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Law, Order, and Hot Dog Stands

Ben Humphries

On November 4, 1970, two days after ballots were cast for the 1970 state elections, Colorado Republican chairman Robert Flanigan told reporters, “We found that [...] voters were terribly interested in the environment and in law and order.”¹ Democrats supported environmental protection as well, so how much of a practical impact did Earth Day 1970 and environmentalism have on Colorado’s election? While the environment was a factor in the 1970 election, it was not the deciding issue. Both Republicans and Democrats incorporated pro-environment policies into their platforms, so very few elections were decided by the candidates’ position on the environment alone. The 1970 election was fought more over social issues, like law and order.

By the late 1960s, America saw the emergence of several counter-cultural and protest movements spring up across the nation. The Black Panther Party, Anti-Vietnam War Movement, hippies, American Indian Movement, and a new wave of

feminism contributed to civil unrest, among other things. University campuses were often hotbeds for student-led movements like these. The most egregious offender in the public eye was the University of California, Berkeley.² Conservative politicians fed into their constituencies’ fears of civil unrest with campaigns promoting “law and order,” and many left-leaning politicians refused to endorse these youth movements. But on April 22, 1970, a new movement emerged onto the national stage: the environmental movement. Possessing almost none of the controversies that plagued other social movements, environmentalism was popular on both ends of the political spectrum. In Colorado, the sheer size of the environmental movement was sure to establish environmental issues as a factor in the upcoming 1970 gubernatorial election. The Republican-controlled government led by incumbent Governor John Love, and the Democratic minority led by Lieutenant Governor Mark Hogan, all understood that the environment would be a key

¹ Leonard Larsen, “It’s Agreed: Love Proved Attractive,” *Denver Post*, November 5, 1970, 3.

² *Ibid.*, 3.

factor. While it was a factor in the election, it was a minor one.

Much of the scholarly work that pertains to the environmental movement and its impact on politics focuses on the environmental movement nationally. Environmental historian Adam Rome argues in his book *The Genius of Earth Day* that the environmental lobbying groups Environmental Action and the League of Conservation Voters participated in the 1970 election season in a way that was “symbolic as well as practical.”³ Symbolic perhaps, but the League of Conservation Voters only contributed to 20 congressional, gubernatorial, and state legislative races nationwide.⁴ That likely did not have as large an impact on the 1970 elections as Rome claims, perhaps less so for Colorado’s election. As for historians’ claim that environmentalism had bipartisan support in the environmentalist movement’s early years, the Colorado election supports that assertion well. In their book, *The Republican Reversal*, historians James Turner and Andrew Isenberg argue that the Republican establishment heartily supported environmentalism until sentiments

among conservatives in the South and West shifted away from it in the early 1970s.⁵ The bipartisan support for environmentalism, during the 1970 election, supports Turner and Isenberg’s argument. Similar to Rome, Turner and Isenberg, the evidence compiled for this study was drawn heavily from contemporary newspapers in the weeks leading up to the election and a few weeks after. This paper will first examine the environmentalist stances taken by both Republicans and Democrats, then discuss the social and economic issues both parties framed the election around, describe Democrats’ lack of party cohesion and its electoral consequences, and conclude with an analysis of the proposed ballot measures for that year.

Colorado Republicans made the environment a core part of their strategy going into the 1970 election. The Republicans emphasized their environmental track record and communicated to voters that they planned to expand existing environmental protections. Throughout 1970, the Republican governor and Republican-controlled

³ Adam Rome, *The Genius of Earth Day: How a 1970 Teach-In Unexpectedly Made the First Green Generation* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2013), 212.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 212.

⁵ James Morton Turner and Andrew C. Isenberg, *The Republican Reversal: Conservatives and the Environment from Nixon to Trump* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), 19-20.

legislature rode the environmentalism wave and passed numerous laws providing greater protection to the environment. Republicans enacted the Air Pollution Control Act of 1970, which replaced and strengthened the Air Pollution Control Act of 1966; numerous acts relating to water quality and water rights, ranging from industrial waste regulation to septic tank permits; the coordinator of environmental problems, a new office under the governor that coordinated different agencies together concerning environmental issues; and a law regulating the erection of billboards on public lands.⁶ These new laws either created new environmental protections or expanded upon pre-existing acts. In addition to these acts, the state legislature also created commissions to monitor the condition of Colorado's environment. Colorado Land Use Act established one such commission.

The land use commission created by the act was required by law to take "trends of urbanization, protection of the natural environment, development of housing, and preservation of green belts, open space

areas, and flood plains" into account while creating a new map determining land use in Colorado. This commission was also charged with establishing a system to monitor Colorado's ecosystems.⁷ Another environmental commission established in 1970 was the Colorado Environmental Commission, or CEC. Created through a Senate resolution, the CEC was tasked with surveying Colorado's natural resources and environment and to submit a report of their findings and recommendations to the legislature in 1972.⁸ Both of these commissions indicated to voters that the Republicans planned to continue enacting environmentalist legislation if reelected, a message that evidently resonated with voters. One political ad published by a Republican incumbent in Denver exemplifies the Republicans' emphasis on their environmentalist voting record. Titled "To the Voters in District 12," Representative Carl Gustafson listed every bill he introduced or sponsored in the 1970 legislative session in response to his opponent's accusations that his bills benefited special financial interests. Of

⁶ William Philpott, *Vacationland: Tourism and the Environment in the Colorado High Country* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2013), 276; Colorado Legislative Drafting Office, *Digest of Bills Enacted by the Forty-Seventh General Assembly: 1970 Second Regular Session* (April, 1970).

⁷ Colorado Legislative Drafting Office, *Digest of Bills Enacted by the Forty-Seventh General Assembly: 1970 Second Regular Session* (April, 1970), 5-6.

⁸ Philpott, *Vacationland*, 276.

these bills, two were concerned with environmental protection.⁹ Gustafson's emphasis on his environmentalist track record, at least partially, reflects the strategy of Colorado Republicans.

Environmentalist ideas often featured prominently in Republican political advertising. One advertisement in the *Denver Post* provided pictures of all Republicans running for statewide offices with the phrase, "Keep Colorado Beautiful! Vote Republican!" printed along the bottom (Figure 1).¹⁰ This ad was another instance of Republicans running on their environmental record because it attributed an environmentally pristine Colorado to the Republican party. Another newspaper ad supported the reelection of incumbent governor John Love by extolling all the good he had done for the environment in office (Figure 2). The ad said, "The leadership of John Love, with the aid of many legislative acts, has vastly improved the cleanliness of our land, water and air. And his ongoing determination will make further and rapid improvements

in the quality of our surroundings."¹¹ This advertisement exemplifies, yet again, Republicans' emphasis on their environmental legislation and signaled to voters their intent to continue.

FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION IN THE
GENERAL ELECTION, NOV. 3, 1970
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
IS PROUD TO PRESENT

THESE OUTSTANDING CANDIDATES

For U. S. Representative Dan GREEN	For U. S. Congress Donald BROTZMAN, M.C.	For Governor John A. LOVE	For Lt. Governor John VANDERHOOF	For U. S. Representative Ralph M. CLARK
For State Representative Betty Ann DITTMORE 37th District	For State Representative Austin F. MOORE 37th District	For State Representative Ralph A. COLE 37th District	For State Representative John D. FISH 40th District	
For County Clerk & Recorder Marjorie PAGE	For County Commissioner Howard E. ABBOTT	For County Treasurer Paul W. WOLF		
For County Sheriff Roy R. VOGT	For County Assessor W. H. WALLACE	For County Coroner Z. R. BULLOCK	For County Supervisor David L. NICHOLL	
For State Treasurer Palmer L. BURCH	For Attorney General Duke DUNBAR	For State Board of Education Lewis STEIGHORST	For Secretary of State Byron A. ANDERSON	

KEEP COLORADO BEAUTIFUL! VOTE REPUBLICAN!
Plan now to vote early (7:00 AM) on TUESDAY,
NOVEMBER 3.

Paid for by more than 1,000 members of Republican 1200 club who give at least \$1.00 per month to maintain a local organization dedicated to good, responsible government.

The Arapahoe County Republican Central Committee,
Dwight Hamilton, Chairman

Figure 1

⁹ Friends of Carl Gustafson, "To the voters in District 12," political advertisement, *Rocky Mountain News*, November 2, 1970, 36.

¹⁰ Arapahoe County Republican Central Committee, "Keep Colorado Beautiful! Vote Republican!," *Denver Post*, Nov. 1, 1970, 43.

¹¹ Committee for John Love and John Vanderhoof Committee, "to be sure... re-elect John Love Governor for Colorado," full-page advertisement, *Rocky Mountain News*, November 3, 1970, 24.

Democrats, like Republicans, framed the 1970 election around the environment, albeit to a much lesser extent. An issue that Democrats ran on was controlling urban sprawl. The Democrat candidate for governor, Lt. Governor Mark Hogan, told voters on the campaign trail he would “prevent a string of hot dog stands (or their equivalent) from going up along the Front Range from Fort Collins to Pueblo.”¹² This very targeted policy was created to appeal to residents of rural areas between cities in the Urban Corridor, who were concerned about urban sprawl destroying grazing lands and wilderness.¹³ Aside from Lt. Governor Hogan’s opposition to hot dog stands, Democrats could not effectively campaign with the environment as an election issue. The Republican legislature was responsible for the 1970 wave of environmental legislation, so Democrats could not meaningfully claim credit for it in the eyes of the voting public. In addition to that, any promises the Democrats could have made to improve environmental quality could have been invalidated by the Republicans, because the Republicans had the ability to enact any Democratic




Figure 1

environmental proposals and could claim credit for it as a result. This undermined Democrats’ electoral potency significantly, forcing them to grasp at straws for other issues to frame the election around.

Since support for the environmental movement was bipartisan, both parties needed different issues to frame the election around. Republicans focused their efforts on emphasizing the economic growth Colorado had experienced under Governor Love’s tenure and a platform of law and order. Colorado

¹² Lawrence Walsh, “Hogan Stresses Specific Issues to Impress Voters,” *Rocky Mountain News*, November 1, 1970, 39.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 39.

underwent not insignificant economic development since Love had been in elected into office. One advertisement touted that per capita income, school funding, and the total number of jobs all increased under Love's government.¹⁴ Another advertisement echoed this message, stating "jobs are up 25%" because of Governor Love.¹⁵ These ads illustrate the Republicans' emphasis of Colorado's economic growth in the previous few years, and show their desire to take credit for the economic development. Republicans also campaigned on law and order on the streets and on school campuses. The violent protests on university campuses that occurred throughout the 1960s, the protests at the University of California, Berkeley in particular, were on voters' minds going into the 1970 election. Republicans sought to tap into this fear of campus violence to secure reelection. One political ad for a Republican running for Congress, Don Brotzman, announced, "Don Brotzman is doing something **NOW** about stopping street, campus violence," and continued to recite his credentials supporting law

enforcement and fighting drug use (Figure 3).¹⁶ Another ad supporting Love's reelection announced his ability to tackle civil unrest both on and off campuses.¹⁷ These two ads showcase the Republican party's strategy of targeting campuses for civil




Figure 3

¹⁴ Committee for John Love and John Vanderhoof Committee, "I'm voting for Governor John Love because he has brought great leadership to Colorado's people," full-page advertisement, *Rocky Mountain News*, November 1, 1970, 51.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 24.

¹⁶ Brotzman Campaign Committee, "Don Brotzman is doing something **NOW** about stopping street, campus violence," political advertisement, *Rocky Mountain News*, November 2, 1970, 32.

¹⁷ Committee for John Love and John Vanderhoof Committee, 24.

unrest. Interestingly, this tactic did not resonate among voters concerning the two vacant seats on the University of Colorado's Board of Regents, which the Democrats won. The chief Republican strategist attributed the Democratic win to the relative quiet of CU's campus compared to UC Berkeley.¹⁸

Democrats struggled to find an issue that they could frame the election around. Some Democrats attempted to campaign on economic policies, like the Republicans did. While campaigning for governor, Lt. Gov. Hogan promised voters to close tax loopholes "big enough to throw a cat through."¹⁹ This message appealed to some blue-collar voters but did not gain much traction. A much larger part of the Democrats' strategy was to decry the Republican incumbents as ineffective leaders, beholden to industrial interests. A Democratic challenger for the 12th District accused the Republican incumbent of proposing legislation on behalf of special interests.²⁰ Lieutenant Governor Hogan attacked Governor

Love's leadership style and the large unspent surplus the government accumulated under Love.²¹ Evidently, this tactic did not resonate with voters because pundits claimed Governor Love's leadership style was what helped him remain in office after the election ended.²² While the Democrats' poor campaign was partially due to the lack of solid issues they could frame in their favor, the divisions within the party did little to help.

The Democratic Party's internal disunity made an already rough election season more difficult. One of the two largest factors contributing to the Democrats' fractured state in the 1970 election was the *La Raza Unida* party. Created with the goal of improving the social and economic prospects of Mexican Americans in Colorado and nationwide, *La Raza Unida* aimed to secure the 10 percent of votes in the gubernatorial election to be recognized as a political party under Colorado law. They failed to that end and the LRU candidate only received 1.8 percent of the vote. In the other elections for state offices, of which

¹⁸ Brad Smith, "'Father Image' helped Gov. Love stay in," *Golden Transcript*, November 6, 1970, Colorado Historic Newspapers Collection, 1,

¹⁹ Lawrence Walsh, "Hogan Stresses Specific Issues to Impress Voters," *Rocky Mountain News*, November 1, 1970, 39.

²⁰ Friends of Carl Gustafson, "To the voters in District 12," political advertisement, *Rocky Mountain News*, November 2, 1970, 36.

²¹ Lawrence Walsh, "Hogan Stresses Specific Issues to Impress Voters," *Rocky Mountain News*, November 1, 1970, 39.

²² Leonard Larsen, "It's Agreed: Love Proved Attractive," *Denver Post*, November 5, 1970, 1.

there were 13, LRU candidates never received over 17 percent of the votes.²³ While the LRU candidates did not split the ticket significantly in nearly any race,²⁴ Democrats could ill-afford any loss of voters in an election they already had a disadvantage in. Although the LRU had little impact on the races, the public perception of disunity in the Democratic Party that the LRU caused was more significant. The day after the election, contrary to what the data indicated, pundits attributed Democrats' difficulties with cohesion partially to *La Raza Unida* taking away some usually Democratic voters.²⁵

In politics (especially electoral politics), image is everything, and the LRU's presence in the election caused voters to perceive the Democratic Party as weaker than it actually was. *La Raza Unida* members attempted to defend the party from these accusations with editorials in newspapers, but their efforts were not effective.²⁶ In addition to the *La Raza Unida* party, the Democrats' gubernatorial candidate, Lt. Gov.

