

The Colorado Historian

CU Boulder Undergraduate History Journal

Spring 2019

Dear Readers,

We are excited to present to you the 2019 edition of the Colorado Historian! This journal seeks the most thorough and compelling historical research by undergraduate students at CU Boulder. In publishing student research, we engage the undergraduate history department with an opportunity to bring their curiosities, perspectives, and skills into a real-world context.

Our small board is likewise composed of undergraduate history students, individuals whose captivation with historical problems and the publishing process has led them to our journal. Student editors read through dozens of submissions in a blinded selection process, searching for excellency in the research methods, writing abilities, and passion of papers received. Selection and editing are vigorous processes, and our student board has put hours of dedication into making the Historian come alive.

As such, I am deeply grateful to my student co-editors, as well as to our faculty advisors, Dr. John Willis and Dr. Celine Dauverd, for their oversight and guidance. We owe the opportunity to present this journal to the CU Boulder History Department, for support in funding and promoting our journal. Special thanks are in order for Kellie Matthews, the history department's Program Assistant, and Abi Peters, our Undergraduate Assistant.

The work of historical research is severely important to a world in which certainties have become blurred, and context in information is often neglected. Similarly, the process of making historical connections to present events is central to a society concerned with correcting past injustices. Our undergraduate students have come of age in a time of social and political turbulence; as such, it is critical we understand the ways in which the “micro” become the “macro”. Many stories—of different nations, events, and peoples—have been insufficiently told, if told at all. It is the historian's task to uncover the story for the truth and relevance it holds to the world at large.

We hope you enjoy the thoughtful research of our student body, as we embark on a small sampling of the many stories in our world.

Anastasia Hanson
Managing Editor

Spring 2019 Colorado Historian Team

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Table of Contents

1. The Power of Artillery: Siege Technology in the Ottoman Empire
Kirsty Meakins 1
2. Geoffrey of Monmouth's Inclinations for Female Kingship
Summer Carper 20
3. In the World's Eye: Pacific Perspectives of the Russo-Japanese War
Noah Cruz 28
4. Chicano Educational Activism and Legal Failures in the Wake of *Mendez v. Westminster*
Everett Abegg 41
5. From Sacred Temple Dancer to Proscenium Performer: How the British Colonial Rule in India Transformed Bharatanatyam Dance
Devan Herbert 52
6. Sentiments of an American Woman in the American Revolution
Kristen Balke 62
7. Sister Suffragettes: World War I and the Women's Suffrage Movement in Great Britain
Emily Ray 68
8. Abolitionism in the Age of Revolution: The Failure of the First International Humanitarian Cause
Ryan Furr-Johnson 79

The Power of Artillery: Siege Technology in the Ottoman Empire

Kirsty Meakins

The Ottoman military made great technological developments to cannon in the years before the siege of Constantinople in 1453. The improvements were a key element in their victory in Constantinople, effectively ending the Byzantine Empire, and the resulting conquest into Europe. The Ottoman Empire's capture of the Balkans and employment of Christian engineers during that time was critical in gaining technological advantage over the Byzantine Empire. Although well researched by many historians, there is a lack of research that follows the technological development in the years between the sieges of 1422 and 1453.

The history of war often revolves around particular historical figures and their participation in battles. It is also necessary, however, to approach the history of warfare from the perspective of weapons. The discovery of the deadly explosive, gunpowder, changed the world, and cannons became its most potent instrument. The Chinese successfully used gunpowder to launch projectiles and to create fireworks, cannon, and rockets. The propagation of gunpowder technology used in cannon and guns was a key element in the development of the art of war. Soon after gunpowder became available in Europe and the Middle East in the late 13th century it was

implemented in cannon technology, creating a new and revolutionary form of warfare.

Mehmed's siege of Constantinople in 1453 was a pivotal moment in the history of Europe and the Middle East, it signaled the end of the Byzantine Empire, which had reigned for over 1,300 years. The successful siege in 1453 came a mere 31 years after Mehmed's father Murad II failed in his attempt to take the city in the siege of 1422. The technological developments of cannon in the Ottoman military during the years between the sieges of 1422 and 1453 and during the siege of 1453 was critical for achieving victory in Constantinople and the subsequent Ottoman advance into Europe.

Historiography

Many historians have discussed the specifics of the siege of Constantinople in 1453, and some have provided information on the siege in 1422. Many of the authors referenced here analyzed the same primary documents. The most common primary

documents are translated accounts from Italians within Constantinople and reports from beyond the city walls. Most historians, however, do not acknowledge the massive changes in siege technology during the 31 years between the two sieges of

Constantinople in 1422 and 1453. In order to understand how the Byzantine's lost Constantinople to the Ottomans and why it was pivotal in Eurasian history we need to look at the artillery weapon aspect of the history. Donald M. Nicol, Jonathan Harris, and Steven Runciman provide archival information about the siege of 1453 and mention 1422. They do not, however, adequately discuss the perspective of the development of siege technology, in both offense and defense, which effectively determined the outcome of the siege. Roger Crowley, and Marios Philippides and Walter K. Hanak, provide some information about the differences between Byzantine and Ottoman capabilities as well as the role of the Hungarian engineer, Urban, in the siege of 1453.

The sources mentioned do not provide adequate information on or analysis of why the technological leap between the sieges of 1422 and 1453 existed, or how that gap closed during the interim 31 years. The missing perspective can partially be found in Joseph Needham's book, where he describes the movement of cannon technology from

China into Europe and the Middle East. He also provides information about the development of gunpowder in the Middle East and Europe prior to the siege of Constantinople in 1453. Needham himself points to the period for which source archive is lacking, pinpointing the 15th and 16th centuries. During that time in China, the Middle East, and Europe, cannon development was very secretive, as a result there are few records of the development of cannon during that time period. These authors do not provide the archival data to show how cannon technology developed in the time between sieges or how Urban became an expert in cannon technology. Nor do they firmly trace the development of siege technology between the two sieges and relate it to the outcome. Needham's book offers data that many of the books listed above are lacking in terms of general cannon and gunpowder development in the years leading up to and including the sieges. However, there is still very little information about cannon technology growth in the area surrounding Constantinople between the sieges of the city in 1422 and 1453.

Gunpowder Siege Technology: Transmission from China to Europe and the Middle East

Saltpeter (potassium nitrate, the explosive ingredient in gunpowder) was discovered in China in the 300s CE.¹ The development of gunpowder followed in the 8th or 9th century.² Gunpowder was refined enough to explode cast iron by the 12th century and the Chinese began to focus on

gunpowder use in weapons at that time and in to the 13th century.³ But the technology is not recorded as having spread to Europe or Arabia until the 13th century.⁴ Joseph Needham shows in a chart (see Figure 1) that saltpeter arrived in the Middle East in the

¹ Needham, *Science and Civilization*, 569.

² Elspeth Whitney, *Medieval Science and Technology* (London: Greenwood Press, 2004),

125

³ Needham, *Science and Civilization*, 347

⁴ *Ibid.*, 319.

1240s and gunpowder in the 1270s.⁵ The Chinese were also casting cannons in one single part, whereas the Europeans and Arabs were still casting cannons in multiple parts in the 15th century.⁶ These discrepancies in

development show that Europe and the Middle East were significantly behind the Chinese in terms of cannon design and construction.

Development in Europe

A European alchemist, Roger Bacon, introduced gunpowder to Europe in the form of firecrackers in 1265.⁷ Needham's chart shows that the first bombard (early name for a cannon) was brought to Europe via Russia in the 1300s.⁸ Those bombards were extremely similar in appearance to those used in China in the 1300s (See Figure 2).⁹ Needham mentions that Europeans did not start to make cannons of cast iron until the 16th century, despite the fact that the Chinese were using cast iron in the 13th century (See Figure 3).¹⁰ In Europe earlier cannons were made of bronze.¹¹

The earliest recorded use of gunpowder weapons in Europe was in the 14th century when cannons were used to "cause panic on the battlefield."¹² The use of gunpowder increased in Europe after alchemists discovered how to make saltpeter cheaply.¹³ During the 14th and early 15th centuries Europeans had developed gunpowder even further to be more effective and less dangerous for the user. The first powder mill in Europe was built in Nürnberg in 1450, and it is possible that this mill supplied Byzantine Constantinople.¹⁴

Development in the Middle East

Gunpowder first appeared in the Islamic world in 1291 and, like the Europeans, the Arabs very quickly understood and developed high efficiency gunpowder.¹⁵ Cannons in the Middle East developed to have thicker walls and banding around the barrel of the gun to strengthen it

and allow it to handle the more explosive gunpowder.¹⁶ It is clear from Roger Bacon's writings that he and other European alchemists were strongly influenced by Arabic and Latin alchemy, further evidence that the Arabs had access to gunpowder earlier than the Europeans.¹⁷

⁵ Ibid., 569.

⁶ Ibid., 341.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., 289.

¹⁰ Ibid., 339.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Whitney, *Medieval Science*, 125.

¹³ Ibid., 125 and 154.

¹⁴ Needham, *Science and Civilization*, 349.

¹⁵ Harris, *The End of Byzantium* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010),

94, & Needham, *Science and Civilization*, 348.

¹⁶ Needham, *Science and Civilization*, 315 and 325.

¹⁷ Whitney, *Medieval Science*, 154 and 213.




Figure 1 Inter-cultural transmission of gunpowder (Needham, 569).



Figure 2 The oldest illustration of a bombard in Europe, a page from the Bodleian MS, dated at +1327 (Needham, 287).




Figure 3 A cast-iron bombard dated +1377, in the Provincial Historical Museum at Taiyuan in Shansi (Needham, 303).

Constantinople – 1422

When the Ottoman emperor Murad II appeared at the gates of Constantinople in June of 1422, the Byzantines were expecting him, as they had triggered his actions.¹⁸ The Ottomans besieged the city using various types of siege technology. An eyewitness account from inside Constantinople recorded that Murad II built a tower and used catapults to strike the walls.¹⁹ Another Byzantine account states that he brought the bombards to the city under the direction of Germans.²⁰ Murad II's machines included tall wooden towers, tortoises, and small cannon called falcons.²¹ Cannons were not a new technology to the Ottomans or the Byzantines, but they were still a somewhat young technology as the Ottomans had only just taken the Balkans and begun to develop effective gunpowder and cannon. Ottoman

falcons using stone cannon balls were not very effective against the thick walls of Constantinople, and Murad II had to resort to traditional siege tactics.²²

The Byzantines in Constantinople had their own cannon mounted on the inner walls to defend the city.²³ But the cannons were of little value because the city had a shortage of saltpeter to make gunpowder, and the vibrations created by the weapons were causing damage to the poorly maintained and repaired inner walls.²⁴ As a result, the Byzantines used javelins and arrows to defend the city.²⁵ The Ottomans rushed the wall on the 24th of August 1422, and although they breached the first of three walls they were forced to retreat and withdrew on October 6th, abandoning their siege weapons outside the city.²⁶

Constantinople – 1453

Urban the Engineer

Urban was a key player in the siege of Constantinople in 1453. According to Philippides and Hanak, nearly every firsthand account mentions Urban's cannons.²⁷ Urban (sometimes referred to as Orban) was a Christian cannon founder from

Hungary.²⁸ It is unknown where Urban's interest in guns began or where he had acquired his training and knowledge. The cannon maker had reportedly approached Emperor Constantine XI and offered his services for a small sum of money.²⁹ Urban

¹⁸ Harris, *End of Byzantium*, 94, and Donald M. Nicol, *The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261-1453* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 332.

¹⁹ Nicol, *The Last Centuries*, 333.

²⁰ Crowley, *1453: The Holy War*, 8.

²¹ Harris, *The Last Centuries*, 94.

²² *Ibid.*, 95.

²³ *Ibid.*, 94.

²⁴ Steven Runciman, *The Fall of Constantinople 1453* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 91-4.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

²⁶ Harris, *End of Byzantium*, 95.

²⁷ Marios Philippides and Walter K. Hanak, *The Siege and the Fall of Constantinople in 1453: Historiography, Topography, and Military Studies* (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2011), 413.

²⁸ Crowley, *1453: The Holy War*, 90.

²⁹ Mark C. Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204-1453* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), 123.

was in Constantinople in 1452 to help the Byzantine Emperor build cannon and hand guns to defend the city against Mehmed's forthcoming siege.³⁰ The Byzantine Empire was not wealthy, however, and Urban's stipend was likely very small, and it is possible he never received any money at all for his work.³¹ For that reason, and perhaps more unknown reasons, Urban left Constantinople and sought out Mehmed in Edirne, where he offered the Sultan his services.³² It is also likely that Constantine could not afford enough bronze to cast the size of cannon that Urban wanted to make.³³ Perhaps the most shocking part of his shift in alliance is that Urban was a Christian but resolved to work with a Muslim Empire against the Christian Byzantine Empire. It is possible that Urban was so driven by his desire to engineer better and bigger cannon that he did not care who funded his experiments, providing he was allowed to create more advanced cannon. Regardless of Urban's motives, his movements show the extreme poverty of the Byzantine Empire as well as Mehmed's openness for the sake of technological innovation.

Urban had spent his time in Constantinople studying the walls and claimed that he could make a gun that could take them down.³⁴ Commissioned by Mehmed, Urban began creating larger cannon then had been made before by the Ottomans (See Figures 4 and 5).³⁵ After successful testing of the new cannons, Mehmed ordered a gun twice the size of the new cannons. The new gun was the first supergun, which he called *Basilica*.³⁶ Urban designed and created *Basilica* in the summer of 1452, it was ready for testing by November 1452.³⁷ *Basilica* was made of bronze, with 8 inch walls; it was 27 feet long with a 30 inch bore.³⁸ It was constructed of two separate pieces with a breach receptacle for powder and a barrel chamber for the stone projectile.³⁹ Urban's supergun weighed over 35 tons and could launch a half ton stone ball over 200 yards (See Figure 6).⁴⁰ The Ottoman army began to transport *Basilica* to Constantinople in February of 1453. It required sixty oxen and two hundred men to move *Basilica* the 140 miles to Constantinople "at a speed of two and a half miles a day."⁴¹

³⁰ Crowley, *1453: The Holy War*, 90.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Fairfax Downey, *Cannonade: Great Artillery Actions of History, the Famous Cannons and the Master Gunners* (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966), 23.

³⁴ Crowley, *1453: The Holy War*, 90.

³⁵ The Ottomans were not the only people making such large cannon, see a chart comparing the various cannon of the era in the Appendix.

³⁶ Crowley, *1453: The Holy War*, 91.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 93-4.

³⁹ Philipedes and Hanak, *The Siege and Fall*, 414.

⁴⁰ Boyd L. Dastrup, *The Field Artillery: History and Sourcebook* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), 5.

⁴¹ Crowley, *1453: The Holy War*, 94.




Figure 4 A cannon Urban may have made before creating *Basilica*, this cannon is at Rumeli Hisar (Philippides and Hanak, Plate 62).



Figure 5 (left) One of Urban's smaller cannon, fourteen feet long, weighs fifteen tons, and fired a five-hundred-pound stone ball (Crowley, number 7).

Figure 6 (right) Stone shot of *Basilica* (Philippedes and Hanak, Plate 64).

Though *Basilica* was an extremely powerful weapon that was effective against Constantinople's triple wall, it was very difficult and dangerous to operate. During the first six weeks of the siege the Ottomans used their cannon continuously to bombard the city walls. But they faced some serious issues as the rain created mud, and the cannon were constantly slipping off their platforms,

requiring many soldiers to push them back into place.⁴² *Basilica* was a problem for Mehmed as it required so much attention to be operational, as it got so hot from firing, and had to be slowly cooled in order to prevent cracking. But even though *Basilica* could only be fired seven times a day, it was extremely effective.⁴³

Cannon at Work

This description of the siege of 1453 offers an insight into the significance of cannon and the unique advantage that cannon lent the Ottomans.

The Ottomans arrived at Constantinople on April 4th, 1453.⁴⁴ Mehmed reportedly brought 68 large cannons, as well as many culverins and smaller bombards

⁴² Runciman, *The Fall*, 97.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Philippedes and Hanak, *The Siege and Fall*, 574.

including arquebuses (See Figures 7 and 8).⁴⁵ But Mehmed did not rely entirely on cannon technology; he also brought traditional siege weaponry. ⁴⁶ Mehmed began his assault in the same location as his father had during the 1422 siege. He placed *Basilica* at the most

vulnerable part of Constantinople's walls, the 5th Military Gate (the Gate of St. Romanus), and positioned himself at the Gate of Charisius to the north, closer to Constantine's palace in the Blachernae (See Figure 9).⁴⁷



Figure 7 Arquebus.



Figure 8 French Culverin +1410.

⁴⁵ Dastrup, *The Field Artillery*, 5.

⁴⁶ Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army*, 122.

