
Total	25	19	37	81

The women in my interviews took other women's roles more often than they took Henry's role (37 times versus 19 times); Henry took the women's' roles 25 times. Each act had a different distribution across gender: most evenly distributed was speaking about another; most used by women with women was speaking for another; the women prompted Henry less often than he prompted them and less often than they prompted each other. These different distributions by act suggest the difficulty of making any hasty summaries about whether taking others' roles serves as an interactive device whose effects (silencing or support) are related to gender. Recall also that even the same act can have different interactive meanings: one can prompt either collaboratively or authoritatively. Thus, further quantitative work should seek to be more specific about the interactive meanings of who does what.

Table 3 shows that taking the role of another is an act that displays a striking age differential.

TABLE 3. *Age and taking another's role*

	O → Y	Y → O	O → O	Y → Y	Total
Speak for	13	1	4	1	19
Speak about	19	3	18	5	45
Prompt	14	0	3	0	17
Total	46	4	25	6	81

O = older participant; Y = younger participant

The older people in my interviews (Zelda and Henry) took either Irene's role or my role 46 times and they took each other's roles 25 times; the younger people took the older people's roles only six times (I never did so; only Irene did). This difference suggests that taking the role of another is an act associated with the kind of power that sometimes accrues with age; e.g., parents often speak for, speak about, and prompt their children. Intriguing in this regard is that Henry and Zelda spoke about one another more than they spoke for or prompted one another (18 times in the O → O column, compared to four and three respectively). This suggests that power differences are less critical to speaking about another than they are in the other two moves, perhaps because speaking about another can provide a metacommentary on action and interaction that either does not alter its future course or reframes it as sociable. Consistent with this idea is that Irene and Henry spoke about one another in ways that reframed the sometimes overtly competitive talk between them.

Table 4 shows the different acts according to relationship, i.e., who was the target of the act.

TABLE 4. *Relationships and taking another's role*

	Friend		Spouse	Outsider	Total
	Female/Female	Male/Female			
Speak for	8	3	4	4	19
Speak about	1	8	18	18	45
Prompt	3	2	3	9	17
Total	13	13	26	31	81

Taking the role of another was not differentiated by relationship: friends took each other's roles 26 times, spouses 26 times; my role as outsider was taken 31 times. Again, these figures obscure the interactional meanings of the acts and their dependence on how they were situated. A relatively straightforward example of how taking another's role conveyed domestic solidarity was when Zelda spoke for Henry during arguments defending their family life. But Zelda and Henry both prompted their friend Irene in ways that displayed very different facets of their friendship: Zelda in a way that gave Irene equal stature in constructing meaning, Henry in a way that used Irene to reinforce his own moral point. Differences such as these are not reflected in the quantitative data.

In sum, I have analyzed the way three people take others' roles during sociolinguistic interviews: participants speak for another, speak about another, and prompt others to speak for themselves. Because these acts display what one person deems to be appropriate action from another, analysis of these moves can be useful for our understanding of the relationship between language and gender. What we have seen here, however, is that the situated nature of these acts makes it difficult to conclude that the acts themselves have either a silencing effect (e.g., when men take roles for women) or a supportive effect (e.g., when women take roles for other women). Although we saw, for example, that Zelda seemed to prompt and speak

for Irene in supportive ways and Henry seemed to prompt Irene in ways that silenced her own voice (see also Schiffrin, forthcoming b), we also saw that people took others' roles in a variety of ways and in very particular interactional contexts, and that how and when they did so seemed to reflect not just gender, but other aspects of their relationship and identity. This finding suggests that although gender identity may very well be displayed by certain acts and attributed to those who perform such acts, it is how the act is performed and situated (not the act itself) that gives it that meaning.

NOTES

1 . Key to transcription conventions:
    .   falling intonation followed by a noticeable pause
    ?   rising intonation followed by a noticeable pause
    ,   continuing intonation; may be slight rise or fall in contour; may be followed by
               a pause
    !   animated tone
    ...   noticeable pause or break in rhythm without falling intonation
    -          self-interruption with glottal stop
    :   lengthened syllable
    italics   emphatic stress

2 . Interviews were carried out in a lower-middle-class Jewish community in Philadelphia. I thank William Labov for access to the data. I am also grateful to the National Science Foundation, grant BNS-8819845, for providing some time in which to first think about the ideas reported upon here.

3 . More informative quantitative analyses would require a group of participants better balanced for age, gender, and so on, and some sense of where and when the different acts are likely to occur (to compare when they are used to when they are not used).

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Preschool girls' discourse competence: Managing conflict[1]

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INTRODUCTION

Children's worlds are arenas in which power, privilege, and access are created, sought after, won, and lost. Preschool social struggles already reflect cultural definitions of power and gender. This paper addresses the question of how girls' attempts to influence each other, to negotiate their differences, and to get what they want are linguistically constructed. The kinds of verbal tactics that girls use to further their own interests in disputes are described. The focus of the paper is a complex example of four-year-old girls' verbal-conflict management. The analysis of this example is related to current discussions of how girls and women verbally engage in conflict, competition, and cooperation.

DISCUSSIONS OF GENDER DIFFERENCES IN VERBAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Gender differences are often framed in terms of polarities. Male groups and male conversations are often described in terms of *competition* and *hierarchy* (e.g., Goodwin 1980; Maltz & Borker 1982). Female groups and female conversations are often characterized as *cooperative* and *egalitarian* (Kalcik 1975; Maltz & Borker 1982). Although many aspects of children's conflicts have been studied (C. Shantz 1987), descriptions of the verbal tactics children use in conflict talk are quite new. A complicating factor is that much research has a male-centered bias. Boys' social behavior has been well-studied, with the result that, as Maccoby points out, "we have a clearer picture of what girls' groups do *not* do than what they *do* do" (1986:271). Male bias can also be seen in our cultural assumption that the norm for conflict involves aggressive behaviors. However, when measured against that norm, girls' behaviors have been interpreted as less forceful (Miller, Danaher, & Forbes 1986:543) or less assertive (Sachs 1987:185-88). The implication that girls are not as effective as boys at managing conflict is further reinforced by characterizations of girls' same-sex interaction as emphasizing an ethic of *harmony* and *collaboration* (Miller et al. 1986:547; Leaper 1991:796).

Interestingly, in male-dominated business settings, women have described themselves as "terrible at dealing with conflict," "hating conflict," "wanting people to get along," and "behind-the-scenes peacemakers" (Kolb 1992). Along the same lines, women colleagues in male-dominated academia have described themselves as "not allowing our disagreements to reach the point of confrontation" and "expert at developing strategies to avoid competition" (Keller & Moglen 1987:22). It has

even been suggested that competition is a feminist taboo (Longino & Miner 1987). On the other hand, studies of girls in the early, middle, and teenage years leave no doubt about the importance of competition in girls' social interaction. Some of these studies emphasize that girls' competitive behaviors often co-occur with cooperation and mitigation (Eckert 1990; Goodwin 1980; Hughes 1989; Sheldon 1992).

The picture that emerges from this research is that competition, conflict, and the exercise of power are complex social behaviors and psychocultural issues which have not yet been well described and understood for females. Furthermore, if they are described in the context of stereotypical masculine-related conflict behaviors, they run the risk of being interpreted as something "less" than the masculine mode, i.e., less than dramatic instances of brute force.

This paper continues to question the view that when compared to males, females are not effective at managing conflict or that they lack a competitive dynamic. I will analyze a vivid example of four-year-old girls' negotiation of power and disagreement that demonstrates the extremely skillful verbal negotiation that even preschool girls are capable of. This paper extends the work of Goodwin and Goodwin (1987) and Sheldon (1992, in press, and Sheldon & Johnson, forthcoming) which show that feminine-related conflict talk can be linguistically more complicated than masculine-related conflict talk. I have described this style of conflict talk as *double-voice discourse*. (Sheldon 1992:99)

DOUBLE-VOICE DISCOURSE

The theory of double-voice discourse reorients the debate about gender differences in talk from one described simplistically in terms of gendered polarities to one that reframes the issues and behaviors in a more complex way. Double-voice discourse reflects the active engagement of the speaker, usually female but not necessarily so, in verbal power plays and competition for access and privilege. I will show how double-voice discourse embodies conflict-mediation skills in which the speaker confronts without being confrontational, clarifies issues without backing down, and uses linguistic mitigators to soften the blow while she acts on her wishes and makes her agenda matter. In double-voice discourse, the speaker is responsive to the companion's point of view even while pursuing her own agenda. Self-assertion is mitigated and contextualized, but nevertheless effective.

GENDER AND CONFLICT

Conflict is a contest of wills. Gender ideology in American cultures gives males the license to argue in direct, demanding, and confrontative ways, with unmitigated rivalry. Girls and women can't or we will be called *bossy*, *confrontational*, *bitchy*, *difficult*, or worse for the same behaviors for which boys and men are called *manly* or *assertive*. The gender ideology of middle-class white America requires girls and women to "be nice." Sachs (1987) finds that preschool girls have already learned to "say it with a smile," pursuing their agendas and

interests within the constraint that they not cause too much stress or jeopardize interpersonal harmony in their intimate groups.

THE STUDY

The conversations to be discussed here come from a sample of 36 middle-class, predominantly white three- to five-year-old preschool children in a large Midwestern city. They were grouped into same-sex triads and videotaped during unsupervised play at their day-care center for more than thirteen hours (see Sheldon 1990 and 1992 for a discussion of the procedures of this study). The examples of conflict discussed here both involve one child's attempts to enter the play of another child. The conflicts include disagreements about sharing playthings. Entry into play with another child has been recognized as a difficult achievement even for socially competent children, and it is a process which often gives rise to conflict (Corsaro 1981; Garvey 1984).

AGGRAVATED CONFLICT TALK AMONG PRESCHOOL BOYS

First, by way of contrast, consider an example of a dispute from a boys' triad that fits a familiar masculine-related cultural model of conflict, in which insistence and brute force can be acceptable strategies for trying to get what one wants. Linguistically aggravated and physically aggressive conflict exchanges of the sort in (1) through (9) below have been found more often in boys' interaction than in girls' (see discussion in Goodwin 1980; Leaper 1991; Miller et al. 1986; Sheldon 1990), although, as Goodwin demonstrates, girls have the same linguistic capacities as boys to argue in an aggravated manner. This conflict-talk style uses direct, unmitigated, confrontational speech acts. Because the interactants have the single orientation of pursuing their own self-interest without orienting to the perspective of their partner or tempering their self-interest with mitigation, I term this dispute style *single-voice discourse* (Sheldon 1992:100).

Example 1: Boys' single-voice discourse: "That's my phone"

Charlie (4.0) and Tony (4.1) are together. Tony is sitting on a small foam chair/couch and is pushing the buttons on a touch-tone telephone base that is on his lap. Charlie is nearby. (Emphasized words are capitalized.)

(1) Tony: I pushed two squares (*giggles*), two squares like this. (*pushes phone buttons*)
(2) Charlie: (*comes closer, puts his fist up to his ear, and talks into an imaginary phone*) Hello!
(3) Tony: (*puts his fist up to his ear and talks back*) Hello.
(4) Charlie: (*picks up the receiver that is on Tony's chair*) No, that's my phone!
(5) Tony: (*grabs the telephone cord and tries to to pull the receiver away from Charlie*) No, Tha- ah, it's on MY couch. It's on MY couch, Charlie. It's on MY couch. It's on MY couch.

(6) Charlie: (*ignoring Tony, holding onto the receiver, and talking into the telephone now.*) Hi. (*walks behind Tony's chair, the telephone base is still on Tony's lap*)
(7) Tony: (*gets off the couch, sets the phone base on the floor*) I'll rock the couch like this. (*he turns the foam chair over on top of the telephone base and leans on it as Charlie tries to reach for it under the chair*) Don't! That's my phone!
(8) Charlie: (*pushes the chair off the telephone and moves it closer to himself, away from Tony*) I needa use it.
(9) Tony: (*kneeling, sits back on his heels and watches Charlie playing with the phone*)

In this conflict each child tries physically to overpower the other in order to use the telephone. Neither child negotiates or tries to persuade the other for a turn. Neither voluntarily reconciles his wishes with the other's. Insistence escalates rather than ends the opposition and leads to aggressive responses and a forceful resolution. Only a limited range of problem-solving strategies are tried here. This pattern of conflict management among boys is discussed further by Coie (1987) and David Shantz (1986).

DOUBLE-VOICE DISCOURSE IN GIRLS' CONFLICT TALK

The girls in the larger sample in this study also engaged in directly insistent confrontations, but in the more than six hours of social play that was recorded with the girls, no oppositional exchanges were found in their groups that even compared with Example 1, whereas occasions of highly aggravated talk, insistence, or physical force occurred in other boys' examples. (For a further discussion of gender differences see Sheldon & Johnson forthcoming). Feminine-related conflict in the larger sample of children often involved a great deal of verbal mediation and negotiation, demonstrated a variety of verbal problem-solving strategies, and showed an awareness of the other person's needs while trying to achieve one's own ends. Perhaps partly as a result of these features, some of the girls' exchanges became very long and verbally complex. The complexity of the following conflict demonstrates the elaborate linguistic and interactional skills that four-year-old girls can use and the difficult and artful work they do in mediating opposition. It also shows the workings of a peer culture that contradicts cultural stereotypes that portray girls as passive, yielding, weak, or conflict-avoidant. It is instead a culture in which girls resist and oppose one another in order to further their own wishes. The elaborate and long conflict described here is one of several found in girls' groups in this study.

Example 2: Girls' double-voice discourse: A negotiational tour de force: "Nurses getta do shots"

This conflict takes place between Arlene (4.9) and Elaine (4.6); Erica (4.2) is present briefly. They have been pretending that their dolls are sick children and they are nurses who are caring for them. A conflict develops over who will use some medical implements that are in the room. Elaine, who started enacting the role

of nurse earlier than Arlene did, wants to keep control of the equipment. But Arlene wants to use something too. Various techniques of double-voicing are underlined and loud speech is indicated by capital letters. In addition, there are various techniques of unmitigated self-assertion.

(1) Arlene: <u>Can I have that- that thing?</u> (*referring to the blood-pressure gauge in Elaine's lap*). I'm going to take my baby's temperature.

(2) Elaine: (*looking up from talking on the telephone*) You can use it- you can use my temperature. <u>Just</u> make sure you can't use anything else <u>unless</u> you can ask (*turns back to talking on the telephone*).

In (1), Arlene asks permission to use the blood-pressure gauge. She gives a reason for her request. In (2), Elaine gives qualified agreement. She lets Arlene use the thermometer with restrictions, telling her to ask before she uses anything else. Although the girls are competing for goods here, there is an attempt to allow for a fair distribution. Elaine shows some flexibility by offering a concession, establishing "a middle ground which moves toward the other position but still opposes it" (Vuchinich 1990:126). However, a mutual opposition subsequently unfolds.

(3) Arlene: (*picks up thermometer from a nearby table and takes her baby's temperature*) Eighty-three! She isn't sick. Yahoo! <u>May I?</u> (*she asks Elaine, who is still on the telephone, if she can use the needleless hypodermic syringe*)

(4) Elaine: No, <u>I'm gonna need to use the shot in a couple of minutes.</u>

(5) Arlene: <u>But</u> I- I need this <u>though</u>. (*asks in a beseeching tone, picks up the hypodermic syringe*)

(6) Elaine: (*firmly*) <u>Okay, just use it once</u>.

In (3), Arlene makes a polite request to use Elaine's syringe, *May I?*, but in (4), Elaine denies the request with a flat *No* followed by a qualification of her refusal; she explains that she will need to use the syringe soon. In (5), Arlene returns with an opposing move, by adopting Elaine's reason and insisting that she also "needs" it, softening her demand with *though* while she picks up the contested syringe. In (6), Elaine reluctantly agrees to let her use it, again offering a concession that establishes a middle ground, but she firmly constrains the use to "just" one time.

(7) Erica: (*whispers*) Arlene, let's play doctor.

(8) Arlene: (*to Erica*) No, I'm gonna give her a shot on the-

(9) Elaine: Hey, I'm the nurse. I'm the nurse. (*she puts down the phone and comes over to Arlene and the crib in which her doll is lying.*) <u>Arlene, remember, I'm the nurse, and the nurses getta do shots, remember?</u>

(10) Arlene: <u>But</u> I get to do <u>some</u>.

(11) Elaine: <u>Just a couple, okay?</u>

In (8), Arlene starts giving her doll a shot, but in (9) Elaine wants to be in control of the syringe. First she responds directly: she addresses Arlene by name and requests that Arlene "remember" Elaine's role. "I'm the nurse," Elaine asserts. She has adopted Arlene's pretend-play frame of reference. Having a common

frame of reference is a useful strategy for gaining entry to Arlene's play because it increases mutual involvement. This also provides a rationale for Elaine's access to the syringe: nurses have a certain role to play, namely, they "getta do shots." She follows this justification with a tag question, *remember?*, that is intended to elicit agreement. It does elicit Arlene's token agreement and a request for another concession in (10) when Arlene says, "But I get to do some." This is a mitigating response, here called a *"yes but" strategy*, in which agreement prefaces disagreement (discussed further in Sheldon 1992 and Pomerantz 1984). It is a partial agreement and a partial disagreement, in which Arlene backs off a bit and acknowledges that Elaine will use the syringe, yet still pursues her own agenda by stating her intention to use the syringe as well. The "yes but" strategy allows for an appearance of agreement while the partners continue to negotiate their action plans. In (11), Elaine again offers a concession, telling Arlene that she can do "just a couple." She follows this directive with a tag question that solicits agreement, *okay?*, although Arlene offers none.

All of Elaine's concessions with constraints allow her to hold onto her own agenda while also accommodating her partner's agenda. This is a form of double-voice discourse. However, although Elaine accommodates Arlene's wishes, competition between the girls actually escalates and intensifies because Arlene presses to keep control of the syringe for her own use and to administer to the doll in other nurse-like ways. The opposition over who has exclusive rights to administer to the doll grows. Whereas in (3) Arlene started out by asking permission to use the needle (*May I?*), she now moves to directly asserting what she'll do, as in (12).

(12) Arlene: I get to do some more things too. Now don't forget- now don't touch the baby until I get back, <u>because it IS MY BABY!</u> (*said to both of the other girls*) I'll check her ears, <u>okay?</u> (*puts down the syringe and picks up the ear scope*)

(13) Elaine: Now I'll- and I'll give her- I'll have to give her (*the same doll*) a shot. (*picks up the syringe that Arlene has put down*)

(14) Arlene: <u>There can only be</u> ONE thing that you- that- NO, she- <u>she only needs</u> one SHOT.

(15) Elaine: <u>Well, let's pretend</u> it's <u>another day</u> that <u>we</u> have to look in her ears <u>together</u>.

At this point Elaine wants to give the doll a shot but in (12) Arlene has ordered her not to touch "her" doll. She announces she is not constrained in what she can do with the doll and that she will check its ears. As Elaine has done previously, Arlene adds a tag question, *okay?*, a marker that solicits agreement. Although Elaine does not directly respond to the tag question, she continues to act as a participant. In (13), she reannounces her plans to give a shot: *Now I'll- and I'll give her- I'll have to give her a shot*. In two indirect statements in (14) in which no agent is mentioned and the responsibility for deciding who gives a shot is vaguely expressed, Arlene tries to cut Elaine out of the action by stating that "there can only be ONE thing ... " and the doll "only needs one shot." Both girls are equally determined to have their own way. In (15), Elaine tries to get Arlene to consider an alternative in which they can both participate, reframing the situation and

responding in multiply mitigated ways. She opens with a delay, *well*, and uses a joint directive, *let's*, to introduce a new pretend scenario: she displaces the time to "another day" and the medical problem to the doll's "ears," in an effort to induce cooperation on a combined agenda, i.e., that "we" will work "together."

In (16), the conflict continues to heat up. In answer to Elaine's suggestion that they look in the doll's ears together, Arlene replies with a token agreement, *yeah but*, and nevertheless continues to demand to examine the doll's ears herself, directly ordering Elaine not to "shot her."

(16) Arlene: No, no, yeah but I do the ear-looking. Now don't SHOT- (*lowering her voice but still insisting*) DON'T SHOT HER! I'm the one who does all the shots, cause this is my baby!
(17) Elaine: (*whispers*) Well-I'm the nurse and nurses get to do the shots.
(18) Arlene: (*spoken very intensely*) An' me'- And men- well, then men get to do the shots too even cause men can be nurses. (*taunting, slightly sing-song*) But you can't shot her.

In (17) Elaine continues to mitigate by delaying—*well*—and countering with a reason for why she should give a shot: *nurses get to do the shots*. In (18), Arlene counters with a competing justification that is intended to take some of the force out of Elaine's claim: *well, then men get to do the shots too even cause men can be nurses*. Arlene indirectly questions whether Elaine, as a female, has an exclusive right to give shots. Arlene again orders her somewhat indirectly not to give a shot: *But you can't shot her.*

(19) Elaine: I'll have to shot her after- after- after you listen-after you look in the ears.
(20) Erica: She (*Arlene*) already shot her even.
(21) Elaine: We have- she didn't do a shot on her finger.
(22) Arlene: But she did- she did- I DID TOO! Now don't shot her at all!
(23) Elaine: We hafta do it- do it after she-
(24) Arlene: Well, I'm going to keep this baby. (*intense but lowered voice*) Now DON'T YOU DARE!

In (19), Elaine insists, "I'll have to shot her," and also continues to offer a concession, that she will give the shot "after you look in her ears." When Erica says that Arlene "already shot her," Elaine assertively persists within the pretend frame, inventively countering (by noting a shortcoming in Arlene's procedure) in (21) that "she didn't do a shot on her finger," i.e., that Arlene missed a spot and it needs to be done by Elaine. Thus, Elaine resists Arlene's attempts to exclude her and instead creatively offers alternatives in which she can share in the action too.

Although both girls develop a complex negotiation in double-voice discourse, Arlene gains more in this struggle than Elaine does. In line (24), Arlene persists; she intensely, directly, and threateningly orders Elaine to stop: *Now DON'T YOU DARE!* Arlene doesn't shout but instead mutes her voice by lowering it. As the confrontation reaches its peak of insistence, the girls' voices get lower and lower with anger, not louder and louder. In (25), Elaine directly orders Arlene in an even lower voice:

(25) Elaine: (*voice lowered more than Arlene's but equally intense*) Stop saying that! (*pause*) Well, then you can't come to my birthday!
(26) Arlene: (*voice still lowered*) I don't want to come to your birthday.

Finally, Elaine leaves Arlene at the crib and goes back to the table.