Hogan, caused problems for the party very early on in the election. Before even the first round of primaries, Hogan attempted to handpick his preferred candidate for lieutenant governor, State Representative Charles Grant, in the upcoming gubernatorial election. Working behind the scenes, Hogan discouraged or disqualified other potential candidates from running, a move that upset party insiders. Although Hogan managed to publicly resolve the issue by the September primaries, internal dissent continued up unto election day.²⁷ The disunity caused by both Hogan himself and the *La Raza Unida* third party greatly damaged the Democratic Party's electoral potency in a way that compounded their difficulty in finding a core issue to frame the election around.

Moving beyond the races for political office, an examination of the ballot proposals for the 1970 elections indicates that the environment was not a divisive issue in this election. None of the six proposed constitutional amendments pertained to the

²³ Rudolph Gomez and Robert L. Eckelberry, "The 1970 State Election in Colorado," *The Western Political Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (June 1971): 278-279, <https://doi.org/10.2307/446871>.

²⁴ Rudolph Gomez and Robert L. Eckelberry, "The 1970 State Election in Colorado," *The Western Political Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (June 1971): 278-279, <https://doi.org/10.2307/446871>.

²⁵ "The Tuesday Elections," *Rocky Mountain News*, November 5, 1970, 46.

²⁶ Jesus T. Alonzo Jr., letter to the editor, "Who Should Be Charged With The Democratic Vote Split?," *Denver Post*, November 5, 1970, 23.

²⁷ Brad Smith, "'Father Image' helped Gov. Love stay in," *Golden Transcript*, November 6, 1970, Colorado Historic Newspapers Collection.

environment.²⁸ This may seem odd at first, given the immense popular support of the environmental movement. Why were there no popular initiatives or referendums to protect the environment? The lack of environmental issues on the ballot makes more sense given the political purpose of popular initiatives. In Colorado, an initiative is when citizens bypass the legislature and propose a measure or constitutional amendment to the people for them to vote on directly. Initiatives are often utilized when the legislature avoids voting on an issue that has the potential to be politically damaging. Therein lies the reason why there were no environmentalist initiatives. Legislators in 1970 understood the power the environmental movement held and needed no prompting to pass environmental legislation. The array of environmental legislation passed in 1970 alone attests to that.²⁹ A chance to attach one's name to a popular bill is always highly sought after by politicians. Since politicians of both parties supported environmentalist legislation, and since they indicated

their desire to continue expanding it with the CEC and the Colorado Land Use Act, there was no need for a popular ballot measure to force action on the environment. This emphasizes the relative electoral unimportance in practical terms of the environment because it reflects the bipartisan appeal of the environmental movement in 1970.

Comparing the 1970 ballot proposals to the 1974 election's ballot proposals further underscores the bipartisan consensus on the environment in 1970. Of the ten constitutional amendments proposed on the 1974 ballot, two pertained to the environment.³⁰ Both of which were proposed in response to the energy crisis of the time. The more significant of these two proposals, Amendment no. 4, streamlined production of energy resources by allowing cities and towns to act as shareholders for both private and public energy development. One of the popular arguments listed promoting this amendment claimed, "Environmental laws and pressures are restricting the options for obtaining electrical energy supplies."³¹ What is

²⁸ Legislative Council of the Colorado General Assembly, *An Analysis of 1970 Ballot Proposals*, Research Publication no. 151 (1970).

²⁹ Colorado Legislative Drafting Office, *Digest of Bills Enacted by the Forty-Seventh General Assembly: 1970 Second Regular Session* (April, 1970).

³⁰ Legislative Council of the Colorado General Assembly, *An Analysis of 1974 Ballot Proposals*, Research Publication no. 206 (1974).

³¹ Legislative Council of the Colorado General Assembly, *An Analysis of 1974 Ballot Proposals*, Research Publication no. 206 (1974), 9-11.

key about this proposal is that it was a referendum, which indicates a shift away from environmental bipartisanship. Given the context of the energy crisis, few legislators would want to damage their image by voting against energy production. Yet on the other hand, a politician could have incensed their supporters by rolling back environmental protections. The General Assembly's decision to wash their hands of the proposal indicates that the environment had become a more divisive issue by the 1974 election, since a candidate could lose for supporting environmental protections in the face of the energy crisis. Therefore, a candidate's stance on the environment now held more significance in electoral politics, which sharply contrasts its relative

electoral unimportance in practical terms in the 1970 election.

Republicans ultimately won the state elections of 1970 handily, retaining the office of governor and a legislative majority, granting them the opportunity to redistrict the electoral districts for the 1972 election. The emergent environmental movement's bipartisan appeal in the face of social issues that were more divisive, such as law and order, gave environmentalist positions little weight in practical terms. Voters in this election did not determine their votes on environmentalism alone, since candidates in both parties supported environmental protection. Instead, voters casted their ballots based on candidates' stances on social issues, the leadership ability of the incumbent governor, and the party cohesion.

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Stateless Workers: The Bracero Program and the Exploitation of Migrant Labor in the United States

Jack Metivier

Introduction

When the United States entered the Second World War, the need arose to construct a massive military machine in order to dominate both the European and the Pacific warfronts. As is the norm with modern army-building, the bulk of enlistments came from working-class Americans who lacked the education and privilege necessary to justify opting out of military service. Millions of men from across the country abandoned farms and factories to serve their roles in a war that demanded contributions from citizens of all socioeconomic classes. As able-bodied Americans were sent from agricultural fields to battlefields, stateside farmers suddenly lacked the workforce that their profits depended on. Fortunately for them, America's

neighbor to the south had a vast surplus of rural workers eager for employment. The government of Mexico jumped at the opportunity to provide these laborers, as sending them north of the border would alleviate rising rates of unemployment without the necessity of increasing spending for social programs. On April 4, 1942, the United States and Mexico established the Bracero Program, which provided American growers with Mexican laborers through inflexible six-month contracts. Although it began as an innovative achievement in transnational cooperation, the program soon proved to be deeply flawed, resulting in the mass exploitation of working-class Mexicans.

Constructing the Program

The initial agreements made between the United States and Mexico provided strict instructions for the recruitment, transportation, working

conditions, and wages of migrant workers (known as *braceros*). Yet these regulations were only effective so long as both governments

maintained their roles in enforcing them. American policymakers were mostly unconcerned with the desires of Mexican officials and workers compared to the demands of domestic growers, so they quickly adopted a relatively laissez-faire approach to the conditions of bracero employment. This executive apathy allowed farm owners to effectively bypass negotiations with the Mexican government and exploit migrant workers to the fullest extent in order to maximize their profits.

The contracts proposed by Mexican officials established that braceros were to be paid equal wages with domestic workers doing similar work, with the average bracero in each state earning at least the minimum wage. Additionally, braceros were to be provided with transportation to and from their places of work, adequate housing facilities, and satisfactory nutrition. Most importantly, braceros were to be given the rights to negotiate their own contracts and to elect representatives who could discuss workers' complaints with employers.¹ American immigration and labor officials agreed to these terms, but never ensured that they were upheld.

¹ Kitty Calavita, *Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the I.N.S.* (Routledge: Chapman and Hall, Inc., 1992), 19.

Unenthusiastic about providing these amenities, American growers quickly found ways to get around them. The most effective method was to recruit migrant workers at the U.S.-Mexico border, which saved them the costs of transporting braceros from the interior of Mexico and allowed them to avoid interference from the Mexican government. The mostly illiterate and unorganized workers who crowded into border towns provided growers with the perfect conditions for exploiting their labor: they were unable to effectively negotiate their contracts, they lacked the support of educated officials to negotiate on their behalf, and they were increasingly desperate for employment.

The same opportunity could be found with apprehended undocumented workers, as growers could quickly and easily legalize them as braceros in a process commonly referred to as “drying out the wetbacks.”² Undocumented migration quickly became growers' preferred method of recruitment, as well as the most efficient path for migrant workers to gain bracero contracts. Word spread that aspiring braceros (known as *aspirantes*) could bypass

² *Ibid.*, 23.

the increasingly lengthy, selective and corrupt Mexican recruiting process by crossing the border illegally. This quickly led to a sharp increase in undocumented migration throughout the late 1940s. This culminated in 1950 when over 96,000 braceros gained employment by illegally crossing the border, compared to only 20,000 braceros who were granted contracts through government sponsorship.³ As the number of illegal border crossings continued to rise, the Mexican government intensified their demands for the end of all employment of undocumented migrants and for the U.S. government to be held directly accountable for the actions of their growers. These requests repeatedly fell on deaf ears, however, as American officials were increasingly supportive of domestic farm owners, who had become highly influential in politics and whose goals were in strict opposition to those of Mexican labor officials.

The inaction of the U.S. government to enforce the agreements of the program culminated in October of 1948 in what became known as the El Paso Incident. Thousands of Mexican workers had crowded into

towns along the border, particularly in Ciudad Juárez, hoping to be recruited and legalized by American growers. This presented Mexican officials with two possible crises: (1) allowing all of these workers to be recruited as braceros would undoubtedly lead to their mass exploitation through unjust contracts with decreased wages, but (2) keeping them in Mexico would exhaust the space and resources of these border towns. In an attempt to avoid these outcomes, the Mexican government declared that American growers would be permitted to recruit 2,000 workers from Ciudad Juárez, but would be required to cease the employment of all non-government-sponsored migrant workers thereafter.⁴ Instead of accepting Mexico's compromise, U.S. immigration officers chose to appease southwest growers by simply opening the border between Ciudad Juárez and El Paso. Between the thirteenth and eighteenth of October, seven to eight thousand men crossed into the United States, where they were immediately legalized, offered non-negotiable contracts, and employed on farms across the country.⁵ Mexican labor officials learned that U.S.

³ Ernesto Galarza, *Merchants of Labor: The Mexican Bracero Story* (Santa Barbara: McNally & Loftin, 1964), quoted in Calavita, *Inside the State*, 29.

⁴ Calavita, *Inside the State*, 30.

⁵ Deborah Cohen, *Braceros: Migrant Citizens and Transnational Subjects in the Postwar United States*

policymakers had no interest in compromising to ensure that both nations benefited from the Bracero Program.

With the United States escalating their involvement in the Korean War in the early 1950s, Mexican labor became increasingly crucial for the survival of American agriculture. The Mexican government saw in this an opportunity to raise the stakes, declaring an ultimatum that called for the termination of the Bracero Program unless government sponsorship of bracero employment was re-established.⁶ American policymakers had no choice but to acquiesce. By the summer of 1951, Congress had passed Public Law 78, which declared that the U.S. government was officially responsible for the recruitment and contracting of Mexican migrant laborers and was therefore required to ensure that the terms of these contracts were upheld. The law also placed restrictions on the employment of undocumented migrants who had been living in the

United States for less than five years, blocked farm owners who employed undocumented migrants from receiving official bracero labor, and established that braceros were to be paid no less than the “prevailing wage” of the areas in which they were employed.⁷ These new regulations were successful in satisfying Mexico’s demands for tighter control over undocumented labor, re-establishing legal migration as the most viable option for aspirantes to gain bracero contracts. Although it was a step in the right direction, Public Law 78 still lacked some of the necessary conditions that would fully ensure that braceros would be protected from exploitation. It did not, for example, include any fines or legal penalties for employers of undocumented workers, nor did it specify how exactly “prevailing wages” were to be set. Even after increased regulations for bracero contracts were established, there was still plenty of room for employers to abuse the system.

and Mexico (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 203.

⁶ Calavita, *Inside the State*, 43.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 44.

Becoming a Bracero

While the path for aspirantes to acquire contracts through illegal immigration had been closed off, there were virtually no government-led efforts to improve the arduous process of selecting braceros in Mexico's interior. Over the course of their recruitment, braceros were deceived by corrupt government and military officials, packed into trains and buses to be shipped across the country, subjected to cruel and dehumanizing medical screenings, and treated like de facto slaves upon arriving on American farms. In this section I will discuss these injustices, as well as the attempts and failures to remedy them through organization and collective action, to which the Bracero Program was designed to be impervious.

To be recruited as braceros, aspirantes were required to provide proper documentation and identification. These were to be provided free-of-charge by the government as aspirantes made their way through the multi-level recruitment process. However, most aspirantes belonged to the rural working class and were uneducated in

the political complexities of the urban hubs that they were forced to navigate and were therefore vulnerable to exploitation by corrupt government officials. Historian Deborah Cohen, citing an investigation conducted in the late 1950s, has stressed the extent to which braceros were subjected to this corruption, writing, "So pervasive was the demand for guarantees [of employment] . . . that almost 80 percent of program participants had paid for a contract."⁸ Many workers received empty promises from officials claiming that they could place them higher on recruitment lists if they paid small bribes, colloquially referred to as *mordidas* (bites).⁹ Other government workers often sold counterfeit bracero certificates to aspirantes, swindling them out of a total of at least forty thousand pesos between 1942 and 1944 alone.¹⁰ Perhaps most cruelly, police tasked with patrolling recruitment centers often seized braceros' newly acquired documentation, claiming that it was counterfeit, only to sell it to other

⁸ Cohen, *Braceros*, 96.

⁹ Mireya Loza, *Defiant Braceros: How Migrant Workers Fought for Racial, Sexual, & Political*

Freedom (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016), 96.