⁴⁷ Philippides and Hanak, *The Siege and Fall*, 574-5.



Figure 9 Map of Byzantine Constantinople (Runciman, 88).

There were two primary weaknesses in the city walls. The first was the central section of the land wall, called the 'middle wall.' At this section the wall descended into a valley to allow water into the city (See Figure 10).⁴⁸ On April 11 Mehmed set up the largest cannons around the whole perimeter of the city. The second weak section of the wall was a length of single wall, as opposed to the triple wall in other areas, near the Golden Horn. The smaller cannon and arquebuses were placed on Ottoman ships.

In defense of the city, Constantine broke the wall into sections as the city was already divided along lines of religion, national, and commercial rivalry.⁴⁹ Constantinople's main defense was the triple wall (See Figure 11), but huge numbers of soldiers would be needed to man both the inner and outer walls.⁵⁰ Constantine followed his predecessors example and defended the city using only the outer wall.⁵¹ Not only was the city undermanned but the walls were in disrepair as a result of the Byzantine Empire's small treasury.

⁴⁸ Crowley, 1453: *The Holy War*, 104.

⁴⁹ Crowley, 1453: *The Holy War*, 104-5.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 106.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*



Figure 10 Elevation drop at the 5th Military Gate/ Gate of Saint Romanus (Philippedes and Hanak, Plate 66).




Figure 11 Approximate section and restoration of the walls of Theodosius II (Runciman, 90).

Though the empire lacked the money to invest in new weaponry it was successful in collecting gunpowder to use with weapons it already had. Constantinople had large frame mounted crossbows, handheld crossbows, and assorted small arms.⁵² Constantine encountered several problems when employing gunpowder weapons in defense of the city. The cannon “could not be fired very often, because of the shortage of powder and shot.”⁵³ Furthermore, the largest cannon “had to remain silent for fear of damage to our own walls by vibration,” and

the cannon cracked after the first firing anyway, rendering itself useless.⁵⁴

On April 12 the Ottoman armada arrived at the entrance to the Golden Horn. But the attacks on April 12 and 15 were failures, because the “cannon-balls could not achieve sufficient elevation to harm the tall Christian galleys.”⁵⁵ To bypass the problem of the boom (chain) and the Byzantine fleet Mehmed decided to transport some of his ships over land, which he began on April 20.⁵⁶ The Ottoman fleet attacked from within the Golden Horn on April 28, and was successful in taking the Horn.⁵⁷

⁵² Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army*, 128.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Runciman, *The Fall*, 98.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 104-5.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 152.



Figure 12 The great chain with its massive eighteen-inch links that was stretched across the Golden Horn (Crowley, number 6).

After his victory, Mehmed resolved to place two large cannon on the walls of Pera (See Figure 9) facing Constantinople on May 3 in order to continue bombardment of the walls and protect his own fleet.⁵⁸ The Byzantines fired back at the Ottomans from the walls, but neither of the guns could knock the other out. To solve the issue Mehmed ordered the creation of a new cannon that “could fire the stone very high, so that when it came down it would hit the ships right in the middle and sink them.”⁵⁹ In early May Mehmed decided to tighten his actions against the land walls and he moved his large cannon closer to the weakest parts of the wall.⁶⁰ An Italian inside the city predicted that the Ottomans used nearly 1,000 pounds of gunpowder a day during their constant bombardment of the city.⁶¹

The Ottomans gained advantages beyond superior firepower in their use of cannon to besiege the city. Constant

bombardment by the Ottomans had psychological effects on the people inside Constantinople.⁶² By May 11 soldiers and civilians alike were beginning to grow tired of the constant fighting, repairing the city defenses, and burying the dead.⁶³ Food supplies were running short, and it was too dangerous to fish in the Horn.⁶⁴ Byzantine soldiers often deserted their posts during quiet times in order to search for food for their families.⁶⁵ The Ottoman army took advantage of those moments to retrieve cannon balls that were close to the walls and to further break down the walls.⁶⁶ The successful demolition of a section of wall near the Theodosian Gate allowed soldiers to breach the city using ladders on the night of May 12.⁶⁷ Though Constantine sent reinforcements, Ottoman cavalry was still able to enter the city and terrorize the townspeople. On May 13 Constantine’s personal arrival at the wall encouraged his

⁵⁸ Ibid., 157.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 158.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 159.

⁶¹ Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army*, 122.

⁶² Nicol, *The Last Centuries*, 382.

⁶³ Crowley, *1453: The Holy War*, 163.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 160

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 164.

disheartened soldiers to rally and push the Ottomans back.⁶⁸

On May 14 the Byzantines disarmed some of the galleys in their fleet, which led Mehmed to follow suit.⁶⁹ Mehmed moved the large bombards away from the Golden Horn and situated them in front of the weakest stretch of wall, the Gate of Saint Romanus, in an effort to concentrate all his firepower.⁷⁰ The constant bombardment was described by a person inside Constantinople: “day and night these cannon did not stop firing... battering large portions of wall to the ground.”⁷¹ Throughout May Mehmed used key medieval siege techniques, “assault, bombardment, and blockade” to further weaken the city’s defenses.⁷² By mid to late May it became clear to Mehmed that his cannon were not effective enough in taking down the city walls, so he turned to older siege techniques. Mehmed used a wooden siege tower and mercenary Saxon silver miners to undermine the walls and hasten the end of the siege.⁷³

The night of May 24 Mehmed sent a messenger to Constantine offering conditions on which surrender could be made.⁷⁴ Mehmed declared that the Byzantines could live under his rule and pay an annual tribute or they could evacuate the city and find somewhere else to live.⁷⁵ Constantine replied stating that the Sultan could have “anything

that he wanted except for the city of Constantinople.”⁷⁶ Consequently, on May 25 Mehmed began to plan his final assault on the city. Constantine’s ministers all advised him to leave the city during the night, in the belief that if he escaped there would still be hope for the Byzantine Empire.⁷⁷ Constantine refused to abandon Constantinople, asserting that he would rather die than surrender the city. Mehmed did not begin his final physical assault on the city until May 29, but he continued to terrify the besieged. Mehmed’s great cannon had been firing at the land walls for forty-seven consecutive days.⁷⁸ He also instructed his armies to light bonfires and play musical instruments throughout the nights of May 27 and 28.⁷⁹

Mehmed’s final morning assault began before sunrise when he sent the first wave of his least valued troops, the Christian vassals.⁸⁰ After the first wave of soldiers had drawn out Byzantine troops Mehmed ordered his cannon to open fire, indiscriminately killing anyone on the battlefield.⁸¹ The second wave consisted of Turkish troops, but they were held at bay by the Byzantine forces.⁸² After several hours of fighting Mehmed sent in the third wave which consisted of his best troops; he led the final wave himself.⁸³ In the confusion of the battle about 50 Turkish soldiers gained access to a small door that allowed them to get on top of

⁶⁸ Ibid., 165.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Philippedes and Hanak, *The Siege and the Fall*, 576.

⁷¹ Crowley, *1453: The Holy War*, 166.

⁷² Ibid., 167.

⁷³ Crowley, 168 & Philippedes and Hanak, *The Siege and the Fall*, 577.

⁷⁴ Nicol, *The Last Centuries*, 385.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Philippedes & Hanak, *The Siege and the Fall*, 576.

⁷⁸ Crowley, *1453: The Holy War*, 203.

⁷⁹ Philippedes & Hanak, *The Siege and the Fall*, 577.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 204.

⁸¹ Ibid., 205.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

the walls.⁸⁴ The Ottomans finally broke through the walls at the Gate of Saint Romanus and were able to open the gates from the inside.⁸⁵ Fighting continued at other sections of the wall, the Byzantine soldiers only giving up when they realized the enemy was at their front and their rear.⁸⁶ Once the

Ottomans were inside the city they realized how few Byzantine soldiers there were, though they had held the city for so long.⁸⁷ Ottoman soldiers quickly turned from killing to plundering and looting the city's residences and churches.⁸⁸

Technological Development: 1422 to 1453

Crowley and Needham point out that knowledge of cannon and gunpowder likely spread from the Balkans and Hungary into the Ottoman Empire in the 13th century.⁸⁹ The Balkans were known for developing the portable gun, the arquebus in 1425.⁹⁰ In the 1420s the Ottomans showed serious interest in seizing the area and they pushed into the Balkans in order to capture resources and craftsmen.⁹¹ Ottoman acquisition of the Balkans gave them copper mines, foundry men, cutters of stone balls (to be used in the cannon), and makers of saltpeter and gunpowder.⁹² It was through control of the Balkans that the Ottoman Empire became the most advanced Muslim nation with firearms and, by the 15th century, they had developed the most powerful artillery in the western world.⁹³

During the 1420s, after acquiring the Balkans, the Ottomans worked on developing gunpowder to make it more stable and potent, eventually creating gunpowder that was 30%

more powerful and much easier to transport.⁹⁴ The Ottomans were therefore forced to strengthen their cannons because of the increase in gunpowder potency. They started to make cannon out of bronze rather than iron and out of one piece rather than many.⁹⁵ The Ottomans were able to advance their knowledge of guns because seizing the Balkans provided the empire with copper (used in making bronze) and saltpeter.⁹⁶ The Ottomans rapidly assimilated cannon technology and by the 1440s they had developed techniques of casting medium size cannon barrels on the battlefield.⁹⁷ Not only could they now repair cannon during battles, the Ottomans could also adjust the caliber of their cannon so they enemy's cannon balls could be collected and fired back.⁹⁸

Though the Ottoman assault on Constantinople failed in 1422, they defeated the Byzantines on other fronts. The Byzantine defeat in 1422 resulted in a treaty signed in 1424 that gave the Sultan a yearly

⁸⁴ Ibid., 205-6.

⁸⁵ Philippides and Hanak, *The Siege and the Fall*, 578.

⁸⁶ Harris, *The End of Byzantium*, 206.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 208.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Crowley, *1453: The Holy War*, 86, & Needham, *Science and Civilization*, 443.

⁹⁰ Needham, *Science and Civilization*, 443.

⁹¹ Crowley, *1453: The Holy War*, 87.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Needham, *Science and Civilization*, 443.

⁹⁴ Crowley, *1453: The Holy War*, 88-9.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 89.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid., 90.

tribute and greatly reduced Byzantine territory to the city of Constantinople and its suburbs.⁹⁹ The Ottomans had learned a great deal about the use of cannons from their European enemies. Italy was particularly notorious for selling guns to the Ottomans until the Pope banned “gunrunning to the

infidel.”¹⁰⁰ They were particularly adept at integrating Christians into their armies and factories, perhaps because they were paid a salary.¹⁰¹ Mehmed’s father had aided in the Ottoman development of cannon when he created an artillery force in the Ottoman army, focusing specifically on gunnery.¹⁰²

Conclusion

The development of the cannon during the 13th and 14th centuries, specifically its rigorous growth from 1422 to 1453, had a huge impact on the art of war. As such, the perspective of artillery weaponry should not be forgotten when writing military history. Gunpowder weapons enabled the taking of castles and fortified cities, which influenced the development of new architectural and structural changes in the planning and construction of fortifications. Cannon and smaller guns changed the way armies were organized; military leaders created artillery units in their armies to maintain and skillfully operate the powerful weapons. The rapid development of cannon by the Ottoman

empire in the 31 years between the sieges of Constantinople in 1422 and 1453 was a key element in Ottoman capture of the city. Seizure of the Balkans in the 1420s and services rendered by Urban gave the Ottoman empire an extreme advantage over the Byzantines. Successful use of cannon changed the political landscape of Europe and the Middle East. Mehmed II’s victory at Constantinople in 1453 ended the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine Empire had ruled for over 1300 years and its destruction was a significant accomplishment. The fall of Constantinople allowed the Ottoman Empire to continue its advance into Europe with no threat of attack from its rear.

⁹⁹ Bartusis, *The Late Byzantine Army*, 117.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Crowley, *1453: The Holy War*, 87.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

Appendix

DATE	LOCATION	BORE(INCHES)	LENGTH (FT)	CANNON WEIGHT (TONS)	PROJECTILE WEIGHT (LBS)	PROJECTILE MATERIAL	RANGE (YARDS)	CANNON MATERIAL
1382	Flanders	25	16	13	700	Granite	Unknown	Bronze
MID- 1400s	Scotland	20	13	5	450	Stone	1400	Iron
1453	Adrianople	30	27	35	1600	Stone	2000	Bronze

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Geoffrey of Monmouth's Inclinations for Female Kingship

Summer Carper

In a period of turbulent civil war in England, Geoffrey of Monmouth crafted *Historia Regum Britanniae*. Like many other historians in the medieval period, he was fascinated with the early history of Britain. Yet, the *Historia* is different – Geoffrey of Monmouth tells the stories of legendary kings and queens of early Britain such as King Arthur. Directly influenced by the battle for the throne between King Stephen and the rightful heir, Empress Matilda, Geoffrey subtly reveals his support for Matilda, who, if victorious would have become the first Queen of England in her own right.

In the turbulent 1130s of England, civil war broke out as Stephen of Blois, nephew of King Henry I, swooped in and took the throne after King Henry's death. Despite King Henry's efforts to have his barons accept his daughter, Matilda, as his heir, the arrival of Stephen created a loophole to avoid female rule. Prior to King Henry's death, Matilda was married to the future Holy Roman Emperor Henry V and thus was already higher in authority as Empress but fought for her right as her father's heir with her second husband, Geoffrey V, Count of Anjou. At the same time, Geoffrey of Monmouth crafted his *History of the Kings of Britain* or *Historia Regum Britannia* which describes the history of the settlement of Britain from the age of Brutus, who first settled the island, to the Anglo-Saxons of the seventh century but his text was clearly influenced by this state of events. Basing his history on "a certain very ancient book,"

Geoffrey of Monmouth seems to pull his facts and stories from his own imagination and fabricated this book to seem more credible – not an unusual thing in this period – causing modern scholars to question the weight to give to *Historia Regum Britannia* although contemporary historians praised his work.¹ It was also hugely popular, evidenced from the hundred plus remaining manuscripts, original and copies. Nevertheless, it is clear that while some of his sources are dubious, he presented the importance of strong leadership and legitimate inheritance. Through his underlying argument for legitimate inheritance and strong leadership, he set a precedent for female kingship. Several women ruled over the island alone and Geoffrey made a point to emphasize that their reign was peaceful, highlighting the possibility of female kingship. Additionally, the date and dedications in Geoffrey's

¹ Geoffrey of Monmouth, *The History of the Kings of Britain*, translated and edited by Michael Faletra (Ontario: Broadview, 2008), 41.

Historia are noteworthy as they imply Geoffrey secretly supported Matilda's cause. Overall, Geoffrey of Monmouth's *Historia Regum Britanniae* has substantial evidence to suggest his veiled support for Empress Matilda's bid for the English throne and implies she had the capacity and right to become a female king through the changing dedications, and the emphasis on female kings and legitimate inheritance.

While there is no absolute date attributed to *Historia*, it is clear it was written in the 1130s and perhaps revised throughout the 1130s and 1140s. Most important, *Historia* could not have been written prior to 1127 when Matilda was made Henry I's heir because histories of reigning queens are absent in other histories of England, Normandy, Wales, or France. Furthermore, Geoffrey included aspects of the first edition of Henry of Huntingdon's *Historia Anglorum*, which was finished in the period of 1129-1133.² Similarly, based on Henry of Huntingdon's lack of usage of *Historia* and his amazement of finding in Norman Bec accounts of the British kings from Brutus to Caesar in January 1139, it can be suggested that the earliest edition of *Historia* was published in late 1138.³ Scholars utilizing dedication evidence argue that the first editions of *Historia* were written between 1136 and 1138. Robert supported Stephen between 1136, when he did homage to King

Stephen, and 1138, when he denounced his allegiance in favor of his half-sister Matilda. Moreover, a double dedication to Robert and King Stephen or Waleran seems unlikely, despite some scholars suggesting feudal psychology would not have prevented this.⁴ Furthermore, the revision of dedications suggests they were often changed to suit Geoffrey's opportunities for patronage or to suit the King.⁵ With Robert as Geoffrey's chief patron, most of this dedication evidence revolves around Robert's changing allegiance to either King Stephen or Empress Matilda. All in all, while the exact dating of *Historia* is complex and heavily debated, *Historia* was clearly rooted in the strife between King Stephen and Empress Matilda. Their efforts to secure the crown certainly make their way into Geoffrey's writing, both in the history itself and its dedications.

Throughout all of the extant manuscripts, there are four types of dedications: King Stephen and Robert, Robert and Waleran, Robert alone, and no dedication.⁶ Overall, the single dedication is the most common in the surviving manuscripts.⁷ Robert's ties to Matilda, both as her half-brother, King Henry's bastard son, and supporter after 1138 are an important aspect, seeing as Geoffrey could not dedicate to Matilda directly as he had no way of knowing who would eventually win the throne. Waleran, Count of Meulan,

² J. S. P., Tatlock, *The Legendary History of Britain: Geoffrey of Monmouth's Historia Regum Britanniae and its Early Vernacular Versions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), 435.