As Elaine and Arlene escalate their dispute with words instead of raising their voices in shouts or screams, which happens in the boys' example, their speaking voices paradoxically become more and more muted. There is a lack of consonance between the girls' angry words and their quieter and quieter tone. It is a dramatic example of the mitigation of the voice of self in their double-voice discourse. It seems that the muting of their speaking voices allows them to escalate the directness of their words and the confrontational nature of their demands and assertions. Notice also in (25) that the kind of threat that Elaine uses is one of social ostracism— ... *you can't come to my birthday party*—not one of physical attack as we saw in Example 1: *I'll rock the couch like this.*

GENDER DIFFERENCES IN THE USE OF DOUBLE-VOICE DISCOURSE

I have described a vivid example of double-voice discourse to give the reader a sense of the linguistic and interactional phenomena that may be involved. One may ask how characteristic double-voice discourse is for the preschool girls in this study compared to the boys. Two coders compared transcripts of half the girls in this study to those of half the boys in the study, or nine children of each sex. The girls were eight months younger, on average, than the boys. Although the boys had more mutual conflicts than the girls (56% versus 44%), more of the girls' conflicts were sites for double-voice discourse than the boys' were (60% versus 45%) (see Sheldon 1992 for further details). In addition, in more than thirteen hours of conversational interaction, no boys' conflict has been found which comes close to matching the girls' for elaborateness or length of double-voice discourse. On the other hand, there are a number of similar complex examples of girls' conflicts, both long and short, that contain elaborate examples of double-voice discourse.

DOUBLE-VOICE DISCOURSE AS A POWERFUL PERSUASION MODE

The negotiation of the conflict between Elaine and Arlene is an example of the linguistic and pragmatic complexity that is often involved in double-voice discourse. The girls use multiple argument strategies that involve a variety of linguistic devices that can be used to soften conflict in order to be effective. In this example, Arlene was successful in getting what she wanted in part because Elaine was willing to negotiate numerous concessions. For the most part, the girls resist without being confrontational, justify themselves rather than give in, and use linguistic mitigators while trying to get what they want. Although both girls use double-voice discourse, the differences in how much they use and when they use it reflect differences in their ongoing successes in getting their way during the negotiation.

Double-voice discourse enabled the girls to have an extensive interaction even though they disagreed. It actually developed their involvement with one another as they negotiated access to the syringe, and particularly as Elaine tried to balance her own interests with Arlene's interests.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of the conflict episode between Arlene and Elaine raises a number of issues for the study of language and gender. First, it demonstrates the communicative competence, already attained in early childhood, that girls display in attempts to get their agendas met when they are faced with opposition (i.e., "managing conflict"). While some have claimed that girls avoid or are unable or unwilling to resolve conflict in their play and games (e.g., Lever 1976), what we find instead are preschool girls who go to great lengths to develop complex ways to negotiate their dissent and to avoid social breakdown. They skillfully use diverse language resources to mediate and overcome opposition. The exchange between Arlene and Elaine demonstrates the challenge of self-assertion: staking out one's point of view or goal, stating it clearly, motivating it in an attempt to persuade or deflect the person who is opposing the speaker, and communicating this in clear verbal terms. This verbal work requires a great degree of attentiveness to discourse processes in order to frame responses and to maintain thematic cohesion and relevance. Responses are produced to a partner's prior move and are framed to accommodate or distance the partner's next move.

The length of the girls' negotiations reflects Elaine's persistence in creating conditions that will overcome Arlene's resistance and convince Arlene to accept her. It also shows an awareness of her partner's needs and the utility of framing her needs in terms of her partner's own. The length of the negotiation is also an index of the importance to Elaine of joining in play with Arlene. The girls demonstrate a variety of problem-solving strategies. Because this example is one of a number of long conflict sequences found in the study, it suggests that further investigation of the elaborate nature and circumstances of long oppositions in girls' disputes would be worth pursuing.

Second, whereas girls' conflict may not be confrontational in the ways that boys' conflict can be, any claim that girls or women operate simply within an ethic of "harmony," "cooperation," or "reciprocality" (Kolb 1992; Leaper 1991; Miller et al. 1986) must be rethought in light of such examples of elaborate verbal work. There are dialectical forces operating in conflicts. Example 2 shows that the achievement of equilibrium and the construction of reciprocality is a delicate and fluid process that proceeds with both self-assertion and mitigation simultaneously.

Third, the close analysis of conflict reveals complexities of human interaction that should make us cautious in evaluating or making generalizations about females and males that are drawn from studies using measures of central tendencies based on aggregated data and that do not describe actual interactions in any detail. Long and complex interactions, which are rarely studied in developmental conflict research, not only give us important insights into social processes, but they also raise questions about individual variation that as yet have not been well addressed.

Analysis of such interactions demonstrates the wisdom of resisting simple labels for gendered behavior. Our understanding of gender can be well served by explicit and extensive analysis of examples. This paper provides the kind of situation-specific sequential analysis that has been called for (e.g., Putallaz & Sheppard 1992) in order better to understand children's social competence.

Fourth, Arlene and Elaine are not equally successful in getting their agendas met. One reason why this example is so interesting is for what it shows us about girls' resistance to opposition. Whereas Elaine's accommodation in the face of opposition may be familiar to us all and certainly fits cultural stereotypes of female behavior, the tenacity and resistance that is shown here in different ways by each girl as she pursues what she wants is a subject that is hardly discussed in the literature on the language of girls and women (exceptions include a number of discussions of contestation in girls' interaction by Goodwin, e.g., 1980). In our collective cultural imagination as well as in the conflict literature we have a clearer picture of females being accommodating and flexible than we have of females as resistant in the manner shown by Arlene. Because gender is usually defined as a polarity, studies of conflict have attributed competition and control to males. Hence, we do not expect to find examples of resistance and competition among girls. This paper calls such generalizations and the expectancies they create in both producers and consumers of research into question. It indicates the need to reframe our thinking about girls and women so that we can begin to see the constructive ways that they put opposition and resistance to work in their social interactions.

In addition, what is intended here is a demonstration that close analysis of discourse can form a partnership with the construction of feminist theory. Discourse analysis is a powerful tool that can reveal the complexity of everyday practices that are involved in "doing gender" and can call into question generalizations about gender differences (regarding boys as well as girls) that simplify rather than reveal the intricacies of human behavior.

Analysis of the negotiation for access and control in the discourse of girls' social interaction can help us to reconsider claims about feminine-related management of dissent as well as broader claims about females and interpersonal expressions of power. It also brings the study of child language squarely into the middle of feminist theory-making.

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Linguistic privilege:
"Just stating the facts" in Japanese

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WHAT IS LINGUISTIC PRIVILEGE?

Linguistic privilege has traditionally been associated with social power or status. In early models of language and gender, women were seen to be linguistically under- (or un-)privileged. They were seen as linguistically underprivileged because they had less access to or made less use of linguistic forms/practices that were associated with high social position.[1] Where men could make "powerful" statements, women had less linguistic authority. Japanese, in particular, is a language that women speak softly, indirectly, and humbly (Mashimo 1969; Jorden 1974; Ide 1979).[2]

POLITENESS

Japanese men are "privileged" to use verb endings that mark their own superior social position, whereas women across a broad range of situations are "constrained" to use polite and honorific verb-ending forms marking lower social position. How does this work? Japanese has two basic verb ending forms: the neutral form, marking speaker solidarity with the hearer or her/his speaker status vis-à-vis the hearer ((1a), (2a)), and the polite form, marking speaker-hearer distance and/or that the speaker is of lower status than the hearer ((1b), (2b)).

(1) a. *Kirei*   *da*
     pretty   is-PLAIN
   b. *Kirei*   *desu.*
                  is-POLITE

(2) a. *Hon*   *o*   *yomu.*
     book   DO   read-PLAIN
   b. *Hon*   *o*   *yomimasu.*
                   read-POLITE
      'I read books'.

Additionally, Japanese has a set of honorific and humble forms; roughly, the first is used when the subject or topic of a sentence is someone to whom the speaker wishes to show deference (3), the second when the person to whom the speaker wishes to show deference is in a non-subject position in the sentence (4).

(3) a. *Yamada-sensei*   *wa kuruma ni o-nori ni natta.*
         professor TOP car   in get-in   past

      'Professor Yamada got in the car'.
   b. *Okusama wa moo o-kaeri ni natta.*
     wife   TOP already go-home- past
      'Your honored wife has already gone home'.

(4) a. *Watakusi wa sensi*   *to o-hanasi sita.*
     I   TOP professor to   speak- past
      'I spoke to the professor'.

   b. *Watasi wa siryoo o o-watasi sita.*
     I   TOP papers DO hand-over- past
      'I handed over the papers'.

High-frequency use of polite endings as well as of honorific and humble verb forms is closely associated with stereotypes of Japanese women's speech; in fact, a typical characterization of Japanese women's speech is that it is more polite than men's speech. Both self-reported speech-practice surveys and observational studies of conversation confirm that women use more polite and honorific forms than men in everyday conversation and, moreover, that honorific forms comprise at least part of the complex of forms used by women to convey impressions of femininity (Kokuritsu Kokugo Kenkyujo 1957; Ogino 1986; Shibamoto 1985, 1987). Thus, on the face of it, it would appear that Japanese men *are* privileged, at least on this measure: they encode their assertions in sentences which are less polite and which mark less subordination to their hearers than the sentences spoken by Japanese women.

But, as everywhere, in Japan women and men use language to achieve particular interactional ends. As Ide and her co-workers state (1986), we need to understand the functions that the different linguistic features in question express; we cannot necessarily claim linguistic privilege for men simply on the grounds that they use different forms than women do in the same contexts. The work of Ide and her group seeks the social mechanism responsible for women's politer[3] speech within the framework of politeness theory (Brown & Levinson 1978). Ide's research team found that women assigned higher politeness to more types of interlocutors than men did and, interestingly, that women assigned lower politeness levels to particular linguistic forms than men did. They conclude that these two findings taken together explain the overall observed tendency to greater politeness in the verbal morphology of women's utterances. Note that the first finding is suggestive of just what the stereotype claims: women are more socially powerless or generally have lower social status, and thus there are more people to whom they are, or perceive themselves to be, subordinate. The second finding, however, suggests just the opposite: that when women are being "more polite," they themselves do not view their utterances as particularly polite. This very interesting finding deserves much more follow-up investigation than has yet taken place. Nonetheless, it is my contention here that, to the degree that the utterances of men and women are judged by a single societal standard for Japanese "politeness," women's utterances are systematically and significantly more polite than men's. In the Japanese case, the standards for politeness are set by male norms; thus, men still emerge, on this measure, as linguistically privileged.

SENTENCE-FINAL PARTICLES

Japanese men are additionally "privileged" to mark an assertive attitude toward what they are saying directly on sentences by adding strongly assertive sentence-final particles. Women are "constrained" to use softer, assertion-mitigating sentence-final particles. Sentence-final particles have been a major focus of attention in Japanese language and gender studies. It is commonly claimed that some sentence-final particles are used exclusively by women (5) and others exclusively by men (6). Yet a third set may be used by all speakers (7).

(5) Feminine particles: *wa, no, -te*

    a. *Sore de ii wa.*
       'That's enough'.
    b. *Nani mo itadakitakuku nai no.*
       'I don't want to eat anything'.
    c. *Tookyoo ni irasita koto atte.*
       'Have you ever been to Tokyo?'

(6) Masculine particles: *ze, zo, na*

    a. *Ore wa moo iku ze.*
       'I'm going'.
    b. *Koitu wa umai zo.*
       'That is good'.
    c. *Zuibun atui na*
       'It's really not, isn't it?'

(7) Neutral particles: *yo, ne*

    a. *Iku (wa) yo.*
       'I'm going'.
    b. *Dame (na no yo) ne.*
       'You mustn't do that'.

The sentence-final particles associated with women's speech are soft, non-assertive, mitigating forms whereas those associated with men's speech have a considerably stronger degree of "assertive force," not to say "insistence" (McGloin 1990:36). The claims of sex-of-speaker differentiated use of sentence-final particles is strongly supported in quantitative studies (Chikamatsu 1979; Peng 1981; Shibamoto 1987).[4] So once again a picture of male linguistic privilege emerges—men "get" to be assertive, while women are "constrained" to mitigate. And, as part of the verb-to-end-of-sentence complex of forms that includes polite and honorific verbal morphology, these forms may work together additively to create an image of indirectness, powerlessness, and social sensitivity in the case of women, a distinctly disadvantaged image when held up against the direct, powerful, authoritative man.[5]

This may be the case; however, two caveats are necessary. First, most work on the gendered use of verb endings and sentence-final particles has focused on private

life situations or other contexts where the general associations of women with appropriately "feminine" roles and of men with appropriately "masculine" roles do not disrupt the relation of linguistic and cultural stereotypes of the Japanese man and the Japanese woman. Here, more studies of men and women in gender-atypical roles and activities are desperately needed. Second, conclusions about Japanese language and gender relations have to date been based almost solely on the investigation of linguistic stereotypes. There has been very little investigation of sex-of-speaker differences in the use of forms which do not comprise part of the sociolinguistic stereotypes of the speech of men and women. In fact, however, it may be the non-stereotypical gender-marked patterns that are the most important to investigate, as their effects on hearers, especially as they accumulate over the whole stretch of a particular discourse, are crucial to an understanding of the communication of meaning and identity, but at this time these are almost wholly unknown. How meaning is negotiated via these forms when gender stereotype and gender reality come into conflict will be particularly critical for our understanding of how gender roles operate and how they change.[6]

LINGUISTIC PRIVILEGE OUTSIDE THE STEREOTYPES

The category of forms that I consider here are *gaigen* and *setumei* forms, together comprising the secondary modality category in Figure 1 (Teramura 1984). Japanese avoid sentences with clear endings, that is, with simple verbs in finalizing forms (Kindaichi 1957; Martin 1975); they strongly prefer sentences which end with a verbal element plus one or more sentence extensions. Sentence extensions, which include the class of sentence-final particles described in the previous section, are "containers that express the judgment or conjecture of the speaker" (Martin 1975:356). No examination of gender differences in the use of the full set of sentence extensions as a category has yet been undertaken, although recent research has identified the secondary modality forms in Japanese as a site of gender-differentiation. These forms convey information about the extent of personal responsibility and/or persuasiveness claimed for assertions (Smith ms., a).


It will probably snow.

FIGURE 1: *Clause structure, with primary and secondary modalities.*

The secondary modalities shown in Figure 1 are subcategorized into two groups: *gaigen* (evidentials) and *setumei* (explanation) modalities. The first category includes forms such as judgment *to omou* 'I think'; inferentials *daroo/desyoo* 'probably', *ka mo sirenai* 'possibly', *kasira* 'I guess/I wonder whether ... '; general sensory evidentials *rasii* 'it seems like', *yoo da* 'it appears'; the visual evidential *~soo da* 'it looks like'; and hearsay *soo da* (see (8)). In general, these expressions suggest that the speaker has not witnessed or experienced the situation about which she/he is making an assertion and therefore cannot make a definite statement, but from other experience, general knowledge, specific sensory evidence, or hearsay is led to conclude that the assertion is accurate. Each of the *gaigen* forms in (8) is associated with a different degree of "personal"[7] responsibility for the evidence supporting the proposition to which the form is linked.

(8) a. *Ame ga huru.*
 rain SU fall
 'It's going to rain'.
 b. *Ame ga huru to omou.*
  I think
  'I think it's going to rain'.
 c. *Ame ga huru daroo.*
  probably
  'It is probably going to rain'.
 d. *Ame ga huru kasira.*
  [I] wonder
  'I wonder if it's going to rain'.
  (lit., 'It's probably going to rain and I wonder if you think so, too'.)
 e. *Ame ga huru yoo da.*
  [it] appears/seems
  'It seems like it's going to rain'.
 f. *Ame ga hurisoo da.*
  [it looks]
  'It looks like it's going to rain'.
 g. *Ame ga huru soo da.*
  [I] hear
  'I hear it's going to rain'.

That is, in (8b), (c), and (d), the speaker gives no information about the source of the evidence she/he is using to support the claim that it will (most likely) rain; the hearer is asked to accept the speaker as authority, with only the assurance (given in the *gaigen* form) that there is some supporting evidence. In (8e) and (f), on the other hand, the evidence is sensory; thus, the evidential support for the propositions associated with these forms has shifted from the reasoning of the speaker to her/his senses. The final shift, in (8g), is away from the speaker entirely, and the source of the evidential support is outside reporting or hearsay. As I have argued in Smith (ms., b), attachment of any *gaigen* form to the end of a proposition serves to soften or mitigate its assertive force and factuality. Moreover, with each shift in choice of *gaigen* form, the speaker takes less personal responsibility for the accuracy of the associated proposition and also indicates less certainty as to its accuracy.

The other category of secondary modality forms is quite different in nature. It includes forms such as *hazu da* 'ought to', *wake da* 'it is for that reason that', and *no da* 'it is the fact that ...' (9).

(9) a. *Asita iku.*
 tomorrow go
 '[He] will go tomorrow'.

 b. *Asita iku hazu da.*
  expectation
  '[He] is expected to go tomorrow'.
 c. *Asita iku mono da.*
  thing, person
  '[He] should go tomorrow'.
 d. *Asita iku koto da.*
  thing, circumstance
  'It is arranged/settled that [he] will go tomorrow'.
 e. *Asita iku wake da.*
  reason
  'It is the case that [he] is going tomorrow'.
 f. *Asita iku no da.*
  NOMINALIZER
  'It is a fact [and a part of our shared knowledge] that [he] will go tomorrow'.

Together, this category is defined as that set of forms that "[serve to] try to explain to a hearer the reason(s) that a proposition that the hearer *knows* as actual fact came to be—the causes, background, etc.—or its particular meaning or significance in relation to a certain [other] set of circumstances or situation" (Teramura 1984:222, emphasis added). These forms imply mutual knowledge and agreement as to that knowledge's factuality. They play important roles in constructing convincing arguments and in effective persuasion (Nakamura ms.). Further, these forms, too, cover a range of "factualizing" force, from the relatively weak *hazu da* (9b) through the strongly factual(izing) and confidently assertive *wake da* (9e) and *no da* (9f).

LANGUAGE, GENDER, AND FACTS

When women and men are talking about the same sorts of topics in the same sorts of settings and with the same sorts of conversational partners, significant differences in the ways that they use the secondary modality forms would provide important clues to differences in the ways men and women find it appropriate to construct or manage verbal interactions.[8] If women and men are equally confident about the factuality of what they are saying and equally able to state facts or make assertions to the people they are talking to, they should be expected to use about the same proportions of these various forms. Recent work centered on analyses of same-sex conversations among friends in a middle-class suburb of Tokyo, however, suggests that they do not.

The data for this study were drawn from tapes of same-sex conversations among six friendship groups of three men or women aged 20 to 49. All were

native speakers of standard Japanese (more accurately, *kyootuugo* rather than *hyoozyungo*) and all resided in a middle-class neighborhood in Tokyo. The group conversations were held in the most usual meeting places for each set of friends; the interviewer was present as a second-order network contact or friend-of-a-friend (Milroy 1987) and co-resident of the neighborhood. Topics ranged across the domestic: children, spouses, and lifestyle were the most frequent topics of conversation, and it turned out that we were all watching the same serial night-time television drama, which centered on the lifestyle issues of an extended middle-class urban family. This drama turned out to be a constant conversational resource for the women and men of this study. The interviews varied in length from one to two hours. Each interview was completely transcribed in normal orthography, and approximately 15 to 20 minutes of interaction was extracted from the middle portion of each for full analysis. Sentence tokens for each speaker were scored for the presence or absence of secondary modality form. The results are shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1. *Overall secondary modality use, by type*

Secondary modality		Men	Women
gaigen	without *omou**	9.2**	20.6
gaigen	with *omou*	14.8	23.3
setumei		14.1	5.7

* Teramura (1984:227) links *omou* to the *gaigen* set, but notes it represents "a greater degree of objectivization of the description of the speaker's state of mind" than the next nearest form, *daroo*. It is this "objectivization" that causes it to be set out as intermediate between the *gaigen* and the *setumei* modality sets.
** Expressed as percentages.

Clearly, women and men in quite similar conversational settings are using these forms differently ($p \le .01$ for all three categories). They are, moreover, using them in a fashion which is in line with the cultural stereotypes of men as more confident and assertive and women as less so; men appear, in this sample, to have a better grip on "the facts," or at least to be more willing to talk about things as if they were facts.

DISCUSSION

This work on secondary modality forms featured analysis of their use in the speech of female and male speakers taped in group sessions under conditions calculated to trigger natural, casual speech. However, it also focused on private life situations and other contexts in which the general associations of women with appropriately "feminine" roles and men with appropriately "masculine" roles clouded possible differences in the effects of sex-of-speaker and gender. More studies of these forms by men and women in unusual or atypical gender roles will be necessary in order to determine the relations of these forms to gender (as opposed to sex) of speakers.

Nonetheless, that women and men use these forms differently in similar contexts is suggestive. Languages "differ in interesting ways in the options they

present in taking particular perspectives on complex scenes" (Fillmore 1977:74). Japanese women and men, in their casual conversations with same-sex friends at least, appear to take quite different perspectives on the "complex scenes" they talk about, and it is particularly interesting to note that the differences in use can be interpreted very handily within the cultural images of women and men available to these urban Japanese speakers. This need not lead to the conclusion that men are linguistically privileged over women in these circumstances: models of difference (Maltz & Borker 1982) allow us simply to conclude that—in light of the still quite extreme degree of sexual division of society in Japan—men and women have developed different interactional (and, consequently, conversational) styles and that each uses the secondary modality forms most suited to that style. Interpretations of speaker responsibility for assertions, forcefulness, and factuality can be made accurately only within the context of each sex-specific style.

Should it turn out, however, that irrespective of role or status, male speakers retain the habit of factualizing their assertions by the heavy use of *setumei* forms while their female counterparts continue to mitigate their assertiveness with responsibility-shifting or assertiveness-softening *gaigen*, then serious questions are raised about the potential, at least outside of same-sex conversations, for women to make their case, about their potential to argue effectively and to be seen—or rather, heard—not as emotional or unsure but as "just stating the facts." In a culture in which men are socially privileged, the pattern of secondary modality use described in this paper constitutes, I argue, yet a third kind of linguistic privilege. Added to the other elements of gendered speech reviewed above—politeness forms and sentence-final particles—one finds at the end of every Japanese sentence a cluster of forms which together provide a very powerful way for a (male) speaker to assert linguistic privilege. And, I assert, he does.

NOTES

1. Cross-culturally, whatever it is that men do seemingly defines "high"-status activities or characteristics.
2. Of the urban middle-class. Little work has been done on non-urban or non-middle-class populations.
3. *Polite* here is an arbitrary linguistic label for a particular set of morphological forms, not a sociolinguistic characterization of them.
4. Very little—virtually no—attention has been paid to the "neutral" SFPs *ne*, *na*, *yo*, and *sa*.
5. These statements must be interpreted within the bounds of Japanese understandings of terms such as *authority* and *power* (Wetzel 1988).
6. I am particularly indebted to Takie Sugiyama Lebra and Taimie L. Bryant for their insightful comments on this point.
7. Cognitive.
8. It would, of course, not be at all surprising to find them used differently where there exist large asymmetries in speaker roles or differences in the contexts of use.