¹⁰ Cohen, *Braceros*, 95.

aspirantes who lacked necessary documentation.¹¹

While local and national governments did little to remedy the immense corruption that workers were subjected to, Mexican labor organizations attempted to expose and abolish the unjust treatment of aspirantes. One such organization was *Alianza de Braceros Nacionales de México en los Estados Unidos* (National Alliance of Mexican Braceros in the United States) which aimed to improve recruitment conditions by educating aspirantes on how to avoid government corruption and how to understand their guaranteed contractual rights. Additionally, the Alianza helped aspirantes secure contracts and advocated for land and wealth redistribution to more effectively re-incorporate ex-braceros into the Mexican economy upon their return.¹² These efforts were promptly halted in 1946, however, when the Mexican government brought the board of the Alianza to trial. The basis of their accusations has been explained well by historian Mireya Loza, who wrote, “Although the stipulations within the bi-national agreement allowed

braceros to choose a representative from their own group to represent their interests in the fields, it prohibited them from joining unions and striking.”¹³ Because participants of the Bracero Program were transnational laborers, the agreement established, they were denied the ability to unionize, a right that belonged to citizens of both Mexico and the United States. The Alianza was largely inactive during the two-year trial, until the group was deemed not guilty of any criminal activity in September of 1948. Though legally in the clear, the Alianza was still under heavy government surveillance and had to continue its efforts to organize braceros by changing their language to only include aspirantes and ex-braceros, being forced to exclude current transnational laborers from their organization. By defining braceros as a stateless people that lacked the rights of domestic citizens, officials in both countries were able to avoid the potential threat of unions calling for more labor reform and more government responsibility.

Although being subjected to various forms of governmental corruption and exploitation was

¹¹ Ibid., 96.

¹² Loza, *Defiant Braceros*, 98.

¹³ Ibid., 105.

grueling for aspirantes, the injustices that were endured by the select quantity of men who were able to obtain bracero contracts were far more vicious. The first offense that braceros faced was the “adequate transportation” that was guaranteed by the initial agreement, coming in the form of unsanitary buses and boxcars, which braceros were crowded into for the often multi-day journey from recruitment centers to the U.S. border.¹⁴ Upon their arrival, braceros were stripped naked, subjected to humiliating and invasive medical screenings, and sprayed with DDT or kerosene as a method of delousing. The justifications for these processes came from American assumptions that migrant laborers were unclean, which were mostly based on braceros’ attire, usually consisting of modest work-clothes and sandals dirty from the long journey. Most braceros were aware of the connotations that came with their clothing, and some wore them precisely for that reason. These outfits allowed braceros to play the part of the uneducated, poor and docile worker that was in such high demand in the United States. If aspirantes enjoyed fashionable clothing and adequate personal hygiene in Mexico, they

quickly learned that these comforts needed to be abandoned in order to obtain work as a bracero. These men had to play the part of the submissive laborer not only in appearance, but also in principle, as American immigration officers additionally subjected them to ideological screenings. Cohen writes, “To keep grower-identified trouble-makers in Mexico, [immigration officers] interviewed men as they passed through reception centers, comparing individual names to those on the list of undesirables: that is, communists or labor organizers in braceros’ clothing.”¹⁵ The abusive and extensive screenings that braceros were forced to endure at the border served as the final filter to stop any potential agitators from entering the United States and hindering growers’ abilities to exploit migrant laborers to the fullest extent.

After being cleared at the border, braceros were again packed into buses and trains to be shipped to whichever grower had acquired control of their contracts. Upon arriving at American farms, these men often found that the “adequate living conditions” guaranteed by their contracts came in the form of dilapidated housing facilities and diets

¹⁴ Cohen, *Braceros*, 97.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 100-101.

consisting of only the cheapest and most basic elements of American cuisine. Braceros themselves, being unable to unionize, lacked any bargaining power whatsoever with which to demand more tolerable living conditions. Additionally, braceros lacked any freedom of labor or mobility, as they were firmly bound by contract to remain in the employment of the grower to which they had been assigned. If a bracero felt that his wages were inadequate, he was denied the ability to market his labor to another grower offering higher pay.¹⁶

Circumstances for braceros were exacerbated in 1954 when President Eisenhower initiated Operation Wetback, an extensive campaign to deport as many undocumented immigrants as possible. Following a slight decline in economic growth in 1953, many Americans blamed the presence of “illegal aliens” as the primary force in driving down wages. Eisenhower appealed to this scapegoatism, militarizing the INS and changing rhetorical strategies to frame immigrants as foreign invaders. Immigration officers raided factories, farms and neighborhoods, capturing and deporting 1.1 million

undocumented migrants in 1954 alone.¹⁷ Operation Wetback also impacted official braceros, whose legal status would immediately be nullified if the terms of their contracts were broken.¹⁸ Many of these men chose to endure deplorable working conditions out of fear that they would be apprehended and deported if they pursued better circumstances, allowing their employers to continue their exploitative practices without the threat of defiant responses from workers.

Despite the overt suppression of any potentially subversive braceros, there were several more attempts at unionization throughout the 1950s, such as the initiatives of Mexican American labor activist Ernesto Galarza. In 1951, Galarza expounded the causes of the plights against braceros, writing, “. . . the vast majority of the braceros have been selected by the bosses based on illiteracy, social inexperience and ideological backwardness, conditions which, coupled with the absence of leadership capacity within the group’s core, completely nullifies the possibility of collective action.”¹⁹ The solution to this system of compulsory

¹⁶ Calavita, *Inside the State*, 56.

¹⁷ Calavita, *Inside the State*, Appendix A, 217.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 58.

¹⁹ Galarza to José Hernández Serrano, Salinas, California, October 12, 1951, folder 11, box 17,

acquiescence, Galarza explains, was to politicize braceros through mass education. Galarza worked with the Alianza to organize a mass labor strike within the farms of the Imperial Valley in California, educating men on the predicaments of migrant workers and the change that could be initiated through collective action. Back in Mexico, the Alianza conducted orientations to educate aspirantes on the contractual rights that would be guaranteed to them while working in the United States. They also acquired bracero contracts for dozens of Alianza members who then went to California to contribute to Galarza's education campaigns. Although Galarza achieved some success in mobilizing braceros to strike, his initiatives failed to impact the program as much as he had hoped. Bracero contracts were fragile and could be terminated by employers at any time. Workers could then be quickly replaced due to a clause in Public Law 78 which allowed growers to gain access to additional braceros by appealing to the Department of Labor and claiming a shortage of domestic workers. Instead of improving living conditions or increasing wages to

satisfy striking braceros, growers could easily replace their entire defiant workforce with other laborers who were less educated and less politicized.

Disheartened with the failure of his initiative to reform from within a labor system designed to be impervious to the forces of collective action, Galarza adopted a new platform calling for the outright termination of the Bracero Program. Along with several other activist groups, Galarza sought to end the binational agreement by launching campaigns to turn Mexican public opinion against contract labor. But the program's death in December of 1964 ultimately came as a result of changing attitudes in the United States. This trend was caused by a number of social and political factors, primarily the reluctance of Congress to continually extend the program, as well as the relatively low amount of sympathy the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had for domestic growers compared to President Eisenhower.²⁰ Although millions of braceros were now out of work, labor activists declared victory, as the legal exploitation of migrant laborers had come to an end

Ernesto Galarza Papers, quoted in Loza, *Defiant Braceros*, 103.

²⁰ Calavita, *Inside the State*, 142.

The Aftermath

Although growers' legal methods of obtaining migrant workers had been eliminated, the American agricultural industry had become totally dependent on cheap Mexican labor. Concurrently, the overabundance of agricultural work north of the border was often the only viable job opportunity for poor working-class Mexicans. The end of the Bracero Program did nothing to change this mutual dependency, resulting in a surge of migrants crossing the border illegally, who, due to their lack of documentation, were far easier for growers to exploit. The influx of undocumented workers stirred the anti-immigrant sentiments that dominated American public opinion. Policymakers soon enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, which for the first time set a strict numerical limit on the amount of Latin American migrants who were allowed entry to the United States each year.²¹ Although control over border crossings tightened and apprehensions of undocumented migrants increased through the 1990s, American growers

continued to employ Mexican migrant workers by the hundreds of thousands.

For the duration of the Bracero Program, Mexican leadership took every action they could to halt illegal border crossings and protect their role in transnational labor negotiations. With the end of the bracero contracting system, however, the most efficient solution for Mexican officials to control the high unemployment rate without increasing funding for social programs had been eliminated. In 1964, the Mexican government quickly reversed its stance on undocumented migration, passively encouraging members of the rural working class to seek employment in the United States, which foreign minister Jorge Castañeda described as “the safety valve for [Mexico’s] surplus labor force.”²² Rural workers were pressured by their government and their financial desperation to illegally migrate to the United States, while an increasingly militarized INS and a growing general culture of distaste for “illegal aliens” pressured them to stay in Mexico. Since the Bracero Program was instituted in

²¹ Ana Raquel Minian, *Undocumented Lives: The Untold Story of Mexican Migration* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), 4.

²² Jorge Castañeda, planned speech, quoted in Minian, *Undocumented Lives*, 16.

1942, Mexican migrant workers have existed in a liminal space wherein they are subject to exploitation and statelessness. While the political and economic complexities regarding transnational labor have continued to evolve, the only constants have been

the abuse of the poorest members of Mexican society and the inaction of the governments of Mexico and the United States to address that abuse unless it has directly challenged the ease with which officials and employers have collected their profits.

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The Death of Piers Gaveston: Hubris and a Misallocation of Royal Favor

Anna Bodnar

One of the most important roles of a medieval king was to give out favors in the form of lands, titles, and gifts, and successful kings rewarded faithful followers and maintained loyalty through effective patronage. Edward II of England, however, was seemingly incapable of dispensing royal favors well. Throughout his reign, he selected several favorites whom he showered with wealth and power at the expense of the rest of the baronial class. The first of these favorites was a knight from the English holding of Gascony named Piers Gaveston, who had been a member of the king's household since Edward was just the Prince of Wales.¹ Due to Gaveston's monopoly of royal patronage, his power over the king, and insults towards the other earls, the baronial class felt threatened enough to engage in an escalating cycle of violence with the king's favorite. This retributive animosity began with a

conflict between two people or groups, failed to be resolved, and concluded with bloodshed.

Edward II was deposed as king, and the resulting desire to justify this coup by its perpetrators has greatly influenced the historical record. While it is undeniable that Edward was not an effective king, later chronicles and histories, such as the *Flores Historiarum*, were so biased against the him and his favorites that they are practically pieces of propaganda.² To justify the removal of Edward from the kingship, he needed to be shown as unfit to rule, and the most common reason given for this was poor council, with his favorites such as Gaveston and Hugh Despenser the Younger receiving most of the blame.³ Even chronicles written during Edward's reign, such as the monastic chronicles like *St. Alban's*, the continuation of Trevet's *Annals*, and the *Lannercost*, tended to portray the ruler and

¹ J. S. Hamilton, *Piers Gaveston, Earl of Cornwall, 1307-1312: Politics and Patronage in the Reign of Edward II*. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988), 34.

² Ian Mortimer, "The Death of Edward II in Berkeley Castle." *The English Historical Review* 120, no. 489 (2005), 1211-12.

³ Pierre Chaplais, *Piers Gaveston: Edward II's Adoptive Brother* (Oxford [England]: Clarendon Press, 1994), 1.

Gaveston in a negative light, despite their rather clear-cut nature.⁴ The *Vita Edwardi Secundi*, which is often considered the most unbiased and sober accounting of his reign,⁵ does not flatter Edward or Gaveston. It was written near the end of Edward's reign by a secular clerk and is a literary piece which contains both "wise judgements" and "factual accuracy."⁶ The *Vita's* chronicler also blames poor council for Edward's failures, claiming that he had been a promising prince but a poor king due to the people he surrounded himself with, such as Gaveston.⁷ The chronicle was likely started right after the death of Piers Gaveston, and its beginning is dedicated to this subject as the author attempted to explain how tensions escalated to the point of murder.

Another point of debate within the historical narrative of Edward II and Piers Gaveston is the nature of their relationship. The belief that the two were sexually involved has been passed through popular culture, and this assumption is largely owed to the play *Edward II* by Christopher

Marlowe (c. 1592) and its modern reproductions.⁸ The play, however, is not the sole source of the idea that Edward loved Gaveston in romantic way, as there were also contemporary insinuations that the king was homosexual.⁹ If these claims were correct and the two were lovers, it would explain the fervor with which Edward focused on Gaveston. Homosexuality, however, is not the sole interpretation of the extraordinary nature of their relationship: the special favors and attention that Edward paid to Gaveston could be due to considering each other brothers.¹⁰ According to this theory, the two would have forged a powerful bond of brotherhood while fighting together in Scotland under Edward I and considered each other family. Whatever the nature of the relationship, Edward's connection to Gaveston weakened his kingship, his support, and almost caused full-blown civil war.

If there is one thing all the chroniclers and biographers can agree on—if not the manner of the

⁴ Antonia Grandsen, *Historical Writing in England: c. 1307 to the Early Sixteenth Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), 2.

⁵ Chaplais, *Adoptive Brother*, 7.

⁶ Grandsen, *Historical Writing in England*, 3.

⁷ *Vita Edwardi Secundi: The Life of Edward the Second*. trans Childs, Wendy R., and N. Denholm-Young (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 5.

⁸ Kathryn Warner, *Edward II: The Unconventional King* (Gloucestershire: Amberley Publishing, 2014), 29.

⁹ Roy Martin Haines, *King Edward II: Edward of Caernarfon, his life, his reign, and its aftermath, 1284-1330*. (Montreal [Ithaca]: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 2003), 42.

¹⁰ Chaplais, *Adoptive Brother*, 109.

attachment—it is that Edward II was extremely emotionally attached to Piers Gaveston. The *Vita* describes Edward’s feelings towards Gaveston saying, “I do not remember having heard that one man so loved another. Jonathan cherished David, Achilles loved Patroclus ... Our king, however, was incapable of moderate affection, and on account of Piers was said to forget himself.”¹¹ Indeed, even if there was nothing sexual between the two, Edward was wholly devoted to the Gascon knight, to the detriment of his relationship with the baronial class. An important part of kingship was the dispensation of favors—giving land, titles, and wealth to those who served him faithfully. Edward, however, rewarded his other barons poorly, so that he could favor Gaveston instead. The other earls grew to resent the Gascon for it. As important magnates, the earls felt that they should have some say in the flow of royal patronage but also felt that Gaveston controlled these favors.¹² The *Vita* states: “Piers alone received the king’s favour, welcome, and goodwill, to such an extent that, if an earl or baron entered the king’s chamber to speak with the

king, while Piers was there the king addressed no one and showed a friendly countenance to Piers alone.”¹³ Indeed, it is likely that the first thing that Edward did after becoming king was give the earldom of Cornwall to his friend, beginning his reign by securing vast wealth and lands and a title for the Gascon knight, as opposed to a high-ranking member of the English aristocracy.¹⁴ Throughout the start of Edward’s reign, he passed over others with more right to English property and influence over their king to bestow favors onto Gaveston.¹⁵ He even went so far as to establish a powerful marriage for Gaveston to his niece Margaret de Clare, making his favorite a member of his family. Concerning the new familial tie, the *Vita* states, “The lord king married Piers to his sister’s daughter, the daughter of the late Gilbert, earl of Gloucester. This marriage tie did indeed strengthen his position considerably; for it greatly increased the goodwill of his friends and restrained the hatred of the baronage.”¹⁶ By connecting his friend so fully to the crown, Edward was able to protect Gaveston from the earl’s

¹¹ *Vita*, 29.