³ Tatlock, *The Legendary History*, 433-434.

⁴ Acton Griscom and Robert Ellis Jones, *The Historia Regum Britanniae of Geoffrey of Monmouth* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 1929), 45; Tatlock, *The Legendary History*, 437.

⁵ Griscom and Jones, *The Historia*, 91.

⁶ Fiona Tolhurst, "The Britons as Hebrews, Romans, and Normans: Geoffrey of Monmouth's British Epic and Reflections of Empress Matilda," *Arthuriana* 8, no. 4 (Winter 1998): 76, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27869400>.

⁷ Griscom and Jones, *The Historia*, 96.

likewise supported King Stephen militarily originally, particularly during the time of his dedications in *Historia* but when his Norman lands were threatened, he surrendered to Empress Matilda. As the discussion of the date of publication and dedication is inextricably linked, it is again difficult to establish a solid chronology of the dedications. Nevertheless, the double dedications seemingly coincide with the period 1136-1138 of Robert's changing allegiances, although some scholars propose that Geoffrey addressed to different factions to maintain a neutral position.⁸ Yet, it is more likely that "both the dedications were written solely to introduce presentation-copies of the *Historia* for Stephen and Waleran, like a modern author's cordial inscription on a flyleaf, and were not intended for general circulation or for copying, though copying might and did follow."⁹ The Bern manuscript's, one of the most complete and important manuscripts that survived, dedication to Stephen and Robert is thus a "hasty rewriting of the more natural Cambridge dedication to Robert and Waleran."¹⁰ In the Bern, Robert is described as "the other pillar of our realm" yet his listed achievements echo more uniquely to Waleran as he served both Henry I and Stephen and made his way into Court, while Robert, as the King's bastard, was already there.¹¹ In another manuscript with a double dedication to Robert and Waleran, Waleran was

described as the "second pillar of our kingdom."¹² Thus, given the chance to present his work to the king, Geoffrey hastily rewrote the dedication to apply to King Stephen and Robert, leaving out Waleran.¹³ Consequently, these double dedications appear prior to the sole Robert dedication. Following Robert's allegiance to Matilda, Geoffrey maintained his patronage with Robert and his secret support of Matilda but abandoned his efforts of currying favor with the king, resulting in the sole dedication to Robert. Lastly, another dedication type has been discovered – one of no dedication. This could be dated to after 1147 and Robert's death, it could also be that a scribe found the dedication unnecessary. Thus, the most appropriate chronology is the double dedication to Robert and Waleran followed by Stephen and Robert dedication when Geoffrey had the opportunity to present *Historia* to the king and then once Robert separated from Stephen's authority, he was given a sole dedication. This sequence of the dedications is significant as it not only showcases the changing favors and political chaos, but also supports the fact that Geoffrey had ties to Empress Matilda through Robert. Dedicating his work to Robert as his chief patron was representational of having belief in Matilda's efforts even while dedicating it to another "pillar of the realm."

The idea of female kingship was unheard of in the twelfth century, despite

⁸ Fiona Tolhurst, *Geoffrey of Monmouth and the Translation of Female Kinship* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 65.

⁹ Tatlock, *The Legendary History*, 437.

¹⁰ Griscom and Jones, *The Historia*, 90.

¹¹ Geoffrey of Monmouth, *The History of the Kings of Britain*, trans. by Faletra, 42; Griscom and Jones, *The Historia*, 93.

¹² Geoffrey of Monmouth, *The History of the Kings of Britain*, translated by Lewis Thorpe (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd, 1966), 52.

¹³ Griscom and Jones, *The Historia*, 91.

there being no legal barrier against it. Furthermore, there was no strict law of hereditary succession in place yet. Still, Matilda stood against a tradition of male kings when Henry I made her his heir. At the same time Matilda was fighting for the throne, two other queens regnant were as well. Queen Urraca of Leon and Castile and Queen Melisende of Jerusalem were designated as heirs to their respective kingdoms and had arranged marriages to defend their title and produce male heirs; yet, Urraca and Melisende “had to fight doggedly against husbands and sons to hold onto the effective political authority that each believed was also her inheritance.”¹⁴ Matilda had been designated as her father’s heir but it was her sons that “allowed the prospect of female rule to be perceived as just a temporary detour from conventional male rule, and not a permanent threat to male dominant political structures.”¹⁵ Still, the preference of a young boy over an adult woman reflects that a female heir was acceptable but “was still considered a default mechanism of the natural order of male kingship” and ultimately, her designation as heir was allowed based on her ability to produce a son.¹⁶ Although the English earls and barons gave several oaths to Henry I to accept Matilda as an heir, Stephen’s speed and readiness to challenge for the crown gave nobles a loophole. Claiming that their oath was invalid when Matilda married an outsider without their consent, they readily accepted Stephen as their king when he

appeared before Matilda did, who was postponed by complications of childbirth. Matilda then had an even harder battle to wage against the patriarchy. Despite being “well trained to be a queen consort; she was not trained to be anything more or less;” Matilda’s character and lawful inheritance drove her to fight for her rightful place on the throne.¹⁷ Therefore, Matilda not only faced a competitor that had already been coronated but she also had to contend with the lack of historical precedents for female kings.

Geoffrey of Monmouth took it upon himself to write his *Historia Regum Britanniae* and solve this lack of precedent of female rulership. As a witness to Stephen’s usurpation, Geoffrey “intrudes into his narrative of the British past in ways that encourage the Norman barons to support Matilda as her father’s legitimate heir and gives to his female figures much more varied – and much more positive – roles.”¹⁸ While he did make it apparent that “women rule only in unusual circumstances,” their capacity to rule was not hindered by their sex.¹⁹ In fact, Geoffrey’s ruling queens’ success “impl[ies] that the Britons would have fared better if they had accepted or retained their queens” as they were not “corrupted by pagan influences or commit crimes against the state or their spouses.”²⁰ Geoffrey included five ruling queens who ruled peacefully with fewer problems than their male counterparts. He emphasized their “competence and morality – traits that make them superior to the majority of male

¹⁴ Charles Beem, *The Lioness Roared: The Problems of Female Rule in English History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 41.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹⁶ Beem, *The Lioness Roared*, 36.

¹⁷ Chibnall, *The Empress Matilda*, 50.

¹⁸ Tolhurst, *Geoffrey of Monmouth*, 54.

¹⁹ Tolhurst, “The Britons,” 78.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 79.

kings.”²¹ These five queens were Gwendolen, Cordelia, Helen, Marcia, and Octavius’ unnamed daughter.²² As the king’s daughters, they had the family inheritance that gave them the opportunity to rule, and many of them were the sole heir. Gwendolen seized the kingdom during war from her husband and then “reigned for fifteen years...and when she saw that her son Maddan had reached adulthood, she handed the scepter over to him and was content.”²³ This highlights the fact that queens could rule independently but were often placeholders for husbands or young sons. Even as placeholders, they were just as powerful and had every right to rule like their male family members. Another important queen in *Historia* was Cordelia, daughter of King Leir. After triumphing over her selfish sisters that took the kingdom from their elderly father, Cordelia “reigned tranquilly for fifteen years” before her nephews waged war against her. Her nephews, “outraged that Britain was now subject to a woman” sought to return to traditional male rule despite Cordelia’s success for fifteen years.²⁴ Similarly, her nephews could have also been driven by a thirst for power that would result in one of them becoming king. Additionally, Marcia was “extremely intelligent and most practical ruled over the entire island,” after her husband’s death and before her son came of age.²⁵ She was noteworthy as well for her creation of the *Lex Martiana* (or *Lex Marciana*) which was translated into the

Mercian Law by King Alfred, proving her intelligence and authority.²⁶ Overall, these women were not simply queens, they were female kings; ruling independently and tranquilly. Essentially, they provided historical precedent to Empress Matilda. Geoffrey included them “meaningfully, and to treat female participation in historical events as normative.”²⁷ Moreover, their histories support Matilda’s rivalry for the throne, both as female precedents and their military efforts in taking the throne.²⁸ It is then apparent that Geoffrey of Monmouth was inclined to acknowledge the power and right of female rulers and strong females in general. Thus, his use of ruling queens can be connected to not only the period of strife between a rightful female king and a usurping male king but also to his veiled support of Empress Matilda in this struggle.

The most crucial argument Geoffrey incorporated was the necessity to abide by legitimate inheritance. Throughout, Geoffrey of Monmouth depicts the succession of kings, primarily from father to son (at least a related family member), noting that those who were of legitimate inheritance governed justly and peacefully. In cases where there were multiple potential heirs, he clearly showed favor to those of true inheritance. Such as the case of Constans who became king after forsaking his monastic vows while his brothers were too young to rule. Constans was incapable of kingship and relied on Vortigern to govern for him and was

²¹ Tolhurst, *Geoffrey of Monmouth*, 110.

²² I use the spellings from the Faletta translation, but other spellings include Guendoloena, Cordeilla, and Helena.

²³ Geoffrey of Monmouth, *The History of the Kings of Britain*, trans. by Faletta, 61.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 67-68.

²⁵ Geoffrey of Monmouth, *The History of the Kings of Britain*, trans. by Thorpe, 101.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Tolhurst, *Geoffrey of Monmouth*, 130.

²⁸ Tolhurst, “The Britons,” 84.

eventually killed because of his ineptitude.²⁹ Because Constans should theoretically be the next ruler, Vortigern deviously manipulated him to abandon his vows which prohibited him from rulership. Thus, he was no longer the legitimate inheritor and it should have instead been his younger brother, even under a regency. Similarly, when “the faithful Cordelia triumph[ed] over her sisters and then rule[d] wisely for many years, [which was] a positive example, perhaps, of the virtues of legitimate inheritance over more tenuous claims to the throne.”³⁰ Helen, as a sole female heir, was trained “in the ruling of the realm so that she could run things more easily after [her father’s] death” and her son, Constantine, too would rule after her.³¹ Later, Octavius, who had usurped the throne from Constantine, also had only a “single daughter and lacked a male heir.”³² Not knowing what to do, Octavius’ counselors found her a suitable marriage to Maximianus, who was “truly the blood of Constantine and [was] the nephew of King Coel whose daughter Helen... should possess the kingdom by the strict law of inheritance.”³³ Even though Octavius’ daughter had to marry to become queen, the importance of the inheritance law was still recognized. As examples of female kings and legitimate heirs, Cordelia, Helen, and Octavius’ daughter highlight that true inheritance was more important than gender in creating a royal lineage. In a time of chaotic rulership transitions from Henry I to Stephen over Matilda, Geoffrey recognized the power of a legitimate inheritance to

keeping stability and peace in the realm. He thus incorporated this element throughout his *Historia* as a means to prove that Matilda had a stronger claim to the throne and her sex should not have kept people from supporting her.

All in all, Geoffrey of Monmouth’s *Historia Regum Britanniae* was clearly influenced by the civil war, in which Britain saw the potential rise of a female king. Historically, there were few examples of such a reign; consequently, this lack kept some from wholeheartedly abiding by their oaths. Yet, Geoffrey fulfilled this need for historical precedents. Though he did not outwardly support Matilda, nor could he without knowing the end victor, he was weaved in stories of female kings that ruled superiorly to their arrogant male counterparts. These female king precedents are not the only key to linking Geoffrey’s support to Matilda. Rather, it is in combination with the dedicatory epistle to Robert earl of Gloucester, her half-brother and chief supporter, that supports Geoffrey’s backing of Matilda’s cause. Geoffrey’s potential opportunity to present a copy of his *Historia* to the king would reflect changing dedications to warring factions. Chronology of the dedications again is complex and disputed, but it is clear that Robert was his chief patron and Geoffrey incorporated his dedication into the presentation copy as well. The dedication to Waleran count of Meulan also supports the fact that Geoffrey was currying favor with important lords and was

²⁹ Geoffrey of Monmouth, *The History of the Kings of Britain*, trans. by Thorpe, 152-54.

³⁰ Geoffrey of Monmouth, *The History of the Kings of Britain*, trans. by Faletta, 13.

³¹ *Ibid*, 102.

³² *Ibid*, 104.

³³ *Ibid*, 107.

most likely writing before Robert denounced his allegiance to King Stephen. Obviously, date of publication and writing plays an important part as well. Although a clear date to writing and publication cannot be found, it is speculated that Geoffrey was writing

during the period of 1136-1138, or at the very least the 1130s. Thus, it is definite that Geoffrey knew of and was influenced by the tumultuous events regarding Matilda and Stephen and included evidence to point towards his veiled support of the rightful heir.

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In the World's Eye: Pacific Perspectives of the Russo-Japanese War

Noah Cruz

The Russo-Japanese War marked a turning point in the history of Japan and relations between the East and West. Delving into the earliest accounts of the war, this paper seeks to illuminate how the early formation of Imperial Japan's national identity and international image in the minds of its people and eyes of its future transpacific rival, the United States. Examining numerous Japanese and American sources from the period reveal how rhetoric around the war united the rising powers as advocates for the common cause of Japanese dominance in East Asia at the outset of the 20th century.

Examining the international and domestic reactions to the Russo-Japanese War reveal a change in Japanese national identity and foreign understanding of Japan. The empires of Europe were shocked when Japan emerged from isolation to challenge Russia, though Japan's trans-Pacific neighbor, the United States, watched with particular interest. This paper will examine the responses to the war of Japanese and American observers from political, military and civilian backgrounds. Each response reveals general sentiments and ideas that would affect the relationship between the United States and Japan for decades to come. The first section examines the high political narratives of the war put forward by former

classmates Theodore Roosevelt and Baron Kaneko Kentaro. The next looks at accounts of Japanese servicemen on the fronts of the war and the American diplomatic attaches sent to monitor it. The final section delves into the narratives of local people in both Japan and the United States through numerous newspapers, letters and poems. Together the sources give insight into the effects the war would have on both societies' perceptions of themselves and the other into the future. They also help to dispel assertions that the Russo-Japanese War was the spark that conflagrated into the Pacific War nearly four decades later.

Background

Crucial to understanding the Russo-Japanese conflict is its basis in the earlier Sino-Japanese War of 1894. The war was fought between a rising Japan and an outmoded China for dominance on the

Korean Peninsula. The Chinese military stood little chance against Japan's European-made armaments and Western military doctrines. Since its "opening" by Commodore Matthew Perry forty years prior,

Japan had experienced unprecedented modernization. It emerged from its insular solitude in 1894 and stunned the world. Japan's forces overwhelmed the Chinese and the ailing "Middle Kingdom" capitulated in under a year. China ceded suzerainty over Korea, favorable trade status, an immense indemnity and control over the eastern portion of the Liaodong Peninsula in Manchuria to Japan. This resounding victory prompted celebration in Japan, but proportional anxiety amongst European powers with their own interests in the region.

Only six days after the Treaty of Shimonoseki ended the war, Russia, Germany and France together demanded Japan relinquish its newly acquired land on the Liaodong Peninsula. Japanese control over Liaodong threatened Russian plans for the region and the dominance of European powers in Asia. Japan had no other option but war with three of the world's most powerful empires, and so it restored control of the region back to China. Outrage ensued across the country. Emperor Meiji pleaded with his subjects proclaiming that they must, "bear the unbearable."¹

The Japanese populace resented the Triple Intervention for humiliating Japan in

front of the world in the midst of its greatest triumph. Russia subsequently began exerting its own influence in Manchuria, constructing railroads from Liaodong into Manchuria, on the land Japan had returned to China. Russia also began fortifying the most strategic position on the peninsula: Port Arthur. The movement of Russian troops along the Korean border would convince Japan that the time had come to push back against the growing threat. Learning from the Triple Intervention, Japan signed a treaty of alliance with the United Kingdom.² This effectively neutralized the threat of European intervention in a Russo-Japanese conflict; Japan began posturing for war. The island nation had continued modernization in the ten years since the war with China, and it spent the Chinese indemnity on new and more powerful armaments that could match Russian war machines on land and sea. On February 8th, 1904, Japanese battleships attacked the Russian fleet stationed at Port Arthur. This marked the first time an Asian power had challenged a European empire since the time of the classical era. The rest of the world, including the United States, vowed neutrality.