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Information management: Women's language strengths

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THESIS

There are three major strands to my thesis. The first is that women in general, from a variety of backgrounds, know more about what is going on in conversations and have much more experience in managing them than is the case with men (no matter what sort of label you give this form of behavior—nurturant, expressive, empathetic, etc., and no matter what context is specified—e.g., in the home, at the workplace, in the classroom). With children, partners, bosses, or employees, women are ordinarily more aware of the layers of meaning, the ironies, ambiguities, and even contradictions in a conversation, and they are more able to juggle all the many inputs and to keep a conversation going; for cumulative research in this area see Cheris Kramarae (1981).

The second point is that in the Information Era, which we are currently entering, communication expertise, which encompasses an appreciation of all the nuances of interaction and information exchange and an ability to manage the many variables that are involved, is at a premium (Brand 1988; Forester 1989). And of course it follows that I think that women are more skilled, more experienced, and in a better position to participate in this critical area of information technology. (See also "Social Aspects of Communication Technologies," Speech Communication Course, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, Cheris Kramarae and Maureen Ebben.)

But, and this brings me to the third—and central—point of my thesis, women will only be able to take advantage of their skills and experience if they are seen as valuable and are put forward as the positive aspects of women's language use. Women have to start singing our own linguistic praises and emphasizing our linguistic strengths. This in itself will represent a transformation.

DEVALUATION OF WOMEN AND WOMEN'S LANGUAGE

Historically and presently, the situation has been that when women do something well, they usually get a bad press. (They generally, get a bad press anyway, as Susan Faludi (1991) has so ably demonstrated.) Any actions that are customarily associated with women acquire low status, and given that the word *woman* itself is low status vis à vis *men* this is not surprising. (See Schulz (1975) on the semantic derogation of women, and Robin Lakoff's (1975) eminently quotable statement that there is a great deal of difference between an old master and an old mistress!]

So entrenched is the belief that women are low status that there are even instances of university professors stating that the inclusion of more women in their courses would lower the standards (see Spender (1989a) for further discussion).

There's nothing new in suggesting that when women are associated with certain activities or occupations, these aren't rated highly by society, even though they may be contributions that are absolutely essential to the continued existence and wellbeing of the community. Margaret Mead was among the long line of women to comment on this devaluation of women's skills:

> Men may cook or weave or dress dolls or hunt hummingbirds, but if such activities are appropriate occupations of men, then the whole society, men and women alike, votes them as important. When the same activities are performed by women, they are regarded as less important. ([1950] 1971)

What Margaret Mead doesn't say here is that this value system doesn't descend from heaven; someone has devised it—someone has set up an agenda. And what needs to be made clear is that the agenda-setters enjoy a considerable measure of power.

SETTING THE AGENDA

In an information-based society—where information, the ability to manage communication and to shape meaning—is the source of wealth and influence, those who devise the agendas and set the terms of reference will be literally the influential (and highly resourced) leaders of society. And while men have traditionally held these positions, I want to argue that in the new context, it is women who have the required skills—although you wouldn't necessarily know it at the moment, because far from being valued, these skills are the object of fear and ridicule. They are the management skills that are generally referred to as manipulative, as sly skills, or as the product of dissembling and intuition.

MEN AS AGENDA-SETTERS

For as long as there have been records there have always been agendas and terms of reference, and traditionally they have been dominated by men—WHIMMS (White, Heterosexual, Insider, Middle-class Men; see Kramarae and Spender 1992 for further clarification). And traditionally men have established their right to be the agenda-setters; they have presented themselves as the rational sex, the authorities, the rightful leaders within the old framework.

But currently the social, political, and economic structures are in the process of transformation; there is a lot of reshuffling going on. The new positions of influence call for a different experience of the world and different competencies and skills—and they are not the qualities that have commonly been taught, valued, or even necessarily noticed in our institutions.

While there is much discussion about the nature of the new communication skills—and the way they will be wealth-generating—there can be no denying that

there has been an enormous shift away from the authoritarian management style of earlier years to one which is more subtle, more "behind-the-scenes shaping" of agendas. The move has been away from the overt decrees and confrontational interactions that have marked the traditional notions of power and agenda-setting.

And there can be no denying that when it comes to "behind-the-scenes" agenda-setting, to the well-established scenario that behind every great and powerful man there is a (scheming?) woman, then clearly women's socialization and status have been good training for the new mode. Except at this stage these skills of women are still savagely disparaged rather than valued. Despite the fact that they are part of women's language repertoire and that they have a significant role to play in the information-based future, these "behind-the-scenes" skills of women are still routinely denounced by women and men alike.

Bitch, witch, scheming, sly, and *gossiping women*—these negative qualities are still seen as peculiarly associated with women for some reason, as if men do not engage in verbal subversion and subterfuge. While I am not trying to suggest that all women are talented, kind, responsible, and misunderstood, and are waiting to use their subtle skills for the good of the world, I am making the point that only women are labelled in this linguistically dangerous way. And given the bad press that women get when they do something well, this is sufficient to arouse suspicion and to constitute a reason for closer examination of the behavior, the label, and the status.

WOMEN RECLAIMING THEIR LANGUAGE

Central to my thesis is the premise that women are going to have to *realize* these abilities. It is women who are going to have to relook at our language behaviors and skills and the way they have been classified as dangerous, and if and when we find that what we are doing is clever, competent, and highly skilled, then it is going to be women who will have to insist on their value in society, in the home, and at the workplace.

Women are going to have to take the fear out of this linguistic strength and redefine its value. And they are going to have to do this for their own sense of fulfillment and self-esteem. But they are also going to have to do it to secure their political and economic future.

For this is women's key to open the door of information technology. The alternative is to be locked out of the new sources of wealth and influence (just as our foremothers were in earlier periods of economic upheaval) so that the feminization of poverty and institutionalised job segregation are the hallmarks of women's existence. Already there is a name for the status women will have in the new order: *the information-poor.*

No one else is going to establish women's credentials for participation in the new workplace and the new sources of wealth, and yet at the moment there are few signs that we are confronting the challenge of exclusion and unsuitability. (The participation of women as the producers and agenda-setters within the information revolution suggests that women have already been excluded; there are no women's television stations, radio networks, newsprint chains, or software corporations as

there have been women publishers, and we know how they were needed to allow women's voice to be raised and to contribute to the information/knowledge base of society.)

PARADOXES AND DIFFICULTIES

George Eliot said that it was a bit awkward arguing that it was because women were oppressed that they acquired special (and better) knowledge, for, far from being an argument to end oppression, this was an argument to extend it: if everyone were oppressed they would all be the beneficiaries of this special knowledge.

And although I keep this point in mind, I think that it has to be said that it is from their experience as women (and as people of color, and as the oppressed and denied in any community) that women have learned many of the "behind-the-scenes" skills that I am now suggesting are the new currency.

It's precisely because of their position that women's socialization has included insights and understandings about what it is like to be on the receiving end. Hardly a day goes by when a woman is not in the position of having to "sniff which way the wind blows" as Sheila Rowbotham (1973) has said; and this makes women very receptive to all the cues and clues that conversation can convey.

Women have had a greater need for information, a greater need to anticipate danger, to manage situations, to steer hostility, anger, and threats to constructive ends; from street harassment to legal offices, women have had to manage the men with whom they come into contact, and it isn't surprising that they have acquired skills. They have developed some power in a situation of relative powerlessness; they have been survivors as well as victims.

And this is not the only facet of women's human management and agenda-setting: as the rearers of children, women have also been more attuned to supporting, bolstering, extending, and enhancing the self-image of human beings. And this is not to be underestimated either. The fact that women have been made responsible for the emotional state of so many has its burdens—but it has its positive aspects, which also need to be documented.

Yes, women have been on the receiving end and have learned from hard experience what it is like; and, yes, they are more likely to make connections and to think in terms of consequences than those who have power—and who are in a position to make pronouncements without regard to the effects. This does not counter the claim for women's liberation; it just calls for the acknowledgment of the skills women have acquired in demanding and awful circumstances.

FROM SCIENTIFIC METHOD TO ECOLOGICAL CONNECTIONS

The time is ripe for the denied skills of women to be reclaimed. There is the shift from print to electronic, and a shift from the old world view of scientific method to the new conceptual framework of ecology, from cause and effect to interconnections.

Few would dispute that we are currently experiencing a change of paradigm at a variety of levels. It does appear that we are moving from a scientific world view that has dominated for the last few hundred years (and in which all was ordered, rational, and explicable) to a much more disjunctured and postmodern view. (Even the ordered scientific frame of reference has admitted the possibility of chaos theory.) The way we think is being altered even as we think.

If there was any one characteristic of the scientific era it was the linear nature of its mindset; associated specifically with the information medium of print, the scientific age was based on premises of cause and effect. The methodologies were empiricist and positivist; there were rules of the universe to be discovered and applied, and variables were there to be controlled. There was a right and wrong and it could all be proved.

And for centuries it has been a highly successful world view; it has given us technologies that it would be unthinkable to live without (it has given us many that we can't live with—which is part of the impetus for change as well, and the reckoning with the side effects, the variables that the scientific model omitted). But over the last few decades the premises of scientific method have been seriously and fundamentally challenged on a variety of fronts, environmental among them.

CRITIQUE OF KNOWLEDGE-MAKING

Much of what was proved to be right has since been found to be wrong, which challenges the method as well as the result. And far from being impartial, objective, and proven truths, much of what we have been taught within this dogma is now regarded as partial, self-interested, and designed to prop up those in power, the upfront agenda-makers.

Feminism has been a contributory factor in this process of exposing the "phallacies." Along with Black studies, African American studies, and aboriginal studies and multicultural studies in Australia, these new bodies of knowledge challenged the very monolithic nature of the scientific model. If there is only one truth allowed within the framework of a particular model, and other "truths" start to be posited and demand inclusion, then the one-truth-only model looks a little absurd. It's much too simple in a context of great complexity.

POSTMODERNISM IN THE DISCIPLINES

That our way of making sense of the world is changing, along with the media that shape our conceptualizations, is made clear by Paul Delaney and George Landow (1991). They show how we have moved from the ordered and linear frame of reference to one in which there is a juxtaposition of images and in which the emphasis is on decentering; they show how in the new medium the sequential narrative and unitary perspective so characteristic of the print medium have been replaced by the collage of images, the multiple realities of the electronic. As they suggest, in this context the electronic media are an "almost embarrassingly literal embodiment" of postmodernism, where the emphasis is on forging meaning from the variety of cues available.

And while they don't make the connection, I will. This is a medium in which women have been schooled to bring everything together, to manage the variables, to anticipate the outcome.

In keeping with the change in medium and in paradigm, we have moved from the one truth to the many, from the one description of women's skills as nonexistent to the acknowledgment of the many skills acquired by many different women in many different circumstances.

So the monolithic history of white men has come to be histories—where the experiences of many groups can be taken into account (and connections made, consequences explored). And the literary canon has been exposed as representing the values of the white male agenda-setters, and demands have been made that it be extended to include women, writers of color, and writers of postcolonial traditions. Even feminism has become feminisms as the different and often contradictory experience of women is admitted.

But what needs to be noted is that the skills that men have advanced as justification for their supremacy have been the skills that worked within the old paradigm, in the monolithic and authoritarian context. They are not necessarily the skills that will be desirable within the new, more complex, and more "behind-the-scenes" management requirements that characterize the information society.

GENDER AND THE AGENDA

It is worth examining the claims that men have made for their superior language and leadership qualities. Rational-minded man; the virtue of single-mindedness; the ability to see straight ahead, to be instrumental, task-oriented, to get on with the task and not "gossip" or scheme; to eliminate all distracting variables. The capacity to be unemotional, purposeful, dedicated. These are some of the images that have found favor during the scientific revolution. But how useful will they be in the new era?

Primarily because women have had to know men's view of the world—and women's as well—they have not been led into thinking that there is a monolithic world view. Those with power may not have to know how those without it feel, but those who are without it ignore the powerful at their own peril. Women, people of color, indigenous people, and those of ethnic origin outside the prevailing mainstream have had to deal in multiple realities and have had to learn how to juggle them.

In all the research that I have done on women's language in mixed-sex conversations (Spender 1988, 1989a), I have always had ample evidence of the way women are functioning at more than one level, juxtaposing all the variables, anticipating moves, outcomes, appreciating the range of responses, and making contingency plans, and often with much more than verbal behavior involved. Let me give you one example.

EXAMPLE

It's a major company; there are managers, staff, and shareholders talking at the end of a meeting. The situation is still semi-formal.

The managing director explains to an important shareholder, in the presence of his female personal assistant, the female marketing manager, a female member of the production staff, and two male salespersons, "Well, you know I worked out that was the best system, and then I just went for it. Got it up and running in no time."

My attention was on the women while he delivered this statement. He did not seem to engage the women at any time. As the managing director stated, "I worked out it was the best system," the four women exchanged eye contact with each other and avoided eye contact with the manager and the shareholder; they clearly were operating in another frame of reference and had a different understanding of the situation.

When he said, " ... and then I just went for it," his personal assistant actually nudged the woman who was standing next to her and both looked at the managing director in an "innocent" manner which was in stark contradiction to the nudging that I observed but which went unnoticed by the managing director.

When he said, " ... got it up and running in no time," three of the women rolled their eyes again without attracting the attention of the managing director (or the shareholder, who was focusing on the speaker, or the two men salespersons who, when later questioned,indicated that they were unaware of any interaction between the women while the managing director was talking).

The women were completely undermining the men's conversation among themselves, but at the same time they were managing the managing director and the other men by letting go unchallenged the male version of the incident. After this contribution, the female marketing manager asked questions that allowed the managing director to take even more credit for his initiative and achievements. He was in a good mood.

Asked later about what messages were being conveyed, the four women—who were not well known to each other outside the workplace—took a long time to explain all the meanings that they shared, meanings that had been unspoken and at odds with the statement of the managing director, who remained oblivious of all this communication in his presence. They also stated without any encouragement that the project had been the brainchild of the marketing manager, and that if the managing director hadn't thought it was his idea it would not have been undertaken. The women set the agenda; when I asked them whether they thought they were "behind-the-scenes" operators, they laughed self-consciously, agreed, and told me not to blow their cover or tell anyone. They were not at ease with their skill's being made visible, and they needed no prompting to make comments about not wanting to be seen as scheming bitches. Indeed, they indicated that they did not even want to be seen talking together as it would have been regarded as dangerous.

MALES AND VISIBILITY (THE VACUUM-CLEANING SYNDROME)

Research literature from a range of disciplines suggests that men want to take credit for their actions to a greater extent than women do; they talk more and seek to be more visible in the classroom (Spender 1989b), in the bedroom (for further discussion of the private sphere see Victoria DeFrancisco 1989; Pamela Fishman 1977; and Marjorie O'Loughlin 1989), and in the boardroom. In her study of women's and men's language in a managerial context, Susan Case (1988) found that males attempted to "assert status and establish dominance in interpersonal situations. They were more direct, informational, and action-oriented. This included extensive use of the imperative form in making demands, commands, and requests" (Case 1991:6). Nothing behind the scenes here.

WOMEN AND INTUITION

While men are doing the talking there is evidence that women are doing the listening, and that this is no passive process. They are forging their own meanings, making their own connections, juxtaposing the words of the men with their own realities as women, and drawing their own conclusions. And by this means, women come to know a great deal that remains unknown to the talking man.

It could be said that while he is keeping out the variables, she is putting them in. It is this ability to take as much into account as possible and to manage the agenda that will be wanted in the twenty-first century. Not that the information-gathering and patterning skill is valued; it is frequently dismissed as intuition, which makes women the passive recipient of insights rather than the active meaning-maker.

Women are highly experienced when it comes to the world view that is going to predominate in the information era. It is one where the primary medium of information will no longer be print but electronic, and where the communication priorities will no longer be linear, single-minded, and authoritarian but will call for the management of a range of variables and a subtle form of scheduling. If the expertise that males have acquired was an advantage under the print medium, the expertise that women have acquired will be highly advantageous in the new context.

If it can be claimed and cultivated.

Again, I would like to provide you with an example. In the absence of video you will have to make do with my linear description and provide your own interconnecting threads:

It was a faculty meeting; fourteen people. I was there early; I watched most of the members enter. One woman and one man who to my knowledge did not know each other came in together and immediately caught my attention. I was struck by the "vibes," the "electricity" that flowed (and which can be qualified as eye contact, slight touching, physical awareness of each other's presence etc.). They sat opposite each other but within my field of vision. I watched. I kept track during the meeting. I noted the body movements, the exchanged looks when certain topics were mentioned. I even observed one wink. They left separately but were undoubtedly conscious of each other's existence as measured by eye contact, body

posture, etc. (He bent down ostensibly to pick up something on his way out; she "accidentally" bumped into him).

As I left the meeting with a male colleague, I said; "Mm, I had not known that A and B were such good friends."

"Who told you that? How do you know that? I don't know that," he said angrily. "Where do you get all your information?"

And I told him: from the meeting we had just attended.

And then there was an interaction that I cannot report here, in which charges of gossip were levelled (and meant to be insulting) and in which—once the facts had been established and my position vindicated—I was accused of using intuition.

CONCLUSION

This is the fundamental point that I made in the beginning and to which I want to return: that women have developed these remarkable skills that are consistent with the demands of the new era; that women have shown they can be attuned to a range of variables, that they can juggle multiple realities and forge meaning from them, that they can engage in the most remarkable and complex forms of management behind the scenes—and that these extraordinary skills can then be devalued as intuition, manipulation, scheming, and gossip.

For twenty years we have been doing research on women's language; for twenty years we have been intent to show that it is not a deficiency model, that there is nothing wrong with women's language. And yet I think there is a fundamental area that we have not tackled at all, and that is the way that women are belittled and bedeviled—by the association of our skills and strengths with danger, with threat, with fear.

If we don't start challenging this definition we can be intimidated linguistically, personally, politically, and economically. Women are well equipped with a linguistic repertoire for the new communication technologies—and it is time we communicated this message.

Even though it won't be easy.

It is because women's skills have been deemed to be dangerous that I suspect that we have been reluctant to reclaim them. To be a gossip, to be accused of manipulating a conversation, of being a dissembler and a scheming bitch (ask male politicians' wives—and I don't recall a single such statement being made in relation to Dennis Thatcher even though he clearly had his own agenda while his wife was the prime minister)—to be described as making decisions on the basis of intuition rather than the ability to gather information, put it together, with reasons, is to be given a very bad press indeed. Yet it is precisely these skills that have been (so conveniently) "outlawed" that women need now to assert as their own, and as necessary for an information-based society.

"Women do the shitwork in conversation," Pamela Fishman (1977) declared, just as they do in the house. They manage the conversations, help keep them going, undertake the maintenance work, and perform all the invisibles that allow communication to take place. And just as many men who live with women don't know that the house gets dirty and has been cleaned, so too do many men who

work with women not know that they have been picked up, dusted, restored, and put back in place again, because of women's conversational skills.

And as much as I want men to know about the work and the many skills that are involved in housework, so too do I want them to know about the work and language skills—and strengths—that women have, and how relevant they are for the twenty-first century.

I think I am a bit tired of being "nice," of being known for my nurturant skills; I think I am ready to claim the bitchiness, the scheming, the gossip, and the manipulating—and to turn them around. I'm ready to give up being nice for a bit of respect for the management skills that I possess. Like another woman who was informed that it was nice that women do things from behind the scenes and never take the credit, I want to register a protest and declare: If we are so nice, so helpful, it's time our skills were valued and rewarded in the information era.

> It's nice? Well, I don't know. If women are supposed to take care of making everyone easy in social situations, how come we are not given tax breaks for cars and gasoline to scoot around helping people out? And how come we're not given training in microphone use, and special classes to help us take care of crowds? What about giving us special phones with cross-country networks connections so we can keep in touch and know who needs help and where? How are we supposed to exercise these "nice" social skills we're supposed to have without having some help here? How come we're not given control of those communication satellites up there so we'd have the necessary equipment to keep everyone talking with each other? (Kramarae 1988:1).

To which I would add: How come we are not setting the agendas in the information wealth-producing arena, when for so long we have been accused of being so expert in this particular area? How come we are not the policy- and decision-makers when it comes to the new technology? Why are we not being given our own software companies, our own facilities for autonomous networking, our own control of the corporate sphere—given that we have all the management skills that are now seen as priorities for the twenty-first century?

There's an agenda that needs managing—behind the scenes and up front. We have to reclaim our language strengths.

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Bitches and skankly hobags:
The place of women in contemporary slang

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"I mean, just how many ugly ... names *do* men have for women, anyway?"
—Luba, a character in the comic book *Love & Rockets*, 1985

INTRODUCTION

A great deal of work has been done on the "ugly names" for women. Researchers have pointed out that in English there are many more negative terms for women than for men—as a quick look in the thesaurus will confirm—and that negative terms, which almost always carry sexual connotations, reflect the status of women in Western society, i.e., as identified in terms of the men they relate to (Lakoff 1975). These terms have probably been in common use since the advent of Modern English and show up most recently in several slang surveys done in California in the last three years (Munro 1989; Ling. 55 data 1991, 1992). While there does not seem to be much change in the "ugly names" men have for women, there are some interesting developments in the terms that *women* use for women.

BACKGROUND

Lakoff (1975) has pointed out that pairs of words in English carry vastly different meanings for men and women: *master/mistress*, *gentleman/lady*, *bachelor/spinster*. The terms for women all have sexual definitions, that is, woman is defined by her sexual relation to men. Schulz examined a huge range of words and discovered, not surprisingly, that "again and again in the history of the language, one finds that a perfectly innocent term designating a girl or woman may begin with totally neutral or even positive connotations, but that it gradually acquires negative implications, at first perhaps only slightly disparaging, but after a period of time becoming abusive and ending as a sexual slur" (1975:135). Schulz concludes that pejorative terms for women are created by men because of their sexual fear of women, which threatens men's power over women.

Treichler argues that selected meanings of terms for and about women are "authorized" by dictionary makers—those in "authority"—and that this authority may be central to the way we construct and interpret concepts and use them in discourse (1989:76). She finds that "dictionaries have generally excluded any sense of women as speakers, as linguistic innovators, or as definers of words ... they have perpetuated the stereotypes and prejudices of writers, editors, and language commentators, who are almost exclusively male. At no point do they make women's words and women's experiences central" (1989:60). Treichler's

examples show that from the selection of words to the sentences given to illustrate definitions, women are relegated to secondary, non-male status, defined by their relations to men.