¹² Hamilton, *Piers Gaveston*, 44.

¹³ *Vita*, 29.

¹⁴ Warner, *Edward II*, 27; Hamilton, *Piers Gaveston*, 37.

¹⁵ Warner, *Edward II*, 36.

¹⁶ *Vita*, 7.

wrath better. Despite being a foreigner, the Gascon was now a member of the royal family as well as the earl of Cornwall. Though this move succeeded at delaying the barony in the short run, it only added one more grievance for the English magnates to seek retribution for later, as, unsurprisingly, this preferential treatment turned many of the jilted barons against the new earl of Cornwall.

Edward's behavior towards the Gascon knight is not solely to blame for the sour relationship between the favorite and the baronial class; Gaveston's own actions did little to garner their approval or friendship. Not only was he at the center of the king's patronage, but he also was not humble in this position. He acted in an arrogant manner, lording his special relationship with the king over the other magnates. The *Vita* claimed that one reason why the other barons disliked Gaveston was his attitude, stating, "For the great men of the land hated him, because he alone found favour in the king's eyes and lorded it over them like a second king, to whom all were subject and none equal,"¹⁷ and that "Piers reckoned no one his fellow, no one his equal, except the king alone.

In fact, his countenance exacted greater deference than the king's."¹⁸ Nowhere was this kingly attitude of Gaveston's on greater display than during Edward and Isabella's coronation. During the ceremony itself, Gaveston carried in the crown, dressed in royal purple silk decorated with pearls, and in every ritual instance of the coronation, he played the role of greatest importance, placing himself above the rest of the nobility. His standard was even hung alongside the king's at the following feast when not even the new queen's coat of arms was displayed.¹⁹ The message that Gaveston's behavior sent was unmistakable: as the closest confidant of the king, he was closer to the throne than anyone, even the queen. The barons, unsurprisingly, resented this utterly unsubtle flaunting of power. The author of the *Vita* goes so far as to claim, "I therefore believe and firmly maintain that if Piers had behaved discreetly and humbly towards the great men of the land from the beginning, none of them would ever have opposed him."²⁰ Most people tend to have best friends, certain individuals that they feel the closest to and hold in high esteem, including kings. Therefore, it is unlikely that the

¹⁷ *Vita*, 5.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 27-9.

¹⁹ Warner, *Edward II*, 43-44.

²⁰ *Vita*, 29.

barony hated Gaveston simply for being the king's friend; it is how this friendship was used that stirred their ire. The Gascon's hubris, his royal manner of dress, and ruling attitude all exceeded the bounds of simple friendship, and the earls did not support this self-fashioned second king.

Edward and Gaveston's actions also further deepened the barony's discontent with the new regime. Shortly after the death of Edward I, a tournament was held in the late king's honor. During the competition, Gaveston competed against several barons and the earls of Hereford, Warenne, and Arundel, but while the new king's favorite claimed the victory, there was no clear-cut winner and accusations of cheating erupted.²¹ This insult was the first of many that Gaveston paid to earls who would later be partially responsible for his murder. Another way in which the king and favorite upset the baronial class was Gaveston's appointment as regent while Edward was in France for his wedding to Isabella: "The kingdom was left in the hands and keeping of Piers. What an astonishing thing, he who was lately an exile and outcast from England has now been made

governor and keeper of the same land!"²² It's impossible to know whether Gaveston had asked for the position or if Edward had granted it to him without prompting due to his immense trust in the knight, but what it did do was sour baronial opinions even further. An older, trusted, and powerful earl such as Lincoln—who would shortly afterwards spearhead a campaign to exile Gaveston, possibly in response to this slight—would have been a more natural choice for the position. Instead, the realm was left to Edward's closest friend, not his powerful, now very disgruntled, magnates.

The growing tension between the king and the baronial class was not solely to blame on Edward and Gaveston's behavior, however. While he did little to ingratiate himself to his fellow earls, they also were not keen to reach out and build a relationship with the Gascon: "On the other hand the earls and barons of England looked down on Piers because he was a foreigner and formerly a mere squire raised to such splendour and eminence, nor was he mindful of his former rank."²³ He was an outsider, and for the closely interrelated elite of England, an unwelcomed addition to the highest

²¹ *Ibid.*, 7.

²² *Ibid.*, 9.

²³ *Ibid.*, 9.

tiers of society. While Gaveston had not come from the English nobility, his family was one of the most prominent in Gascony.²⁴ His Gascon status, however, did not impress the other earls, who felt that he was an upstart and an outsider, sneaking his way into power and favor with the king that they felt was theirs by right. The *Vita* claims, “So seeing the young king’s ingratitude, that he was trying to promote the unknown over the known, the stranger over the brother, and the foreigner over the native ... the barons strove to destroy this unlawful lord, this insolent earl.”²⁵ The barony was prejudiced against Gaveston from the start, and though he did not take any pains to avoid provoking them, it is likely that his fellow earls would have disliked him anyways. It is the combination of Gaveston’s poor behavior, Edward’s misallocation of favors, and the baronial class’ dislike of the foreigner which together created the situation that led to the favorite’s death.

The earls themselves were mostly young, around Edward’s age or younger, and had grown up with the Prince of Wales and fought in Edward

I’s Scottish wars. Three of them were senior: the earl of Lincoln was fifty-six, the earl of Richmond was forty-one, and the earl of Pembroke was thirty-six at the time of Edward’s coronation. They had played large roles in the reign of Edward’s father, and while the late king had had a poor relationship with his earls during his reign, there is no indication that this grudge was carried onto his son.²⁶ All of the violence and distrust between Edward and the baronial class seems to have begun under his own kingship. Much of the discontent occurred between Edward and the earls close to his age, such as Warwick, Hereford, and Lancaster, who had begun their military careers as the then-Prince of Wales’ personal companions, and the younger earls of Warenne and Arundel.²⁷ Lancaster, Warwick, and Hereford likely interacted with Gaveston while in Scotland with Edward, as the Gascon was also a companion of the prince’s at the time.²⁸ Whether or not animosity started between Gaveston and his future enemies during the reign of Edward I is unclear. It is, however, unlikely as, “on 6 August, Gaveston

²⁴ Hamilton, *Piers Gaveston*, 28.

²⁵ *Vita*, 29.

²⁶ J. R. Maddicott, *Thomas of Lancaster, 1307-1322: A Study in the Reign of Edward II* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 67.

²⁷ Maddicott, *Thomas of Lancaster*, 68.

²⁸ Hamilton, *Piers Gaveston*, 30.

was enfeoffed with the earldom of Cornwall ... but there is no evidence to suggest that the English magnates opposed the king's action. Indeed, seven of the earls affixed their seals to Gaveston's charter of enfeoffment."²⁹ If the earls were already as violently opposed to Gaveston as they later were, then it does not make sense for them to endorse his rise to earldom. Because of this, the behavior that made Gaveston so reviled likely began when Edward II rose to kingship, not beforehand. The escalating tension between the king, his favorite, and the barony started after Edward was able to give royal favors, which he began by granting an earldom to Gaveston. If it was Gaveston on his own that the earls personally reviled, it is unlikely that he would have been able to become the earl of Cornwall so smoothly, as several of the other earls had likely known him beforehand. Instead, the hatred of the baronial class and their dedication to remove him from England stems from Edward's mismanagement of royal patronage and Gaveston's attitude during and after the coronation.

Shortly after Gaveston's elevation to earldom, tensions increased until he was exiled from

England. This opposition movement was led by the earl of Lincoln, the most senior earl, in the spring of 1308. The discontent was in retaliation for Gaveston's behavior during the coronation and his following control of royal favors, and the only earls who remained committed to the king at the time were Richmond and Lancaster,³⁰ though Lancaster offered no practical help.³¹ The opposing faction arrived armed at parliament, and representing the baronial opposition, "The earl of Lincoln ... demanded Gaveston's immediate exile from England and the confiscation of his lands."³² It is reasonable that the baron's first course of action against the Gascon was to have him exiled. As the king's closest companion, and now related to the king by marriage, killing Gaveston would be difficult, and the barony had not been pushed to that extreme, yet. Exiling, on the other hand, would simply remove Gaveston from Edward's presence, where he would no longer be able to monopolize the king's time, act like the pseudo-king of England, or receive the lands and titles that the barony wished to keep to themselves. Edward was resistant to the exile, of course, and while he was unable to stop it from occurring, he

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 37.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 48.

³¹ Warner, *Edward II*, 47.

³² Hamilton, *Piers Gaveston*, 50.

was able to instead have his friend made his lieutenant in Ireland.³³ This lessened the baron's victory: Gaveston had not been expelled from England landless, title-less, or ashamed, but had instead gone to Ireland on the king's duty as his representative. It had, however, served the baron's main purpose: Gaveston was now in Ireland, not by the king's side.

While Gaveston was away in Ireland, Edward frantically began to appease his favorite's detractors so that he could bring his friend back, and within a year, he succeeded. After returning from Ireland in 1309, Gaveston was reinstated as the earl of Cornwall, and his re-enfeoffment was signed by all the other earls excluding Lancaster.³⁴ The king, it seems, was able to skillfully navigate the political sphere for once, bribing the papacy effectively to remove the threat of excommunication placed over Gaveston and patching all but one of the tenuous relationships with his earls just enough. This shaky peace, however, was destined to crumble, and quickly. Gaveston was still the king's favorite, and though he no longer received kingly favors, it was clear to the barony that he controlled royal

patronage.³⁵ Gaveston's behavior was even worse than it had been before his exile as well, as his subtle insults—his status as a foreign knight, his kingly behavior, and tournament victory—were surpassed by blatant ones. Possibly due to his sense of security as the king's favorite, a tactless sense of humor, or some combination of the two, Gaveston made insulting nicknames for his fellow earls, such as the "Black dog of Arden" for the earl of Warrick.³⁶ These new affronts to the earls' dignity were added to their long list of grievances with the Gascon. Despite having just returned from exile and Edward's efforts to appease his magnates while Gaveston was in Ireland, tension had escalated once more.

The barons responded with a new piece of legislation: The Ordinances. These new proclamations, overseen by a group of barons called the Ordainers, limited the king's power, held him to his coronation oaths, and most importantly, specifically requested the exile of Gaveston.³⁷ Edward tried his best to wheedle his way out of these regulations and claimed that as the king, he did not have to follow these

³³ Warner, *Edward II*, 48.

³⁴ Hamilton, *Piers Gaveston*, 74.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 72.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 75.

³⁷ Warner, *Edward II*, 61.

laws. When it became clear, however, that the Ordinances were not going away, he tried to compromise, promising to adhere to every clause, except for Gaveston's exile. Supposedly, he responded to the Ordainers, saying, "Whatever things have been ordained or decided upon, ... however much they may redound to my private disadvantage, shall be established at your request and remain in force forever. But you shall stop persecuting my brother Piers and allow him to have the earldom of Cornwall."³⁸ Here Edward demonstrated just how irrationally far he was willing to go for his friend, offering much of his kingly power in return for keeping Gaveston by his side. This plea did not move the earls, who responded to the king with an ultimatum between Piers being exiled or civil war.³⁹ Edward had no choice; the opposition against him was too strong and resolute as it was led by his cousin, the earl of Lancaster, who following the earl of Lincoln's death was second only to the king himself in land and power.⁴⁰ Backed into a corner with the threat of civil war with most of his earls looming, Edward had no choice but to back down. Gaveston was sent from England in exile one

more time, though this time it was specified that he had to leave all English lands and holdings, preventing Edward from pulling another stunt like the lieutenant of Ireland once again.

Gaveston was not exiled long, however, as Edward irrationally summoned him back to England once more after only a few months. Following their success in removing Gaveston from the king's presence, the Ordainers went even further, attempting to change Edward's household to meet their wishes: "After this, the earls, wishing to make further arrangements according to the lord king's Ordinances, declared that Piers's friends and supporters should leave the king's court under penalty of imprisonment, lest they should urge the king to recall Piers once more."⁴¹ Edward felt that this crossed a major boundary, as the earls attempted to remove his household, his supporters, and replace his servants with individuals loyal to the Ordainers. Just as Edward and Gaveston had insulted the barony over and over again, the earls now insulted the king. This attempt to usurp his power even further drove Edward to irrational anger, as the *Vita* recounts, "At this the king, angered beyond measure that he was

³⁸ *Vita*, 33.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁴⁰ Maddicott, *Thomas of Lancaster*, 114-115.

⁴¹ *Vita*, 49.

not allowed to keep even one member of his household at his own wish ... recalled Piers out of hatred for the earls, swearing, as he was wont, on God's soul that he would freely use his own judgement."⁴² Edward called Gaveston back to England for a third and final time. This time, however, he had not bribed the pope to remove the threat of excommunication nor had he attempted to appease conflict at home. Instead, he brought Gaveston back into an even more tenuous position than the one he had left.

The earls of Lancaster, Warwick, Hereford, and Arundel especially took offense to Gaveston's recall to England. Only days or weeks after recalling Gaveston, in late January of 1312, Edward began preparing for open civil war.⁴³ The earls did as well, traveling around the country claiming to be a tournament, a transparent excuse for traveling with armed men.⁴⁴ Edward possibly even went as far as to offer his enemy to the north, Robert Bruce of Scotland, legitimacy if he were to help Gaveston.⁴⁵ The king was so desperate to help his friend that he offered legitimacy to the man that he and his

father before him had been fighting. In the end, it was all to no avail, as Gaveston was eventually captured by the earl of Warrick, charged with treason by the earl and his companions, Lancaster, Hereford, and Arundel, and executed on Lancaster's land.⁴⁶ Clearly, the earls no longer felt that just exiling Gaveston was adequate; no matter where he went or what threats they made, Edward would always call his friend back. Therefore, they opted for a more permanent solution: removing the Gascon knight's head from his shoulders. Edward was distraught at the death, and though he was not in a position to retaliate against Gaveston's killers, he did his best to help his friend by caring for his corpse until the excommunication could be posthumously lifted and his body interred on sacred ground.⁴⁷ He also helped Gaveston's widow and young daughter, taking care of his friend's family after his death.⁴⁸ Edward was wholly devoted to his friend, and did not forget his killers, especially the powerful Lancaster, throughout his reign.