1 Courtney Browne, *Tojo: The Last Banzai*. (New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967). p.17

2 Ibid. p.21

The Mission of Japan

Japan had many advocates abroad. In the United States, one of the most influential and vocal representatives was Baron Kentaro Kaneko. On April 28, 1904 he spoke at Harvard, his alma mater, on “The Situation in the Far East.” In his address he laid out the Japanese reasons for war. According to Kaneko, Japan’s existence was threatened by the actions of Russia in Manchuria and Korea.³ Japan gave up the Liaodong Peninsula with the expectation that it would remain under Chinese control, though Russia “soon obtained a lease in the very same region.”⁴

Japan was a victim in Kaneko’s description of events. It had followed all the laws of diplomacy and respected the wishes of the Triple Intervention. It was Russia that began to push into Japan’s sphere of influence and forced a military response. Japan’s patience was exhausted in negotiations with a belligerent and uncooperative Russian Empire.⁵ Kaneko claimed that the world’s attention had been directed to the Far East since the eruption of violence in the region and believed its sympathy and support should be behind Japan.⁶ In addition, he insisted that despite differing in “longitude and race,” the Americans and Japanese had “essentially the same emotions and the same methods of reasoning.”⁷ Asserting that such connections existed between these rising powers was

unprecedented and representative of a Japan that proudly embraced Westernization.

Kaneko believed the United States and Japan were united by the threat of a mutual enemy: “The White Peril.” He characterized Russia in this way in an attempt to counter assertions amongst some scholars in Europe and America that Japan was a threat to the stability of the world; its expansion in Asia exemplified a “Yellow Peril” that the powers of the world had to quell. In his address at Harvard, Kaneko declared the only “Yellow Peril” that ever threatened the west was the Mongol Empire of the thirteenth century, which Japan and its people defeated, saving the world as a result.⁸ He contended the world was now threatened by Russia, or the “White Peril.” In an essay published in the *North American Review* he reiterated these claims, stating that Russian and other European aggression in Asia threatened the sovereignty of Japan, China and Korea.⁹ Whenever the powers of Europe felt threatened by a rising nation they united to subdue it in one way or another. The United States, like Japan, threatened Europe when with its “enormous resources” and “wonderful energy” quickly took a place among the great powers prompting cries of an “American Peril” across the Old World.¹⁰ These cries, it can be argued, would culminate in the Spanish-American War. Baron Kaneko saw the proclaiming of a

3 Kentaro Kaneko. *The Situation in the Far East*. (Cambridge: The Japan Club of Harvard University. 1904). p.1

4 Ibid. p.3

5 Ibid. p.8

6 Ibid. p.17

7 Ibid. p.21

8 Ibid. p.22-24

9 Kentaro Kaneko. “The Yellow Peril is the Golden Opportunity for Japan.” *The North American Review*, (Vol. 179, No. 576 (Nov. 1904), p.641-48). p.644

10 Ibid. p.643

“Yellow Peril” by Europe as a direct response to Japan following closely in the developmental footsteps of the United States and as the attainment of a “long-sought-for rank among the great Powers.”¹¹ This emboldening cry along with a belief that its sovereignty and mission in Asia faced grave danger from Russian aggression comprised the Japanese high political narrative of war.

President Roosevelt’s own narrative of the war would be directly influenced by Kentaro Kaneko. The two attended Harvard at the same time and upon writing his old classmate, Kaneko was invited to the White House. Kaneko’s visits became common as the two became better friends. Roosevelt soon developed an interest in Japan, especially in “its way of the warrior,” *bushido*, and jiu jitsu, for which Kaneko provided him an instructor.¹² It is hard to refute the influence of this relationship, but as President of the United States there were undoubtedly innumerable other factors shaping how Roosevelt saw the war. Roosevelt stated that “from the beginning” he had favored Japan.¹³ He emphasized the deceitful nature of Russia in the war saying, “[The Japanese] have always told me the truth, and the Russians have not.”¹⁴ Roosevelt admired the Japanese people lauding them as “formidable from the industrial as from the military standpoint,” and “a great civilization.”¹⁵ He genuinely felt that they could both learn from each other and saw Japan as a friend of the United States. This was partially motivated by the fact that

in declaring war on Russia, Japan was serving as an agent of American interests in East Asia as well.

The real “peril” in the East, according to the United States, was Russia. The same attempts to consolidate power and influence in Korea and Manchuria that had threatened Japan also worried President Roosevelt. Therefore it is not difficult to understand why the narratives of both nations at this level were so similar. Both felt their national sovereignty and interest was threatened by the czar’s expanding eastern border. Increased resources and manpower from Manchuria and Korea would have shifted global power in the Russian’s favor in both Europe and the Pacific.¹⁶ In addition, as has historically been the case, Russian policy was heavily influenced by the national desire for warm-water ports from which to carry out naval operations and commerce while its other ports were frozen during the winter. If a nation so friendly and admirable as Japan came into possession of these regions instead and expelled the Russians, the predominant powers in the Pacific would remain Japan and the United States. Roosevelt only asked that Japan maintain the open door policy in Manchuria and return it to China at the end of the war.¹⁷

President Roosevelt also denounced any claims that the United States should support the Russian Empire in the war for reasons of racial prejudice. Such pleas had an adverse effect on an attempt to convince him of the czar’s cause. In a letter to a missionary,

11 Ibid. p.647

12 Tyler Dennett. *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War*. (Garden City, NY: The Country Life Press, 1925). p.35

13 Ibid. p.160

14 Ibid. p.161

15 Ibid. p.166

16 Ibid. p.152

17 Ibid. p.158

D.B. Schneder, Roosevelt likened the Japanese to the barbarians of Classical times, whom the Romans and Greeks never saw as assimilable, but who wound up being the successors to Roman and Greek power - the cultures and nations of Northern and Southern Europe.¹⁸ Furthermore the President criticized moves by anxious politicians in California for pushing anti-Japanese legislation. He stated that the Japanese could not possibly treat foreigners worse than the California legislature¹⁹

These racial divisions were a foundational part of Russian propaganda for the war and Roosevelt's disdain for them was telling of how the United States aligned itself.

"Mobilization!"

The war was like none the world had ever seen. Both sides unleashed modern arsenals upon the other. Each was also testing new doctrines of naval and ground warfare which aroused the interest of many western spectators who would witness death and destruction on an unprecedented scale and a preview of the gruesome nature of war in the new millennium. Fighting was confined to the land on and around the Liaodong Peninsula and the Yellow Sea. This small theatre of war was crowded with Russian and Japanese troops fighting intensely over every inch of land. For the first time in history the armies of Japan met the armies of Europe on the battlefield. This fact was not lost on any of the Japanese participants in the war and was something that servicemen of the army and navy took much pride in. It permeates the accounts of Japanese participants as well as

The combination of this issue along with American admiration of Japanese progress and animosity towards Russia created a predominantly pro-Japanese narrative across the country in the early years of the twentieth century. The narrative in itself is representative of the globalizing nature of this war. It would have been unfathomable just a half-century earlier that the United States would favor Japan in a war with Russia, but the conflagration of war between the two nations in an opportune climate created just that. The Japanese and American high diplomatic and political narratives of war were nearly indistinguishable.

American reports. Also significant is the determination of the Japanese and their devotion to Emperor Meiji, who had led Japan through great modernization and now against the Russian threat. To the Japanese soldiers and sailors it was about Japan fighting its way out of isolation, shattering the perception of European superiority, and showing the world it could contend for its own imperial ambition. Japanese soldiers marched to the front "fully prepared to suffer agonies and sacrifice their lives for their sire and their country..."²⁰ Lieutenant Tadayoshi Sakurai, a soldier who fought on the frontlines of the war, describes himself and his comrades as "human bullets." Success in the war was not going to come through "the power of gun," but through the power of "courage and perseverance" on the part of the Japanese.²¹ Their sheer desire to win, Sakurai

18 Ibid. p.159

19 Ibid. p.163

20 Tadayoshi Sakurai. *Human Bullets: A Soldier's Story of Port Arthur*. Trans. Masujiro Honda. Ed.

Alice Mabel Bacon. (Boston, MA: Houghton, Mifflin & Company, 1907). p.x

21 Ibid. p.61

felt, would determine Japan's fate. Like a bullet, the Japanese soldiers would only move forward, piercing through the enemy lines. Only death could stop them. Sakurai believed the invincible spirit of Japan, *Yamato-Damashii* in Japanese, would give its soldiers the advantage over the Russians, whom they viewed as lacking the necessary morale to repel Japanese forces.²² Upon the call of "mobilization!" from their superiors the soldiers of Japan "all felt [their] bones crackle and [their] blood boil up," and they were all prepared to unleash the "long-stored energy," that had filled them since tensions with Russia began to rise.²³ They were all ready to fight and die for the Emperor and homeland.

Like many Japanese, Sakurai were excited by the prospect of "chastening the unjust" by taking back the land that rightfully belonged to Japan in Manchuria and preserving the honor of the men who died fighting for the land in the Sino-Japanese War.²⁴ Japan was ready to reveal its *Yamato-Damashii* to the enemy and the world. Sakurai was sure their campaign in Manchuria would not only stun the enemy, but also garner the "applause of the world-wide audience."²⁵ Japan and its people desired to repel Russian aggression while at the same time showing the world that it belonged within the ranks of its great nations. Sakurai thought the tenacity and purpose of Japanese soldiers alone was that of a great power and worthy of admiration.²⁶ These

international concerns are consistent throughout his journal and align with ideas from both the United States and Japan about the latter's global emergence in this war. Fifty years earlier Japan and its people had tried to shut the world out. Now, Japan stood against one of the world's largest empires on the battlefield. This and the reality that the world was watching became an immense source of pride and motivation for the Japanese soldiers.

The personal diary of Japanese naval officer Hesibo Tikowara reiterates many points made by Sakurai about the determination and courage of Japanese servicemen. He says that "which Europeans call 'fear of death'" is not known in Japan and insists he only knew about it through reading books.²⁷ He asserts there was no greater glory than sacrificing one's life for one's country.²⁸ Like Sakurai, Tikowara maintained that this is what separated the Russians from Japanese and he went further, claiming that he did not believe "those obtuse creatures [had] got any idea of patriotism."²⁹ Much like his landed counterparts, Tikowara's commander could hardly contain his excitement upon news of the war, only being able to utter "Mobilization!" as he "kept jumping from one place to another, twisting his legs, and laughing without coming to the point."³⁰ This sense of national confidence and excitement, evident in both accounts, makes clear Japan's desire to wage this war. The sailors and soldiers were determined to put forth their

22 Ibid. p.10

23 Ibid. p.3

24 Ibid. p.xiv

25 Ibid. p.25

26 Ibid. p.94

27 *Before Port Arthur in a Destroyer: The Personal Diary of a Japanese Naval Officer*. Trans. Captain R. Grant. (New York, NY: E.P. Dutton and Co., 1907).

28 Ibid. p.15

29 Ibid. p.50

30 Ibid. p.4

greatest effort for Japan, its honor, its glory and its emperor.

Hesibo Tikowara says he loathed Russia because it constituted the only obstacle to Japan becoming a powerful and prestigious power in the world.³¹ He believed that at the end of the war Russia would be forced to pay Japan “a hundredfold for our losses.”³² Though Tikowara concedes that the Japanese military benefitted from attacking when Russia was totally unprepared and unorganized.³³ The international implications of this conflict are not lost on him either. He took note of a conversation he had with a naval contractor while docked in Nagasaki. The contractor believed victory would establish Japan as the predominant power in Asia and allow it to become the leading commercial power in the region, surpassing the empires of Europe who had exploited Asian nations up to this point.³⁴ Like the United States had done to Japan, Japan would do for Asia. The continental markets would be opened up and Japan would reap the benefits of industrialization and capitalism to become a power on par with the U.S. On the topic of the “Yellow Peril,” the officer notes that he did not believe Japan would ever be the aggressor, but would only protect the nations of Asia from European encroachment of the type it had suffered in Manchuria and Korea.³⁵ He took a lot of pride in the fact that Japan had made itself “enemies to be reckoned with” by defeating the “proudest

whites in Europe.”³⁶ Expelling European interests from one of the most strategic parts in the continent would create innumerable opportunities for Japan to expand commercially and politically. Tikowara’s account speaks to a broader, internationalist view not present in the account of Sakurai.

Major Louis Livingston Seaman’s account of his time with the Japanese military in the war provides a unique American perspective of the conflict. Seaman was part of a military attaché examining Japanese medical practices in the war. He saw Japan as being in a “life-or-death” struggle with the Russians.³⁷ He admires the peoples- “utter contempt for sensationalism” and their ability to make war as “scientifically as they master all the operations of civilization.”³⁸ Seaman paid special attention to Japan’s medical treatment of its soldiers. Upon visiting a Hiroshima hospital full of the wounded he declared that it was the greatest exhibit of surgical and medical treatment the world had ever seen.³⁹ He also acknowledged the treatment of Russian prisoners of war, claiming that they lived better lives in Japan than they ever had in Russia.⁴⁰ Seaman also made note of the industrial and cultural progress he saw occurring in Japan. He compared the factories of Kure to those in American cities and said Japan had not only mastered western industrial techniques, but had improved upon them.⁴¹ Seaman’s account made it clear how much he admired

31 Ibid. p.2

32 Ibid. p.111

33 Ibid. p.121

34 Ibid. p.234

35 Ibid. p.237

36 Ibid.

37 Louis Livingston Seaman. *From Tokio through Manchuria with the Japanese*. (New York, NY: D. Appleton and Co., 1904). p.2

38 Ibid. p.22

39 Ibid. p.56

40 Ibid. p.60

41 Ibid. p.74-5

the Japanese people. His writings serve to enforce ideas about Japanese modernity and their place amongst nations of the west. In another show of reverence, he ended his account with the patriotic cry of “*Banzai Nippon*,” which he heard shouted by Japanese civilians and soldiers alike in his time in the country.⁴²

Seaman looked upon the mission of Japan with admiration. According to him Japan’s first goal in the war was self-preservation from Russian aggression.⁴³ Japan served as an agent of global interest as well. The country was protecting Chinese sovereignty and was returning Manchuria to its rightful owner through “generously assisting Russia,” in its “oft-promised evacuation of that territory.”⁴⁴ Like most other narratives, Seaman’s denounces the term “Yellow Peril” as a Russo-German ploy to turn global sentiments against the nation that stood in the way of their national interest.⁴⁵ His version of the war regarded Japan as the champion of freedom and an “open door” policy in Asia. Japan fought for the same things many powers of the world wanted and needed to be supported accordingly. His position as an officer in the military made his view especially important. There existed no sense of threat or anxiety about Japanese ambitions; in fact it was welcomed and seen as beneficial to the world.

The report of Lieutenant Commander Newton A. McCully offers a different view of the Japanese efforts. It pays close attention to the tactics and ability of the Japanese navy

in the war, his conclusions offer some insight into the American naval analysis of the war. McCully was the only U.S. naval attaché sent to observe the war; sent to travel with the Russian Imperial Navy. Although he remains somewhat impartial, often criticizing Japan, he constantly commented on the incompetence of the Russian forces. In regards to the Japanese, McCully said they were far better prepared for the initiation of hostilities than the Russians and that this was critical to Japanese victory.⁴⁶ He also noted Japan’s ability to implement modern techniques of naval warfare exceptionally well compared to the Russians and that this gave them the edge in battles, like the great skirmish with the Russian Baltic Fleet at Tsushima.⁴⁷ He also observed that Japan seemed to have a better understanding about the treatment of attaches in wartime. McCully claimed to have been treated poorly by the Russians and denied privileges that prevented him from effectively doing his job, while Japanese naval forces gave their British observers “exceptional opportunities of observation.”⁴⁸

42 Ibid. p.268

43 Ibid. p.253

44 Ibid. p.261

45 Ibid. p.258

46 Newton A. McCully. *The McCully Report: The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05*. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1977). p.243

47 Ibid. p.249-50

48 Ibid. p.255

Animosity toward Russia was prevalent throughout McCully's report which conforms with American friendliness toward Japan in the war. Russians had felt the U.S. was a silent partner in the British-Japanese alliance. Lieutenant McCully took note of a comic from a Russian paper which depicted Uncle Sam shining the shoes of Japanese soldiers and telling them not to worry about payment for his services.⁴⁹ McCully proposed that Russian defeat in the war was a direct result of the Russian character which inherently creates a corrupt, autocratic

government.⁵⁰ His dislike of the Russians is in no way an endorsement of the Japanese though it reveals general sentiments in the military at the time. Major Seaman shared McCully's opinion and lauded the Japanese war effort and population. If other American servicemen shared these sentiments it is no surprise that the narrative they had of the war was partial towards Japan. These accounts aligned with the sentiments of President Roosevelt as well.

"There are no victors here."