The vast landscape of language, then, seems to be a male construct in which women are talked about and talked to, but do not themselves speak. Let's shift the focus to words which specifically refer to women in their sexual relationship to men, words which do not pretend to do otherwise. Penelope (1977) found 200 expressions and Schulz another 100 which describe women's availability to men as sexual objects; these were primarily male slang, a set which changes constantly and can be viewed as the cutting edge of language. Penelope refers to this collection as "Paradigmatic Woman: The Prostitute" and sets up parameters which define "woman" in a male world: Cost, Method of Payment, and Length of Contact. All women exist only to provide sex for men; "no man perceives consenting sex with a woman as free, [and] the only question in his mind is how much it will cost him to get a woman into bed with him" (1977:121). *Slut* and *whore* are often applied to women who have sex with different partners (without charging them). They are the worst insults that can be hurled at women, because "a woman who thinks so little of herself as to not get something in exchange for sex is perceived as pitiful, the lowest of the low" (1977:121).

Referring to women as the reduction of the being to the body part is also among the worst of insults. Calling a man a *dick* is something of a standard insult term; you even find it on television in mutated forms, such as *dickweed* and *dickwad*. But you will never hear a woman called a *cunt* on TV. And while *dick* (or its "cuter" form, *weenie/wiener*) seems to be used by women as well as men, it is extremely rare to hear one woman refer to another as a *cunt*. There seems to be very little or no work on the words that women have for women. In fact, in an informal survey of my female friends and acquaintances, there was only one word used to insult a woman: *bitch*.

The word *bitch* is the prime example of a subclass of terms for women-as-sex-objects, that of women as animals. Whaley and Antonelli (1984) provide a deft and thorough analysis of this linguistic area, pointing out that since the Western mind generally values humans over animals, most animal comparisons express negative attitudes toward the person so compared. In some few cases positive values are found in animals that are considered "noble, courageous, assertive, clever, or sexually powerful" (1984:219). But none of them can be applied to women: *lion-hearted, a real moose, Italian Stallion, young buck*. Those that are positive are again admirable from a male viewpoint: *fox, foxy lady, kitten, Playboy Bunny*.

Whaley and Antonelli (hereafter W&A) claim that by examining this set of terms "we may discover a basis for the concept of woman as male chattel, themes of male conquest, domination, and exploitation, and the roots of the idea that 'woman's place is in the home'" (1984:220). Using the categorization of animals into four classes—pets, pests, cattle, and wild animals—W&A make the case that because women are equated with animals in the minds of some men, "when men use animal metaphors to refer to women, they reveal a set of assumptions, a kind of regard, and the relationships with women they prize and despise" (1984:222). Echoing Penelope's point, W&A demonstrate that terms like *pig* and *cow* show that women

are thought of as sexually accessible if the male pays for them (or "feeds" them). Women are viewed either as domesticated animals, or as pets, soft, affectionate, easily controlled. But there are also women who can be classed as wild animals, like *fox* or *wildcat*. "Their value exists in their relative scarcity, superior physical appearance, independence, the challenge of exploiting them sexually, and the possibility that they may steal the male's resources without giving reciprocity ... foxes are desired as trophies" (1984:225). And then there is the case of the domesticated animal that has gone wrong, that bites the hand that feeds it. A female dog in heat or protecting her young will growl, threaten, or even bite her owner; she has reverted to her wild state; she is a *bitch*, uncontrollable.

Woman-as-animal metaphors are most commonly expressed in slang. Slang, in general, is a rich source of timely and creative metaphors; if language is indeed manmade and man-authorized, it is no surprise that the images of slang are those from the male point of view. This is true for the slang used 100 years ago and what is being spoken on the street outside today. The slang I will talk about is some of the most up-to-date available.

SLANG

The first group of slang data comes from work done by Pamela Munro and her graduate students at University of California, Los Angeles, during 1988, much of which was later published as *Slang U* (1989). Aranovitch (ms.) reports that most of the words used to describe women can be grouped into several basic categories: women as objects, women as prostitutes, women as dumb, and women as rude and evil. Although she doesn't provide figures, Aranovitch mentions that most of the insulting or negative terms are used by males in conversation. She notes that even though words could be classed as positive if they referred to a woman as attractive, the term itself might still be demeaning: *filet* ('cute girl'), *freak* ('attractive girl'), *treat* ('cute girl'), and *goddess* ('female achiever') are all compliments, but still define women in relation to men, as meat, as abnormal, as prizes, and as untouchable.

Aranovitch concluded that almost 90% of the words for women in the UCLA slang list describe women in a negative way, as compared to 46% of the words for men. None of the positive words for men are demeaning (Aranovitch compares the corresponding terms for men, *adonis* and *god*, and says that their connotations are quite different from *goddess*), and the negative words do not focus on attractiveness to women. Even a term rated negative may still imply desirable qualities: *mr. groin* ('promiscuous male') is kind of cute and funny, while *roadwhore*, *skag*, and *wench* (all meaning 'promiscuous female') are all clearly insults.

From the negative terms for women in the UCLA slang list, we might conclude that the following are Bad for women to be: fat (*heifer*), unattractive (*skank*), dumb (*dimbo*), too free sexually (*turboslut*), assertive (*bitch*), and prudish (*nun*); a woman should not display interest in a man without following through, i.e., having sex (*trap*). Conversely, it is Good to be attractive (*betty, filet, freak, treat, wilma*). Unless women are seen by men as attractive to men, they are fat, dumb, evil, and

sexually promiscuous. No such restrictions are placed on men, according to the UCLA Slang List; there are no words for fat men, assertive men, dumb men, and only one each for ugly men (*lou*) and sexually promiscuous men (*mr. groin*). The word *barney* is defined as 'person who's not with it, nerd' and only secondarily as 'ugly guy' (Munro, 1989:28). Clearly, there is some linguistic sexual dimorphism going on.

The data I have been working with from undergraduates at Berkeley (Ling. 55 data 1991) show much the same results. The slang terms were collected from students in a large lecture class at Berkeley held in fall 1991 and spring 1992. The students in these classes, all undergraduates, represent the diverse student body and its many varieties of speech. For their assignment, students were told to collect 10 slang terms that they or their friends used frequently and to write down definitions and example sentences. They turned their assignments in to their teaching assistants, who in turn gave copies to the small group of graduate students processing data for the class. The assignments were then coded and entered into a database. For the fall semester 1991, the complete database consisted of a total of 1,528 terms, reported by 139 students. Collapsing the multiple reports of a single word, we ended up with a total of 1,205 different items. For spring semester 1992, approximately 2,260 terms from 226 students were collected, reflecting a higher enrollment in the class.[1] For both semesters, the ratio of female to male students was about one to one. Definitions were provided by the students themselves; we did not attempt to impose judgment. It's important to bear in mind that the students were *not* told what categories of words to report; their choices reflect their own intuitions about what words they felt they used most frequently.

Here is a raw listing for the collected terms (student definitions are given in the appendices).

FALL 1991: A total of 79 terms for and about women, collapsed to 63 different terms. *Women.* 53 terms. Excluding the terms for ugly women, we are left with terms for women who are sexually loose, spiteful, fat, and attractive. The first group, of course, is the largest: *bait, beddy, ho, hooker, hootchie, nocturnal, parnass, scud, skank ho, sex [trip], skanky, skank, skankly hobag, skeezer, slag, slam hole, slut, squid bait, stimey hole, strawberry, tramp, tuna, whore.* Spiteful or malicious women: *bitch, biscuit, CWA (chick with an attitude), yatch.* Fat women: *feet, heifer.* Finally, some attractive women: *around the way girl, babe, Betty, chack, chubby, dinghy, fawn, GK, honey, hoogie, hottie, nectar, tender.* There were also a few words which seemed to be insults; they referred to women specifically by their sexual organs: *box, clam, hole, hootchie, hot dog bun, pink taco, software.* Finally, there were some terms which singled women out for appearance or behavior (there were no corresponding terms for men): *barker, jailbait, lush, sober-chick, glamour bitch.* One term which did have a male corollary was *guidette.*

Ugly people. 11 terms. The nouns referring to ugly people were all for women, except one: *barney* 'stupid or ugly guy'. This obviously reflects the importance of women's looks over almost everything else about them, except sexual activity: *butch, GG "gangster girl," heifer, hellpig, hiddie, hobag, scud, tuna, UFO, un-K.* Some of the terms also indicated that the woman could be fat as well as ugly.

SPRING 1992: A total of 87 terms for and about women, collapsed to 64 different terms. *Women*. Again, words for promiscuous women led the pack with 14: *bambi, ho, hobag, hoogie, hoochie, pelt, slut, skank-ho, skeezer, skankly ho, skank, strawberry, thumper, trinket*. Spiteful or malicious women: *apple, bitch, catty, wicked witch of the west*. Fat women: *heffa, swamp sow, ewok, tug boat, tetunca, thunderthighs, yeti*. Attractive women: *peach, betty, box, elegant, cheesecake, bytches, bitty, MILF* ('attractive older woman'), *freak*. Genitalia: *cooch, coota, clam, beaver, bearded clam, tuna, cheesehole, poon tang*. Ugly women: *roll, six pack beauty queen, mutt, sea-hag, mud-duck, shark, stank, scud*. Terms that singled out women for appearance or behavior: *cha cha, duck, hyper-hootch, barbie, guidette, cracker, skeezy*. There were some words which were just defined as 'women': *fluke, hole, puddy*. There was only one word which was a verb rather than a noun, *slime* (meaning 'the act of a woman walking home after a night of partying with a man') which evokes images of filth and implies that women's sexual organs are unclean, or perhaps like slugs or snails.

Immediately we can see that this group of Berkeley slang follows the pattern of the UCLA slang very closely. There is a higher percentage of negative words for women than positive, and the positive words all focus on the attractiveness of women to men as sexual partners. The animal references fit perfectly in W&A's framework, and some are especially creative, like *hellpig*, which combines the domesticated animal metaphor (sexually available) with a strong contradictory image of demons or nightmare. *Nocturnal*, too, implies a woman who lives in darkness and preys on others—a wild animal, uncontrollable. *Heifer* fits the domestic animal paradigm, also implying youth and possibly virginity due to unattractiveness; a cute and submissive, timid woman is a *fawn*. Another interesting variation is *swamp sow*, using both the domestic animal image and one of nastiness.

Some other animal references are more obscure. *Duck* and *mud-duck* are probably formed from *lame duck*, and this is confirmed in the meaning given by the student for *duck*, 'a lame girl'. (*Lame* is a common slang term meaning something like 'loser' or 'in a sorry state'.) Both *bambi* and *thumper* are references to media, and fit W&A's class of women as pets (cute, cuddly, with large eyes and high voices). *Puddy* might be a mutated form of *pussy*, but it's hard to tell whether this is a reference to genitalia or to cats. *Mutt* is a common term for ugly women, perhaps less aggressive than a bitch but still on the animal scale.

Jailbait has been around for a long time and is straightforward in construction (*bait* that will send you to *jail*), and from that comes the shortened form *bait*; there is also *squid bait*, a woman who tries to attract men in the Navy. In a slightly different aquatic realm, we have *tuna* and *clam* (also *bearded clam*), men's perceptions of the appearance and "odor" of women's genitalia. More creative terms for women's genitalia are food images—*pink taco, hot dog bun*—and as the students explained, are often extended to refer to women themselves, not just their genitals. There are several built on *hole*: *stimey hole, cheesehole, slam hole*. These terms support Penelope's observtion of the paradigmatic woman as "holes, receptacles, containers—things they [men] can or want to fuck" (120).

Terms for attractive women parallel Aranovitch's findings. Women are considered attractive only if men find them sexually desirable, and then are still viewed as objects, especially as food: *peach, nectar, cheesecake, honey*. The other

terms can still be seen as offensive, with one exception, *elegant*. The acronym *MILF* ('mother I'd like to fuck') is particularly interesting, since it singles out older women and expresses the condescension of men towards them.

The terms for a promiscuous woman are similar, based either on *skank* or its variation *stank* and the word *ho* (also *hobag*, which one student reported was derived from *bag lady*). *Skank* is phonetically similar to *slut* (strangely, *skank* was also said to refer to marijuana). Women who have sex frequently are also reduced to their genitals: *stimey hole, slam hole, tuna, hootchie, pelt*.

The one word offered as a male parallel to *hobag* was *hoebuck*. This seems a prime example of the kind of radical difference in meaning that we saw earlier with *master/mistress*. *Buck* has entirely positive connotations—man as an animal with strength, speed, and aesthetic value; *bag* is either the common word for old woman, or, more likely, from *douchebag*. A man who has sex often is to be admired; a woman, despised.[2]

Once again, the conclusions drawn are the same as from the UCLA slang: it's OK to be thin, smart (not too smart), passive, and sexually available (but not sexually promiscuous). It's not OK to be fat, ugly, aggressive, or sexually unattractive to men. As Lakoff (1975) pointed out, women are still defined by their sexual relation to men.

SOME OBSERVATIONS

Because we had a class database for the students in both semesters, I was able to match up terms with the ethnicity of the students who reported them. The breakdown for fall 1991 was 23 by Asian Americans, 4 by Latinos, 17 by European Americans, 8 by Americans of mixed ethnicity, and 26 not identified; for spring 1992, 54 by Asian Americans, 6 by Latinos, 24 by European Americans, 3 by Americans of mixed ethnicity, and 1 not identified. Surprisingly, there were no students who identified themselves as African Americans, although there were several in both classes.

For fall 1991, 32 terms were reported by women and 47 by men; for spring 1992, 32 terms were reported by women and 56 by men. In entering the data, I paid special attention to the terms that women reported. Although the women sometimes specified that the terms were used only by males, most just said that the slang was used *by these women* with their friends (this appeared in the "Comments" column as "college students"; see appendices). Some even gave examples using a female as a speaker.

For fall 1991, 2 words were reported by women as being used exclusively by men (*fawn* and *barker*) and 3 as exclusively used by women (*nectar, parnass, slag*). Men reported that 3 words were used only by men (*babe, betty, chubby*) and none only by women. In spring 1992, women reported that 5 terms were used only by women (*barbie, catty, heffa, trinket, hoochie*) and 9 by men only (*betty, clam, box, skanky ho, slime, troll, apple, peach, shark*). Men said that 5 terms were used exclusively by men (*betty, clam, ho, hyperhootch, tetunca*) and none only by women. All other terms were not specified as being used by one sex or the other.

One very interesting fact came up in the data. Several of the women reported that *ho* and *bitch* were used between women as term of affections but never by men in that way. This was only true for *ho* and not for any of the other forms (*hobag, skank ho*). To verify this, I conducted a small survey with the students of Ling. 55, spring semester, in which I asked them if they used *bitch* and *ho*, and if the terms had positive or negative meanings. I also asked them to identify themselves by sex. 30 females responded; of these, 20 said that both the words *bitch* and *ho* had negative meanings, and reported that they did not use them as terms for or about women except as insults. Of the remaining 10, 2 said that although they did not use either of the words, and the words have a negative meaning to them, they would not be insulted because "it is used among friends. No offense will be taken—just teasing." The last 6 of 8 claimed that they used *bitch* to their female friends as "joke insults," but all 8 said they used *ho* and some specified that it is "just another name," "a neutral word," or that it "doesn't really mean anything." This corroborates the information taken from the slang assignments, where women mentioned that they used *ho*, but not *bitch*, as a term of endearment among friends. As one woman put it, "when talking about women it's negative, but when talking to women it's a joke."

It's possible that we can attribute the use of insult terms as affectionate terms to the influence of Black English Vernacular on mainstream youth culture. It has been established that signification, the verbal art of insult in which a speaker humorously puts down the listener, is a standard feature of BEV (Smitherman 1977), and some of the students mentioned that their slang was taken from rap or hip-hop music, or from the speech of their Black friends. The covert prestige of BEV for non-Black kids is well-known and growing, and appearing cool and hip is definitely a priority for students on the Berkeley campus. Certainly not all of the women who reported using *ho* and *bitch* are Black.

I don't really know why it's OK to be a ho or a bitch. Using *ho* and *bitch* as a signal of solidarity between women is probably much like the use of *nigga* (not *nigger*, which is always considered offensive) between African Americans—it's OK for us to do it, but definitely *not* OK for an outsider to call us that. Does it go deeper than that? Triechler (1989:77) mentions that in the Victorian period, women were classed as single women (who could own property but not have sex), married women (who could have sex but not own property), or prostitutes. Prostitutes, because they could have sex *and* own property, were the exception to the rule; they contradicted existing conceptions and dichotomies. So when we call each other *ho*, maybe we acknowledge that we are women who have sex and earn our own money, too; when we call each other *bitch* we acknowledge the realities of this manmade world and affirm our ability to survive in it. We still can't be sluts (still too promiscuous and poor), or skankly hobags (still too ugly), but perhaps being a ho or a bitch is a start.

NOTES

1. As of this writing, the data for spring 1992 is still being processed. All counts should be regarded as close approximates.

2. It's worth noting that many of the insults reported for men were simply calling them homosexual. For men to have sex with women is OK, but sex with men reduces men to the level of women (and therefore subject to insult).

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APPENDIX 1(a). *Terms for women, defined by Linguistics 55 students, fall 1991*

Lexical entry	Meaning	Student comments about slang users or usage	S	Ethnicity
airhead	a perky, unintelligent female	Southern California	f	Latino
around-the-way girl	an attractive girl		f	0
babe	really good-looking girl	guys, especially in groups	m	Asian
bait	sexually loose woman	used by Korean Southern California high-school students	m	Asian
barker	a woman who makes a lot of noise having sex	related to living conditions in a fraternity	f	European
beddy	a promiscuous girl	students in Southern California	f	Mixed
Betty	an exceptionally good-looking female	male high-school and college students	m	0
Betty	a good-looking girl	students in the Philippines	f	Mixed
Betty	an attractive female	a character in "The Flintstones." Used mainly by high-school and college students	f	
Betty	pretty girl	surfers in Southern California	f	0
biscuit	lewd, immoral or spiteful, malicious, and domineering woman		f	0
bitch	lewd, immoral or spiteful, malicious, and domineering woman		f	0
box	n. a woman's vagina, female genitals	used in reference to an attractive, desirable woman	f	0
box	female genitals	semantic shift, used by high-school students	m	Asian
box	n. a woman's vagina, female genitals	used in reference to an attractive, desirable woman	f	European
butt	an ugly girl usually.	shortening of *butt ugly*; used by my co-workers and me	m	European
chack	an attractive female		m	Asian
chavala	a girl, but used mostly in reference to males	from Spanish, used mostly by Mexican youths	m	Asian
chubby	a very beautiful girl who makes you feel tingly.	Wilson High School students (male)	m	Latino
clam	a derogatory term for the female gender	private and public schools in Philadelphia	0	0
CWA	"chick with attitude," a hard-to-get-along-with girl	college and high-school students	m	Asian
dinghy	a perky, giggly, naive girl	Southern California	f	Latino
fawn	good-looking girl	men	f	Asian
feet	very fat woman	students in Hawaii	f	European
freak	girl, girlfriend	Rap, hip hop, neighborhoods of cities like Chicago	m	Asian
GK	a very attractive girl		m	0
glamour bitch	female with very long, manicured nails, hair-sprayed hair, too much makeup, and a low IQ.	same as Guidette, but does not refer specifically to an Italian	f	European
Guidette	a Guido's girlfriend	ethnic identification; derived from *Guido*; used by non-Italian high-school students in New York's suburbs	f	European
hairbear	a girl who uses a lot of hairspray	students in Northern California	f	Mixed
beifer	extremely ugly teenage female, almost always overweight	high-school students	f	European
heifer	a very overweight female	Texas	m	Asian
heifer	a fat girl	students in California and Maryland	m	0

APPENDIX 1(b). *Terms for women, defined by Linguistics 55 students, fall 1991*

Lexical entry	Meaning	Student comments about slang users or usage	S	Ethnicity
heifer	an unattractive girl, generally large or overweight		f	0
hellpig	an unattractive female	high-school seniors from Southern California	m	Asian
hiddie	an unattractive person, especially a girl	shortening of *hideous*; Orange County high-school students	m	Asian
ho	a girl who submits to sex often and with anyone	*whore*; pronunciation from Black English	f	European
ho	promiscuous woman		f	Asian
ho	a derogatory term used to accuse a girl of promiscuity		f	0
ho	promiscuous female		f	0
ho	a bitch; a girl who sleeps with everybody	short version of *whore*; used by most people	m	Asian
hole	insulting term for woman; also used for mouth	refers to vagina; used by my co-workers and me	m	European
honey	an attractive girl (generally plural)		f	0
hoochie	promiscuous female		f	0
hoochie	female genitalia, pussy	*hooch* refers to the person with the hoochie.	m	European
hooker	promiscuous female		f	0
hotdog bun	female genitalia		f	0
hottie	very attractive female	ethnic identification: hip hop (Black)	m	0
hyna	female, used often to describe unfamiliar females	borrowed from Spanish, used by Mexican youths	m	Asian
jailbait	a woman considered too young for sexual activity		m	European
jailbait	a girl below the legal age of sexual consent	teenagers and college students	f	Asian
lush	heavy drinker, female	students	f	Asian
nectar	a good-looking guy or girl	sorority	f	Mixed
nocturnal	(of a woman) sexually promiscuous	used in Los Angeles	m	European
parnass	a female who has large breasts and is sexually promiscuous	sorority	f	Mixed
pink taco	female genitalia		f	0
scud	a girl who looks good from far away, but is mufugly close up.	"Saturday Night Live" audience	0	0
sex trip	a person (usually female) who is a tease or a slut	Philippines	f	Mixed
skank	promiscuous female		f	0
skank ho	a slut; a woman who sleeps around	made up; used by most African Americans	f	Mixed
skanky	a tramp, slut, or sleazy woman	University of California at Berkeley band members	f	Asian
skate betty	girl who skates	skateboarders	m	Asian
skeezer	promiscuous female		f	0
slag	an overweight female who is sexually promiscuous	sorority	f	Mixed
slam hole	promiscuous female	*slam* = to have sex with and *hole* = the vagina	m	European
slut	(n.) slovenly or promiscuous woman		m	Asian
slut	promiscuous female		f	0

APPENDIX 1(c). *Terms for women, defined by Linguistics 55 students, fall 1991*

Lexical entry	Meaning	Student comments about slang users or usage	S	Ethnicity
sober chick	an extremely drunk girl on the point of passing out	used to someone who insists she's not drunk	f	European
soft-ware	vagina or a woman's breasts	her boyfriend	f	Latino
squid bait	a girl acting flirtatiously in order to attract a squid (i.e., a Navy man)	people from large military communities	m	0
stimey hole	a sleazy girl	*hole* means female genitalia, *stimey* means disgusting	f	European
straw-berry	a woman who sells sex for crack		m	Asian
tender	a very beautiful girl	Berkeley	m	European
tramp	promiscuous female		f	0
tuna	(1) whore, prostitute (2) promiscuous woman		m	Asian
tuna	ugly girl	students in Hawaii	f	European
UFO	"unidentified female object," an unattractive female	senior students of Bellaire High School in Houston	m	Asian
Un-K	a most unattractive female		m	0
whore	promiscuous female		f	0
yatch	n. a malicious, heartless woman; bitch	my old high-school jazz group	m	Asian