While his dedication to his friend is in some ways admirable,

⁴² *Ibid.*, 39.

⁴³ Hamilton, *Piers Gaveston*, 93.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 95.

⁴⁵ Warner, *Edward II*, 67.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 74.

⁴⁷ Hamilton, *Piers Gaveston*, 100.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 101.

Edward's focus on Gaveston led to many problems in the beginning of the king's reign. The favorite's insulting behavior and control over royal favor alienated him from a barony already disinclined to accept his foreign origins. His pride and Edward's inability to effectively allocate royal patronage caused the barony to personally resent the Gascon. Gaveston threw the power dynamics of the English magnates into upheaval, causing many, such as Lincoln and

Lancaster, to feel slighted by their new king. This violence escalated from exiles and insults to the brink of civil war and murder. While it is possible to view this period through the lens of constitutional history, due to the Ordinances and Edward's coronation oath, these laws alone do not explain the violence and vengeance that occurred. Rather, the Ordinances were used as a tool to enact personal goals in response to personal insults.

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On the Effects of U.S. Intervention Against Hitler's Advance into the Rhineland

Samuel Everett Grassi

Midday Saturday March 7th, 1936, Hitler rose amid a thunderous applause to deliver a speech in which he would inform both the public and the Reichstag of his decision to remilitarize the Rhineland that same day: "The German Reich government has therefore from today restored the full and unrestricted sovereignty of the Reich in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland."¹ Hitler's move to reoccupy the Rhineland was seen as an inevitability; after all, the move would have been of primary concern in any nationalist German government at the time. The decision to march troops into the Rhineland was one of the boldest moves Hitler had taken in dismantling the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pact. However, Hitler's decision to do so was guided by both the likelihood of almost certain acquiescence by the League of Nations - as indicated by their treatment of the Abyssinian Crisis - and by the need for a Nazi Party victory amid continued economic hardship and low quality of

life for the German people.² Despite the blatant violations of Versailles and Locarno, resulting in continued transfer of power towards Hitler and the engine of fascism, the decisive event fell on deaf ears in the United States. All the more unfortunate, the United States was in a position to turn the tables against Hitler with minimal exertion. This paper puts forth a realist argument, demonstrating the precarious position Western Europe was in during March 1936, and how limited U.S. involvement entirely within their capabilities could have been the decisive force in stymieing Hitler's continued rise to power.


The Treaty of Versailles was signed in June 1919, bringing World War I to a close. The primary thrust of the treaty was to pacify Germany so that such a war may never happen again, and one way the treaty sought to accomplish this aim was through rendering the West German Rhineland (pictured in map) a permanent demilitarized zone, even upon

¹ Ian Kershaw, *Hitler* (Norton Press, 2008,) 354.

² Ibid.

eventual evacuation of French and British troops from the region in 1929 and 1930. Under the terms of the 1919 peace settlement, the German Reich had been “forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometers to the east of the Rhine.”³ Furthermore, by Article 43 “In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or

temporarily, and military maneuvers of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.”⁴ Article 44 of the treaty makes clear the supposed consequences in violating either Articles 42 or 43: “In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace



User: Soerfm. “Remilitarization of the Rhineland.” *Wikipedia*, Wikimedia Foundation, 9 Dec. 2019

³Article 42, Treaty of Versailles.

⁴ Article 43 Treaty of Versailles.

of the world.”⁵ Six years later, in 1925, the status of the demilitarized Rhineland had been subsequently endorsed by the Locarno Pact.⁶ As such, it follows that Hitler’s reoccupation of the Rhineland was in explicit violation of Articles 42, 43, 44 of the Treaty of Versailles⁷ and the Locarno Pact.

The importance of the Rhineland and its non-trivial treatment in the Treaty of Versailles is made clear upon studying its strategic implications for both Germany and western Europe. The Rhineland provides a natural defensive frontier for Western Europe, particularly France and Belgium⁸, on account of the River Rhine and the French hills and mountains. However, most importantly, the demilitarized status of the Rhineland meant France could pose considerable influence over Germany and ensure a future war would be fought on German soil. As noted by the U.S. Ambassador in Germany (Dodd):

The military reoccupation of the Rhineland zone and especially its fortification which Germany intends is a serious threat to the preponderance of French influence in central and eastern Europe if indeed it does not definitely end it. In brief, a fortified Rhineland zone and the powerful army which Germany proposes to have would seem to spell the end of France’s present position on the continent⁹.

French Diplomat Massigli concurred with Ambassador Dodd, warning that German fortification of the Rhineland would give the Reich ample opportunity to expand into Eastern Europe.¹⁰ Upon Germany’s remilitarization of the Rhineland, France had lost its grip over a guarantee of security in central Europe: a demilitarized Rhineland meant France could impose itself over Germany as soon as she felt Germany was threatening the peace, an all too

⁵ Article 44 Treaty of Versailles.

⁶ Ian Kershaw, *Hitler* (Norton Press, 2008,) 350.

⁷ Treaty of Versailles.

⁸ Martin Alexander, “The Military Consequences for France of the End of Locarno” *Journal of Intelligence and National Security*, Volume 22, Issue 4, p. 563-572, 4-5.

⁹ The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, March 8, 1936—8 p.m.

¹⁰ Gerhard L. Weinberg. *The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933–36*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press.)

important factor in maintaining peace in Europe.¹¹

In addition, the strategic importance of the Rhineland for Germany was similarly paramount. The Rhineland encompasses the western portion of the important Ruhr industrial region (previously held by French and Belgium forces in response to Germany's default of reparations payments,) and was crucial to the manufacturing capability of Germany. As such, uninhibited German rule of the region was pivotal in their achieving rearmament and production goals.

It was for such reasons that Hitler became transfixed on reoccupying the Rhineland early in his rule, particularly in view of the rapidly withering popular opinion of the Nazi Party in the Winter of 1935-1936. Throughout the 1930s Hitler saw his power grow steadily amid continued political victories, such as the 1935 plebiscite in which the resource-rich Saar region returned to German control.¹² As such, in large thanks to the Third Reich's relentless

propaganda machine, by late 1935 Hitler had provided marked strides in growing his presence as a national leader, one that transcended purely party interest.¹³ However, despite Hitler's success as a leader, the Nazi party was often blamed for the continued ills of daily life in Germany, and often rightly so.¹⁴ In particular, the party's image had badly suffered following its attacks on the Christian Churches, giving way to the remarkable drop in popularity over the 1935-1936 winter.¹⁵ Furthermore, the German working class in particular were feeling the bite from continued food shortages and unemployment,¹⁶ and would often blame the Party for such problems.

Hitler, aware of the dismal domestic situation, found the Abyssinian crisis to present ample opportunity to look for foreign policy success. The Abyssinian Crisis made clear the League's weakness and reluctance to act, and coupled with the collapse of the Stresa Front, Hitler noted the opportunity to make a bold political move. Furthermore, the

¹¹ Correlli Barnett, *The Collapse of British Power*, (Pan Books, 2002,) 336.

¹² Justus D. Doenecke, Mark A. Stoler, *Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt's Foreign Policies 1933-1945*, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005,) 25.

¹³ Ian Kershaw, *Hitler*, (Norton Press, 2008,) 349.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

French military leadership, grossly exaggerating Germany's armed strength had made it clear that they opposed military retaliation, and that any retaliation should be purely political: the French "had no stomach for a fight over the Rhineland", and Hitler was made aware of this through intelligence obtained from Paris.¹⁷ Soundings had also lead Hitler and von Neurath to a strong presumption that Britain, too, would refrain from any military action in the event of a coup.¹⁸ As such, the remilitarization of the Rhineland was a clear step to take - for any German nationalist government - and the army viewed it as essential for the rearmament plans it had established in December 1933.¹⁹ In preparation for such action, Hitler stated (February 1936) that the French and British talk of possible joint military action against Italy in the Mediteranean had destroyed the balance of Locarno and could only lead to the collapse of the Locarno system,²⁰ implying his move to ignore it. As such, with Hitler privy to the unique political opportunity and the corresponding strong incentive to act, he gave the orders to reoccupy the Rhineland on March 7th, 1936. In the

days following the orders, Hitler, aware of the significance of the situation, set to take full advantage: new elections were set for the 29th of March and reporters remarked "this impending vote is visibly affecting the speeches which he is making day after day,"²¹ making clear the remarkable political consequences of this action.

France was not surprised at the news of the Rhineland invasion: following the Abyssinian Crisis they had seen it as inexorable. There were talks in France addressing the possibility of this very crisis in February. The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) took note of such discussion:

The French Cabinet feels that since French acquiescence in German participation would, in a measure, condone the violation of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, it would be disastrous to the French Government if this were followed by a step over which the French are very apprehensive, namely, a further violation of the treaty through

¹⁷ Ibid, 350.

¹⁸ Ibid, 351.

¹⁹ Ibid, 350.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ "Hitler as a Campaigner" (March 18 1936), *New York Times*.

the military occupation of the Rhineland.²²

The French development of the Maginot Line was effective French admission that Germany would eventually rearm herself and pose a threat to France yet again. However, despite early discussion of ruling out military countermeasures by French military leaders,²³ the French were highly critical of the invasion and not willing to acquiesce: upon receiving word of the German invasion on March 7th, the French government issued a statement implying military action was a serious option.²⁴ Georges Mandel however, was ultimately the only voice in the French cabinet persistently demanding that France march into the Rhineland, regardless of the costs.²⁵ Further, the French Government issued a series of demands, as reiterated by the U.S. Ambassador in France (Straus) as follows.

That the signatories of Locarno should send what amounts to a

virtual ultimatum to Hitler to withdraw his troops from the Rhineland, That the signatories of Locarno should consent to refuse all negotiations with the Reich as long as German troops remain in the Rhineland, That if German troops are withdrawn, negotiations can proceed under article 8 of the Locarno treaty which provides that the Council of the League of Nations can denounce the treaty with the consent of all signatories, If Hitler should refuse to withdraw troops from the Rhineland the Locarno signatories should solidly demand sanctions from the Council of the League of Nations the first of which should be the withdrawal of their ambassadors as a gesture of discontent²⁶

Many French newspapers had called for the League of Nations to impose severe sanctions against Germany.²⁷ For many in the French government,

²² The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 12, 1936—9 p.m.

²³ Ian Kershaw, *Hitler* (Norton Press, 2008.) 352.

²⁴ Robert J. Young, *In Command of France, French Foreign Policy and Military Planning (1933-1940)*, 124-25.

²⁵ J.T.Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis 7 March 1936 A Study in Multilateral Diplomacy*, (Iowa State University Press, 1977,) 104.

²⁶ Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State Paris, March 10, 1936—noon.

²⁷ J.T.Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis 7 March 1936 A Study in Multilateral*

retaliation in the form of sanctions was not nearly sufficient. The French made clear they would put all their forces at the disposal of the League of Nations on the condition that they be accompanied by those bound to do so by Locarno.²⁸ As such, the French clearly indicated their willingness for military intervention given support by the other powers; after all, they were not in a position to act against Germany alone.²⁹

Had the French been in a position to act alone against Hitler they certainly would have: Spring 1936 was not a good time for the French and the Rhineland Crisis only exacerbated their internal problems. France had little to no support from many of the other European Powers. Headlines noted that the “French felt they could not count on British support in steps to halt the German action”, and that “[t]here will probably be small

enthusiasm in either London or Paris for the erection of a new peace arrangement upon the scraps of two other treaties,”³⁰ although France made it clear that it would act against Germany if Britain and Italy acted likewise.³¹

Although it was true that France possessed superior military might than Germany, France having 100 divisions compared to Germany's 19 battalions in the Rhineland,³² the French were psychologically unprepared to battle Germany,³³ Furthermore, France was stricken with military problems, despite their superior numbers. France had failed to fully modernize their weapons and machinery since the First World War,³⁴ and they worried about Luftwaffe domination over French air forces: the French have reported that the Luftwaffe have superior aircraft, and the superior Germany productivity meant the Luftwaffe had a three to one

Diplomacy, (Iowa State University Press, 1977,) 116.

²⁸ R.A.C. Parker "The First Capitulation: France and the Rhineland Crisis of 1936" *World Politics*, Volume 8, Issue # 3, April 1956.358.

²⁹ Zach Shore, "Hitler, Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine" *Journal of Contemporary History*, Volume 34, Issue #1, January 1999, 7-8.

³⁰ Edwin James, "Germany Tears up Treaty of Locarno" (March 8, 1936), *New York Times*

³¹ R.A.C. Parker "The First Capitulation: France and the Rhineland Crisis of 1936" *World Politics*, Volume 8, Issue # 3, April 1956, 358.

³² William L. Shirer, *The Collapse of the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940*, (Da Capo Press 1994,) 293.

³³ Ibid, 291-293.

³⁴ Martin Alexander "The Military Consequences for France of the End of Locarno" *Journal of Intelligence and National Security*. Volume 22, Issue 4, p. 563-572, 2.

advantage over their fighters.³⁵ The French also reported that problems with their productivity in the aircraft industry meant their air force couldn't readily replace losses sustained during combat.³⁶

However, one of the greatest problems plaguing France was its economic situation. General Maurice Gamelin of France informed the government that mobilizing the Army to remove Germany from the Rhineland without outside support would cost roughly 30 million Francs a day,³⁷ indicating that the primary incentive for France not to retaliate was a paralyzing economic situation. Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland had caused such war panic that the dire French economic situation was heightened by significant cash flow out of France by investors moving their money to safer foreign markets.³⁸ As such, the French government couldn't fund mobilization, a mobilization that

would only heighten war scare and further perpetuate the economic crisis.³⁹

Given their domestic economic situation, France had hoped to find support resisting Hitler in Britain, however they only found a British people sympathetic to the Reich's cause, unwilling to act in any way that may provoke a war and thereby calling for French "restraint." When the French Foreign Minister Flandin met British Prime Minister Baldwin and Foreign Secretary Eden in London, he clearly expressed France's outrage over Germany's moving, saying they would be willing to go to war over the issue, and strongly criticizing Britain's calls for "restraint" yet offering nothing in return.⁴⁰ "An increasingly large segment of British public opinion had become convinced that the Treaty of Versailles was deeply 'unjust' to Germany,"⁴¹ and saw the Germans as merely taking over their own territory, hardly a punishable crime. On March

³⁵ J.T.Emmerson, *The Rhineland Crisis 7 March 1936 A Study in Multilateral Diplomacy*, (Iowa State University Press, 1977,) 108-109.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Stephen Schuker, "France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland, 1936" from *The Origins of the Second World War* (Arnold Press, London, 1997,) 206–21. Also in *Journal of French Historical Studies*, 235.