The Japanese people stood behind the war and its stated motivations. In Kobe, soldiers were sent off by a fanfare of decorations, flag-waving and large, enthusiastic crowds shouting "Banzai!"⁵¹ Upon the surrender of Port Arthur the city of Osaka erupted into celebration. People paraded around the castle in the center of the city and burned an effigy of the enemy fortification populated with Russian flags and soldiers made of straw.⁵² Praise from the international community followed Admiral Togo Heihachiro's decimation of the Russian fleet at Tsushima. Some foreign observers exalted him as "The Nelson of the East," analogizing him to Lord Horatio Nelson, who is often hailed as the Britain's greatest naval mind. By contrast, Russia saw its Black Sea

fleet rise up in mutiny and its capital's streets filled with revolutionaries. The war appeared all but over.

At the request of Japan, President Theodore Roosevelt agreed to mediate its peace talks with Russia.⁵³ He would arrange for their representatives to meet in Portsmouth, Maine as Washington was deemed uncomfortably hot for a summer peace conference. The store rooms at the Portsmouth Naval Yards were prepared with nearly fifteen-hundred dollars' worth of furnishings, liquor and electronics.⁵⁴ By August 5th the delegations from each nation had arrived. After a month of negotiations, the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on September 5th ending the Russo-Japanese War. Its terms would stun the world and

49 Ibid. p.4

50 Ibid. p.253

51 *A Diary of the Russo-Japanese War: Being an account of the War as published in the Kobe Chronicle.* (Kobe, Japan: Chronicle Office, 1904). p.44

52 Ibid. p.113

53 Grant Carlson. "In His Own Word: Concluding the Russo-Japanese War." Nov. 25, 2013. Theodore Roosevelt Center.

54 Peter E. Randall. *There Are No Victors Here!: The Local Perspective on The Treaty of Portsmouth.* (Portsmouth, ME: Portsmouth Marine Society, 1985). p.21

Japan.

Baron Komura, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, departed Tokyo for Portsmouth on July 11th, 1905. He was sent off with a celebration. A crowd of nearly two thousand gave him a “hearty reception” when he arrived at the ferry station for his departure to the United States.⁵⁵ The people of Japan rejoiced for the end of the war. Tsuda Ume, founder and namesake of Japan’s Tsuda College, remarked, “the most inglorious peace is more glorious than the most glorious war.”⁵⁶ She saw Japan as being at the center of the diplomatic world in Portsmouth and that upon hearing word of peace from the New Hampshire town, her country would “go crazy with joy!”⁵⁷

Japan’s initial demands required that Russia pay an indemnity to reimburse Japanese war costs and that the Russians cede Sakhalin to Japan.⁵⁸ The Russian delegation refused and negotiations looked bound to collapse. Eventually, thanks in part to the lobbying of President Roosevelt, the two nations came to an agreement. Both Russia and Japan were to evacuate Manchuria, the Liaodong Peninsula would be ceded to Japan along with fishing rights in Siberia and the railroad between Port Arthur and Central Manchuria. Each side also agreed to respect the “open door” policy in China.⁵⁹ These terms ended the war, but resulted in civil

unrest in Japan.

Japanese discontent began as far back as August 19th, 1905 when the terms of the peace deal began to leak to the press. Three hundred members of the newly-founded Peace Question League met in Tokyo and claimed that the terms of the treaty were “moderate to excess” and that military operations should resume in Manchuria to ensure more favorable terms.⁶⁰ Japan believed it deserved much more for its resounding victory against one of the greatest powers in the world, and it especially desired the war indemnity. This discontent continued to foment in the Japanese populace. Stories about police censorship of newspapers critical of the treaty would come to light in September.⁶¹ Riots broke out across Tokyo soon after. Of Tokyo’s 278 police boxes, 246 were destroyed, and the city was placed under martial law.⁶² Tsuda Ume summarizes Japanese sentiments well when she says “[Russia] had behaved like a naughty child, and got all her own way, and Japan had lost all the spoils of war.”⁶³ Baron Komura returned on October 19th to a subdued Japan. Japanese flags strung up around Yokohama to welcome British visitors were promptly taken down upon word of his return to the city.⁶⁴ Japan had fought its way to global prominence only to be humiliated by the failure of its diplomats. What many of the

55 *A Diary of the Russo-Japanese War: Being an account of the War as published in the Kobe Chronicle*. p.284.

56 Tsuda Ume. *The Attic Letters: Ume Tsuda’s Correspondence to Her American Mother*. Ed. Yoshiko Hirata. (New York, NY: Weatherhill Inc., 1991). p.427

57 *Ibid.* p.429

58 Randall. p.48

59 *Ibid.*

60 *A Diary of the Russo-Japanese War: Being an account of the War as published in the Kobe Chronicle*. p.320

61 *Ibid.* p.329

62 *Ibid.* p.344

63 Ume. p.431

64 *A Diary of the Russo-Japanese War: Being an account of the War as published in the Kobe Chronicle*. p.368

protestors failed to realize was Japan's inability to fight a prolonged war with Russia. By the conclusion of war, Japan was paying nearly one million dollars a day to maintain the effort and nearly two-hundred thousand casualties had been suffered by both sides in little over a year.⁶⁵ Japan could not possibly sustain this for much longer—the war needed to come to an end, but the peace left many feeling betrayed.

However, not all of Japan shared this anti-peace sentiment. Even at the outset of the war, there was an anti-war movement highlighted by the 1904 poem "*Kimi shinitamo koto nakare*" by Yosano Akiko. The poem translates to "Never let them kill you brother!" and was an unusual critique of the war at a time in which it was overwhelmingly supported by Japan.

Brother, do not give your life.
His Majesty the Emperor
Goes not himself into the battle.
Could he, with such deeply noble
heart,
Think it an honor for men
To spill one another's blood
And die like beasts?⁶⁶

This is only an excerpt, but publicly criticizing the emperor and pleading for a family member to stay home and not fight in the war was unprecedented. As made clear by other accounts, it was an honor for one to fight and die on the behalf of Japan. The poem was seen as dangerous and traitorous in the eyes of Japanese critics. Others were

critical of the war as well. When denouncing it in a review, the critic Omachi Keigetsu published another poem alongside Akiko's that he also considered to be the work of a traitor: Otsuka Kusuoko's "*Ohyakudo mode*" which translates to "A Hundred-Time Prayer."

One step thinking about my husband
Second step thinking of my country
Third step again thinking about my
husband
Is this womanly thought to blame?⁶⁷

This excerpt laments the deployment of the author's husband to war while at the same time acknowledging the loyalty most Japanese felt. These blending loyalties were probably more common than is known, but the greater national fervor for the war buried these writings. Akiko's poems represent a criticism opposite that of the Peace Question League and the rioters in Tokyo. To be even subtly anti-war was considered dangerous and would have been spurned in early twentieth century Japan. The fact these women published poems doing just that was unusual, but an important aspect of the war nonetheless. Such criticism and protest against the government would never be so public again, as Japan continued down the path of modernization. The fact that these poems were even released reflects an openness in wartime Japan that would be absent in the future.

American observers had a more consistently positive view of the peace. There

65 Ibid. p.255

66 Steve Rabson "Yosano Akiko on War: To Give One's Life of Not: A Question of Which War. *The Journal of the Association of Teachers of Japanese*, (Vol. 25, No. 1 (April, 1991), p.45-74) p.46

67 Tomoko Aoyama. "Japanese Literary Response to the Russo-Japanese War." *The Russo-Japanese War in a Cultural Perspective, 1904-1905*. Ed. David Wells & Sandra Wilson. (New York, NY: St. Mary's Press, Inc., 1999). p.71

was a seventy-six gun salute for the arriving diplomats and people crowded the small streets of Portsmouth to watch the foreign procession pass through their town. There was a pronounced difference in the volume of cheers each delegation got; Portsmouthians cheered much louder for the Japanese delegation than the Russian.⁶⁸ Many Americans saw the Russians as the clear aggressors in the war, and despite appeals to racial, cultural and religious ideas, advocates found it was difficult to turn public opinion against the Japanese. These were not the people of California, who pushed policy to combat the perceived “Yellow Peril.” Many Americans identified with the narrative created by many correspondents from the war; that Japan was the “little fellow” in this fight against an intrusive, imperialist foe.⁶⁹ One correspondent called Japan “the energetic Yankee of the Orient” and likened its mission in Korea and Manchuria to a type of Manifest Destiny.⁷⁰

In American, people fully expected Japan to reap the spoils of its victory. There was speculation about the neutralization of the port of Vladivostok and an Russian indemnity in the billions of dollars.⁷¹ European bankers convened to discuss how to finance the massive loans Russia would need to repay the indemnity going as far as sending representatives to New York to enlist the cooperation of J.P. Morgan.⁷² Ultimately, the Portsmouth Treaty would be considered a national embarrassment by the Japanese people, but it symbolized a massive victory

for the United States. Russia was repelled from the Asian Pacific and Japan, a power the United States saw as an ally at the time, became the predominant power in the region.

Conclusion

These accounts give a sense of the impact this war had on several countries. The United States saw the rise of an ally in the Pacific, one that shared its interests and had proved itself against a European power. Japan had established itself as one of the predominant powers in East Asia. It garnered international attention: the eyes of the world were on Japan from 1904-05. All of the sources explored here share a similar string of belief about the emergence of Japan while providing its own unique insights into the war. The high political actors saw the conflict as laying the foundation for future American-Japanese cooperation in the Pacific. Soldiers and attaches lauded Japanese adoption of Western military doctrines and how the spirit of Japan translated into success on the battlefield. The civilian population rallied around the war on both sides of the Pacific, though it brought out a side of Japan seldom talked about in relation to the country’s history in the twentieth century. These narratives combined reveal that the war was far more important than the historical footnote to which it is often relegated. Far from unimportant, the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 signaled a major shift in the thought process, conduct and reputation of Japan and the balance of power in the world.

68 Randall.p.25

69 Marshall Everett. *Exciting Experiences in the Japanese-Russian War*. (Henry Neil, 1904). p.116

70 Ibid. p.358

71 The Denver Post. “Japan Wants Full Billion.” July 27, 1905.

72 Ibid. “Morgan’s Part in Indemnity.

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Chicano Educational Activism and Legal Failures in the Wake of *Mendez v. Westminster*

Everett Abegg

This paper explores the failure of judicial precedent, such as that set in the 1947 federal court case *Mendez v. Westminster*, to end the educational segregation of Chicano students in the Southwestern United States. In the wake of inefficient legal precedent, grassroots activism arose as the most effective method utilized to dismantle Chicano segregation. Starting in 1947 and continuing through the late 1990s, Chicano leaders, teachers, and administrators strove to create inclusive educational institutions for Chicano students that remain in place today.

Educational segregation of Chicanos has been a significant issue in the United States, but several judicial rulings in 1947, 1971, and 1982 attempted to remove its presence from the U.S. entirely. The 1947 *Mendez v. Westminster* court case laid the foundation for future rulings on Chicano segregation, including the U.S. Supreme Court case *Hernandez v. Texas*, in order to attempt to stamp out the illegal segregation of Chicano students. What resulted, however, were continued efforts by American schools, particularly those in the Southwest U.S., to continue to segregate Chicano students. While the judicial precedent necessary to end the institutionalized segregation of Chicano students came as a result of these cases, their legal rulings remained ineffective. While historiographies marked court cases such as *Mendez* and *Hernandez* as legal precedent that altered racial dynamics without resistance, this research demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case. Without

effective legislative reform, the method of segregation of Chicano students shifted from *de jure* to *de facto* where educational requirements replaced racial justifications for the discrimination of Chicano students. In the wake of such insufficient legal precedent, Chicano activism proved to be the greatest bulwark against further attempts at educational segregation in the Southwest United States.

Mendez v. Westminster School Dist. of Orange County in 1947 emerged as the initial legal effort to halt the segregation of Chicano students. The case addressed segregation of Chicanos by their race in California. Gonzalo Méndez, the father of three daughters who were denied equal entry into Westminster Main School, was the primary plaintiff in the case.¹ Méndez claimed that the school district engaged in “concerted policy and design of class discrimination against ‘persons of Mexican or Latin descent or extraction’ of elementary

¹ Philippa Strum, “‘We Always Tell Our Children They Are Americans’: *Mendez v. Westminster* and

the Beginning of the End of School Segregation,” *Journal of Supreme Court History* 39, no. 3 (2014): 308.

school age.”² To demonstrate that the segregation of his daughters was not an isolated incident within Westminster Main, Méndez gathered additional families from three neighboring districts who also attested to being subject to segregation.³ With a general consensus that Westminster Main was engaged in systemic segregation, the school’s legal response only further demonstrated a conscious effort to isolate Chicano students due to their race. The school “declared that there be no segregation of pupils on a racial basis but that non-English-speaking children (which group, excepting as to a small number of pupils, was made up entirely of children of Mexican ancestry or descent), be required to attend schools designated by the boards separate and apart from English-speaking pupils.”⁴ The targeting of non-fluent students was a direct attempt to separate Chicano students from their Caucasian peers masked by the issue of English fluency. While the ruling of the Mendez case did provide the legal precedent designed to halt *de jure* segregation, the litigation required to implement the ruling in the Southwest, and the rest of the U.S., did not materialize.

The lagging judicial system directly contributed to the ineffectiveness of legal precedent to halt educational segregation.. After *Mendez*, the next major case aimed at the segregation of Chicano students was the

1971 case *Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District*, where “the disparities in the funding of schools in wealthy and poor districts” was attacked⁵ The case challenged alternative means through which Chicano students found themselves disadvantaged through legal disparities present in the funding of schools. In Texas, low income residents, which included a significant number of Chicanos, were subject to higher tax rates than higher income residents who paid less and received far more in educational funding.⁶ Legal discrimination was justified through means which hid implicitly racial discrimination through blatant income disparities. The court recognized this inequality and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, arguing that “financing public education in Texas [discriminated] on the basis of wealth by permitting citizens of affluent districts to provide a higher quality education for their children, while paying lower taxes.”⁷ While greater Chicano educational equality was seemingly assured, the ruling would not stand for long. In March 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the case. While the Court argued that the funding system was flawed, they stated that the law did not discriminate against Mexican Americans directly.⁸ With the failure of *Rodriguez*, Chicano litigation lost its most fundamental cause. Litigation was an attempt from Chicanos to secure an educational

² *Mendez v. Westminster School Dist. of Orange County* 64 F. Supp. 544 (US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 1947), 545, Justia Law.

³ Strum, “We Always,” 314.

⁴ *Mendez v. Westminster School Dist. of Orange County*, 64 F. Supp. 544 (US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 1947), 545, Justia Law.

⁵ Guadalupe San Miguel, *Chicana/o Struggles for Education: Activism in the Community* (College

Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2013), 39.

⁶ *Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District*, 337 F. Supp. 280 (US District Court for the Western District of Texas 1972), 282, Justia Law.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 285.

⁸ Miguel, *Chicana/o Struggles*, 39-40.

equality case equal in magnitude of that demonstrated in *Brown v. Board of Education*. The fact that *Rodriguez* was overturned by the Supreme Court severely damaged the credibility of the U.S. legal system to prevent continued discrimination, pushing Chicano activists away from litigation to halt inequality.

The lengthy legal battle associated with *Rodriguez* resulted in minor legal reform in Texas. The case influenced the Texas legislature to pass a bill, HB 1126, that reformed how the state financed schools.⁹ In 1980, seven years after the Texas legislature instituted its own legislative reform in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in *Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District*, similarly oppressive laws were tackled in Colorado. *Lujan v. Colorado*, oppressive school funding laws were attacked by Chicanos. The court ruled that "the state's poorer school districts did not have the property tax base to provide the same quality of education as wealthier districts."¹⁰ The case in Colorado, however, is far more significant for its timing. The case was decided in 1982, over 10 years after the Supreme Court overturned the *Rodriguez* case. In the wake of the passing of HB 1126, "Mexican Americans' struggles against unequal schools temporarily ended."¹¹ While *Rodriguez* inspired local change in the Texas legislature, the cost of such localized change at the expense of a failed Supreme Court case is one potential explanation as to the decline

in the use of litigation by Chicanos. The *Lujan* required similar precedent to the *Rodriguez* case. It was decided by the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling which required numerous, and increasingly costly, rounds of legal appeal. Chicanos found that rulings at this time had "either limited impact or no significant impact on local school policies and practices."¹² With such limited gains in the political arena, Chicanos felt that efforts were better spent advocating for local change, where the high costs of litigation could be avoided.

The failure of legal reform was stark. Despite the promises of a truly equitable school experience for Chicano students, massive educational disparities still existed among Chicano students and their peers in the American Southwest. A report conducted by the United States government in 1974 found that Chicano students "[were] isolated by school district and by schools within individual districts."¹³ As an ethnic minority in the United States, Chicanos were continually subject to systematic discrimination, despite the promises of equality presented in *Mendez v. Westminster*. For many Chicanos, schooling continued to be at the discretion of their own race. Federal studies of the southwest United States found that "[Mexican Americans] are in about 1,500 schools, which account for a little more than 10 percent of the more than 13,000 public schools in the region."¹⁴ High school achievement of Chicanos also faced

⁹ Ibid., 40.