APPENDIX 2(a). *Terms for women, defined by Linguistics 55 students, spring 1992*

Lexical entry	Meaning	Student comments about slang users or usage	S	Ethnicity
apple	girl who is evilish, cruel	Northern California college students, frats	m	0
bambi	female slut	association with *thumper*; high school	f	Asian
barbie	girl who acts superficial	high-school and college girls	f	European
bearded clam	pussy or vagina	waterpolo players	m	Asian
beaver	female organ for sexual intercourse	high-school boys	f	Asian
betty	attractive female	male college and high-school students	f	European
betty	girl who is extremely beautiful	males of all ages	m	Asian
betty	beautiful girl	teenagers and young adult males	m	Asian
bitch	person with no regard for others (usually a woman)	used by everyone	m	Asian
bitch	girl with a very bad attitude	college students	m	European
bitty	attractive girl	from *betty*; New York City	m	Mixed
box	good-looking girl	frat guys	f	0
bytch-es	good-ooking females	East Coast	m	European
catty	girls who backstab or don't get along with other girls	used by girls	f	Asian
cha cha	a girl with a lot of make-up		f	Asian
cheese cake	very good looking female	college students	f	Asian
cheese hole	slut	dorm at the University of California at Berkeley	m	Asian
clam	female	male college students	m	Asian
clam	female	Philadelphia males	f	Asian
coota	cunt, in a foreign language		f	Asian
cracker	ordinary, common girl	coined by Eddie Murphy in "Raw"; high-school students	m	Asian

APPENDIX 2(b). *Terms for women, defined by Linguistics 55 students, spring 1992*

Lexical entry	Meaning	Student comments about slang users or usage	S	Ethnicity
duck	lame girl	used in Seattle	f	Asian
elegant	extremely beautiful (usually a woman)	college students	m	Asian
ewok	very fat unattractive girl	South San Francisco high school	m	Asian
fluke	female	Southern California football players	f	European
freak	slut, nasty		f	Asian
freak	attractive girl, sometimes slutty or promiscuous	Hispanic college students	m	Latino
freak	beautiful girl	Los Angeles	m	Asian
freak	cute girl or boy	Black college students	m	Asian
guid-ette	female guido	New York City	m	Mixed
heffa	fat girl	from *heifer*; used by Black girls	f	European
ho	loose or slutty girl	high-school and college students	f	Asian
ho	slut, girl who is promiscuous	high-school and college students	f	Asian
ho	promiscuous woman	New York	m	Asian
ho	promiscuous woman	male high-school and college students	m	Asian
ho	cute girl who is very promiscuous	college students	m	European
hobag	female who readily surrenders her body for sex	teenagers and college students	m	Asian
hobag	slutty woman, whore	college students	f	Asian
hobag	promiscuous woman	University of California at Berkeley students	m	Latino
hobuck	womanizer	teenagers and college students	m	Asian
hole	woman	high school in Pennsylvania	m	European
booch-ie	prostitute, whore	college students	m	Asian
hooch-ie	slut, ho	used by women	f	European
hoochie	ho, promiscuous woman	Black college students	m	Asian
boogie	slut	rap/hip hop music	f	European
hyper-hootch	outgoing, loud, annoying female	male college students	m	Asian
hyper-hootch	overly excitable female	teenagers at the University of California at Berkeley	f	Asian
MIF	"mother I'd fuck," extremely attractive older woman	Marin males	m	Asian
MILF	"mother I'd like to fuck," attractive older woman	college students from East Contra Costa	m	European
mud-duck	girl who is extremely ugly, to the point of nausea	Hispanic college students	m	Latino
mutt	ugly girl	Los Angeles	m	Asian
mutt	very unattractive girl	college students	m	European
nectar babe	pretty girl	radio station	f	Asian
peach	girl who is very sweet, charming, soft, lovely	Northern California college students, frats	m	0
peach	beautiful girl	high-school and college students	m	Asian
pelt	pretty and notoriously easy girl	Massachusetts boarding school	f	Euro
poon tang	vagina	college students	m	Latino
puddy	girl	New York	m	Asian
putang	vagina	some guy just made it up; college students	m	Asian
scud	ugly, undesirable girl	college students	m	Asian
sea-hag	thin unattractive girl	South San Francisco high school	m	Asian
shark	ugly girl	used in dorms and frats	m	0

APPENDIX 2(c). *Terms for women, defined by Linguistics 55 students, spring 1992*

Lexical entry	Meaning	Student comments about slang users or usage	S	Ethnicity
six-pack beauty queen	unattractive woman	college students	f	Latino
skank	nasty, cheap	skaters	f	Asian
skank	flirtatious girl	Los Angeles	m	Asian
skank	extremely ugly girl, who is also promiscuous	college students	m	European
skank	dirty, nasty, unprincipled (woman)	Black/Hispanic college students	m	European
skank-ho	very ugly person who is also promiscuous (female)	New York	m	Asian
skank-ly ho	slut, ugly girl	Los Angeles guys	f	European
skeezer	filthy, slutty person	high-school and college students	f	European
skeezy	gross, nasty		f	Asian
slime	the act by a female of walking home from a boy's house after a night of partying	frat guys	f	0
slut	easy girl, willing to put out	high-school students	m	European
stank	ugly girl	college students	m	Mixed
straw-berry	girl who sleeps around to obtain drugs	college students	m	Asian
straw-berry	prostitute who works for drugs	street term	m	Asian
swamp sow	fat unattractive girl	South San Francisco high school	m	Asian
tetunca	very fat girl	Indian word for buffalo; frat guys	m	
thum-per	promiscuous female	from a movie; high school	f	Asian
thunder thighs	fat female wearing a short skirt	teenagers	m	Asian
trinket	slut	freshman girls in high school	f	Asian
troll	ugly girl	frat guys	f	
tug boat	fat and ugly girl	Los Angeles	m	Asian
tuna	a slut	teenagers in Hawaii	m	Asian
tuna	slut, whore, or just a derogatory term for females	Hawaiian high-school students	f	Asian
wicked witch of the west	mean woman	college students	m	Asian
yeti	big girl	high school in Pennsylvania	m	European

A synthetic sisterhood: False friends in a teenage magazine

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INTRODUCTION

In this paper I present a fragment of a larger study entitled *Language, Intertextuality and Subjectivity: Voices in the Construction of a Consumer Femininity*. This work is contributing to the development of a linguistic model of discourse that integrates linguistic and social theoretical perspectives, so that discourse can be analyzed both as interaction between individuals and as socially reproductive and constitutive of subjectivity. On the practical side I am trying to locate points of focus for taking up a critical (more specifically, feminist) reading position in discourse analysis.

From an intertextual perspective, a text is a textual dialogue. It consists of a mesh of intersecting voices, an indeterminate population. It is not the product of a single author; the author herself is multiple, fragmented, and part of the population of the text. And what's more, so is the reader. In reading a text, she is drawn into a complex of intersecting voices. An adequate presentation of this model in a short paper would be impossible.[1] All I am going to attempt are a few words about power in the mass media (who wields it and how), a brief outline of the notion of women's magazines as "synthetic sisterhood," and then a little detail on the simulation of a friendly relationship in a two-page feature from a British publication for teenagers called *Jackie*. I will conclude with some discussion of how "unsisterly" this feature really is.

DISCOURSE IN THE MASS MEDIA AND THE LOCATION OF POWER

Reading is nonreciprocal discourse. It takes place on the reader's terms; she can stop whenever she wants to, skip over fragments, reread others, etc. The reader is in control of the discourse. However, the mass media bestow a position of power on producers. In contrast with face-to-face interaction, media discourse is one-sided. Producer and interpreter are sharply divided and distant from one another. So, even though mass-media texts are always read or viewed by actual people, because of this distance producers cannot "design their contributions for the particular people they are interacting with" (Fairclough 1989:51). Addressing a mass audience imposes (1) on mass-media producers, the need to construct an ideal subject as addressee; (2) on mass-media interpreters, the need to negotiate with the position offered in the ideal subject.

The need to construct an ideal subject bestows a position of power on the producers of the mass-media texts. They have the right to total control over

production, such as what kinds of representations of events are included, and how they are presented. In the construction of an ideal subject as addressee, the mass media are in a position to present assumed shared experiences and commonsense attitudes as givens to a mass audience. Actual addressees in the targeted audience are likely to take up the position of ideal subject sharing these experiences, attitudes, etc. In addition, the producers of mass-media texts, unlike their addressees, are professional practitioners. Producers do not work blind in postulating subjects as addressees; mass-media discourse is targeted for specific audiences. These have been measured by sophisticated market-research practices, which in particular scrutinize kinds of discourse.

MASS-MEDIA AND COMMUNITIES: THE NOTION OF SYNTHETIC SISTERHOOD

The ideal subjects postulated by mass-media producers are constructed as members of communities. I will briefly attend here to the kinds of community constructed in women's magazines and advertisements. The targeted audience of women's magazines is addressed, simply by virtue of its femaleness, as a single community. As Ferguson says:

> The picture of the world presented by women's magazines is that the individual woman is a member not so much of society as whole but of *her* society, the world of women. It is to this separate community that these periodicals address themselves. Their spotlight is directed not so much at the wider "host" society, as at that host society's largest "minority" group: females. (1983:6)

This bogus social group has been described as a kind of surrogate sisterhood by various writers (e.g., McRobbie 1978; Ferguson 1983; Winship 1987). Within this female community, which appears to ghettoize women, magazines are targeted for different socioeconomic groups. *Jackie* magazine has a predominantly working-class, young readership (the target audience is young teenage: 12 to 14; its actual readership is predominantly younger than this).

A word or two about imaginary communities. Think of advertisements: as well as informing consumers about what is available, they also present to audiences the concept of communities based on the consumption of commodities. Advertisements offer consumers membership in imaginary communities; to belong, we only need to buy and use products. Leiss, Kline, and Jhally explain that in the transition from industrial to consumer culture, "'consumption communities' ... , formed by popular styles and expenditure patterns among consumers, became a principal force for social cohesion in the twentieth century, replacing the ethnic bonds that people had brought with them to the industrial city" (1986:53). In the consumer feature I am going to discuss, producers and readers are set up in a synthesized "sisterly" relationship in a community based on the consumption of lipstick.

An increasingly common feature of types of discourse used to address mass audiences is *synthetic personalization*. The term comes from Fairclough, who explains it as "a compensatory tendency to give the impression of treating each of

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the people 'handled' *en masse* as an individual" (1989:62). This synthetic personalization is extremely common in the mass media, in magazine advertisements and articles, front-page headlines, junk mail, etc. It involves the construction of an ideal subject as if it were an actual individual and also the construction of a persona or ideal subject for the producers. It involves addressing an anonymous audience as thousands of identical *yous*, with attitudes, values, and preoccupations ascribed to them.

SYNTHETIC PERSONALIZATION AND FRIENDSHIP IN A MAGAZINE FOR TEENAGERS

I intend to concentrate on the mass-media producer's identity as a friend and the synthesized friendly relationship set up between producer and audience in a single sample of mass-media discourse: a consumer feature from *Jackie*. There are certain kinds of linguistic features (proliferating in advertising and the mass media in general) that contribute to synthetic personalization and the establishment of an informal friendly relationship between the producers of mass-media texts and their audience. I shall briefly present (1) the simulation of friendship and (2) the simulation of reciprocal discourse.

THE SIMULATION OF FRIENDSHIP

How do we establish friendship? In part, by communicating, "I know what you're like, and I'm like that too." Aspects meriting attention in examining the producer's construction of a friendly persona for herself are use of the pronouns *we* and *you*, relational and expressive values of lexis and punctuation, the setting up of shared presuppositions and projected facts (beliefs, etc., attributed to the reader, to "us" or just to some vague common sense), and a variant on this, negating the reader's supposed assumptions. In focusing on these specific linguistic features, I am attending to the way the producer realizes her simulation of friendly interaction with her audience, how she shows she knows who the reader is, and how she establishes herself as a member of the same social group. The text reproduced in excerpt (1) shows part of the consumer feature on lipstick: a column of text on the history of lipstick, fashion changes, etc.

(1)   Ask any clever advertiser how to suggest femininity with a product, and he'll probably tell you "a kissprint." Lipstick on a collar, a glass, his cheek— they all suggest a woman was there. When men think of make-up they think of lipstick.
       It's hardly a modern invention—women have been adding artificial colour to their lips for centuries now. Before the days of lipstick as we know it, ladies used vegetable or animal dyes like cochineal—beetle's blood—to colour their lips.
       The reason behind it wasn't simply to make themselves more beautiful— superstition lingered that the devil could enter the body through the mouth, and since red was meant to ward off evil spirits "lipstick" was put around the mouth to repel his evil intentions!
       These days there are more complicated (and ruder!) theories. Experts in

human behaviour say that it's all to do with sex (what else?!).

Other "experts" claim that the shape of your lipstick can reveal a lot about your character —i.e., if you wear the end flat you're stubborn, if it's round and blunt you're fun loving, etc. etc.—but don't seem to take into consideration the fact that each brand of lipstick is a different shape to start with and it's easiest just to use it accordingly. So much for the experts!

What *is* interesting is the way that fashions in lipstick have changed over the years. When lipcolour first came into fashion at the beginning of this century, dark colours and the style of "drawing" on little pursed lips meant that women looked cutesy and doll-like. Later on, in the forties, film stars wanting to look lovable and "little-girl"ish continued this, while the newer breed of dominant business-like women opted for a bolder look, colouring right over the natural "bow" in the lips. By the sixties "women's lib" was in style and most girls abandoned lipstick altogether, or used beige colours to blank out the natural pink of their lips, and concentrated on over-the-top face painting instead.

Now, in the eighties, there are more colours available than ever before—right down to blue, green, and black! "Glossy" lips, popular for a while in the seventies, are out again, and the overall trend is for natural pink tints, with oranges and golds in summer, on big full lips.

Large cosmetic manufacturers will have upwards of 70 shades available at a time, introducing a further three or four shades each season to complement the fashion colours of that time. And with some companies churning out batches of lipstick at a rate of 9,000 an hour, that's an awful lot of kisses to get through...!

Pronouns

In excerpt (1), there is an example of the inclusive *we*, referring to both producer and audience together: *lipstick as we know it.* Elsewhere in the feature, use of exclusive *we* (i.e., the "editorial *we*") contributes to setting up the producer as a team; the anonymous group voice is a friendly gossip in the orientation beneath the title (see excerpt 2).

(2) LIPS INC.!
We kiss and tell the whole story behind lipstick!

Pronominal reference to the reader as if she were an individual addressee is quite frequent. There is an example of it in the first sentence in excerpt 1: *Ask any clever advertiser how to suggest femininity with a product and he'll probably tell you "a kissprint."*

Relational and expressive values of lexis and punctuation

The informality of some lexical terms contributes a little to the construction of a youthful, female identity for the writer, matching the targeted audience by approximating the sort of vocabulary that teenagers might be supposed to use among themselves (*awful, cutesy,* in excerpt 1, *dying to look grown up*, in excerpt 4 below). The frequent exclamation marks seem to add some kind of expressive value, attributing to the writer a friendly, enthusiastic emotional state. The use of scare quotes contributes to setting up the familiar and the normal for the reader: the

writer makes out she knows what is and what isn't normal usage for her readers.

Common ground: Projected facts, presuppositions, etc.

In the column of text in excerpt (1), the writer negates an assumption attributable to the reader, concerning the modernity of lipstick: *It's hardly a modern invention.* Similarly, in some instructions (reproduced in excerpt 3 without the accompanying photographs), the writer negates the reader's assumed pessimism about using lipstick successfully: *You* can *achieve a long-lasting look!*

(3) LIP TRICKS!
Choosing the right shade of lipstick is easy—making it stay on is a bit more tricky. But by applying lipcolour correctly, you *can* achieve a long-lasting look!
1. Outline the lips with a toning pencil—this will help stop your lipstick from "bleeding" around your mouth (a touch of Elizabeth Arden's Lip-Fix Creme, £4.95, provides a good base to prevent this, too).
2. Fill in using a lip brush loaded with lipstick—a lip brush gives you more control over what you're doing, and fills in tiny cracks more easily.
3. Blot lips with a tissue, dust over lightly with face powder, apply a second layer and blot again.

The writer is the reader's best friend and knows what she thinks, or rather claims to know. The writer minimalizes the social distance between herself and her readership, claiming common ground and a social relation of closeness. With her implicit claims to common ground in presuppositions and projected facts she is setting herself up as a member of the same social group as her readers. So for each example, two agreed-upon and interesting facts in excerpt (1) are that each brand of lipstick is a different shape, and that fashions in lipstick have changed over the years (these are projected by the fact-nouns *fact* and *way*, respectively).[2] The shared knowledge that the writer assumes relates to historical details about "breeds" of women and kinds of "looks," to fashion changes, to choice and ownership of lipstick, to details about lipstick as a commodity subject to fashion change, to the boringness of experts, and so on.

THE SIMULATION OF RECIPROCAL DISCOURSE

In the sample I have chosen, this simulation of two-way discourse is most striking between the writer and various characters set up in the text, more so than between the writer and the audience. The effect is an impression of overhearing gossip.

Various features used to simulate reciprocal discourse contribute to constructing relationships on the page:[3] response-demanding utterances (commands and questions in particular), adjacency pairs (including absent-but-assumed first pair parts and sequentially implicated second pair parts), and interpolations.

Producer-audience

Response-demanding utterances directly addressed to the reader occur notably in excerpt (3). They are commands requiring a mode of action as response (highly conventional in instructions scripts):

[stage 1]   Outline the lips with a toning pencil ...
[stage 2]   Fill in using a lip brush ...
[stage 3]   Blot lips with a tissue, dust over lightly, ... apply a second layer, ... blot again.

In excerpt (1), the writer begins with a command addressing the reader: *Ask any clever advertiser*. ...   In the same text, she interpolates her own comments twice:

Statement: ladies used animal
                           dyes like cochineal
Interpolation: —beetle's blood—
(Statement):   to colour their lips

Statement: These days there
                           are more complicated
Interpolation: (and ruder!)
(Statement):   theories.

There is another interpolated remark in a caption in a group of testimonials (see excerpt 4): *[Clara] wouldn't tell us her age!*

Representations of dialogue

The opening sentence in excerpt (1) places the reader in an imaginary dialogue with a male advertiser. This dialogue consists of a two-part question-answer exchange, in which the reader asks the advertiser for some information and he provides it:

Question: how to suggest femininity with a product
Answer: a kissprint

Simulation of reciprocal two-way discourse is particularly noticeable in the testimonial section of the *Jackie* consumer feature. These testimonials are reproduced (without their accompanying photographs) in excerpt (4).

(4) MARGARET (15)
     "I wear it all the time, because I aways wear make-up. My favourite shade's a sort of brown-and-red mixture—I usually buy Boots 17 or Max Factor lipstick. I got my first one when I was 10, for Xmas—it was a sort of pink colour, I think it was just for me to play with."

EMILY (12)
"Usually I just wear lipstick when I'm going out, but sometimes for school, I

like pinks, oranges and plain glosses. I was about 7 when my mum gave me a bright red lipstick to experiment with—I think I've worn it ever since!"

CLARA (wouldn't tell us her age!)
"I always wear red—dark red—and usually from Mary Quant or Estee Lauder. I don't know if I can remember my first lipstick—wait! yes I can! It was called "Choosy Cherry" by Mary Quant—everyone used to ask me if I was ill when I was wearing it!"

RHONA (18)
"I like pinks and deep reds. I don't wear it all that often. My first lipstick? I stole it from my sister's drawer—I was about 12—dying to look grown up even then!"

To make any sense at all of these testimonials we need to postulate a set of questions by an interviewer, first pair parts that don't appear on the page. They are reconstructed interviewee responses to three questions: "How often do you wear lipstick?", "What's your favorite shade?", "When did you get your first one?". Notice the questioning repeat in the fourth testimonial.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The audience is being offered sisterhood in consumption. Synthetic personalization and the need for adult femininity catch readers up in a bogus community in which the subject position of consumer is presented as an integral part of being feminine. Members of this community other than the reader and her friendly editorial "big sister" are media celebrities, the testimonial-givers, and other wearers of lipstick (including "most girls in the sixties" in excerpt 1).

In the beauty feature, womanhood is a pattern of consumption. Teenagers aspire to adulthood. What girls aspire to be as women is presented as a matter of what kind of look they will "opt" for.

The beauty feature is not a piece of sisterly advice or an exchange of sisterly secrets; it is covert advertising, a consumer feature. Its producers' aim, apart from cheaply filling two pages in the magazine, is to promote lipstick as a commodity. The advice it does provide for readers—that is, the instructions for professional application of lipstick—is curiously inappropriate for the age range. These instructions seem to be calculated to encourage experimenters to consume extravagantly by playing at being movie star and beautician rolled into one.

Girls need peer-group membership; they turn to other girls for friendship and to learn how to behave like a teenage girl. Consumer femininity is a real part of adolescent patterns of friendship. The consumer feature, however, offers no real human relationship. The testimonials are an example of how, at puberty, girls are drawn into synthetic consumption communities of commodity users. Whether based on actual interviews or invented altogether, they are manipulative. Cosmetics use is presented as a natural part of a woman's identity, making demands on her discernment, her creative energies, and her time. In reading the feature, girls are "associating" with business people. Fashion and beauty alone are newsworthy. The only practices cultivated relate to being a competent consumer; in fact, readers

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are encouraged to ridicule the scientific/analytical.

The sisterhood offered in the consumer feature is also "unsisterly" because it is patriarchal. The feature makes a small contribution to the shaping of the "paradigms for women's production of appearances" (Smith 1988:39) that are formed for women by the manufacturing, advertising, fashion, and magazine industries. In the opening paragraph of excerpt 1—in which the "kissprint" is presented as a symbol of femininity—this symbol is provided by a male character. It is a man who is the authority on femininity. The same passage goes on to present lipstick smudges as indications of a woman's presence. These are located on a man; to be feminine is to be (hetero)sexual. Feminine identity is achieved in consumption and in relationships with men. The author, the friendly "older sister" writing for *Jackie* magazine, betrays her young readers, tying up their self-definition with external patriarchal standards of femininity. And for what? In order to plug a product.