³⁸ Ibid, 237-238.

³⁹ Ibid, 238.

⁴⁰ Robert J. Young, *In Command of France, French Foreign Policy and Military Planning (1933-1940)*, (Harvard University Press, 1978), 123.

⁴¹ Gerhard L. Weinberg, *The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933–36*, (University of Chicago Press, 1970), 259.

8th, the British War Secretary Cooper pointed out that while the British were prepared to fight for France, “most of them probably took the view that they did not care 'two hoots' about the Germans reoccupying their own territory,”⁴² and were far from willing to take up arms on the matter.

Similarly to France, the British had also been fully aware of the inevitable reoccupation of the Rhineland: according to the Charge in the United Kingdom, “Germany’s intention to reoccupy the Rhineland at some date was fully realized by the Government here.”⁴³ The British were prepared to continue a policy of appeasement to maintain peace, even if it meant scrapping otherwise critical treaties such as Versailles or Locarno. Similarly to the British, even though Italy was also bound by Locarno to act against Germany, the Italian government publicly refused to intervene, refusing to aid the British and French who were imposing sanctions on them.⁴⁴ From Italy's point of view, “Hitler could enter the

Rhineland with impunity,”⁴⁵ leaving France alone as the only nation prepared to act against Germany.

The Rhineland action of March 7th, 1936 did not instigate any United States response, a particularly unfortunate fact, for as we assert here limited U.S. involvement could have resulted in disproportionate consequences. At the time of the Rhineland invasion, the next U.S. presidential election was only seven months away, and although the invasion was a double violation of Versailles and Locarno, Secretary Hull noted it did not contravene the 1921 separate peace agreement between Germany and the U.S.,⁴⁶ giving Roosevelt an excuse for avoiding the matter. Hull summarized the administration’s view on the matter in a note to the American ambassador to France.

We understand and appreciate thoroughly the French Government’s desire that we give a public statement with regard to the present situation,

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State (1936, Volume I, General, British Commonwealth) Recorded Date March 26, 1936—6 p.m. *FRUS*.

⁴⁴ “Italy to Ignore Rhineland Action” (March 8, 1936), *The Baltimore Sun*.

⁴⁵ Ian Kershaw *Hitler* (Norton Press, 2008,) 351.

⁴⁶ Justus D. Doenecke, Mark A. Stoler *Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Foreign Policies 1933-1945*, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005,) 25.

but I feel sure that they will also understand, that in view of the procedure we provided for application to the present situation, we do not feel we could appropriately make any comment at this time.⁴⁷

Despite the administration's stance, upon framing the political situation in America, we assert that Roosevelt very well could have responded, and even a limited response, coupled with France's willingness to act could have been decisive in beating back a growing German threat, particularly when considering the precarious position the Nazi Party was in at the time.

Much of Roosevelt's foreign policy, particularly in concern of events involving European nations, was dictated by the terms of the Neutrality Acts. The first Neutrality Act was established in June 1935 by Senators Gerald P. Nye, chairman of a committee investigating the American munitions industry, and his colleague Bennett C. Clark. These bills included an impartial arms embargo against belligerents, the banning of loans to belligerents, and denial of passports to Americans wishing to enter war zones.

This legislation was introduced on the belief that the U.S. was seduced into WWI because of massive loans and arms shipments to allies.⁴⁸ Further, largely to prevent U.S. embroilment in the Abyssinian Crisis, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported a joint resolution prohibiting the export of munitions to belligerents and restricted the use of American ports by belligerent submarines. A rigid "non-discriminatory" form of neutrality was in the offering and the Roosevelt administration "reluctantly allowed the bill to pass,"⁴⁹ with Roosevelt warning "the inflexible provisions might drag us into a war instead of keeping us out."⁵⁰ Given his domestic priorities and political needs, Roosevelt signed the Neutrality Act of 1935, even though he would have preferred a bill giving him discretion to distinguish between aggressor and attacked states.⁵¹ The Assistant Secretary of State Moore made clear the administration's views on the matter in his *Memorandum on Neutrality*, objecting to many of the provisions in the Neutrality Act (1935.) Regardless, after the 1935 Neutrality Act was passed, Roosevelt signed two more, the next one in 1936;

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 20.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid, 119.

identical to 1935 law along with an added provision forbidding loans to belligerents and extended the arms embargo to new belligerents.⁵²

Much of Franklin D. Roosevelt's activity during his first two terms seemed to manifest sheer isolationism: he readily signed the Johnson Act, the three Neutrality Acts, and the Tydings-McDuffie Act. However, these actions often obfuscated his true sentiment towards many of these issues, and he did not consistently fail to sign interventionist legislation or act in such a way. Throughout his presidency, Roosevelt consistently pushed for more involvement in European conflict and events, such as the 1938 naval buildup, the base-destroyer deal, and the Lend-Lease Bill. Roosevelt also signed many more interventionist acts such as the Reciprocal Trade Act and would push for more international involvement in speeches such as his Quarantine Speech. Unlike Wilson, Roosevelt would often not hesitate to act following important international events and would make clear whose side he was on. For example, On October 3rd, 1935, when Mussolini's

forces attacked Ethiopia, Roosevelt quickly invoked the new neutrality legislation, thereby banning munitions shipments altogether, and sought to levy a "moral embargo" on general trade with the belligerents: a move that obviously offered greater benefit to the insolvent Ethiopia.⁵³ Upon Hitler's complete takeover of Czechoslovakia, Roosevelt supported legislation to repeal the arms embargo in the Neutrality Acts and place everything on cash-and-carry, and encouraged the French to place aircraft orders.⁵⁴ It may be argued that Roosevelt even went so far as to intentionally mislead the public to grow interventionist sentiment, as was the case with failing to provide the complete picture when the USS Greer was fired upon by a German U-boat.

One could easily label FDR as an interventionist and Anglophile, desiring much greater American involvement internationally. As a young man he worshipped Theodore Roosevelt and had supported more international involvement through the league of nations:⁵⁵ it is argued that Roosevelt still held many of these views during his presidency, only

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Justus D. Doenecke, Mark A. Stoler, *Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt's Foreign*

Policies 1933-1945, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005,) 21.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 127.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 116-117.

espousing isolationist rhetoric so as to garner sufficient support for his New Deal.⁵⁶ Roosevelt's tendency toward interventionist methods in foreign policy was also made clear through the fact that the Secretary of State Cordell Hull was a believer in Woodrow Wilson's ideas, and FDR likely agreed with those ideas.⁵⁷

Despite FDR's signing of the Neutrality Acts, Roosevelt was opposed to such "mandatory" isolation, countering with a bill that would permit discriminatory embargoes. Assistant Secretary of State Moore stated the bills would harm nations that are "fighting our battle and entitled to our assistance".⁵⁸ In response to the Neutrality Acts, Moore continued: "This is certainly not the time... when the future is so unpredictable, to tie our hands in advance instead of leaving discretion to the President, who is primarily responsible for our international affairs."⁵⁹ FDR warned that "History is filled with unforeseen situations that call for some flexibility of action,"⁶⁰ positing the bill's inflexibility "might

have exactly the opposite effect from that which was intended."⁶¹ Moore did not object to many of the neutrality provisions, citing common sense, however he disagreed with the primary thrust of the Act.

Personally, I doubt whether any legislation in addition to that already enacted, would be effective in safeguarding our neutral rights, and I am driven to the conclusion that nothing would be so effective in that direction as making our navy sufficiently strong to prevent other nations from disregarding those rights.⁶²

Moore emphasized that permissive legislation would afford the President an opportunity to embroil the U.S. in a war by applying embargos to one belligerent and not its adversary, however the president always has the power to involve the nation in a war, despite any additional restrictive legislation.

Although the isolationists held a powerful position in American politics in 1936, and Roosevelt had to satisfy

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 120.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 20.

⁵⁹ Moore, *Memorandum on Neutrality*, August 27, 1935.

⁶⁰ Justus D. Doenecke, Mark A. Stoler *Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt's Foreign*

Policies 1933-1945, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005,) 20.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Moore, *Memorandum on Neutrality*, August 27, 1935.

them for political purposes, the public equally disliked Hitler and his aggressive actions.⁶³ “Most Americans did wish to engage the rest of the world, but only on their terms and without binding international commitments.”⁶⁴ This is noted because the public would not have been outright against minimal U.S. involvement in the Rhineland Crisis, and the triumph for Hitler upon successful Rhineland reoccupation was priceless. Hitler had outwitted the major powers, demonstrating their incapability of adjusting to a style of power politics that did not play by the rules.⁶⁵ As a consequence of his success, as noted by the Ambassador in Germany,⁶⁶ Goebbels opened the campaign by speech on March 10, allowing Hitler to further consolidate his power and reaffirm his position with the people given his success. Furthermore, Hitler had been looking to form alliances, and appeasement only made him a more desirable ally to the likes of Italy.⁶⁷

⁶³ Article: Daniel Greene, “American Public Opinion and the Holocaust” April 23, 2018, *Gallup*.

⁶⁴ Justus D. Doenecke, Mark A. Stoler, *Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Foreign Policies 1933-1945*, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005,) 116.

⁶⁵ Ian Kershaw, *Hitler* (Norton Press, 2008,) 352.

As such, we assert that despite the political situation in the U.S., FDR could have acted against Hitler, albeit in a limited but sufficient manner. Roosevelt was bound by the Neutrality Acts, however following Hitler’s violation of Versailles and Locarno via aggressive military action, Germany could have been labelled belligerent, thereby barring Germany from trade with America. In particular, had the U.S. joined with France and the U.K. to implement embargo against Germany, the results would have been devastating for Hitler. As previously noted, the French had on multiple occasions called for sanctions against Germany. Although the U.K. did not want to intervene, with pressure from both the U.S. and France to respond economically, the U.K. would have likely followed suit.

At the time of Hitler’s reoccupation of the Rhineland, Germany’s trade with other countries was far from negligible, and little interference in the flow of goods into

⁶⁶ The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State Berlin, March 8, 1936—8 p.m.

⁶⁷ George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (Oxford University Press, 2011,) 512-13.

Germany would have been noticed. Following the depression and Hitler's rise to power trade between the U.S. and Germany dropped, however in early 1936 trade between the U.S. and Germany was not yet insignificant: through 1935 approximately 10% of American exports into Europe were sent into Germany, and approximately 15% of American imports from Europe came from Germany.⁶⁸

Germany's primary trade bottleneck in 1936 was its lack of raw materials such as copper, rubber, chrome, iron and tungsten, which severely limited its rearmament program.⁶⁹ Germany needed to import most raw materials, even food, and millions of workers depended on foreign purchase of German goods.⁷⁰ "Germany imported a large amount of its copper, iron ore, chromite, tungsten and manganese from France or Commonwealth countries".⁷¹ France continued to sell iron ore and copper ore to Germany following the Rhineland Crisis.⁷² Britain, however, was privy to Germany's problems with

raw material supply, and did in fact intervene: Britain purchased shipments of iron ore from Sweden in an effort to deny it from Germany.⁷³ Given Germany's severe numerical shortages of raw materials, coordinated effort between the U.S., Britain, and France to embargo critical resources could have seriously endangered Hitler's rearmament program⁷⁴ and political situation. Further, such maneuvers would not have been impossible: Roosevelt had the power to act in such a way, the French were explicitly prepared to act, and Britain was already implementing a limited embargo against Germany. Coordinated embargo between the three nations would have very likely succeeded.

Hitler's popularity soared upon the Rhineland reoccupation because there were absolutely no ramifications.⁷⁵ Had the major powers responded to Hitler's aggression with coordinated embargo, the already dire economic situation in Germany would have only been exacerbated, and the

⁶⁸ "February 1936 Survey of Current Businesses", U.S. Department of Commerce

⁶⁹ Robert Forczyk, *Case Red: The Collapse of France*, (Osprey Publishing, 2017,) 92.

⁷⁰ Adam Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (London: Allen Lane, 2006,) 50, 72-73.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ian Kershaw, *Hitler* (Norton Press, 2008,) 352.

Rhineland occupation would likely have only had the opposite effect of lowering the popularity of the Nazi Party and Hitler. As previously noted, the Nazi Party's position was suffering in light of their attacks on the Christian Churches, and the dismal mood in Germany was only worsened by deterioration in the political situation coupled with dire material conditions.⁷⁶ In particular, anger was high in the German working class in light of rising food shortages, rising food-prices, and renewed spike in unemployment.⁷⁷ Embargo imposed by the major powers would have dramatically worsened the situation in Germany, with the important consequence of lowering Hitler's position.

Many historians have made it clear that military response from the major powers following the Rhineland invasion would have not only thrown Hitler out of the Rhineland but would have severely damaged Hitler's popularity as a leader. In the present paper we studied the political situations in Germany, France, the U.K., and the U.S. We made clear the precarious political situation in

Although such economic maneuvers may lead to oscillatory behavior and even war, Germany was not in a position to respond economically, the Wehrmacht were in no position to respond with any effective military measures, and the German people were war weary: after all, their post Rhineland Crisis elation primarily stemmed from the lack of any ramifications imposed by the major powers. Germany did not have power in the early or mid 1930's to achieve their objectives if faced with unified opposition by the other major powers,⁷⁸ but such unified opposition never emerged: instead, Britain and France tried to appease Germany, and the U.S. avoided the matter entirely.

Germany, and that France, despite being rife with internal problems, was prepared to strike back against Hitler given any support by the other major powers. The British were sympathetic toward the Germans and were in no mood to mobilize over the issue. Similarly, the Americans could not have offered any kind of military or financial support to France or Britain given the Neutrality Acts and the

⁷⁶ Ibid, 349.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Justus D. Doenecke, Mark A. Stoler, *Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt's Foreign*

Policies 1933-1945, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005,) 115.