¹⁰ No Author, "Education Finance Lawsuit Ends in Victory," *La Cucaracha*, January 9, 1980.

¹¹ Miguel, *Chicana/o Struggles*, 40.

¹² Ibid, 56.

¹³ United States Commission on Civil Rights, *Toward Quality Education for Mexican Americans* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1974), 1.

¹⁴ United States Commission on Civil Rights, *Mexican American Education Study Report 1: Ethnic*

significant setbacks. In a large-scale study of high school students, Chicanos in various high schools showed losses in retesting and were found to drop out of school at higher rates than other races.¹⁵ This is not to say, however, that Chicano students were predisposed to poor academic achievement due to racial dispositions. Attempts persisted to restrict Chicano students educationally, often through the guise of language proficiency that schools, such as Westminster Main in the *Mendez* case, attempted to defend their segregation policies through. Government reports also supported the positive impact that bilingual curriculum and educators had on their students. In a report from the United States Civil Rights Commission, Frank Sotomayor reported on the effects of bilingual programs in public schools. When given sufficient educational material, which included bilingual education, the 1974 report found that Chicano students were found “to have been tested as ‘gifted’ (IQ above 132).”¹⁶ When presented with the same level of academic support as their white classmates, Chicano students were capable of equal, or even superior, academic achievement. Despite these benefits, however, Sotomayor detailed the failures of schools in the Southwest United States to provide support to Chicano students. Sotomayor’s report found that “none of the Southwestern States ... established requirements for cross cultural courses that

would help counselors in their work with Chicano students.”¹⁷ Sotomayor’s observations highlight a significant reason why activists felt disillusioned in pursuing further legal recourse to end Chicano segregation, as local and federal governments failed to implement bilingual and bicultural curricula that was proven to better educate Chicano students.

Systematic discrimination of Chicanos continued long after the precedent established by *Mendez v. Westminster*. While the Ninth District Court in California dismissed the Westminster School District’s policy of racial segregation, school administrative policies still prevented Chicano students from integrating into classrooms. Of these, tracking emerged to be one of the most prevalent methods in which schools continued to segregate Chicano students. Tracking is based on a student’s intellectual achievement, with those students who score poorly placed on slow educational tracks to accommodate their perceived academic shortcomings.¹⁸ While in theory these tracks are designed to provide educational support to students failing to meet academic standards, in reality, it only further isolated them from their school peers. Chicano students were targeted directly through this tracking system. Even more striking is that “in California a local district court reported in the late 1960s that three out of every one hundred Mexican American

Isolation of Mexican Americans in the Public Schools of the Southwest (Washington DC: Government Printing Office), 1971, 25.

¹⁵ United States Department of Education. *Study of Excellence in High School Education: Longitudinal Study, 1980-82 Final Report* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1986), 174.

¹⁶ U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Para Los Ninos – For the Children: Improving Education for Mexican Americans* by Frank Sotomayor (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1974), 21.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹⁸ David F. Gomez, *Somos Chicanos: Strangers in Our Own Land* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), 111.

students were assigned to classes for the mentally retarded, but only one and one-third of every one hundred other whites were assigned.”¹⁹ One of the most prominent markers for a student’s placement on slower tracks, I.Q. tests, were also “designed for Anglo middle-class children, not Mexican Americans.”²⁰ I.Q. testing failed to account for the unique cultural identities and backgrounds of Chicano students. Rather than consider these facts, educators were far more focused on testing the academic proficiency of white students and not that of Chicano students. Studies also found that the IQ tests given to students were not indicators of educational success, but gauged “the subjects acculturation.”²¹ It is no wonder that Chicano students performed poorly on these tests, given that they were purposely placed on tracks that slowed their academic achievement and consequent acculturation. What was purported to be a method to cater to students’ academic needs became a means to isolate Chicano students from their peers.

Alongside tracking, a failure to recognize Chicano students’ unique identity also contributed toward their discrimination in public-schools. Educators failed to attempt to better understand the diverse body of students they taught. Educators feared acknowledging differences in Chicano students as they believed “it [was] probably prejudicial to treat them in any fashion reflecting awareness of ethnicity, language of the home, socio-economic background, etc.”²² All students in public-school are

distinctly unique, and the inability for educators to recognize the unique identity of Chicano students harmed their academic potential. Even today, for Chicano students who share both Mexican and American values, “their socialization has accustomed them to the expectation that their needs will be noticed and help provided without its having to be asked for.”²³ While an educator may place inaction at the fault of the student, understanding that their cultural upbringing may hamper their ability to do so is critical. Where the American education system claimed to not focus on the unique identity of Chicano students out of fears of prejudice, their inaction manifested as blatant ignorance.

Despite failures to litigate for true educational equality and the dismantlement of institutionalized discrimination present in the American public-school system, Chicanos activists sought to replace the educational shortcomings presented to their children. Attempts to fight against educational segregation now shifted toward attempts by Chicanos to advocate for greater reform and inclusivity within traditional education settings. Activists within local communities were forced to push for change in the wake of the ineffective legal precedent of the *Mendez* and *Rodriguez* cases, often through local reforms, to best include Chicano students.

The development of Chicano-inclusive curriculum was another attempt to better include Chicano students in curricula

¹⁹ Miguel, *Chicana/o Struggles*, 43.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 111.

²¹ Jose Rodriguez, “An In-Service Rationale for Educators Working with Mexican American Students,” in *Perspectives on Chicano Education*, ed.

Tobias Gonzalez and Sandra Gonzales (Stanford, CA: Chicano Fellows, 1975), 18.

²² *Ibid.*, 14.

²³ *Ibid.*, 15.

designed for white students. Sal Castro, one of these advocates, added Chicano-relevant material to traditional curriculum taught at his school. Once he was granted a classroom to teach in, “[Castro] collected for [his] history and government classes a whole bunch of Chicano pictures showing the history and contributions of Mexicans, as [he] set out to build up the self-esteem of [his] students.”²⁴ Bilingual education also better included Chicano students in traditionally white educational frameworks and disarmed arguments that school districts, such as Westminster Main, used to separate students not fluent in English. For example, St. Vrain School District in Longmont, Colorado, pushed for the inclusion of a Chicano Studies program in the district. To do so, St. Vrain was awarded part of a \$61,000 grant in 1971, which included training for staff members, the hiring of three human relations staff to foster communication with the community, and a study to research Chicano dropout rates and the hiring of Chicano faculty.²⁵ The fund allowed for the greater inclusion of Chicano students and the Chicano community through the hiring of a human relations staff. The efforts to push for this educational reform built upon similar, earlier efforts in the region to implement bilingual education. Neighboring Boulder County School District faced pressure in 1956 from “a committee of parents and teachers ... [who] began to push for foreign language teaching in elementary

schools.”²⁶ Advocates did not desire to dismantle established academic programs, but to promote inclusivity of Chicano culture within traditional curriculum. Community efforts in both schools reinforced beliefs that more inclusive educational practices should be implemented to best serve the needs of Chicano students. St. Vrain’s request, however, was still muddled with bureaucratic shortcomings. For one, St. Vrain did not fully detail the ways in which the grant was to be allocated. Community members attempted to request further details as to how the grant would be utilized to benefit Chicano students. Among these members was Angelo Velasquez, who “pressed school officials to point out reflections in the budget given recent and past requests for Chicano studies and representation.”²⁷ Velasquez advocated for the grant to address previous Chicano needs within the district, which did not appear to be properly addressed as the grant was then-allocated. Among these demands was a call for “a separate study of the Chicano dropout program be made apart from the overall study.”²⁸ Actions like those taken by Velasquez, demonstrated grass roots efforts by Chicanos to better cater to the needs of their communities. The Chicano community’s dedication to the inclusion of Chicano students, particularly in the St. Vrain School district, proved to be vital. Despite securing funds for the creation of a Chicano Studies Program, the district faltered in its

²⁴ Mario T. García and Sal Castro, *Blowout!: Sal Castro and the Chicano Struggle for Educational Justice* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 111, ProQuest Ebook Central.

²⁵ No Author, “Chicanos Winning Bid for \$61,000 for Chicano Studies,” *Longmont Times Call*, November 11, 1971. Boulder County Latino History Project.

²⁶ Marjorie K McIntosh, *Latinos of Boulder County, Colorado, 1900-1980: Volume I: History and Contributions* (Palm Springs, CA: Old John Publishing, 2016), 167, <https://bocolatinohistory.colorado.edu/sites/default/files/McIntosh-Latinos-Volume1.pdf>.

²⁷ No Author, “Chicanos Winning Bid.”

²⁸ *Ibid.*

commitments to Chicano students. In 1975, Esther Blazon, a Bilingual Bicultural Education Director, argued for greater bilingual education in the St. Vrain School District to better accommodate students whose primary language was Spanish.²⁹ Both Velasquez and Blazon's efforts signaled Chicano activist's direct involvement within their community's educational programs.

This is not to say, however, that activist-led efforts did not exist without political resistance. While activists were successful in implementing Chicano-inclusive programs in the St. Vrain School District, educators across the U.S. found the continued implementation of them difficult. As a principal at Nelson School of La Puente, California, David Gomez oversaw the implementation of a bilingual and bicultural curriculum three years after he became principal in the early 1970s.³⁰ Despite its initial success, the program was soon stunted by the school board's distrust in both it and Gomez, as the school board's doubts were not driven by academic achievement but by racial fear. From Gomez's perspective, the school board saw bilingual education as a direct threat to their political power by "potentially ... [strengthening] the already menacing numerical strength of the Hispanics."³¹ The school board's decision to exclude educational curriculum that better met the needs of Chicano students was driven purely by fear of educating a traditionally

disadvantaged racial minority. The cost for shutting down the program did not come lightly for the school board either. After ending the program in 1979, the school board would see the loss of "three-quarters of a million dollars [they] had invested in building up a model bilingual school and in training bilingual aides and teachers."³² Despite the sheer financial cost of halting the bilingual and bicultural program at the Nelson School, the school board's own racially motivated fears were sufficient in their justification for cutting diversity programs. The resistance Gomez met in his school's bilingual program marked yet another instance in which racial bias hampered the success of Chicano students.

Despite continued racially-motivated resistance to inclusive education programs, Chicano activists continued to present the benefits of inclusive curricula to their communities. Proponents of bilingual education argued that children who learned multiple languages achieved similar levels of academic success as their single-language peers in traditional classroom settings.³³ While easing the fears of Chicano parents of the poor integration of their students, activists such as Blazon defended the learning ability of multilingual students. Blazon also argued for their greater individual ability, citing "the McGill University psychologists, Lambert and Peale," whose work argued that "bilingual 19-year-olds in Montreal are

²⁹ Esther Blazon, "Why Bilingual, Bicultural Education," *Longmont Times Call*, March 1, 1975. Boulder County Latino History Project.

³⁰ Larry Nicholl and Miguel Gomez, *Quality Education for Mexican Americans/Minorities: Sí, Se Puede! – Yes, it Can be Done!* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1980), 185.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 187.

³² *Ibid.*, 184.

³³ Blazon, "Why Bilingual, Bicultural Education," *Longmont Times Call*, March 1, 1975. Boulder County Latino History Project.

markedly superior to monolinguals on verbal and non-verbal tests of intelligence.”³⁴ The Montreal study Blazon referenced was not the only study to demonstrate educational benefits of bilingualism for students. Several studies conducted, from 1970-1972, demonstrated that bilingual students tended to score higher in IQ and language skill tests.³⁵ As an educator in the St. Vrain School district, Blazon provided an educator’s insight into potential remedies for St. Vrain’s indifference to the needs of Chicanos years after it was awarded a grant to do so.

While the implementation of inclusive educational models was focused primarily on primary and secondary education, Chicano activists also targeted higher education institutions. George Autobee, an alumnus of Colorado State University-Pueblo, advocated for the inclusion of a Chicano studies program at the school. Autobee was elected as Commissioner of Academic Affairs, and through his position, secured funding to research other schools’ Chicano Studies programs to establish one at CSU-Pueblo.³⁶ As Commissioner, Autobee advocated for the creation of a program that would best represent the ignored Chicano population at his campus. His actions went further than purely academic pursuits, as he fought against blatant discrimination toward Chicanos within the school. Shortly after establishing the program, Autobee “wrote a proposal to student government for a disadvantaged scholarship program—

because the racism that was in the financial aid office was so bad, many [Chicanos] couldn’t get financial aid.”³⁷ Already faced with an indifferent curriculum that disregarded Chicano students, Autobee had to take further action to ensure students were treated fairly and without regard to their race. Where institutions failed, Chicano activists had to pave the way for true educational equality. With petitions to CSU-Pueblo, Autobee required that one particularly racist financial aid officer be fired if the Chicano Studies program were to be implemented, and the school accepted his offer.³⁸ Institutionalized indifference toward Chicanos was present at all levels of education. Chicanos fought for the inclusion of Chicano students throughout multiple levels of education. Where activists within primary schools fought for greater representation of students, others, like Autobee, advocated for greater inclusivity in higher education.

Other higher-education activists focused primarily on outreach, advocating for the increase presence of inclusive educational organizations. For Julián, who started pursuing his undergraduate at the University of California in 1999, advocacy encompassed high school outreach. As a part of the university’s branch of *Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlán* (MEChA), Julián “[brought] over 1,100 high school students to campus ... [and] community spokespeople like Antonia Darder, Sal Castro, and Michelle Cerros to motivate

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Rodriguez, “In-Service Rationale,” 14.

³⁶ George Autobee, interview by Deborah Martinez Martinez, Pueblo, CO, February 24, 2016, 2, Voices of Protest Oral History.

³⁷ Ibid., 3.

³⁸ Ibid., 3.

students to consider higher education.”³⁹ Through his involvement in MEChA, Julián fostered a connected Chicano community at the University of California. For students likely to feel isolated while attending college, MEChA’s community building provided Chicano students with a resource to feel included in institutions that had historically ignored them. Julián’s work was especially important given the fact that “the percentage of Chicano/Latino students at [the] campus [had] dropped by almost 50 percent.”⁴⁰ Just as Autobee advocated for programs to better integrate Chicano students at CSU-Pueblo, Julián sought to better encourage and integrate Chicano students at CSU-Pueblo at a time where the college’s attendance began to decline. MEChA provided Chicano students entering higher education with a sense of belonging in an unfamiliar landscape. Given the tumultuous state of Chicano-inclusive educational programs prior to college, the organization provided students with essential resources that prepared them for college.

Where legal precedent failed, Chicano activism rose to meet the educational needs of Chicanos that court rulings failed to fully protect. With demonstrated inequality continuing within the American Southwest following rulings such as those set in *Mendez v. Westminster* and *Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District*, it is not hard to argue that legal precedent was insufficient to solve the institutionalized discrimination toward Chicanos in public education. Even with the aid of outside funding, activists were forced to continue to fight for greater Chicano inclusion. These efforts included modified curricula, the implementation of Chicano Studies, and greater inclusion of Chicano students at all levels of education to allow for a greater sense of belonging for Chicano students accustomed to de facto segregation present throughout their academic careers. Chicano activists, through the various actions they took, attempted to remedy the inadequacy of legal precedents needed to truly end educational segregation.

³⁹ Luis Jr. Urrieta, *Working from Within: Chicana and Chicano Activist Educators in Whitestream*

Schools (Tucson, AZ: The University of Arizona Press, 2009), 125.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 125.

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From Sacred Temple Dancer to Proscenium Performer: How the British Colonial Rule in India Transformed Bharatanatyam Dance

Devan Herbert

Throughout the period of colonization and the Indian independence movement, the classical dance form of Bharatanatyam experienced major aesthetic and practical shifts. This paper examines these major shifts and the historical actors that caused them. Over time, Bharatanatyam has shifted to better reflect the populations that practice it. In the face of Bharatanatyam's near decline, as it lost relevance in a changing cultural climate, revivalists were able to fuse and recreate the dance form to reflect a nationalistic and modern view of India.

As Savitha Sastry gazes out into the audience and sensually traces her palm to her wrist, her stunningly large eyes catch in the light. Her black hair is slicked back and separated with a delicate piece of gold jewelry. She performs a series of leaps, jumping with the suspension of a spring grasshopper. Her legs create a perfect diamond in the air, and the movement is accentuated by her peach and gold sari, which catches the wind and light with the same grace as her body. Holding her upper body with a delicate yet confident posture, she stomps the ball of her foot repeatedly against the stage. The bells of her costume as well as the percussion of her foot contribute to the music. While maintaining this footwork pattern, she travels in a growing spiral, keeping her gaze intensely focused on her hands which are perched forward in a giving gesture. As she bellows her arms out, the

momentum of her body and costume make her appear large, like a great mother, looking over all of India.