NOTES

1. For discussion, see Talbot (1990, 1992, and forthcoming).
2. Following M. A. K. Halliday (1985).
3. There is some interesting work by Martin Montgomery on simulated reciprocal discourse on BBC's Radio 1 (Montgomery 1988).

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The construction of conversational equality by women[1]

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The interest in how women talk among each other arose only after years of investigating mixed-sex conversations, i.e., after giving ever new detailed analyses of how men dominate and control women in conversations. Unfortunately, the research focusing on the question of how women talk among each other was extremely short-lived, proving within academic research what is common knowledge outside the academic community: that women's talk is irrelevant, that what women say to each other is not worth listening to and how they say it is not worth describing. Even feminist researchers have by now almost given up the topic of women's talk before we found out much about it.[2]

Being in the privileged position of being independent of academic fads and academic approval, which means by and large the fads and approval of academic men, I do not follow this trend. I am interested in pursuing the properties of women's talk that turned up in the initial descriptions by Edelsky (1981), Jenkins (1984), West (1985), and Troemel-Ploetz (1984a, 1984b) in the early 1980s, properties pointing toward collaboration, creative atmosphere, balance of speaking rights, cooperative style, symmetry, and mutual support when women talk with each other. These characteristics of women's talk I am describing as special conversational abilities. To study them is important because of the political consequences: making the competence of women visible in all the fields that rely on language as their main instrument—i.e., law, medicine, teaching, politics, journalism, counseling, psychotherapy, consulting, management, etc.—means changing the evaluation of women in these fields; it means being able to perceive them as better equipped and better qualified than most of their male colleagues.

I am investigating the conversational competence of women in certain professions: interview journalism, management, and psychotherapy. Among various properties of women's conversational style that contribute to their achievement of excellence in these professions, one characteristic emerges that I will concentrate on for the purposes of this paper: the construction of equality among speakers.

In order to place this property in perspective and to provide some context, I want to list a few other properties that I have found in the analysis of television discussions and televisions interviews among women.[3] For reasons of space limitation, I cannot give any illustrations.

1. *Fairness*

The following mechanisms that I observed I ascribe to a basic fairness in the conversational practice of women:

a. Women frequently protect the face of an opponent by packing criticism, by implicit correction, or by withholding correction or reproach where these would be appropriate.
b. Women are less likely to exploit a situation to their own advantage.
c. In the discussions I analyzed, women withhold power gestures, e.g., they do not use toppings to show their superiority over an opponent; they do not devalue the content of other speakers.
d. Women are willing to compromise.
e. Women distribute time equally.
(1a) through (e) contribute to women's conversations being free of competition.

2. *Honesty*

a. Women deal seriously with the arguments of their opponents rather than pretend to deal with them.
b. Women use certain mechanisms straightforwardly rather than exploiting them. E.g., they do not ask pro forma questions to use for self-presentation. They do not make compliments in order to save their own turns. As moderators they do not use irony at the expense of others.

3. *Clarity*

Women take responsibility for clear, transparent, comprehensible utterances. They speak personally and concretely with the result that their intention and the purpose of their talk becomes clearer. They do not blur differences or cloak conflicts.

4. *Modesty*

Women do not use self-aggrandizement; they often even refrain from presenting their own achievements and successes.

5. *Respectfulness*

Women acknowledge the achievements of others. High-status women are seen to reduce distance to lower-status women and to keep respectful distance among equals. Women withhold personal attacks and insults.

6. *Conversational generosity*

Women are seen to be generous in complimenting and commending others and in attributing expertise to them.

Evidently some of these features are also effective in producing more equality, e.g., being modest about one's own success reduces status differences with other

speakers and makes for more equality, in the same way as does reducing distance from the more powerful to the less powerful.

Not only do properties (1) through (6) make for a more humane style of talking but they are also very important in certain occupations, such as in the healing and teaching professions. Without them there can be no change in psychotherapy and no learning in school.

I will now deal with the property of equality among speakers.

EQUALITY

In the television discussions and interviews I analyzed, high-status women are seen to raise the status of younger, lesser-known and less-experienced women by various conversational means, thus doing away with power differences and establishing more closeness and equal rank with them. Among the mechanisms by which more equality among the women participants is achieved are joinings, copies, and other symmetrical moves; support of other speakers by referring to them and the points they have made; allowing power gestures by low-status speakers; refraining from power gestures like correction, reproach, and criticism; and where power gestures are necessary, toning them down or camouflaging them.

I will look more closely at these mechanisms. At the outset, let me say that it is by no means a matter of course that in any conversational situation where speakers differ in social status, age, knowledge, or expertise with the topic at hand, moves toward more equality among the speakers will be made. In the mixed-sex conversations I analyzed, I found that male moderators as well as male participants used moves that would confirm the differences of status and power among them; i.e., they established their dominance and constructed a hierarchy. Thus it is a particular ability when women are seen to use their power to undo differences, which has the effect of establishing more closeness and equality among speakers.

Take the woman expert, a family therapist, on Sally Jessie Raphael's talk show. She began her very first turn with a joining of the two mother-daughter pairs who had talked in a fairly confused manner previously. The therapist said, "I am so happy that I could listen to you because I am going to have a grandchild soon—my first—and I was sitting listening to you and wondering how I will do as a grandmother and whether I will be able to manage."

It is hard to imagine a male expert give off in his first turn so much of his expert power and put himself on equal footing with a confused group of women, or men for that matter. This kind of generosity in the way high-status women speak turns up again and again in generous compliments and commendations, in attentiveness and intensity of interest, in short, in solidarity with other women.

How then is equality constructed among women of non-equal status, e.g., a well-known, highly educated, experienced professional woman and a rock singer; a famous old psychotherapist and a journalist; the most experienced old Swiss politicians and young women from the autonomous women's movement? The answer is that they are sharing their respective power in interesting ways.

There is an analogy with psychotherapeutic discourse in which the aim is to achieve a balance of strength and autonomy in both client and therapist by the end

of therapy, from a usually quite unequal start. In the process, the therapist does not lose autonomy and strength, but the client develops and gains strength and autonomy and becomes—in the optimal case—an equal partner.

I shall specify now some of the mechanisms functioning in the construction of equality:

1. High-status women do not insist on demonstrating their status by using power gestures and they do not constantly work on confirming it.

   a. They are seen to explicitly join lower-status women. E.g., in D4 a high-status woman joins a young unknown journalist in her first turn, saying:

   Ich möchte mich ähnlich aussern wie meine Vorrednerin (I want to express similar things as the speaker before me.)

   b. They are seen to allow power gestures, e.g., interruptions, by lower-status women. Thus in D4, a high-status woman lets herself be interrupted by the younger woman on her side and returns to her point after several turns have occurred, saying:

   Was ich aber vorhin noch hab sagen wollen (But what I did want to say before ...)

   This move also illustrates a refraining from a power gesture, e.g., a reproach, however slight, even where it could be expected. Thus the utterance could have been:

   But what I did want to say before I was interrupted ...

   c. As moderators they can let participants self-select rather than insist on using their power to attribute turns. Thus in D3, the moderator allows practically complete self-selection by the four participants, and in D4 she still allows more self-selections than she attributes turns.

   d. As moderators, high-status women can furthermore refrain from power gestures like interruption, correction, explanation, reproach, criticism, irony, topping, and attack. Thus, when the rock singer Ina Deter in I4 is visibly upset about being criticized in the media for her lifestyle (which is still very unassuming), the moderator Inge von Bönninghausen suggests that this is her own contribution. Deter fails to understand, seeing only what the critics do to her and not what she herself contributes to being upset. Rather than insisting on an explanation of what she has said, Bönninghausen drops the subject. Refraining from an explanation which would have made the limitation of Deter's understanding evident means protecting her from face loss.

   e. If power gestures are necessary, women are seen to give a motivation for them and/or tone them down; e.g., they pack criticism, depersonalize an attack, or modify a correction or objection. The toning down of power gestures has the function of refraining from constructing a higher status for oneself at the expense of the other. Using weaker means than would be available according to one's status has as a consequence that status differences are equalized.

In I2,[4] Eva Mezger, following for once the male model of interviewing which prescribes (at least in Germany and Switzerland) that there be provocative questions or counterpositions by opponents that surprise the expert, quotes a newspaper review that says that the interviewee, Fritzjof Capra, confuses reality with a dream world. She not only positions this attack well into the interview when her positive acceptance of Capra's ideas has been firmly established, but she does much more as well. She cushions the attack by preposing a question about people who think similarly to Capra. This allows him to say that he is one of many; it also relativizes the position of possible opponents. A further relativization is the embedding of the critical quote A in the utterances B and C:

Mezger: now I could imagine that your ideas do not produce sheer joy everywhere (Capra joins with *yes*) that you are also making enemies (Capra joins with *yes, clearly*) and somebody wrote I read a review it said well ah (B) Fritjof Capra is confusing reality with a dream world (A) for instance that's what it said (C).

Without giving a detailed analysis of all the modifications in B, I want to point only to the repetition of distancing devices that Mezger uses to stress that this is not her own opinion but someone else's, whose name is not given, a further protection mechanism: Capra's opponent remains anonymous, without name and status identification. In the wording *somebody wrote*, Mezger places the origin of the criticism outside herself, leaving it anonymous. Then follows a repair, *I read a review*, which takes the emphasis away from the critic by placing the review in the object position of the sentence; the repair might also aim at making clear that the source is a review, and just one at that. With *it said* the subject now changes from *somebody* to *it*, referring to the review, depersonalizing the attack by citing the review rather than the author and again stating that the speaker is not the source of the criticism. The two hesitation features, *well ah*, just before the concrete quote A signal Mezger's distance from what she has to say and her dislike of saying it. Interestingly, even A itself, being a direct quote—*Fritjof Capra is confusing reality with a dream world*—is face-saving. An indirect quote—*Someone said you are confusing reality with a dream world*—would have been a direct attack on Capra. The direct quote here depersonalizes this attack. A then is further embedded by C: *for instance, that's what it said* states again that this criticism was a quote of which she is not the source.

We see here how a criticism is marked in manifold ways as the criticism of someone else, how it is packed into layers of distancing and hesitation devices and thus toned down to take away its force. Where the male and the female model of interviewing meet, it is clear that respect for the other person and a harmonious relationship with him is primary for Mezger. As a matter of fact, the larger context around A shows additional preparation before the criticism and working through after it, so that we have heavy packing of the only face-threatening utterance Mezger makes during the entire one-hour interview. If Capra had refuted the attack in A as absurd and defended himself, no controversy with Mezger would have arisen, since she had not identified with the attack. In fact, what happens is that it is possible for Capra to join his critic and say:

Yes, that's always the case if one shows something really new, then you are attacked by the establishment and made out to be a dreamer for ah and in a certain sense let's say in there is there is something positive one one looks to the future it is a vision a view of the future which I offer.

We see that Capra can accept some of the criticism and deal with it productively:

Yes, I am a dreamer, I dream a different future.

This is an extremely interesting consequence of toning down power gestures or dominant speech acts. The technique and its function are highly valued in psychotherapeutic discourse. In analyzing the effectiveness of psychotherapeutic interventions, I have shown that embedding threatening material in joinings, commendation, agreement, etc., enables clients better to accept and integrate what is difficult to deal with (Troemel-Ploetz 1977).

2. High-status women are seen to raise the ranking of lower-status women by actively supporting them.

a. They give verbal and non-verbal support.

Verbal support is displayed by referring to and corroborating what lower-status women have said. Non-verbal support is displayed by looking at the speaker, nodding one's head, and producing minimal reactions and other attention signals.

Thus in D3 the woman of lowest status receives the highest number of supportive minimal reactions from the other women, accompanied by nodding of the head while she speaks.

b. They give speaking opportunities and speaking time by asking questions, encouraging others to talk, and referring to other women and their topics.

In D3 the woman of lowest status has the longest speaking time. The fact that a speaker has the longest speaking time is not just the natural outcome if one speaker takes more time for herself or himself than others do. It is a mutual construction of privileged speaking rights for one speaker. In the mixed-sex television discussion, D1, the speaker with the highest status, takes almost half the discussion time for himself although there are seven other speakers besides him, but he is also allowed this time by the moderators and the other speakers due to his status. He is not interrupted and restricted in his speaking rights as lower-status speakers are.

Similarly, the longest speaking time of the lowest-status woman in D3 is a construction—albeit a very different one—by the other women speakers who display their interest in her by referring to her and addressing her again and again and by showing their agreement with her while she talks via looking at her, minimal reactions, and nodding their heads.

c. High-status women are seen frequently to refer to and address other women by name, thus raising their status.

d. They produce explicit joinings of content, numerous implicit joinings, i.e., agreements, and what I have called prospective joinings—i.e., they talk in such a way that others can join in (cp. Eva Mezger with Capra in (1e) above).

e. They produce numerous copies and even simultaneous endings showing not only fine mutual attunement between speakers but also acceptance of and agreement with what is said by speakers of lower status.

f. High-status women frequently repair a rule violation by a lower-status speaker, e.g., by building an interruption into their own turn, by ignoring an inappropriate or ignorant remark, etc. In D4, for example, Bührig is attacked by a young woman on the opposite side, who implies that Bührig is in effect lying:

You know exactly that this is not the case, that the first strike would come not from the US but from the other side. You know that exactly.

Bührig totally ignores the inappropriateness of the utterance and refrains from explicit correction. She says:

If you read the papers closely, you will see that there is talk about a first strike

This is very different from saying:

If you had read the papers, you would know

It also differs from how a high-status man in D1 handles an inappropriate remark by a lower-status man. The former threatens the latter, silencing him by putting him down:

Mr. T., I have been polite to you so far, I suggest you keep the same policy.

By dealing in this way with rule violation, high-status women not only accept moves that are out of order, but additionally, they make these moves successful. Thus, speakers who commit a faux-pas can feel they are allowed to learn without face loss and can feel empowered by the non-critical healing responses of the older women.

Moves like those above have a psychotherapeutic quality for two reasons: the offenders do not have to feel guilty, and they can feel more competent since they have been spared criticism and embarrassment.

By becoming more competent, younger women also become more equal to the high-status women; by having their power gestures accepted, younger women can become more powerful.

g. High-status women are seen to generously use speech acts, such as praise, compliments, and commendation, that evaluate other speakers positively. These also serve the function of construction of competence for the other speakers, thus raising their self-confidence and their feeling of well-being.

h. High-status women are seen to construct equality and share power by camouflaging dominant speech acts.

Thus, Nancy Badore, top manager with Ford, gets a resisting male subordinate to comply by camouflaging an order as an invitation. Badore's camouflaged order, *I INVITE you to go* (B2), is deeply embedded in other utterances (A1-B4):

Badore: I do think you should go (A1). I can't and I think we should be represented (A2)
John: This meeting will be a waste of time. And that memo!
Badore: But this is something we have to get involved in (BO). Let me put it this way, John (B1): I INVITE you to go (B2). But feel free to leave at any time (B3). If you were Bush, and Gorby and Thatcher were having a meeting, would you decide not to go because you didn't like the memo (B4)?

The surrounding utterances soften the impact of the order (A1), provide a rationale and motivation for it (A2, BO, B4), establish authority while preparing for its unpleasantness and toning down its negative impact (B1), and modify the order by restricting its length (B3). B2 itself is slightly deviant for various reasons: an invitation usually offers an event that is engaged in mutually and pleasurably but can also be refused. None of these properties hold for B2; none of these properties hold for an order. If one is ordered to do something, one does it characteristically without the speaker, it is not something one would like to do anyway without the order, it is not usually profitable, and, especially, one cannot refuse it. Thus by explicitly calling her request an invitation, the speaker camouflages these undesirable properties of an order. An invitation, on the surface, leaves more options for the addressee. It is easier for him to accept an invitation than to have to execute an order. We see here quite an expenditure of energy on the part of Badore where a simple order would have been enough. But she refrains from using authority and rather takes time to convince and persuade. In doing so, she is giving the man more room to voice his objection, treating him more like an equal than a subordinate, and thus making him more powerful (cf. Troemel-Ploetz, ms.).

It can be assumed that there is a transfer of some of these mechanisms, e.g., toning down and camouflaging dominant speech acts, from women's conversations to mixed-sex conversations. If an enlightened male is involved, as in the case of Capra, or if the status difference between woman and man is considerable, as in the case of Badore, these mechanisms might be successful even in an adverse situation. This would account for women's success in professional situations in which they are the experts and their status is acknowledged. Clearly, many of these devices have multiple functions. Along with constructing a more equal ranking among speakers, they also reduce distance (e.g., address by name, joinings) and create an atmosphere of trust (e.g., protective moves, withholding power gestures). An atmosphere of closeness, trust, and equality is conducive to information flow and self-disclosure, which are important in both therapy and interview journalism; it is also conducive to liveliness, interaction, creativity, and understanding, all of which are important for learning and for working productively.

In summary, the property *construction of equality* is of particular interest for three reasons:

1. It shows that women handle power differently: rather than confirming hierarchical differences, they undo hierarchies and rankings in favor of a more equal distribution of power and rights.
2. The fact that high-status women handle power differently from men contradicts the frequently heard claim that women, once they have powerful positions, will act just like men.

3. Most importantly, this property is a vital prerequisite to professional practice and success in all areas that rely heavily on the use of language. E.g., it furthers information flow, which is important in journalism; it decreases the patients' expectations for the expert's help in psychotherapy, which is important for change to take place; and it decreases the distance between manager and employee, which is important for leadership and productivity.

NOTES

1. I am grateful to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Bonn, for a generous research grant that allows me to work in the United States.
2. A notable exception is Coates and Cameron (1989).
3. My data are five television discussions, D1 through D5, 10 Swiss and German television interviews (length usually one hour), and one German radio interview (length 20 minutes), I1 through I11.
4. I will now use an illustration from a mixed-sex interview (cf. also Fuchs 1985) because it shows that the mechanism of toning down criticism is so strong that it has desirable effects even in a situation with a male expert, Fritjof Capra. Capra, of course, has a somewhat feminist consciousness and can open up to some extent. Similar mechanisms used by Alice Schwarzer in an interview with the editor of the German news magazine *Der Spiegel* did not work.

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The Goddess and the sea people: On the origins of the languages of the Minoan scripts

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INTRODUCTION

It is ironic that although the world has known for millennia about the accomplishments of the "Ancient Greeks" through the writings of Homer and his contemporaries, it was only relatively recently that evidence has come to light of an advanced civilization predating Homer by almost a thousand years. Excavations by Sir Arthur Evans, most notably at the site of Knossos on the island of Crete (Greece) in 1901, first gave notice of the existence of scripts used by the Bronze Age Minoan civilization.

This paper attempts to demonstrate a relationship between the writing and linguistic system of the Minoan civilization and systems of other earlier and historically contemporary Goddess-centered civilizations (e.g., Sumer, Egypt, Phoenicia). The primary focus of the analysis will be on the similarities between Minoan Linear A, its precursor, Cretan-Pictographic Script, and the symbolic language of the Goddess religions described in *Language of the Goddess* (Gimbutas 1989), which has been shown to include elements that have been consistently evident in the religious/historical artifacts of widespread cultures spanning from the Paleolithic (ca. 50,000 B.C.E.) through to the last days of the Roman Empire (ca. 500 C.E.). In connecting the Minoan scripts to this historical religious tradition, I propose a link between the Minoans as a people and a larger religious-cultural tradition that may help not only in the identification of the ancestry and linguistic roots of the Minoans, but also in the decipherment of the origins of their writing system(s).

The influence of researcher bias on the study of ancient languages and cultures will also be a focus of this paper. It will be proposed that one result of the traditional reliance of the original decipherment of Linear B has been the obscuring of a relationship between the Minoan scripts, the Minoan language, and the language of the religion of the Goddess; therefore, the implications of this initial decipherment with its ethnocentric and sexist overtones will be examined in detail. It will be suggested that the unquestioning acceptance of earlier work may have compounded an original error. Examples of unsubstantiated assumptions concerning societal structures leading to linguistic assertions will be discussed, and reinterpretations of some of the linguistic data will be offered. Specifically to be re-examined is the traditional interpretation of the Cretan pictographic ideograms for man and woman. It will be concluded that the original decipherment, derived primarily from twentieth-century sociocultural expectations, lacks an internal linguistic foundation.

THE SCRIPTS

The scripts discovered by Evans can be roughly divided into three groups: (1) those apparently encoding the languages of non-Indo-European Minoans (dating between 2500 B.C.E. and 1600 B.C.E.; e.g., Pictographic, Linear A, and Linear C); (2) those encoding the language of the Indo-European Proto-Greek Myceneans (1600-1250 B.C.E. to Linear B); and (3) Linear D (ca. 1450, derived primarily from one text, the Phaistos Disk). It will be the first group, non-Indo-European Linear A and Cretan Pictographic, which will be the focus of this discussion because the other two types of scripts date after the arrival of the Indo-European Mycenaeans. It is generally agreed that the arrival of the Mycenaeans on the Aegean penisula resulted in major cultural and linguistic change; therefore, these scripts are not strictly representative of the Minoan civilization (e.g., Cotterell 1979; Drews 1988; Eisler 1988; Stone 1976; Woodman 1991).

The decipherment of Linear B script, which has fundamentally influenced the subsequent interpretations of the other Pre-Homeric scripts (i.e., Cretan Pictographic, Linear A, Linear C, and Linear D), was based on the imposition of phonetic values to the somewhat stylized ideograms of Linear B. Thus, for example, the ideogram of a three-legged cauldron was seen to be accompanied by syllabic signs which could be read as *ti-ri-po-de*: "almost exactly the Greek word *tripodes*, which of course means 'tripods' and is used of cauldrons of this type" (Chadwick 1987:20).

With the decipherment of Linear B as a very early form of Greek came the decoding of Cypro-Minoan Linear C script, facilitated by the discovery of a bilingual (Greek/Linear C) text. In fact, a number of bilingues of various combinations of languages have been found (see discussion in C. Gordon 1966). It was assumed that this script, in use on the island until ca. 800 B.C.E., also encoded a Greek phonology for a different dialect. Although questions remain concerning the origins of the Linear C script, its use predates Linear B so it has been assumed to be derived from Linear A and/or Cretan Pictographic scripts (see Best & Woudhuizen 1989).

LANGUAGE AND THE GODDESS

One of the first researchers to connect the widespread (temporally and geographically speaking) similarity of the symbols associated with the worship of the Goddess was Marija Gimbutas (1989). In exhaustively cataloguing what had previously been marginalized as "geometric designs" on artifacts dating from the Paleolithic era onward, Gimbutas became aware of a systematic and consistent use of specific patterns of symbols on wall paintings, votive offerings, pots, and other artifacts by followers of the Earth Goddess religions throughout the continent. She argues persuasively that the "geometric designs" represent an ideographic script encoding religious symbols in a consistent cross-cultural, albeit non-language-specific, manner. She and others (e.g., Castleden 1990; Cotterell 1979; Eisler 1988; Gadon 1990; Stone 1976) identify the Minoan civilization as one of the last

great Goddess-worshipping societies.