Johnson Act, however the U.S. had a population prepared to respond in a limited way, as well as a president who throughout his entire time in office was consistently pushing for more involvement overseas, and would have likely been supportive of retaliatory measures in the form of sanctions or embargo. As such, we posit that

coordinated embargo from at least the U.S. and France, particularly with the U.K., would have been sufficient in severely compromising Hitler's position, corresponding with a necessary drop in German aggression and rearmament, along with eventual demilitarization of the Rhineland.

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Attachment to the Body: Gandhi's Relationship with Medicine

April Gosling

In his autobiography, Gandhi summarized his mother in two paragraphs. He chose to describe her using strong adjectives like intelligent, commonsensical, and saintly.¹ Each was a trait he wanted to find in himself. He observed her intelligence and commonsense, but he emulated her saintliness. This attribute spawned from her dedication to the *Chandrayana* vow, a practice of eating with the phases of the moon. When his mother fell ill observing this vow, her devotion was undisturbed. Her “illness was not allowed to interrupt” her practice.² Though subtle, this undated recollection set Gandhi's opinion of illness and treatment. According to Gandhi, the body, illness, and medicine interrupted the spirit from achieving *moksha*, true enlightenment and freedom from the cycle of life and death. Health—both mental and physical—was inextricably linked to the pursuit.

Biographers, historians, and comedians rely on a few moments to illustrate Gandhi's medical beliefs. In his show “Messiah Complex”, comedian Russell Brand reduced Gandhi's opinion on Western medicine to a joke about his wife's death. Like Gandhi pointed out his mother's desirable traits, Brand treated Gandhi the same way. The comedian defined Gandhi as the closest “to a secular saint as it's possible to be.”³ To Brand, Gandhi embodied the change he wanted to see in the world—a singular practice. Brand warned his audience they were not going to like the story of Kasturba's death. In Brand's retelling, when the British doctors offered treatment for Kasturba, Gandhi declined, stating “We're Hindu people. We only believe in Ayurvedic medicine. We don't want any of your modern British pharmaceutical rubbish.”⁴ According to Brand, after Kasturba's death,

¹ Mahatma Gandhi, *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth* (Boston: Beacon, 1993), trans. Mahadev Desai, 4-5.

² Gandhi, *An Autobiography*, 5.

³ *Russell Brand: Messiah Complex*, directed by Paul Wheeler, featuring Russell Brand (Epix Original, 2013), 0:44:40 to 0:44:44.

⁴ *Russell Brand*, 0:46:00 to 0:47:47.

Gandhi fell ill with a similar ailment and accepted the Western medicine. Brand's oversimplified story of Kasturba's death constructed an image of a static duplicitous man who hated British things, especially medicine. However, he was not. He distrusted indigenous medical systems as well. When he opened a medical college in 1921, Gandhi hoped "for a union of the three systems (Ayurvedic, Unani, and Western medicines [that would] result in a harmonious blending and in purging each of its special defects."⁵ Despite medicine's relationship to the body, Gandhi saw value in treatment. Like his political beliefs, Gandhi's medical position was dynamic.

Throughout his life, he encountered indigenous medical systems like Ayurveda and Unani as well as the British-controlled Western medicine. Popular history will encourage readers to believe Gandhi disliked all medical systems and his stance was static. Contrary to this, Gandhi's opinions and personal experiences with medicine and treatments remained dynamic and not duplicitous. He argued that medical innovation turned people away from *moksha*, but by drawing on examples from his life, it is possible to connect his dynamic position on medicine with his desire to find *moksha*.

Historiography

It was and remains the hubris of imperial countries to believe they are not beastly but civilizing. During the eras of the East India Company and the British Raj, the imperialists upset a culture that had existed for many millennia. Winston Churchill explained he hated Indians because he felt they were "a beastly people with a beastly religion."⁶ The indigenous

culture did not fit his ideals or those of the British as a whole, so the British attempted to remake the country in their own image. This construction included the institution of Western medicine as the prevailing medical tradition. India, however, possessed one of the oldest medical traditions in the world, Ayurveda, as well as another tradition that predated Western

⁵ "The Mahatma on Medicine, The Telegraph"

⁶ Maya Oppenheim, "Winston Churchill has as much blood on his hands as the worst genocidal dictators,

claims Indian politician," Independent, September 8, 2017.

medicine, Unani. As the side effects of Western medicine became well-known, the benefits of indigenous medical traditions like Ayurveda and Unani rose to the surface. Survey courses cover Gandhi's distrust and negative opinions on both Western and indigenous medical systems, hinting at a continuous line of treatment by Ayurvedic and Unani practitioners. Despite the British attempt to replace "native" medicines with Western, the traditional systems persisted and are regaining their place as reliable venues of treatment.

Many modern Indian medical historians and doctors argue that despite Britain's attempt to remove Ayurveda, it "still cater[ed] to the medical needs of a large chunk of the country's population."⁷ The history of Ayurveda can be traced to the Indus civilization. Ayurveda should be considered the only "mainstream health care system in early periods."⁸ This direct linkage makes Ayurveda

one of the oldest medical traditions still in practice. In the introduction to their book *India's Indigenous Medical Systems: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach*, editors Syed Ejaz Hussain and Mohit Saha argued the "[s]ocial character and cultural polity of India is reflected in the domain of scientific and medical development of the country."⁹ Indians practiced Ayurveda before Galen posited his humoral medicine, closely related to Unani. Though popular history of the West constructs India as a "recipient society," the Indians possessed knowledge of the body and how to treat diseases.¹⁰ In *Traditional Medicine Systems in India*, editor K.G. Sreelekha collected manuscripts on the validity and impact of Ayurveda on modern society.¹¹ The depth of knowledge contained in Ayurveda has not been "exhaustively explored."¹² It is India's contribution to the world.¹³ Even though Ayurveda possessed a defining history in India, Gandhi felt

⁷ Syed Ejaz Hussain and Mohit Saha, ed., *India's Indigenous Medical Systems: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach* (Delhi: Primus Books, 2015), ix.

⁸ P.R. Jaya, "Pharmacology and Pharmacotherapy of Ayurvedic Drugs," in *Traditional Medicine Systems in India*, ed. K.G. Sreelekha (New Delhi: National Mission for Manuscripts, Indira Gandhi National Center for the Arts), 17.

⁹ Hussain and Saha, ix.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, ix.

¹¹ K.G. Sreelekha, ed., *Traditional Medicine Systems in India* (New Delhi: National Mission for

Manuscripts, Indira Gandhi National Center for the Arts), ix.

¹² Yogini S. Jaiswal and Leonard L. Williams, "A glimpse of Ayurveda—The forgotten history and principles of Indian traditional medicine," *Journal of Traditional and Complementary Medicine* 7, no. 1 (January 2017): 50-53.

¹³ Rejani R.S., "Bālaciktsā—An Introductory Study," in *Traditional Medicine Systems in India*, ed. K.G. Sreelekha (New Delhi: National Mission for Manuscripts, Indira Gandhi National Center for the Arts), 27.

the tradition moved treatment beyond the reach of everyone.¹⁴

The intention of this modern empowerment and mainstreaming of the AYUSH tradition is to “meet the challenge of [a] shortage of health care professionals and to strengthen the delivery system of the health care service.”¹⁵ However, Joseph S. Alter, author of *Gandhi’s Body* argued that in the early twentieth century, German naturopath Louis Kuhne presented a third option. Not Western or indigenous, Kuhne’s book offered a way through the current state of public health in British India “and, more specifically, among those who were seeking healthier, less invasive, and more natural alternatives to both allopathy and Ayurveda.”¹⁶ To many, Western medicine was just another tool the British used to control the natives.¹⁷ Wary of Western medicine, Mahatma Gandhi was more open to new Western theories such as vegetarianism and Kuhne’s nature

cure.¹⁸ It appeared to be a middle path between the surviving indigenous treatments and their devotees and the violent cures Western medicine offered.¹⁹ The hurdle is people correlate natural to healthy.²⁰ Western medicine’s refusal to acknowledge the benefits of ancient systems created uncontrolled/untrained use of these systems.²¹

Between the creation of Ayurveda and the forced introduction of Western medicine, Unani arrived in India.²² An “organic synthesis of Greek, Arabic, and Islamic medical knowledge”, Unani is a lesser known ancient medical tradition.²³ According to Abdelhamid, Unani is worthy of attention because it “perseveres, even in the face of modern cultural trends” that remove “the old guard of ancient medicine for the shiny hopes and promises of a new system of powerful drugs, healing steel, and high-tech diagnostic tools and machinery.”²⁴ As part of the AYUSH system, Unani

¹⁴ Alter, 13.

¹⁵ Saurabh RamBihariLal Shrivastava, Prateek Saurabh Shivastava, and Jegadeesh Ramasamy, “Mainstreaming of Ayurveda, Yoga, Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha, and Homeopathy with the health care delivery system in India,” *Journal of Traditional and Complementary Medicine* 5, no 2 (April 2015): 116-118.

¹⁶ Joseph S. Alter, *Gandhi’s Body: Sex, Diet, and the Politics of Nationalism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2000), 56.

¹⁷ Hussain and Saha, ix.

¹⁸ Alter, 12.

¹⁹ Ibid., 12.

²⁰ Pulok K Mukherjee, ed., *Traditional Medicine and Globalization: The Future of Ancient Systems of Medicine* (Kolkata: Maven Publishers, 2014), xvi.

²¹ Mukherjee, xvi.

²² Jaiswal and Williams, “A glimpse of Ayurveda.”

²³ Yaser Abdelhamid, “Unani Medicine, Part 3 – The Practice Framework,” *Integrative Medicine* 11, no 5: 24-30.

²⁴ Yaser Abdelhamid, “Unani Medicine, Part 1,” *Integrative Medicine* 11, no 3: 24-30.

maintains a level of respect in present day India.

Though I have relied on Alter heavily to illustrate the historical community's understanding of Gandhi and medicine, this dearth of sources shows the depth of acceptance of the static anti-medicine theory. By examining primary sources, I argue Gandhi was not anti-medicine or static in his beliefs. He was a scientist, creating hypotheses and testing them on himself and those close to him.²⁵ Science has never been a stagnant pursuit. Throughout his life he interacted with the three main medical systems; sometimes he accepted innovation and at others he withheld treatment. These choices did not come from an anti-medicine mindset. Rather, Gandhi understood the specific situations better than we have interpreted.

Because of the lack of secondary sources, I relied upon primary sources to illustrate Gandhi's dynamic relationship with medicine. Gandhi authored the majority of the sources. His *Collected Works* as well

as his autobiography were essential to establish a timeline of events. Several books by Gandhi proved useful to elaborate his opinion on the medical practices available to him; these are listed in the bibliography. Finally, Sushila Nayar's exclusive biography of Kasturba opened a door into what really happened at the end of Kasturba's life; without this book, I believe any retelling of her death would be incomplete.

Although life is linear, I decided to divide this paper along slightly different lines within its three sections. In the first section, I use episodes from his early life including his father's death and a case of ringworm to illuminate his early relationship with medicine. In the second section, I focus on Kasturba and her contentious death. By elaborating on her end of life care, the reader is able to see a change from the young man who cried when he applied acetic acid to his leg in London. Finally, I employ a couple experiences from his adulthood as evidence Gandhi was not staunchly against medical treatment.

²⁵ Alter, xi.

Medicine in Gandhi's Early Life

Gandhi's mother taught him health came from a working body and mind; if one failed, the whole system deteriorated.²⁶ In this arrangement, the mind's health trumped that of the body. His experiences informed his dynamic opinion of where medicine fit into maintaining a healthy mind. Between his childhood and his early adulthood in South Africa, Gandhi established the framework for his medical position.

As a child, Gandhi wanted to be a doctor. Medical practice meant serving the people. Service was integral to the pursuit of *moksha*. In spite of this, his family prohibited his studying medicine.²⁷ Doctors helped people to be and remain healthy. They also exposed themselves to high levels of uncleanness. Gandhi's family were Vaishnava, a sect devoted to cleanliness inside and out. Bathing occurred three times a day.²⁸ The schedule and demands of a hospital job did not cater to such dedication to cleanliness.

Despite being barred from medical practice, Gandhi still acted as a nurse

during his father's illness in 1885. Diagnosed with a fistula, an abnormal opening between a hollow organ and the body's surface, Karamchand Gandhi, required constant care. Gandhi completed all nursing duties such as "dressing the wound, giving [his] father his medicine, and compounding drugs whenever they had to be made up at home."²⁹ Nightly, Gandhi massaged his father's legs, serving his father as best he could.

At the end of his life, Karamchand Gandhi received treatment from Ayurvedic and Western doctors as well as *hakims*, Unani physicians. Gandhi summarized each in turn: Whether intentional or not, he included *hakims* in the same sentence as "local quacks".³⁰ A Western physician recommended surgery, but the family's Ayurvedic doctor counselled against it. In the next few sentences, Gandhi complimented the skill and notoriety of the Ayurvedic practitioner and the Western surgeon who would have performed the surgery.³¹ Western medicine taught the Gandhi family how to care for Karamchand and

²⁶ Mahatma Gandhi, *A Guide to Health* (New Delhi: Ocean Books Ltd, 2016), 17.

²⁷ K.S. Bharathi, *The Social Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi* (New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company, 1991), 79.

²⁸ Vaishnava Etiquette, "Basic Principles of Vaishnava Behavior," Vaishnava Etiquette.

²⁹ Gandhi, *An Autobiography*, 29.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 29.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 29.

maintain his religious devotion.³² Because of the surgery's risk, Karamchand Gandhi returned home to die. Like Gandhi's mother, he set an example of steadfastness by upholding the cleanliness levels required by his religion. Dying was not permitted to interrupt his routines. Though he "despaired of living any longer," Karamchand Gandhi maintained his practice.³³

Gandhi's lack of intervention might be blamed on his minority or his relationship with his parents. Regardless he chose not to include any dissenting opinion. In few words, he explained the path of his father's illness was not theirs to decide. Ultimately, "God... willed otherwise."³⁴ He understood the surgery would have "easily healed" the wound.³⁵ On the other hand, he also understood treatment did not translate into health. Medical innovations such as antibiotics, general anesthesia, and aseptic practices increased the success rate of such a surgery.³⁶ A successful surgery would have repaired the fistula and, in time, the body, but not the

spirit. Life required—still requires—the health of the body and soul. A diseased body might easily be healed with treatment, but a diseased soul was cured through self-control.³⁷

Early in his life, Gandhi's parents both exemplified the behaviors he adopted. When he traveled without them to England, Gandhi fused their examples into his own behavior. During the voyage, he used soap to clean his body. He saw soap as a "sign of civilization."³⁸ Saltwater did not rinse the soap away, but the inconvenience did not interrupt his practice. As a result of his dedication, Gandhi contracted ringworm, a fungal infection that thrives in warm moist places on the body.