This performance, which was captured on the video-sharing platform *Youtube*, is a fusion of the Bharatanatyam tradition and contemporary concert dance.¹ It is much more than just a beautiful performance; it is representative of the greater aesthetic shifts in Bharatanatyam dance since the age of the British Colonial Rule in India. It fuses the sharp, athletic, and performative qualities of Western dance with the traditional shapes, movement patterns, and hand gestures of Bharatanatyam. Dance is both constituted by representative of culture, and the transformation of Bharatanatyam dance in India reflects the greater cultural changes caused by British colonial rule.

¹ Savitha Sastry, "Savitha Sastry Bharatanatyam Performance," Youtube Video, 3:45, June 10, 2009,. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SgiLOzFQh14>.

This paper examines these shifts in Bharatanatyam dance in three sections. First, it will discuss a brief history of the traditional dance form from its origins in the Hindu religion. Then, it will examine the British labeling of the dance form as savage and sexual, which ultimately led to the anti-nautch movement and the eventual colonial ban on Bharatanatyam. Lastly, this paper will discuss the revivalist movement and how Bharatanatyam became the highly cherished proscenium dance style that it is today. In the face of Bharatanatyam's near decline, as it lost relevance in a changing cultural climate, revivalists were able to fuse and recreate the dance form to reflect a nationalistic and modern view of India.

To contextualize this paper within current discourse regarding the development of Bharatanatyam, it should be noted that much has been written on the subject. Many secondary accounts provide detailed descriptions of the lives of the Devadasis before the colonial period. The anti-nautch

movement has also been studied and written about in-depth. However, many of these sources do not discuss the British attitudes towards Bharatanatyam that this paper argues were central to the themes of the anti-nautch movement. Janet O'Shea's book, *At Home in The World: Bharatanatyam on the Global Stage* offers a very complete and detailed analysis of the development of Bharatanatyam from the pre-colonial period to today and is used as the primary reference for timelines and details throughout this paper. Many of the essays in Pallabi Chakravorty and Nilanjana Gupta's collection, *Dance Matters: Performing India*, argue that cultural appropriation and conforming to British standards are at the heart of the Bharatanatyam revival. However, this paper argues in favor of the changes made to Bharatanatyam as a result of the revival, based upon dance critics Joann Kealiinohomoku and Deborah Jowitt's research on dance fusion and cultural blending.

Sacred Temple Dancers

The Development of Bharatanatyam in Pre-Colonial India

It is unknown how long *Devadasis*, or Temple Dancers, have been performing various forms of the Bharatanatyam dance tradition within South India, but literature suggests that it dates back to the first or second century CE. While this paper uses the term "Bharatanatyam," to describe the dance form throughout its development, it should be noted that the term wasn't coined until the

1930's, when the revival movement was well underway.² There were many names to describe its early stages, including the common, "Sadir Attam," but it was primarily referred to as *nautch*, which literally translates to "dance." The foundations of Bharatanatyam, including movement vocabulary as well as spiritual meanings, performance guidelines, and more, are

² Avanthi Meduri, "Bharatha Natyam-What Are You?" *Asian Theatre Journal*. University of Hawaii Press. 5 (1): 1988, 1-2.

outlined in the Sanskrit text, *Natyasastra*. Traditionally, it is performed by Devadasis, who were women that remained outside of the marriage system and instead lived a life in loyalty and dedication to their local temple and its deity. These women often lived in the temple or in a house of other Devadasis, and spent their days studying and honoring the deities of their temple. The dance, which was performed solo and often in private, served as a ritual to assert this dedication. According to the *Natyasastra*, the music (which is played live) actually follows the dancer, as opposed to the reverse: “The playing of the drums (...) should be properly following different aspects of the dance.”³ Bharatanatyam also relies heavily on the performance of *mudras*, which are hand gestures that each hold a specific meaning and can be used in sequence to tell a story, much like sign language. It is a very rhythmic form, with the dancer often adding her own percussive beats by stomping or ringing bells. Early performances of the form were held at temples under very strict performance guidelines. Dancers had to train often over twelve years before they could perform in public.

The most common early misperception of Bharatanatyam dance is that it was used as a way of luring men into paid

sexual relations. However, this is false. While it is true that Devadasis often participated in prostitution, the involvement of dance is largely misunderstood. Dance scholar Janet O’Shea describes the relationships Devadasis had as “liaisons with men, initially selected by the senior women of the household, who became their patrons.”⁴ These relationships were largely positive for the women, who used the money to pay for non-essential items as a supplement to their salary from the temple. Bharatanatyam dance does not play a part in this relationship, but there is evidence that other forms of street dancing did. According to the *Natyasastra*, “the Class Dance is mostly to accompany the adoration of the gods,” while street dancing, which is referred to as a “gentler form,” (implying it has a less codified technique) “relates to the erotic form” and therefore is likely linked to prostitution.⁵ However, little is known about this street dancing form as, much like Bharatanatyam, it took many names and is difficult to track through the pre-colonial era. It is unlikely that Devadasis performed this street dance in order to lure men. Therefore, the labelling of Bharatanatyam as being in service of prostitution is a wide misconception.

³ Muni Bharata, *The Natyasastra: A Treatise on Hindu Dramaturgy and Histrionics*, trans. and ed. by Manomohan Chosh (Rippol Classic Publishing House: 1951), 70.

⁴ Janet O’Shea, *At Home in the World: Bharatnatyam on the Global Stage*. (CI: Wesleyan University Press, 2007), 29

⁵ Bharata, “The Natyasastra,” 288.

Profane Prostitutes

The Anti-Nautch Movement and Colonial Ban on Bharatanatyam Dance

Bharatanatyam quickly became associated with prostitution as British enlightenment views arrived in India. Because of these misconceptions, an anti-nautch or “anti-dance” movement began to stir. The movement was led by British imperialists, missionaries, and Indian elites who thought the dance to be overtly sexual in nature and representative of India’s backwards society. Eventually, “the Madras presidency banned temple dancing altogether as a part of the social reform movement. This act was meant to stop exploitation of helpless women performers and to change the low status accorded to the Devadasis, and it resulted in the whole tradition coming to a halt in 1910.”⁶ This section explains how public opinion on Bharatanatyam dance changed, ultimately leading to this 1910 ban.

When the British arrived in India and asserted colonial rule, they were quick to degrade Indian dance, labelling it as savage and sexual. The association of Devadasis with prostitution, which was influenced by Victorian morals of the mind being nobler than the body, led to an idea that the dance itself was highly sexual and even used as a tool to lure men into sexual acts. In 1838, a troupe of Indian women and their musical accompanists toured through Europe. A review of this performance in the *The Spectator UK* by an unknown author provides an excellent example of the

degrading nature in which the British perceived Indian dance. The article calls these dancers *The Bayaderes*, which is French for *Temple Dancers*, but it is unknown if this is the name that the touring women had called themselves. In the author’s description of the work, he calls one dancer “a lithe creature” instead of a human, implying that she is sub-human.⁷ The author also comments on the dress of the dancers, remarking:

...the kirtle of silk fastened round the waist, falling on one side a little below the knee, and the corset or stomacher, overlaid with plates of gold set with gems—the breasts being enclosed in pliant cup-shaped cases—are almost concealed by a voluminous scarf of white muslin passing over the left shoulder, and crossed under the right arm so as to pass round the body...

His description of the clothing matches the traditional costume of a Bharatanatyam dancer (usually a tighter fitting and highly decorated Sari).⁸ However, the author makes this dress seem unusual, commenting that “the costume differs somewhat from that of their native country, chiefly in its covering the form more completely.”⁹ It is unknown how the author got the idea that this costume was a more covered version of the traditional costume, but his assertion of that as fact makes it seem

⁶ Urmimala Sarkar, “Another Time, Another Space—Does Dance Remain the Same?” In *Dance Matters: Performing India*, ed. by Pallabi Chakravorty and Nilanjana Gupta (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 30.

⁷ “The Bayaderes,” *Spectator UK*, October 6, 1938, <http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/6th-october-1838/9/the-bayaderes>.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

as though the dancers not only would wear something more scandalous, but that they needed to then cover themselves for the British, who were higher company.

The conceptualization of Bharatanatyam as “sexual” spread not only within Britain, but to the missionaries and even Indian elites who resided in India under colonial rule. In the early 1900s, the “anti-nautch” movement began to build momentum. This movement consisted primarily of British missionaries and Indian educated elites; whose ultimate goal was to ban dancing all together. However, the anti-nautch movement was specifically targeted towards the Devadasi system as a whole. Because British imperialist views had previously labelled Bharatanatyam as being sexual and associated with prostitution, the anti-nautch reformers were able to target it for encouraging this sexual behavior. Bharatanatyam was not linked to prostitution, yet it unfairly took the blame. In 1910, British officials in the Madras presidency banned all dancing, with particular emphasis on temple dancing and Bharatanatyam.¹⁰ This ban would not be lifted until Indian independence was achieved in 1948.

One might assume that while British officials were behind the anti-nautch movement, all Indian nationalists were in favor of it. However, many were quite conflicted on the question of Bharatanatyam dance. An article written in the Indian Times in 1913 reveals that many Indians actually came to view Bharatanatyam as a sexual

dance form as well as the British.¹¹ The unknown author, who self-identifies as an Aryan living in India, criticizes Indians for viewing “all kinds of dancing as either undignified or indecent.”¹² The author seems to be rather informed on Indian dance. He explains its origins and how “the greatest dancer among the gods is Shiva,” which is in accordance with the classic texts.¹³ He then goes on to explain the differences between theatrical and feminine dancing in the Hindu tradition. This somewhat oddly-placed primary source seems unfitting in the general overall narrative of the anti-nautch movement. Why is an Aryan explaining these concepts? This newspaper reveals that a significant number of Indians were likely opposed to the Bharatanatyam tradition and in favor of the anti-nautch movement. These views are reflective of the Indian Nationalist movement’s desire to westernize and reveals that Indian dance was losing traction and popularity. As Urmimala Sarkar-Munshi explains in her essay, “Another Time, Another Space,” “As the Indian Nationalist movement gained force, there was an underlying motivation for all the reform movements taking place in different parts of the country to gain acceptance in the eyes of the modern world by doing away with India’s somewhat distorted social and cultural practices.”¹⁴ This left Indian dancers and dance enthusiasts at a crossroads between modernization and the keeping of tradition.

While some reformers sought to westernize society and therefore ban dancing

¹⁰ Sarkar, “Another Time, Another Space,” 30.

¹¹ “Behind the Indian Veil: Dancing Among Hindus,” *Times of India* (Mumbai, India), September 12, 1913.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Sarkar, “Another Time, Another Space,” 28

altogether on the basis that was too sexual, others saw it as a reason to reform Bharatanatyam in a way that carried the tradition in the context of a newer, more modern Indian society. As Janet O'Shea reveals, "reformers sought to alter aspects of Indian society in order to accommodate modern, European ideals of equality, while revivalists underscored the merits of "traditional," orthodox Hindu culture."¹⁵ The crossroads of modernization and tradition caused the anti-nautch and subsequent

revival movement of Bharatanatyam to become increasingly politicized. Reformists would ultimately align the Bharatanatyam revival with the greater political discourses of nationalism and regionalism. The alignment of the two served each other, with the Nationalist movement providing legitimacy to the Bharatanatyam revival and the dancers providing a sense of national pride, tradition, and in-group belonging to the independence movement.

Proscenium Performers

The Revivalist Movement to Today

The alignment of the revivalist movement and political discourse resulted in a complete transformation of Bharatanatyam, which was reflective of the nationalist movement as a whole. These changes embody the conflict of modernism and tradition that the Indian Nationalist movement faced. By 1910, Bharatanatyam traditions were suffering under the ban. The role of Devadasis in society was constantly under question both by British imperialists and Indian nationalists. According to Janet O'Shea, revivalist dancers "faced a new dilemma: how to celebrate the heritage that made India unique while contesting colonialist changes of stagnation."¹⁶ One of these revivalists, Rukmini Devi, sought to address this conflict by altering the dance form to become more presentational and less religious.¹⁷ This aligned with the Nationalist movement because it showed a separation from old,

outdated traditions while simultaneously showing off the beauty and mastery of an ancient Indian art form. Instead of dancing in a temple, she brought the temple to the proscenium stage through set design and costuming. She fused Bharatanatyam and contemporary forms by travelling across the stage more and incorporating a presentational aesthetic that allows the dancer to acknowledge and interact with the audience. With these changes, she was able to make Bharatanatyam itself a more inclusive and nationalistic form. Along with other reformers such as Uday Shankar and Balasaraswati, she took the principles of the *mudras* to tell nationalistic stories that argue for the pride of the Indian national heritage.¹⁸ A 1932 article in *The Los Angeles Times* called her "destined for immortality as the modern mother of ancient Indian Temple

¹⁵ Janet O'Shea, *At Home in the World: Bharatanatyam on the Global Stage* (Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 2007), 76.

¹⁶Ibid, 32.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

dances.”¹⁹ This primary source not only reveals her popularity within India, but her respect on a world stage, which conjured international cultural legitimacy and ultimately fueled the nationalist movement inside of India. By 1941 dance revivalists were performing at the Indian National Congress meetings as a way of both re-affirming cultural legitimacy and displaying a culturally representative piece of Indian art work.²⁰ The revivalist movement had successfully removed Bharatanatyam from its association with savagery and sexuality.

Critics of Rukmini Devi’s work would call the changes she made “appropriation,” however, it is instead a modernization of the form to reflect the changing culture and values of Indian society. To these critics, the alteration of a traditional form meant conformity to British imperialist views. However, India’s culture changed as a result of the independence movement. The culture became more British. Devi’s changes to the dance form are reflective of these cultural shifts. As Rukmini Devi herself said, “India’s real achievement depends upon her understanding of the place of art in life.”²¹ This quote implies that Indian culture is dependent upon its art, and that as Indian culture changes, the art must change with it. Furthermore, the core principles of Bharatanatyam dance have remained unchanged in its expanding role in society. While much of the religious ritual

surrounding the performance is gone, the connection to Hinduism is not; it’s become more accessible. While Bharatanatyam used to be reserved solely for the Devadasis, it has since its revival become increasingly more popular. The Devadasi system was outlawed in 1947 in the Madras presidency and in all of India in 1988 because it no longer fit into Indian society. Because Bharatanatyam revivalists were able to alter Bharatanatyam to fit modern Indian culture, it was able to survive independently of the Devadasi system while still maintaining a connection to Hinduism. As Bharatanatyam dance scholar and author Annie Marie Guston writes, modern day Bharatanatyam:

...consists of aesthetic movement and theatrical dances, the latter drawn largely from Hindu mythology. Thus for many Indian girls both in India and abroad, the dance is regarded as an important vehicle for becoming familiar with Hindu myths, in particular, those myths which embody the ideal role they are to emulate as women.²²

This quote illustrates that Bharatanatyam dance remains to be a carrier of Hindu culture. Furthermore, it has become a medium which can be shared. With public proscenium performances becoming increasingly popular with India and its diaspora, the dancing is exposed to much greater and more diverse public audiences.

In response to traditionalists who argue for the purity and stagnation of the

¹⁹ “Woman Who Shocked all of India: Brahmin Dancer, Legislator Tells of Fight Against Age Old Customs,” *Los Angeles Times* (Los Angeles, CA), September 10, 1952.

²⁰ O’Shea, *At Home in the World*, 5.

²¹ Rukmini Devi Arundale, “The Spiritual Background of Indian Dance” In *Bharatanatyam: A*

Reader, ed. by Davesh Soneji (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 192.

²² Annie-Marie Guston, “Dance and the Hindu Woman.” In *Bharatanatyam: A Reader*, ed. by Davesh Soneji (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010): 273

form, it would be ludicrous to believe that Bharatanatyam would have survived without changing along with India's culture. In fact, it is ludicrous to believe that any dance form can be held purely in a sort of "tradition," or unchanging state. The performance of a dance is reliant on the physical body that performs it. Because those physical bodies change with each practitioner of dance, the form is always changing. As anthropologist Joann Kealiinohomoku argues in her article, "An Anthropologist Looks at Ballet as an Ethnic Dance Form," "we must not be deceived into believing that a few hundred people all got together and with one unanimous surge created a dance tradition which, having once been created, never changed from that day forward."²³ In the context of Bharatanatyam, this means that just as one should not believe that it never changed or evolved from its first dictation in the *Natyasastra* to its role in pre-colonial Indian society, one should not expect that it would remain unchanged while India undergoes a massive nationalist and independence movement.