The research reported in this paper began with the realization that many of the characters or ideograms of the earliest discovered Minoan scripts found by Sir Arthur Evans (1909) bear an amazing resemblance to the symbolic "Language of the Goddess" documented from sources across the ancient world by Gimbutas (1989). Ironically, as will be discussed below, Evans (1909) also drew a connection between what he termed the Minoan "hieroglyphs" (i.e., Cretan pictographic script) and the Goddess of the Minoans. However, it appears that until now his observation has not been pursued. It is proposed that the primary importance of the discovery of a link between the Minoan scripts and the "language of the Goddess" lies in the implicit connection therein to the worship of the Goddess (or a Mother-Goddess) and hence between the temporally and geographically disparate groups who worshipped Her. Considerable controversy exists concerning the linguistic and/or cultural affiliations of the Minoans. For example, while C. Gordon (1966) argues for a Semitic interpretation of the Linear A scripts, others suggest Anatolian, Luwian, and even Egyptian connections (summarized in Best & Woudhuizen 1989). Thus, it would appear beneficial to be able to identify the Minoans with respect to the cultures of Old Europe and the Middle East. Evidence from literary sources (e.g., inscriptions invoking the same resident deity, etc.) and other script-based sources suggest this may be possible.

SIR ARTHUR AND THE GODDESS

Given the minimal acknowlededment of the Minoan Goddess religion in many recent works (e.g., Castleden 1990; Cotterell 1979, 1985), it is surprising to find many attributions to the "Goddess of the Minoans" in Evans' (1909) research, albeit without examination of the possible sociopolitical and/or linguistic ramifications of a female-centered culture (especially with respect to the Cretan Pictographic script). Even Chadwick notes that Evans "had been in no doubt that his 'Minoan' Cretans were not Greek speakers" (1987:17). However, many Minoan scholars appear to have omitted a close perusal of Evans' original work with respect to a female-based religion—although they do tend to assume like Evans that the palaces were controlled by Priest-kings rather than by the equally plausible Priestess-queens (e.g., Baikie 1926; Baker 1979; Burn 1930; Castleden 1990; Chadwick 1987; Cotterell 1979; Packard 1974; Yamauchi 1967). This position seems even more untenable if one considers the literary and archeological evidence supporting the latter position, which has come to light via the work of female linguists and archeohistorians (e.g., D'Eaubonne 1976; Eisler 1988; Gadon 1990; Gimbutas 1989; Goodison 1989; Goodrich 1989; Stone 1976).

Evans suggested a number of similarities between the Minoan "hieroglyphs" (Cretan Pictographic script) and scripts of civilizations which have been identified as Goddess-influenced (e.g., Egypt, Cyprus, and Lycia; see discussion in Stone 1976). Of the "hieroglyphs" summarized, he directly identifies a number of them as "symbols of the Goddess." One such example is the double axe (the *labrys*) from which the name *Labyrinth*, the Place of the Double Axe, is assumed to have been derived (1909: 232-33).

Evans states:

> the double axe is associated with the *Palace sign* ... as an ideograph, the sign may at times cover a religious title in connexion with the Minoan priest-kings (*sic*). In a recurring formula it is grouped with the serpent or zigzag (#83) and grain jar (#50). In one case it is coupled with the "serpent" alone, a point of some significance when it is remembered that the snake, like the double axe itself, was a special attribute of the *Minoan Mother Goddess* (1909:195; emphasis added).

Some of the other ideographs that Evans (1909:195-97) attributes to the Goddess or "early Cretan" religion include the following: the bull's head (#62), the ox's head (#38), the ankh (#39), the owl (#78), the dove (#79), the snake and "zigzag" (# 84; frequently grouped with the double axe, arrow), the "sieve" (#54), the sun (#108), the moon (#111), the axe (#12), the double axe (#36), and the "cross" (#112). In addition, similarities may be noted between Evans' "sieve" (#54), a circular net-like ideograph, and the images on the pottery in Gimbutas (1989:82). The resemblance between the "three flowers" ideographs in (25c), (25d), (25h), (25l) and (25m) (Evans 1909:215) and the poppy crown on the head of the statue of the Goddess in Cotterell (1979:160) is also thought-provoking. Finally, the symbolism of three reflected in some of the Minoan characters can quite transparently be seen in earlier votive offerings and pottery (compare, e.g., Evans 1909:215 with Gimbutas 1989:91).

QUESTIONS OF OBJECTIVITY: SEXISM AND ETHNOCENTRISM

The influence of researcher bias on the decipherment of ancient scripts has resulted in the imposition of non-linguistic values on the analysis (Stone 1976). From our perspective, the lack of interest in the world-view implications of the symbols of the Goddess in the Minoan scripts shown by Evans and others serves to demonstrate a determined avoidance of this topic. For these researchers, it is the norm to limit discussions of the implications of the Goddess religion for the Minoan society to approximately one or two paragraphs of a discussion of the Minoan religions (e.g., Castleden 1990; Cotterell, 1979, 1985).

In discussing an apparent general tendency for Goddess-based cultures to be denigrated and devalued by Western scholars, Stone (1976) asks:

> Why do so many people educated this century think of Greece as the first major culture when written language was in use and great cities built at least twenty-five centuries before that time? And perhaps most important, why is it continually inferred that the age of the "pagan" religions, the time of the worship of female deities (if mentioned at all), was dark and chaotic, mysterious and evil, without the light of order and reason that supposedly accompanied the later male religions, when it has been archaeologically confirmed that the earliest law, government, medicine, agriculture, architecture, metallurgy, wheeled vehicles, ceramics, textiles and *written* languages were initially developed in societies that worshipped the Goddess? (1976:xxiv)

One blatant example of sociocultural and linguistic preconceptions leading to unwarranted linguistic extrapolation in a decipherment of relevance to the Minoan

scripts may be found in Best and Woudhuizen (1989). It concerns the origins and meaning of the term *sa-ri (sa-ru* - nominative). The authors claim that because this term appears before the name of the person most often mentioned (i.e., the most powerful), the one receiving the largest amounts of goods on the tablets, it must a priori transliterate as 'king'. In this assertion, as will be illustrated below, the authors ignore their source's own transliteration of the word in definitively non-gender-specific terms. Best and Woudhuizen cite the linguist ten Haf as having

> compared *sa-ra* with Hebrew *sar*, 'chief, *ruler*, captain', *ru-zu-na* with Hebrew *rôzên*, *râzôn*, 'prince, knight, *ruler*', and *sa-qe-we* with Hebrew *zâqif*, 'military guard' and deduced from the numbers behind them that the three functionaries, like the *wa-na-ka*, *ra-wa-ke-ta* and *te-re-ta* in a more or less similar context on the Linear B tablets, are noted in order of decreasing importance. His (ten Haf's) conclusion on *sa-ra* was: "It would not be surprising if it turned out to be the official title of the local *ruler*." (1989:13; emphasis added)

However, ignoring ten Haf's frequent use of the gender-neutral term *ruler* (i.e., not necessarily a male ruler, or a king), Best and Woudhuizen choose the following sexist and somewhat ethnocentric, baronal nomenclature, which they apparently assume would be agreed upon by their readers:

> we have on HT 116 in order of descending importance *sa-ri*, 'my king', *ru-zu-na* 'prince', *sa-qe-we*, 'baron' on one line with *wa-na-ka*, *ra-wa-ke-ta* and *te-re-ta* in Linear B. (1989:14)

One final note with respect to the title *sa-ri*: ironically, it appears that this term may derive from the name of the Phoenician "Pillar Goddess," Asherah—in which case it would not seem unusual for it to inflect for the feminine (a sticking point for Best and Woudhuizen). The fact that the name of the Goddess in Hebrew inflects for the masculine plural (*asherim*) also serves to illustrate one of the dangers of making linguistic comparisons without reference to the temporal, cultural, and/or religious differences between the language groups in question. The Pillar Goddess of Canaan was the "main competition of Jahweh" (Stone 1976), and the Hebrews (then and now) refused even to acknowledge the possibility of the worship of a female deity, using only the masculine word *Elohim* ('gods').

Stone (1976) helps to contextualize this apparent oversight, commenting:

> the writers of the Judeo-Christian Bible, as we know it, seem to have purposely glossed over the sexual identity of the female deity who was held sacred by the neighbours of the Hebrews in Canaan, Babylon and Egypt. The Old Testament does not even have a word for 'Goddess'. In the Bible, the Goddess is referred to as *Elohim*, in the masculine gender, to be translated as *god*. But the Koran of the Mohammedans was quite clear. In it we read, "Allah will not tolerate idolatry ... the pagans pray to females" (Stone 1976:xviii).

Thus, to understate the case, "a Hebrew translation of a religious Linear A formula is incompatible with a Phoenician pillar cult" (Best & Woudhuizen 1989:19). Ironically, considering the confusion perpetuated by their discussion of the meaning of *sa-ri/sa-ru*, Best and Woudhuizen suggest that the most temporally

appropriate comparisons for the Minoan Linear A texts would be those made to texts of the Ugaritic (ca. 1400-1200 B.C.E.), who were also followers of the Goddess (see Stone 1976).

Another example of sexist bias in the decipherment can be seen in Chadwick's (1987) assumption that female workers in the Cretan records would necessarily be slaves. He states:

> in Crete at least the production of wool was highly organized; and there too the palace controlled groups of female workers, who spun the yarn, wove and decorated the cloth...*These women are not specifically called 'slaves' but their status can hardly have been much higher*. Other workers are *specifically called by this title*, but perhaps the distinction between slave and free was not so rigidly drawn as in later Greece. There are also slaves (or servants) of various deities, but some of these seem to have been of higher status. (1987:37; emphasis added)

Note that in addition to the blatant imposition of a twentieth-century perspective on the Minoan civilization, the author has also apparently overlooked the fact that supplicants of most religions declare themselves to be subservient (i.e., slaves or servants) to their gods and goddesses. Stone (1976) cites similar evidence of bias concerning the religious status of women in ancient times. She notes:

> the women who followed the ancient sexual customs of the Goddess faith, known in their own language as sacred or holy women, were repeatedly referred to (by academics) as "ritual prostitutes." This choice of words once again reveals a rather ethnocentric ethic, probably based on biblical attitudes. Yet, using the term "prostitute" as a translation for the title of women who were actually known as *qadesh, meaning holy*, suggests a lack of comprehension of the very theological and social structure the writers were attempting to describe and explain. (Stone 1976:xx; emphasis added)

A final case of a researcher's unwillingness to accept the sociocultural and linguistic implications of his data can be found in a paper entitled "Homeric $\alpha\nu\theta o\varsigma$" (*anthos*) in Chadwick and Baumbach's (1963) discussion of Mycenaean Greek and Linear B (Woodman 1991). In this paper, J. M. Aitchison provides—albeit unintentionally—evidence of the influence of the Minoan religion on the development of the Greek language. His discussion arises from questions pertaining to the traditional interpretation of $\alpha\nu\theta o\varsigma$ as 'flower', which from the point of view of this paper is provocative since the Minoan word *Athēnai* refers to the goddess after whom the city of Athens was named (Athena), who has also been identified as a Minoan Goddess (see Eisler 1987).

Aitchison's disagreement with the traditional definition lies in the "word (and its derivatives) ... (having) to be regarded as metaphorical in at least six of the contexts in which it occurs" (1963:271). He proposes that a more "natural meaning" for $\alpha\nu\theta o\varsigma$ based on analysis of the contexts in which it is found is "upward, visible growth" (1963:272). The latter interpretation fits well with our thesis, since the relationship between the Minoan Goddess religion and nature, life, and fertility, is well documented by the murals and artifacts discovered at Minoan sites (Betancourt 1985; Castleden 1990; Cotterell 1979, 1985; Doumas 1978; Hägg & Marinatos

1984, 1987; Packard 1974; Stone 1976). Perhaps indicative of the depth of adherence to his preconceptions despite the additional evidence he himself presents, Aitchison seems unable to acknowledge the obvious relationship between the origins of the term $\alpha\nu\theta o\varsigma$ and the "fertility cults." Thus, although noting (1963:276) the use of $\alpha\nu\theta\epsilon\alpha$ (*anthea*) in reference to the goddesses Hera (*A$\nu\theta\epsilon\alpha$ i Hpα [Anthea i Hera]*) and Aphrodite (*A$\nu\theta\epsilon\alpha$ A$\phi\rho o\delta\eta\tau\epsilon$ [Anthea Aphrodite]*), and even going so far as to cite Welcker's theory that Hera was "originally an earth goddess" and that "she was ... undoubtably connected with growth and fertility (since) ... ears of corn were called $\alpha\nu\theta\epsilon\alpha$ H$\epsilon\rho\eta\varsigma$ [anthea Heris]*, incredibly, Aitchison balks—stating that such theories have "met with strong opposition" (1963:276). Nevertheless, he is forced to conclude upon reviewing the etymological theories on the origins of $\alpha\nu\theta o\varsigma$ that there remains an "absence of convincing cognates in other Indo-European languages" for $\alpha\nu\theta o\varsigma$ (1963:277)!

THE GODDESS IN THE LINEAR SCRIPTS?: INVOCATIONS AND LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE

The origins of the Minoan scripts remains the subject of considerable debate. For example, Best argues against a blanket assumption of Semitic origins (Best & Woudhuizen 1989) on the basis of his questioning of F. Gordon's (1931) interpretation of the name of the goddess, Aššra, as Semitic. He suggests instead that for the term *a-ša-ša-ra.me/ma*, the ending *me/ma* should be considered as a separate inflectional. He comments:

> A sophisticated interpretation based on the Semitic stem *š/m*, in which *(y)a-sa-/sa-la-mV* must be read instead of just *(y)a-ša-ša-ra-.me/ma* contradicts the facts, because the epigraphical evidence proves that the pair *ma/me* forms, from the very origin of Cretan writing, (played) no part of the stem *a-ša-ša-ra*. not to speak of the fantastic appropriation of *y-*, which in the pictographic inscription never occurs to the stem *a-ša-ša-ra*. (1989:21)

It should be noted that by making this claim, however, he is in fact arguing against his own initial hypothesis concerning the Semitic origins of Minoan (Best 1972). Emphasizing the extreme complexity of the linguistic situation under investigation, the author offers the example of a text in which can be found: "Akkadian technical terms, graphic variants typical for Akkadian texts from the Northwest Semitic area, Northwest Semitisms like fluctuating endings and a purely indigenous title" (Best & Woudhuizen 1989:14).

The phrase mentioned above is found on many of the Linear A-inscribed materials. Significantly, Best asserts:

> One of the important linguistic consequences of the decipherment of Pictographic and Linear A is that *a-ša-ša-ra.-ma/me c*. 2000 B.C. formed nothing more or less than proof of a primary vocative particle *ma/me* in, in diachronic order, Pictographic, Linear A and, as *-m*, in Ugaritic and *ya-ša-ša-ra.me/ma* c. 1600 B.C. of a secondary vocative particle *ya-*, and *y-* in Linear A and Ugaritic respectively: i.e., *ya-ša-ša-ra-ma-na*, 'Oh, our Pillar', if *y*-vocative particle, *(ma)* would stand in its right place in the clause, and function in combination with the name of the deity invoked, followed by the first plural possessive

pronoun suffixed behind the whole. (Best & Woudhuizen 1989:22)

The comparison with Ugaritic is pertinent given the cultural/religious ties the two nations apparently shared. Of course, the fact that the nature and content of this "most frequently attested standard libation formula in Linear A" is the invocation of the Goddess is also significant. The formula reads as follows:

> *(y)a-ta-nā-tī wa/u-ya (y)a-di hi-te-te...(y)a-ša-ša-ra-me...(i-)pi-na-ma (=(ib)bi-nam-ma)*
> 'I have given and my hand has made an expiatory offering ... oh Pillar (Aššara) ... please give me ... '. (From Best & Woudhuizen 1989:32)

Finally, further proof of the connection between the Goddess religions and the Minoan scripts can be found in the work of C. Gordon (1966), who in discussing one of the Cypro-Minoan bilingual texts suggests the following lexical similarities:

> The Eteocretan [Creto-Minoan script] is better engraved than the Greek and its readings are clear. The final word in the Eteocretan is AMO corresponding to]MATPI TAI A[. Since MATPI can only be the dative for 'mother', the Eteocretan AMO is the equivalent of Hebrew l'immō 'for his mother' ... (cf. the Ugaritic name īštrmy 'Ishtar-is-my mother' = syllabic *iš-tar-im-mi-ya*). (1966:8).

Since Ishtar is known to be another name for the Goddess *Aššara* (Eisler 1988; Stone 1976), this inscription confirms the influence of the Goddess religion in both the Cretan Minoan culture and scripts and in their neighboring community on the island of Cyprus.

MALE OR FEMALE?: A RE-ANALYSIS OF SOME CRETAN IDEOGRAMS

It is critical to consider the implications of the decisions implicit in every aspect of the decipherment of ancient (and unquestionably dead) languages and/or civilizations (Stone 1976). Consider the implications of an incorrect assumption of the value of the ideographs and/or characters assumed to represent the male and female on the subsequent characterization of an entire sociocultural and linguistic era. It is my contention that questions of such magnitude can be raised concerning the decipherment of the Minoan scripts, specifically with respect to basic assumptions of gender-specific ideograms.

From the initial analysis by Evans in 1909 through to current times (e.g., Chadwick 1987), a stick figure topped by an inverted triangle (i.e., point down) has been assumed to represent the Minoan ideogram for male, and a rather shapeless stick figure is assumed to be the ideogram for female (see examples in Chadwick 1987:13 and Packard 1974:33). Attempting to discover the basis for the original gender allocation in the decipherment of the Minoan scripts is difficult since discussion of the "female" sign is virtually nonexistent in the literature. For example, Evans does not even include a discussion of the "female" ideogram, although he dedicates a page to the "male" one (1909:181). However, one finds very little of what could be considered independent evidence for his original gender designation.

Some comments by Packard as to the rationale behind his support for the original decipherment of the male and female ideograms are illuminating. Discussing the basis for the two ideograms identified as MAN, he states:

> The criterion for assigning a list to the B series is the presence of the sign L99 or one of its variants L125, L126, Lc55. *These signs seem to depict men, though they do not closely resemble the Linear B [Greek] ideograms VIR and MULIER. We shall refer to them as 'MAN' ideogram*, but for purposes of classification *it will not be necessary to establish what the signs represent*. For the most part these signs stand in isolation in apparent ideographic usage, but in a few cases phonetic function is conceivable. (1974:51; emphasis added)

The strength of this decipherment may be brought into question by reference to the ideograms cited: the two MALE ideograms do not particularly even resemble each other—one appears to be wearing a skirt, which according to evidence from wall paintings Minoan men did not wear (they wore loincloths; see Cotterell 1979). Nevertheless, Packard attempts to clarify his reasoning:

> The analysis of the B series lists shows that the entries appear to form a coherent group and does not contradict the view that they designate entities counted (in whole numbers) rather than measured (with fractions). The identification of these ideograms as MEN on the basis of their shape is consistent with the context in which they occur. ... It is further supported by the nature of the lists which appear on the same tablets with B lists. ... These groupings would accord well with an interpretation of the B series ideograms as *classes of men*. (1974:52; emphasis added)

However, when the underlying assumptions upon which Packard's decisions were made are later clarified, we find that they are based on his assumptions concerning what constitutes "men's jobs," in conjunction with the assumption that women did not work. He does not even consider women worthy of discussion with respect to these hypothesized professions. Packard states:

> The most obvious need for distinguishing *groups of men* is by their profession. In this connection it may be relevant to consider three signs which occur in B series along with various MAN ideograms: L8, L35, and L10. The first of these resembles the Linear B ideogram for bronze; the second looks like the prow of a ship, and the third may be based on the ideogram L67, perhaps BARLEY. It is tempting, though highly speculative, to interpret these as '*men* who work with bronze', that is, bronzesmiths (cf. *ka-ke-u* in Linear B); '*men* who work with boats', perhaps shipwrights (cf. *na-u-do-mo* in Linear B); '*men* who work with barley', or bakers of some sort (cf. *a-to-po-qo* in Linear B). (1974:53; my emphasis).

Ironically, the bias noted above also seems to have certain costs attached to it. A number of problems arise in Packard's analysis as a result of the author's adherence to the original decipherment. Packard complains:

> It is not easy to determine what distinctions are made by the various modifications of the MAN ideograms and by the various sign-groups and ligatures which occur in lists with them. ... *Some of the MAN ideograms seem to be wearing ceremonial robes* [skirts?] ... though this may be illusory in view of the schematic nature of the signs. The detailed

> ritual preparations listed on the Linear B tablets might lead one to look for *religious personnel* in Linear A. (1974:53; emphasis added)

It is interesting that for Packard and others even figures in dresses must be MALE, presumably based on "context." Researchers have seemed extremely hesitant to consider the ideograms as FEMALE, despite evidence from the wall paintings and sealstones depicting Minoan women as large-shouldered, small-waisted, and dressed in long skirts (e.g., Gimbutas 1989). Glotz, in a discussion of the roles of women and men in the Minoan Goddess religion, comments:

> The priestesses long presided over religious practices. ... Hosts of objects represent the priestesses at their duties. ... the *participation of men in the cult was, like the association of a god with a goddess, a late development*. Their part in the religious ceremonies was always a subordinate one, even when the king became the high priest of the bull. ... while private worship was performed in front of small idols, in *public worship the part of the goddess was played by a woman*. It is the high priestess who takes her place on the seat of the goddess, sits at the foot of the sacred tree or stands on the mountain peak to receive worship and offerings from her acolytes and from the faithful. (Glotz 1925, cited in Stone 1976:58; emphasis added)

The triangular upper body of the traditionally designated MALE ideogram is also problematic in the face of other archeological evidence. Gimbutas (1989) provides evidence of the triangle having been a symbol historically associated with the FEMALE (based on the breasts and vulva). According to Gimbutas, this association of triangles and the female body can be traced from the Upper Paleolithic. Interestingly, in a number of the pictures designating a female with a triangular upper body, the obviously anatomically male image is a very linear figure, much like the currently designated FEMALE ideograph (see sealstones in Gimbutas 1989). The triangle itself is also a symbol in the Minoan script, and arguably has come down to us as the Greek letter delta (Δ,δ).

A final questionable attribute of the traditionally MALE signs (albeit for animals) is the double or bi-line. In Chadwick's illustrations of the ideograms for domestic animals (e.g., Chadwick, 1987: 29), the animals distinguished by a double line crossing mid-body are designated as male (as well as castrated male). No rationale is given for this decision. As with the triangle, the cross-cultural and historical information in Gimbutas (1989) suggests a strong affiliation with the female (e.g., see "mother-and-child" statue in Gimbutas 1989:170). Furthermore, a tri- and bi-line symbol/ideogram also exists in the Minoan script (Evans 1909).