Dr. Mehta, an acquaintance who looked after Gandhi in England, suggested acetic acid to Gandhi as the acid was meant to destroy the infection. As a medical treatment, acetic acid possessed a long history; it was discovered in the 700s.³⁹ Recollecting the medication years later, Gandhi noted "how the burning acid made [him] cry."⁴⁰ Even though

³² Ibid., 30.

³³ Ibid., 29-30.

³⁴ Ibid., 29.

³⁵ Ibid., 29.

³⁶ Jonathan B. Lundy, M.D. and Josef E. Fischer, M.D., "Historical Perspective in the Care of Patients with Enterocutaneous Fistula," *Clinics in Colon and*

Rectal Surgery 23, no. 3: 133-141. Doi: 10.1055/s-0030-1262980.

³⁷ Gandhi, *A Guide to Health*, 18.

³⁸ Gandhi, *An Autobiography*, 45.

³⁹ "The History of Vinegar," Vinegar, Acetic Acid Vinegar, accessed April 28, 2019.

⁴⁰ Gandhi, *An Autobiography*, 45.

Gandhi failed to include Dr. Mehta's medical system, one might assume he was Ayurvedic because it lined up with Gandhi's previous recollections: Western and Unani doctors were identified by their medical practice.⁴¹ Family doctors and those named only as 'doctors' practiced Ayurveda. Acetic acid is the main component in vinegar, but when concentrated, it causes damage to the skin, eyes, and mucous membranes.⁴² A more

invasive and potentially damaging treatment pointed a finger toward Western medicine. Despite this exclusion, Gandhi noted later that Dr. Mehta trained as a Western physician; he attended Grant Medical College in Mumbai.⁴³ Regardless of Dr. Mehta's medical background, Gandhi accepted and completed the treatment. After he returned to India, Gandhi continued to seek and follow Dr. Mehta's medical advice.⁴⁴

Gandhi's Wife and Medicine

A few years after establishing the ashram in Sevagram, cholera broke out among the population. The disease is commonly found in overcrowded areas with poor environmental management. During the sixth choleric pandemic which ended in 1923, more than 800,000 died in India alone. The British named the natives as the vectors for disease. Sushila Nayar, a community member, advised others to take anti-cholera medicine to keep the outbreak from reaching the ashram.⁴⁵ Nayar and her brother were like

children to Gandhi and Kasturba, so her opinion was valued.⁴⁶ Gandhi agreed with Nayar that inoculation would help the community. At evening prayers, he suggested immunization as a tool to keep the ashram healthy. Many "inmates did not believe in injections of any sort" but still agreed to Gandhi's suggestion.⁴⁷ It was Kasturba who stood up and said she preferred quarantine and the risk over a shot. Kasturba refused the Western treatment Gandhi advocated for. In the end, very few in the ashram received

⁴¹ Ibid., 29.

⁴² "Safety," Acetic Acid, New World Encyclopedia, last modified April 20, 2018 22:53.

⁴³ Gandhi, "Draft Report of Natal Indian Congress," *Collected Works*, vol 3, 130

⁴⁴ Gandhi, "Letter to Dr. Pranjivandas Mehta," *Collected Works*, vol 3, 310.

⁴⁵ Sushila Nayar, *Kasturba: A Personal Reminiscence* (Ahmedabad-14: Navajivan Publishing House, 1960), 23.

⁴⁶ Mahatma Gandhi, *Collected Works*, vol. 78 (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1969), 433.

⁴⁷ Nayar, 24.

the immunization, but most of the village did. The ashram escaped the epidemic completely.

Nayar's recollection omitted Gandhi's reaction to Kasturba's refusal, but the lack of observation speaks loudly. Refusal was a personal choice. Gandhi could not vilify those who denied treatment as much as he could not praise those who accepted the injection. In the end, the choice did not matter as those receiving the vaccine and those declining were no different from each other. The inoculated pieces of the community protected the unvaccinated much like a body handles any illness; some villagers did fall ill, but the epidemic was limited because others took part in a successful anti-cholera campaign.

On January 27, 1944, Gandhi wrote the Indian Home Department about Kasturba's failing health. After his arrest in early August 1942, Gandhi was held in Pune's Aga Khan Palace. As she had on other occasions, Kasturba elected to join Gandhi in jail. Diagnosed with chronic bronchitis, the stresses of the ashram and the 'Quit India' movement exacerbated the seventy-three-year-old's condition.

Imprisonment further complicated her medical health.

Among the many things Brand oversimplified in his joke were Gandhi's beliefs about death. Decades before Kasturba's final imprisonment, Gandhi replied to a friend who inquired about Kasturba's ill-health. In a 1914 letter, he explained "death should make us think of our duty and fill us with contempt for the body, but inspire no fear...Those who cling to the body so very tenaciously only suffer the more."⁴⁸ Gandhi worried medicine would "increase our attachment to the body", but he understood the world required doctors.⁴⁹ He set out three lessons for those who followed him and possessed a fear of death: The first was compassion as all things are one. The second was no great attachment to the body as well as living without a fear of death. The third instruction was to strive for *moksha*, "knowing that the body [was] all too apt to let us down."⁵⁰

In February 1944, Kasturba Gandhi's body let her down, but not before Gandhi exhausted every venue, he had to find treatment for her.

⁴⁸ Mahatma Gandhi, "Letter to Raajibai Patel," *Collected Works*, vol 12 (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1969), 365-366.

⁴⁹ Mahatma Gandhi, "Letter to Maganlal Gandhi," *Collected Works*, vol 10 (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1969), 203-207.

⁵⁰ Gandhi, *Collected Works*, vol 12, 366.

According to a late January letter to the British Home Department, Kasturba insisted Gandhi write and discover what happened to her requests to have a Western practitioner as well as an unnamed Ayurvedic physician attend her.⁵¹ Four days later, he had not heard back. He explained the restriction of attendants made caring for Kasturba difficult, but she was “the mother of the whole of India” and her caregivers, including Dr. Sushila Nayar who recommended the anti-cholera treatments in 1938/9, worked to give her what they had.⁵²

Two days before her death, Kasturba asked Nayar for a dose of castor oil because she believed it would help her. Nayar, who was educated in Western medicine, disagreed and withheld the treatment. When Nayar tried to give Kasturba a different medicine, the older woman refused and said she would not take any of Nayar’s medicines.⁵³ Nayar relented and gave Kasturba the castor oil. Though Gandhi was on the palace grounds, he appeared nowhere in this episode. It was Kasturba who refused Nayar’s treatment, not on moral or

religious grounds, but because Nayar denied her request for castor oil. Forty-eight hours before she died, Kasturba continued to make the decisions about her care.

As her health declined, Kasturba requested a consultation with a Vaidya as well as a nature cure expert she knew.⁵⁴ Gandhi began a lengthy correspondence with the British government to grant her requests. The requests were settled with a caveat that when she received treatment, only the doctors were allowed near Kasturba. Gandhi was excluded from her immediate treatment.⁵⁵ Still, he did not stop her from receiving the treatment she wanted. When the Vaidya arrived, he gave instructions that all other treatments must be stopped. This lasted one day before Kasturba “felt she had had enough of Ayurvedic treatment and requested [the doctor] not give her the Vaidya’s medicine anymore.”⁵⁶ She changed her mind.

Gandhi did not interfere with Kasturba’s Ayurvedic treatment. Drs. Nayar and Gilder suspended their Western treatments but not their care at the request of the Vaidya. On February

⁵¹ Mahatma Gandhi, “Letter to the Additional Secretary, Home Department, Government of India, January 27, 1944,” *Collected Works*, vol 84 (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1969), 1.

⁵² Nayar, 69.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 73.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 81. Note: Vaidya is Sanskrit for ‘physician’; it is generally used to describe an ayurvedic practitioner.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 81.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 83.

18th, the Vaidya explained to Gandhi that despite using “all the resources at his disposal, he [was] unable to produce a condition in Shri Kasturba so as to give him hope of final recovery.”⁵⁷ As Nayar and Gilder returned to treating Kasturba, Gandhi asked them to consider stopping all medicines and allowing her the peace of Ramanama.⁵⁸ The next day, he asked them to quit treatment. He did not demand or block treatment. Kasturba was still in charge of her body, but her earlier fear of death had disappeared. When a package of penicillin sent from Calcutta arrived, Kasturba “was disinclined to take” the medicine.⁵⁹ She was not denied the antibiotic. On February 22nd, the doctors still present readied to give the dying Kasturba a dose of penicillin as a trial. Gandhi asked the group why they lacked trust in God.⁶⁰ He

understood a will greater than theirs worked in the Aga Khan Palace.

In my opinion, Nayar’s description of Kasturba’s behavior over the last week—including her brief rally—indicate a dose of penicillin would not have helped her; Gandhi was right to stop all treatments. Nayar described the urine of Kasturba as concentrated, a common occurrence as the dying body dries up. Her delirium also implied the end of life. A few days before her death, Gandhi admitted “nothing happens outside the Divine Will.”⁶¹ However, a person’s interpretation is limited to the results they can see. Gandhi tried to save his wife with all the medical traditions at his disposal. With a slew of denied or slowly granted requests behind him, Gandhi blamed the government for the grievous level Kasturba’s illness reached.⁶²

⁵⁷ Mahatma Gandhi, “Letter to Inspector-General of Prisons, Bombay, February 18, 1944,” *Collected Works*, vol 84, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1969), 15.

⁵⁸ Nayar, 85.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 87.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 96.

⁶¹ Gandhi, *Collected Works*, vol 84, 16.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 16.

Gandhi's Adulthood and Medicine

Though not a doctor, Gandhi's followers sought his opinion on medical matters. Records exist of his recommendations, which ran the gamut of medical traditions, including the nature cure. On June 15, 1942, he responded to a letter from the family of a sick individual.⁶³ This particular letter contained traditional treatments as well as advice to do as the doctors in Bombay suggest. An abdominal mudpack was likely associated with Ayurveda or Unani. To the patient, Gandhi recommended hipbaths, a treatment associated with Kuhne's nature cure. This third path lay outside the duel between Western and indigenous medicines. Gandhi saw doctors as adopting what they wished from the nature cure and snubbing what they left behind, regardless if they practiced Western and traditional medicines. On the other hand, the nature curists possessed "very limited scientific knowledge."⁶⁴ Gandhi saw the orthodox medicines of Ayurveda, Unani, and Britain possessed their own success in science and instruction, but

he warned against faithfully following things "which [had] yet to be fully tested and scientifically proved."⁶⁵ He viewed himself as a scientist and his body the laboratory; his suggestion a hip-bath came after he had taken several and found success three-quarters of the time.⁶⁶

Prior to his arrest in 1942, someone informed Gandhi that the BBC was curious about his health and ability to lead the nonviolent movement. Either the BBC or the person asking believed being ill and possibly bedridden might impede his revolutionary path. Gandhi replied *Mens sana in corpore sano* was the accepted path for those seeking truth and nonviolence.⁶⁷ A healthy mind in a healthy body. Once again, he repeated his parents' example by explaining that "physical illness [was] no bar to the conduct of a non-violent struggle."⁶⁸ He rationalized that as long as the mind was healthy, duty or passion forced a person's pursuit of *moksha* and that the body was secondary to the pursuit.

⁶³ Mahatma Gandhi, "Letter to Madalasa, June 15, 1942," *Collected Works*, vol 83 (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1969), 31.

⁶⁴ Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Sushila Nayyar, *Key to Health* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1948), 66.

⁶⁵ Gandhi, *Key to Health*, 66.

⁶⁶ Gandhi, *Key to Health*, 64.

⁶⁷ Mahatma Gandhi, "Notes: In Case of Illness," *Collected Works*, vol 83 (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1969), 93.

⁶⁸ Gandhi, *Collected Works*, vol 83, 93.

When he received a diagnosis of appendicitis in early 1924, Gandhi attributed it to a failure of the mind or personal thought.⁶⁹ In a moment of egoism, he submitted to the surgery to remove the enlarged organ. Reflecting on the surgery, Gandhi wrote he “wanted to live in the present body. Completed detachment is not a mechanical process. One has to grow to it by patient toil and prayer.”⁷⁰ This observation paralleled his comments

on Kasturba’s fear of death and how it held her back from *moksha*. However, he wrote the letter in which he laid out the three lessons about illness and death ten years before his own appendectomy. Gandhi’s relationship with medicine was dynamic and capable of shifting quickly. After the surgery, Gandhi felt he should have accepted the inevitable rather than accept the surgery. He blamed the acceptance on a bit of egoism.⁷¹

Conclusion

Following examples set by both of his parents, Gandhi refused to let bodily illness interrupt his pursuit of *moksha*. He argued that a healthy body came from a healthy mind and disease spread from the body to the mind. However, his opinions on medicine are often boiled down to scenes without context. Looking deeper into primary sources such as his autobiography, collected works, and the only biography on Kasturba, one is able to build a stronger context for those reduced scenes. Throughout his life, Gandhi defined health as something beyond the reach of medicine. Medical treatment from Western or indigenous physicians was not something to be

refused but to be considered case-by-case. He had several personal experiences with medicine that illustrate his dynamic relationship with medicine. While he did believe medical innovation turned people away from *moksha*, his position on medicine was dynamic, not static.

Gandhi’s life was an experiment. And like any successful experiment, it involved the creation and testing of hypotheses. He devised lessons from his wife’s illness as he saw her struggling with a fear of death. He asked for treatment to be suspended and he witnessed others recommend surgery. Science, like life, is not a stagnant pursuit. Throughout his life,

⁶⁹ Mahatma Gandhi, “My Mission,” *Collected Works*, vol 27 (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Trust, 1969), 155.

⁷⁰ Gandhi, *Collected Works*, vol 27, 155.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 155.

Gandhi refused stagnation. He was not anti-medicine as historians and comedians construct him to be. Gandhi

understood that life was an experiment and interpretation was required to find the right path to *moksha*.

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