CONCLUSION

In this paper, a linguistic comparison of the Pre-Homeric scripts with the language of the Goddess was done in order to examine the influence of the Goddess religion on linguistic and script development in Minoan Crete, on the basis of symbol similarities and textual evidence of a religious nature. The hypothesis that the linguistic evidence would support the influence of the Goddess religion as a unifying principle in the origins of both the Minoan scripts and the Minoan

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language(s) appears to have received substantial support. Similarly presented was evidence of the influence of bias on the study of ancient languages and cultures, which has to a considerable extent conspired to obscure the relationship among the Minoan scripts, the Minoan language, and the language of the religion of the Goddess—most notably in the area of gender-specific ideograms. The lack of an internal linguistic foundation for the decipherment of the ideogram MALE in the Minoan scripts raises serious questions as to the validity of the traditional decipherments of many ancient languages. Further research and re-evaluation in these areas are required.

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"Spare women a beating for three days, they will stand on the roof and tear the house apart": Images of women in Chinese proverbs

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INTRODUCTION

As part of oral popular culture, proverbs have long been recognized as an important repository of social, cultural, and historical information about the people who use them. Arising and being preserved within a particular cultural environment, proverbs reflect or mirror a people's collective attitudes and its underlying cognitive structures or world view. In this regard, proverbs provide us with a unique opportunity both to study them as the "text" that documents and expresses important social-cultural messages and to relate them to the social context that renders such messages culturally meaningful.

The purpose of this paper is to show how women are portrayed in Chinese proverbs and what the sociological bases and cultural patterns are that have given rise to such images. The corpus of data for my analysis is based upon about 500 proverbs about women, drawn from two massive collections of Chinese proverbs: *Suyu* ('Popular Sayings', 1983) and Zhu Jie-fan's *Zhonghua Yanyu Zhi* ('The Records of Chinese Proverbs', 1989). *Suyu* contains more than 40,000 proverb entries and Zhu's collection has 10 volumes and 52,115 proverbs. Both collections are sufficiently comprehensive to reveal gender perceptions and stereotyped images of women that are reflected in Chinese proverbs generally.

A preliminary overview of these 500 proverbs shows the wide range of themes covered. Almost every aspect of women's lives is captured, commented on, and evaluated. For the convenience of analysis, I have grouped the proverbs into four broad categories: (1) proverbs highlighting gender differences; (2) proverbs reflecting women's familial roles; (3) proverbs expressing male conceptions of ideal womanhood; and (4) proverbs depicting the power recognized in women as dangerous and reaffirming the necessity of male control over women.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN

It has generally been recognized that gender differences are to a large extent cultural constructions rather than merely biological givens. The gender relations and differences in a particular culture are generated and reinforced by its dominant belief system and social organization. In the Chinese cosmological order and cultural system, the female and male dichotomy is polarized into two antithetical though complementary forces, Yin and Yang, wherein female represents the negative Yin forces, which are passive, weak, yielding, and dark; and male

represents the positive Yang forces, which are creative, strong, dominant, and bright.

One cultural significance of such gender polarization is its justification of the complete separation of the sexes in Chinese society. In transmitting the facts of cultural ideology and experiences, proverbs often serve to dramatize such an absolute separation. Thus, we have not only proverbs emphasizing the differences between women and men such as "Man and woman do not belong to the same group," or "Men and women are five hundred steps apart," but also proverbs that set up different life concerns and occupations for women and men: "Men are concerned about plowing the field in the autumn, women about weaving and spinning in the evening"; "Men love hoes, women love needles and threads"; "Men travel between counties and provinces, women just turn around the kitchen stove"; "Men are most ashamed of losing their pen, women are most ashamed of losing their chastity"; "Men succumb to school, women succumb to marriage."

One clear message from the above proverbs is that men and women belong to different spheres of life, with men occupying the public realms (working in the field or embarking upon the world of officialdom) and women relegated to the domestic sphere (weaving, cooking, etc.). As argued by Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo (1975), the devaluation of women in many cultures has to do with their confinement to the domestic sphere where they have no access to the power and prestige that are accorded to men because of their involvement in and dominance of public social activity. In other words, the gender difference is often rendered hierarchical due to the participation of women and men in different social domains: men are valued because they work outside the home, whereas women are devalued because they work at home. This assumption about sexual hierarchy finds its expression in the following proverbs: "Men's ambition is in four directions (meaning 'far and high'), women's ambition is in the embroidery room"; "Woman may be born beautiful, but she forever crawls around the kitchen stove; man may be born ugly, but he always travels outside."

Over the centuries, Chinese culture was dominated by the Confucian social order of hierarchy. Women's subordination to men in this social hierarchy was not only justified but essential in maintaining it. The "three obediences" (to obey one's father before marriage, one's husband after marriage, and one's son upon the death of the husband) were set out as a moral standard subordinating women to men's control. While the Confucian canon of texts may delineate the social hierarchy in terms of proper rites and behaviors, in the proverbs it is often depicted in a crude, down-to-earth manner: "A father is not ashamed of beating his son, a husband is not ashamed beating of his wife"; "Do not count women as real human beings just as you do not regard cats and the like as gods"; "Noodles are not real food (or rice), women are not real human beings."

Through the use of simple and natural analogies, proverbs often imply a sexual hierarchy that is deemed natural, immutable, and in accordance with the cosmic order. Women's inferiority is exemplified in the proverbs: "Even a bright, bright moon cannot be compared to a dark, dark sun" (meaning even the most gifted woman is not worth the plainest man). While not infrequently man's superiority over woman is expressed by elaborating on his physical dominance—"Man only

has to stretch his arms, woman has to work a whole spring to catch him up"—at other times it is voiced through denigrating woman as stupid and ignorant: "Woman has long hair but short sight."

Women's submission to men's control is often rationalized in the proverbs by prescribing women's total dependence upon men: "A horse must have a headstall and pigs a pigsty; what a woman must have is a man"; "Officials depend on their seals, tigers on mountains, and women on men"; "A woman without a husband is like a house without a roof beam"; or "Without a husband, a woman's body has no master."

To ensure man's dominant control, proverbs often advocate a strong fatalism on the part of women by telling them to submit to their predestined fate and marriage: "Follow a chicken if married to a chicken, follow a dog if married to a dog"; "Married to an official, you are an official's wife; married to a thief, you are a thief's wife"; "A woman has no real fate, it all depends on her husband's astrology sign."

As noted by scholars, in societies in which sexual stratification is marked, there usually exists a double moral standard that emphasizes women's chastity while at the same time allowing polygyny for men (Bullough 1974). In traditional China, a double moral standard was certainly practiced to an extreme degree. Men were encouraged to take as many wives as they could afford, since having more than one wife was a symbol of prestige and wealth, whereas women had to remain faithful even after the death of their husbands. Reflected in the proverbs, we have on the one hand expressions that show men's differential attitudes to and evaluations of their different wives—"The first wife stinks, the second wife is fragrant, the third wife is an ancestor to be worshipped" or "The first wife is distasteful, the second wife is lovable, the third wife is adorable"—and on the other hand we have expressions that aphorize female chastity: "A women who marries three times is a prostitute"; "A twice-bleached cloth is no longer good cloth; a twice-married woman is no good woman."

With the rigid seclusion imposed upon women, female chastity became almost a religious cult under the Chinese patriarchal state. Women who committed suicide or remained widows all their lives were praised and recorded in history as exemplary women (lie-nu), and special royal memorial arches were usually erected to commemorate their deeds. Examples of proverbs highlighting the social norms of female chastity are: "To die of hunger is a trifling matter, to lose chastity is a grave matter" (this proverb was dated as early as the Song Dynasty and coined by Zheng Yi, one of the founders of Neo-Confucianism); "Better be a short-lived ghost and keep one's chastity rather than remain alive and lose one's chastity."

WOMEN'S ROLE IN THE CHINESE FAMILY AND KINSHIP SYSTEM

Kay A. Johnson points out:

One of the features of the traditional Chinese family that cut across history, geography and class was the low status of women in a family and kinship system organized around men and male authority. The ideal traditional family was patriarchal, patrilineal and patrilocal, and was embedded in an extended male kinship network. (1983:8)

Indeed, given its male-centered kinship system, the outsider status of women in Chinese society was inevitable; women were "temporary sojourners or future deserters" to their natal family and "stranger-intruders" in their new husband's family. In popular belief, that a daughter is a potential loss to her family is thought to be manifested the moment the daughter comes into life: "A boy is born facing in; a girl is born facing out." It is no wonder that the collective sentiment recaptured in the proverbs often expresses the disappointment felt upon the birth of a baby girl: "Even the kitchen god will be depressed for three days upon the birth of a girl" (because a girl is thought to consume rather than produce food for the family); "A boy is born, the whole family is overjoyed; a girl is born, the whole family sighs and frowns"; "Upon the birth of a boy, the whole house is radiant with red (red signifies wealth and happiness in Chinese culture), with the birth of a girl, the family gains nothing." Very often, a daughter is compared to a thief in terms of her relation to her natal family: "Giving birth to a daughter equals giving birth to a thief."

Daughters are not welcomed because "they are goods upon which one loses money," and "you raise a daughter to one hundred years old, she is still a member of another family." There are many stereotyped metaphors for a married daughter in the proverbs, ranging from "a married daughter is water that has been thrown out" (meaning one can no longer take it back and make use of it) to "a married daughter is farm land that is sold out" (meaning it is useful only to the buyer) to "a married daughter is a ghost that is chased out" (signifying the urgency and necessity of getting rid of a daughter).

While the birth of a daughter might be met with dismay and disappointment, a daughter in general still receives parental protection and probably even some parental affection. Her life at her natal home might not be enviable, and very often might well be miserable, but she definitely knows that her life upon marriage at her new husband's family will be much more difficult and unpleasant. Indeed, the status of a new bride or daughter-in-law was lowest in the traditional Chinese family system. By the patriarchal laws and customs, the new bride was not married just to her own husband; she was married into his whole family and had the obligation to serve its members.

Proverbs concerning daughters-in-law or new brides are particularly numerous; this may be due to the high tensions and ambiguities toward the status of a new bride—the fact that she is at once a stranger to and a new member of the family. Two major themes can be discerned from the proverbs dealing with a new bride or daughter-in-law: the need to control the bride and the difficulties and dilemmas facing a bride or daughter-in-law. Examples of the proverbs in the first group are: "A new bride is fresh for only three days, after three days deal with her with sticks and bars"; "A new bride must be the first to work and the last to eat." A proverb in Hebei province prescribes "five nevers" for a good daughter-in-law: "Never thirsty, never hungry, never sleepy, never tired, and never wanting to go to the bathroom."

Proverbs also spell out that one should not praise a daughter-in-law too soon in order to control her more effectively: "It is too early to tell crops in May, it is too

early to speak favorably about a bride in three days." To subjugate oneself under the mother-in-law's control is absolute for the daughter-in-law: "Mother-in-law beating daughter-in-law is justified everywhere"; "Eating your mother-in-law's food, obeying your mother-in-law's control."

Proverbs of the second group are voiced from the bride's point of view and to some extent sympathetically capture her perplexities and powerlessness in the traditional Chinese family. To a new bride, life in her husband's family is like a prison, so she would rather remain unmarried as long as possible: "Remain unmarried one day, a carefree immortal one day; be a daughter-in-law one day, be in prison one day." It is almost impossible for the bride to please everyone: "Getting up early, I offend my husband; getting up late, I offend my mother-in-law." If her husband has many siblings, the new bride's situation is worsened: "Too many younger sisters-in-law, too many tongues; too many elder sisters-in-law, too many mothers-in-law (since the young bride had to submit to the control of her husband's elder sisters); too many younger brothers-in-law, too many shoes to make; too many elder brothers-in-law, too many rules."

The relation between husband and wife is ruled by that of distance and indifference in traditional Chinese family: "In bed, husband and wife; out of bed, strangers." According to Margery Wolf (1972), affection between husband and wife in traditional Chinese family was discouraged because the mother did not want her son's loyalty to her to be taken away by her daughter-in-law. But Myron L. Cohen (1976) asserts that the distance between husband and wife must be maintained for the sake of brotherly solidarity and family unity. Whatever the psychological or socioeconomic reasons, it was a rule of thumb that no affection was allowed between husband and wife. No wonder we have proverbs that reflect the wives' complaints: "Wearing out nine skirts given by my husband, I still do not know his heart"; "It takes more than ten years to understand my sister-in-law and father-in-law, more than twenty years to understand my husband."

The only avenue for the daughter-in-law to secure her place and gain formal recognition and power in her husband's family is to produce male children and become a mother-in-law herself. But before reaching that stage, she must be patient and obedient: "It takes a thousand years for a small ditch to become a river; it takes a thousand years for a daughter-in-law to become a mother-in-law"; "A daughter-in-law wants to become a mother-in-law, climbing up slowly and slowly."

Upon becoming a mother or a mother-in-law, a woman's submissive and powerless status as a daughter-in-law is over. However, new sorts of insecurities still arise to threaten women in their old age. One source of insecurity comes from the painful realization by the mother that she is going to be deserted by her sons once they are old enough to get married. Proverbs abound in lamenting the betrayal and unfaithfulness of the sons toward the mother: "A mother's care and affection for her son is as long and forever as a river; a son's for his mother is as long as a carrying pole"; "It is not enough that the mother bears ten sons, but it is felt burdensome that ten sons have to support the mother"; "Mother's body conceives sons; but a son's body bears no mother"; "Gentle wind and good shade; getting a wife, forgetting one's mother"; "Ten sons, ten daughters-in-law; leaving an old widow unwanted." Realizing that she cannot depend on her sons, an older Chinese

woman will then often consider herself very fortunate if she dies before her husband: "To die before a husband is a virtue accumulated over three generations"; "Fortunate if dying before husband; unfortunate if dying after husband."

It is clear that in all her stages of life, a Chinese woman is always placed in a dependent situation. Although the images and status may change when she assumes different familial roles, her marginal position in the Chinese patrilineal kinship system remains constant.

MALE CONCEPTIONS OF WOMANHOOD

It is probably only natural that we find women as a marked category in a male-dominant cultural system such as traditional Chinese society. Certain social rules and restrictions apply only to women: "Three virtues are essential for a woman: to keep her body pure, not to soil her hands, and to hold back her tongue." Even the commonest activity, such as the way a woman walks or smiles, is subject to a critical eye: "Never reveal your shoes when walking; never reveal your teeth when smiling." Too much learning or intelligence was considered not only unnecessary for a woman, but also dangerous to her virtue: "A virtuous woman is one who has no talents." In the Confucian hierarchal order, submission on the part of women is idealized as *fuchang fushui* ('Husband sings, wife echoes'). In popular folk sayings, wives are often compared to shoes: "A submissive wife; a pair of well-fitting shoes."

In accordance with the social values defined mainly from the male's point of view, proverbs often serve to provide pragmatic advice for men in choosing a wife. Proficiency in domestic work is a highly valued quality: "Marry not a woman who wears gold and silver, but a woman who is diligent and hardworking." Men are warned not to look for beauty when selecting a wife: "A wife interested in make-up must dislike working in the kitchen"; "Do not look for beauty when marrying a wife, only for her performance in the familial role, diligence, and virtue" "Disregard her big feet, dark skin, or a pockmarked face, so long as she can weave, spin, and bear children." In effect, many a proverb emphasizes that having a *chouqi* ('ugly or homely wife') is the best thing a man can have: "A homely wife at home, a priceless treasure"; "Straw sandals may be cheap, but good for walking around; a wife may be ugly, but good as a watchdog"; "There are three treasures in the world: a homely wife, a poor piece of land, and a worn-out jacket." The preference for a homely wife is probably due to the tensions and difficulties in securing a wife (especially for a poor man) in traditional Chinese society, where the existence of concubinage and female infanticide gave rise to a numerical imbalance between marriageable women and men. However, for those who could afford to have concubines, they had options and found themselves compensated for having attractive women as their concubines: "The homely woman is precious in the home, but at a feast the beautiful one is preferred"; "A wife is sought for her virtue, a concubine for her beauty."

Xian-qi liang-mu ('Virtuous wife, kind mother') is a crystallized Chinese expression as well as a criterion for ideal womanhood. There is no doubt that *xian-qi liang-mu* is valued for its importance to men. Thus, a virtuous wife is desired

because she can protect her husband from troubles: "With a virtuous wife at home, man will not suffer unexpected calamity"; "With a virtuous wife, a husband's disasters will be reduced." A good wife is important because she can guarantee good offspring: "With one good wife, you have three generations of good offspring"; "You are poor only for one season if you miss one crop; you are poor all your life if you get a bad wife."

Although getting a wife is regarded as important and necessary for a man, it serves only a utilitarian purpose in the Chinese patrilineal family system. It is but a means to an end; the final goal is to beget children (especially males) in order to continue the family line: "To give out loans is to get interest; to take a wife is to have children." Indeed, to a man in the Chinese patrilineal system, his wife is less important than his sons: "The death of a wife means the collapse of one side of the house (implying that one can always rebuild it as one can remarry); the death of a son means the end of one branch of the family line." Even one's brothers are more valuable than one's wife: "Brothers are like one's arms and legs; a wife is like clothes" and "Brothers are like one's arms and legs; a wife is like the whitewash on the wall." The contrastive images in these proverbs are telling: they imply that brothers constitute a unity and are indispensable to each other just as one cannot part with one's arms and legs, whereas a wife assumes only a peripheral place and can be changed and replaced just as one can with clothes and a peeling wall.

WOMAN AS A SOURCE OF DANGER

Although structurally women are powerless due to their outsider status in the traditional Chinese patrilineal kinship system, they are at the same time very much feared as a powerful force that can undo man's world and disrupt the existing social order. Such a fear is often translated into men's need to exert a firm control over women: "A copper gong will become blackened if not shot; a woman will become a demon if not beaten"; "Spare women a beating for three days, they will stand on the roof and tear the house apart."

In her book *Women and the Family in Rural Taiwan* (1972), Margery Wolf gives a very vivid account of how gossip in Chinese rural villages often helped women to establish a network of support and occasionally even to "bring the men's world to terms." Indeed, in many proverbs, women's gathering together was viewed with suspicion and women's gossip was considered the cause of troubles: "Three old women sit together, disasters will befall within three days"; "Three women together, no good words will come out of it." In societies in which male authority is recognized and dominant, women are often depicted as manipulative and trying to gain power through informal means. Therefore, men are often warned not to listen to women: "Husband should not listen to the words by the pillow."

Another source of danger associated with women is the belief that women are unclean and polluting (Ahern 1975). Women are banned from certain activities because it is feared they will bring ill fortune and threaten the normal social order. Thus, it was believed that if women plough the field, a job that belongs to men only, natural disasters will occur: "If women work the ox and plough the field, a

drought will last for three years." Similarly, heading a family is exclusively a man's affair. If women try to take men's place in presiding over the family, it is thought to be as dangerous as disrupting and reversing the natural world order: "A mule pulls a carriage and a horse becomes a beast of burden; it messes everything up if women become the head of the family"; "The world is upside down if a wife controls a husband."

That women are destructive and dangerous can be observed from the assumption that women are by nature jealous and disquieting: "Nine women out of ten are jealous"; "A mule's strength is big, a woman's anger is big"; "Having no women, the food has no taste; having women, even fowls and dogs are left in no peace."

In a similar vein, women's sexual power also constitutes a source of threat to men. Women's sexual behavior and desire are regarded as instinctual and uncontrollable as animals: "In their thirties, they are like a wolf; in their forties, like a tiger; in their fifties, like a leopard." Men are warned to stay away from women and not to be obsessed with sex because it is thought to be detrimental to their health. In the proverbs, sexuality is often compared to a sharp knife, a deadly weapon that will kill and destroy men: "On top of the word *sex* lies a knife"; "Sex is a bone-cleaning knife." In order to live a longer, healthier life, men are urged to take a homely wife to make sure that they are not frequently aroused to have sex: "Do not cover your head when sleeping, walk a hundred steps after dinner, and have a homely wife, your longevity is guaranteed"; "Longevity songs must be remembered: rise up early, eat less for supper, and have a homely wife."

CONCLUSION

This paper has dealt with proverbs as a manifestation of popular culture at the local level. Specifically, it has analyzed the way that women are depicted in the cultural productions of the proverbs. This local-level portrayal of women as inferior, subordinate, submissive, and potentially dangerous if unregulated by men tends to be at one with the dominant ideological traditions of the hegemonic Confucian state. The hegemonic culture of the Confucian elite in China is riddled with negative images of women and prescriptions for how they should behave and submit to the rule of men. While the Confucian canon of texts may serve to transmit and standardize these cultural beliefs for the literate, yet many of the same kinds of images and beliefs are found among the illiterate peasants of the countryside. At the local level, alongside the more formal and literate cultural productions of the educated elite were elements of popular culture that often relied on oral traditions such as the proverb that anyone could recite and remember, in order to communicate culturally shared attitudes and social norms.

Chinese cultural constructions and evaluations of the sexes are obviously asymmetrical and find their expression in the proverbial wisdom that serves to legitimize the necessity of the dominant cultural mechanisms for the subordination of women to men in a male-dominant cultural system. On this point, the hegemonic state and the local-level society as manifested through the proverbial lore are in agreement, because they share similar ideals concerning the structure of the family

and kinship and because this structuring is instrumental in maintaining and reproducing the domains of male power in both cases. But it would be a mistake to think that the relation is that of the orthodoxy of the hegemonic state reproducing itself at the level of an unreflective popular culture of local society. Just what this male dominance means for the state and what it means at the local level cannot be fully explained by recourse to the state's hegemony as manifested in orthodox Confucian texts and ideology. The symbols and metaphors that are utilized by the proverbs to depict women are drawn from images of the daily life of a largely illiterate peasantry—images that constitute the lived social reality of a people for whom life is lived and taught by practical experiences rather than by literary etiquettes. Moreover, the imagery and local wisdom of the peasant is often seen as unrefined, inferior, and even morally reprehensible to the Confucian scholar. And one could say that he would rarely refer to such illiterate cultural productions since they would debase his high culture, perhaps even pollute it, or him.

Using proverbs as cultural texts therefore allows us to view some of the concrete cultural practices that demonstrate the relationships between the hegemonic state ideology and local variations and transformations. Here one can identify an important aspect of traditions that depend on the spoken as opposed to the written word, for by representing an anonymous collectivity of traditional wisdom and teaching, proverbs can at one and the same time legitimize themselves as texts of tradition not unlike Confucian texts while allowing themselves the freedom of not having to refer to elite ideologies specifically but rather constructing cultural images that are reflections of local-level meanings and social relations.

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