From its creation, Bharatanatyam dance has undergone significant changes. However, it is only in recent history and

primarily the colonial and post-colonial eras that we are able to track these changes. Because of outside influences and the age of globalization, changes happened more quickly and more drastically than ever before. Culture does not exist in isolation. It is through dance forms that cultures are able to maintain a sense of cultural heritage—but at the same time, without allowing dance forms to change, they will get lost in history as they become no longer relevant. While it is tempting to hold onto certain dance traditions, they must modernize along with us, or they will lose relevance. Bharatanatyam holds a very specific role within India and its diaspora. It provides a sense of belonging, education, and cultural heritage. However, it is also an opportunity for creative outlook. For instance, many Indian-American dancers may find that by fusing American-street dance styles and Indian classical dance, they can create something that feels unique to their specific cultural identity: part American, part Indian. While it is important to be conscious in the choices made when fusing dance styles as not to use one to enhance another but rather equally represent the two, fusion is what makes dance reflective of the 21st century.

²³ Joann Kealiinohomoku, "An Anthropologist Looks at Ballet as an Ethnic Form of Dance," in *Moving*

History/Dancing Cultures: A Dance History Reader, ed. Ann Dils and Ann Cooper Albright, (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2001), 36.

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Sentiments of an American Woman in the American Revolution

Kristen Balke

In 1780, as the Continental Army struggled to win what seemed like an unwinnable war, Esther Reed published a broadside, *Sentiments of an American Woman*, that called for women to do their part in the American Revolution. The goal of this paper is to question how *Sentiments of an American Woman* influenced women's roles in the American Revolution and its effect on the Continental Army. Therefore, this paper will argue that *Sentiments of an American Woman* encouraged and enabled wealthy women to take a more political stance by uniting to form an independent all-women's group that campaigned for money to donate to the Continental Army.

In 1780, the Revolutionary War disfavored the United States. The Continental Congress struggled with severe economic problems, inflation surged, many civilians refused to send aid to soldiers, and the government failed to provide the Continental Army with basic supplies. George Washington and his troops suffered from harsh conditions, tattered clothes, and worn-down shoes. Esther Reed, the patriotic and prominent wife of military officer Joseph Reed, realized these concerns and declared women needed to take a stronger political stance to contribute to the army. Reed published this argument in a newspaper broadside, which gained immediate support and led to the creation of the Ladies Association of Philadelphia, which the women ran and funded themselves. Reed's broadside ultimately helped fundraise thousands of dollars to aid George

Washington and the Continental Army. The broadside "*Sentiments of an American Woman*" encouraged and allowed wealthy women across the nation to take a more political stance by uniting to form an independent all-women's group that campaigned for money to contribute to the Continental Army.

Before "*Sentiments*" was published, women contributed to the American Revolution, but mostly through domestic means. Women played a major part in making goods to aid America and boycott British goods.¹ The women who participated in spinning bees—large group activities in which women spun cloth for colonists' clothing—earned the name "Daughters of Liberty." Similarly, as the war evolved, women made soldiers' uniforms, powder wallets, and cartridges.² In addition to

¹ Joan R. Gunderson, *To Be Useful to the World: Women in Revolutionary America, 1740-1790*

(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 174.

² *Ibid.*, 176.

making goods, women also housed British prisoners and American soldiers.³

On June 10, 1780, a Philadelphia newspaper published “Sentiments of an American Woman,” in which Reed targeted wealthy women and implored them to do their part in the war.⁴ “Sentiments” reminded women of their patriotism and called for them to take a greater political stance by uniting to campaign for money to send to the Continental Army. Speaking for all women in the nation, Reed stated they “aspire[d] to render themselves more really useful,” and their work needed to be so effective that women “should at least equal, and sometimes surpass [men] in [their] love for the public good.”⁵ Women were “born for liberty” and as equally as patriotic and political as men.⁶ The broadside called for women to act on their own to gather this money, which was “the offering of the ladies” and the ladies alone.⁷ “Sentiments” inspired the creation of the group the Ladies Association of Philadelphia, an independent political association that did what America’s government did not—supplied and aided the troops who fought for their country.⁸

“Sentiments” called for an association that consisted of mostly wealthy women. The association primarily included affluent women because they had more spare time than their poorer working counterparts.

The women Reed targeted in “Sentiments” lived comfortably enough that they could support themselves even if they donated their time and money to the cause. Reed asked these women to “dress less elegant,” and give their extra money to those who fought for the women and their families.⁹ These women could afford to “wear a clothing more simple” and give up their “vain ornament[s],” thereby saving money to donate to the revolutionary cause.¹⁰ In addition, a majority of upper-class women possessed some sort of education; many attended lectures and wrote or critiqued literature.¹¹ Because of this, they benefited from exposure to critical thinking, reasoning, and political ideas. This also connected them with other individuals of the same status, and they were therefore present in the public sphere. Connected influential individuals could join Reed’s association and donate more money to the women’s campaign.¹²

Through this broadside, Esther Reed related to other women. Reed accomplished this by signing the broadside with “An American Woman.”¹³ This vague signature implied she was similar to the targeted readers—a woman and an American. She also stated women should “aspire to render themselves more really useful; and this sentiment [was] universal from the north to

³ Ibid., 186.

⁴ Owen Ireland, *Sentiments of A British-American Woman* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State Press, 2017), 182.

⁵ Esther Reed, “Sentiments of an American Woman,” *Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia), June 21, 1780.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ James Martin and Mark Lender, “*A Respectable Army*”: *The Military Origins of the Republic, 1763-1789* (Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 129.

⁹ “Sentiments.”

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Arendt, “Ladies Going About for Money: Female Voluntary Associations and Civic Consciousness in the American Revolution,” 168.

¹² Ibid., 168.

¹³ “Sentiments”

the south of the Thirteen United States.”¹⁴ By using an ambiguous signature and stating the sentiment was universal throughout the United States, Reed appealed to women around the nation to help the cause. She created a group sense of power by comparing herself and her fellow American women to historic influential women in politics—“The Batildas, the Elizabeths, the Maries, the Catharines,” and Joan of Arc.¹⁵ Similarly, she appealed to women through their victimizations.¹⁶ She also connected with women by discussing how the Continental Army ensured safety for their families. Women coming together and protecting the troops was important because

if [the women] enjoy any tranquility, it is the fruit of [the army’s] watchings, [the army’s] labours, [the army’s] dangers. If [the women] live happy in the midst of [the women’s] famil[ies]; if [the women’s] husband[s] cultivates [their] field, and reaps [their] harvest in peace; if, surrounded with [the women’s] children, [they, the women] nourish the youngest, and press it to [their] bosom, without being afraid of seeing [themselves] separated from it, by a ferocious enemy; if the house in which we dwell; if our barns, our orchards are safe at the present time from the hands of those incendiaries, it is to [the army] that [the women] owe it.¹⁷

Many patriotic women related to the subjects Reed wrote about. The last line resonated with a large part of the United States’ female population and was received with support.¹⁸

“Sentiments” gained nationwide political support from women, and it motivated the establishment of many associations similar to the Ladies Association of Philadelphia and published broadsides similar to “Sentiments.” When writing Washington about the money the Association made, Reed mentioned she “expect[ed] some considerable additions from the country” and added she “also wrote to the other states in hopes the ladies there [would] adopt similar plans.”¹⁹ Reed wrote to a variety of other wives of politicians in order to spread the word and included a copy of “Sentiments” with the letters.²⁰ Along with many others, she contacted Mary Digges Lee, Maryland’s governor’s wife; Eleanor Madison, wife of a prominent planter; and Martha Wales Jefferson, wife of Governor Thomas Jefferson.²¹ This tactic was successful—messages like those found in “Sentiments” appeared in nine other states’ papers.²² Shortly after the Ladies Association of Philadelphia formed, associations emerged in Maryland, Virginia, and New Jersey.²³ In addition to the money raised by Reed’s association, Maryland raised another 60,000 continental dollars.²⁴ Women not only played a more political role in Pennsylvania, but did so in at least three other states. The publicity these women produced was incredible—the

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Sarah M. S. Pearsall, “Women in the Revolutionary War,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the American Revolution*, ed. Jane Kamensky and Edward G. Gray, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4, URL: <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/colorado.idm.oclc.org/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199746705.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199746705-e-16>.

¹⁷ “Sentiments.”

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Esther Reed to George Washington, July 4, 1780, *George Washington Papers at the Library of Congress, 1741-1799: Series 4. General Correspondence. 1697-1799*.

²⁰ Arendt, 175.

²¹ Gunderson, 192.

²² Ireland, 183.

²³ Pearsall, 12.

²⁴ Arendt, 178.

argument spread across the Atlantic to at least one other European newspaper.²⁵ Europeans received the message in a positive manner, and American women earned political and monetary support from Europe.²⁶ American women in these associations demonstrated to European women “females [were] capable of the highest virtue.”²⁷ Publicizing these women’s actions worldwide was “a signal [of] honour to [their] cause.”²⁸

“Sentiments of an American Woman” was also careful to prevent objections from men or those who thought women took too much of a political stance. Despite the unfamiliarity of women campaigning for money, men looked unpatriotic if they did not support the plan “Sentiments” put forward. Women campaigned to help the troops in the Continental Army, and by opposing Reed’s ultimate goal of obtaining money for the soldiers, men would not “be... good citizen[s]” because they “[would] not applaud...efforts for the relief of the armies.”²⁹ The troops lacked funds, so impeding the plan to raise money further hindered the Continental Army’s ability to fight. Because the ladies raised thousands of dollars, men could not deny the calls of “Sentiments of an American Woman” ultimately helped the Continental Army. Therefore, even men supported “Sentiments,” and a majority accepted the

women’s political campaigning.³⁰ In the *Pennsylvania Packet*, Benjamin Rush claimed the Association had “transcendent influence in society and families” and it “must lead us on to Success.”³¹ “Sentiments” allowed for “behavior that under other circumstances would elicit accusations of ladylike impropriety and earn...social stigma.”³²

Esther Reed’s call for help from American women in “Sentiments” was a huge success and led to a great offering to George Washington. After the campaign ended, Reed and Washington exchanged letters regarding the use of money. Altogether, the Association raised \$300,634. Although Reed believed the total amount of money gathered met the Association’s expectations, the women failed to meet their desired goal. Regardless, Reed “wait[ed] for direction on how [the money] should best be disposed of,” but hoped to donate two dollars to each soldier for their own personal use.³³ Washington wrote back and instead asked for “the purchasing of coarse linen, to be made into shirts, with the whole amount of their subscription.”³⁴ Washington believed these shirts would “do more to preserve [the soldiers’] health than any other thing that can be procured him.”³⁵ If the soldiers received hard dollars, they could use it for alcohol. This generated another problem, so Reed

²⁵ Ibid., 182.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Vivian Conger, “Reading Early American Women’s Political Lives: The Revolutionary Performances of Deborah Read Franklin and Sally Franklin Bache,” *Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 16, no. 2 (2018): 342.

³¹ Arendt, 165.

³² Ireland, 184.

³³ Owen S. Ireland, *Sentiments of a British-American Woman: Esther Reed and the American Revolution* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State Press, 2017), 201-202.

³⁴ George Washington to Esther Reed, 1780, *George Washington Papers at the Library of Congress, 1741-1799: Series 4. General Correspondence. 1697-1799.*

³⁵ Ibid., 202.

agreed, and the women went to work on using the money to make shirts for the men in the army. While this correspondence ultimately led the women back into their domestic role in making clothing for the men, it also provided proof of the major role women began to play--they corresponded and debated with George Washington about how to use the money they raised.

While earlier in the war women contributed to the Continental Army through domestic means, Esther Reed's "Sentiments of an American Woman" called for change. "Sentiments" encouraged women to take a more political stance. To do so, wealthy women united to form associations that campaigned for money to send to the

Continental Army, which lacked supplies and money. Many accepted Reed's call; the broadside led to the Ladies Association of Philadelphia, which consisted of wealthy women. "Sentiments" success was clear; the broadside appeared in multiple other newspapers, and associations formed in three other states. Despite the absence of women in government, they took a more political stance by uniting to form an association exclusively made up of women who campaigned for money. While Congress and many civilians failed to aid the Continental Army, "Sentiments" provided the help George Washington and his troops desperately needed.

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Sister Suffragettes: World War I and the Women's Suffrage Movement in Great Britain

Emily Ray

In 1918, the parliament of Great Britain passed the Representation of the People Act, giving some women the right to vote. This paper explores how World War I affected this momentous legislation. Some historians argue that the vote was granted as a reward for women's increased role in the workforce during the war. While important in the social and economic development of women, their participation in the wartime factories was not the primary cause of women's voting rights. Instead, World War I caused a political shift in the way parliament dealt with the suffrage question, which led to women's enfranchisement.

Introduction to the Research Question

The British women's suffrage movement, though it began in the mid-1800s, gained momentum and public recognition around 1910. By the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914, the women's suffrage campaign had become a mass movement, commanding time, energy, and resources from thousands of men and women.¹ Historians recognize the importance of World War I on the suffrage cause, however, there is debate on the specific impact of the war. In the 1930s, historians began focus on the increased role of women in the workforce, a shift in historiography from earlier theories. This incongruity led to the research question of this investigation: to what extent was the increase of women in the workforce during the First World War the

primary cause leading to women's enfranchisement in Great Britain in 1918? An analysis of primary source accounts taken from the suffragist and anti-suffragist viewpoints and secondary sources written by experts in the field indicates that the role of women in the workforce, though it played an important role in the economic and social elevation of women, was not the primary cause of women's enfranchisement in Great Britain. World War I had the effect of stopping militancy practiced by the Women's Social and Political Union (WSPU) led by Emmaline Pankhurst.² This was a strategy for winning the vote that actually hurt the suffrage cause. Stopping militancy allowed the constitutional suffragist societies, like the National Union of Women's Suffrage

¹ Susan Kingsley Kent, "The Politics of Sexual Difference: World War I and the Demise of British Feminism," *Journal of British Studies* 27, no. 3 (1988): 232.

² Jane Purvis, "Gendering the Historiography of the Suffragette Movement in Edwardian Britain: some reflections," *Women's History Review* 22, no. 4 (2013): 576 – 577.

Societies (NUWSS), led by Millicent Garrett Fawcett, who campaigned for women's suffrage through lawful means of petitioning legislators, to take over the campaign.³ Arguably, the most important impact of World War I on the British women's suffrage campaign was the political shift in the way parliament dealt with the women's suffrage

question. The war forced the country to reform voting laws and an influential committee was formed to help deal with the issue of women's suffrage, and eventually pass the first women's suffrage measure in the Representation of the People Act of 1918.⁴

Women in the Workforce

The First World War impacted the British women's suffrage movement in numerous ways. Perhaps the most obvious effect was the increased role of women in the workforce. During World War I, many men went to fight on the front leaving their jobs open for a hitherto untapped workforce: women. Prominent suffragette and leader of the WSPU, Emmeline Pankhurst, called an end to the previous militancy of the early 1900s and developed a new strategy: encouraging women to engage in war work to win their enfranchisement by increasing their social and economic status.⁵ Indeed, by April 1916, around 275,000 women were engaged in work formerly performed by men in industrial occupations.⁶ For example, at the beginning of the war, the Woolwich arms factory in London employed only 14,000 workers, none of whom were women. By the middle of 1916, they employed 17,000

women out of a total of 67,000 workers.⁷ In addition to filling needs in industry and manufacturing, women were also engaged in shop-keeping, domestic service, teaching, nursing, and the raising of children,⁸ as well as the food, and printing industries, finance, civil service, agriculture, and transport.⁹ By the end of the war, 6,298,000 women in Great Britain were employed in many careers that had previously been dominated by men.¹⁰ The increased role in of women in the economy allowed them to gain both higher economic and social standing. The war also increased the average pay for women, even when inflation (which doubled in about four years) is considered.¹¹ Before the war, most women earned between 10 shillings (s) and 15s per week, and in 1919 the war cabinet committee estimated that they earned between 25s and 35s per week (12s and 17s

³ Purvis, "Gendering the Historiography of the Suffragette Movement," 577.

⁴ *Representation of the people, 1918, c. 64.*

⁵ Purvis, "Gendering the Historiography of the Suffragette Movement," 577.

⁶ John D. Fair, "The Political Aspects of Women's Suffrage during the First World War," *Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies* 8, no. 3 (1976): 280.

⁷ Fair, "Political Aspects of Women's Suffrage," 284.

⁸ Millicent Fawcett and C. W. Radcliff-Cooke, "Women's Suffrage in Parliament," *LSE Selected Pamphlets* (1898): 11.

⁹ Dorothea M. Barton, "The Course of Women's Wages," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 82, no. 4 (1919): 554.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 538.

by prewar standards).¹² In addition, other improvements were made in women's jobs. Most trades women in which women were employed were unorganized before the war and wages were not uniform within the industries.¹³ During the war, some lasting and substantial improvements were made. Women's wages became more uniform, businesses became better organized, and people pushed for legislation to establish a minimum wage for all workers.¹⁴ This demonstrates an increased recognition of women's work and their economic standing. It also shows the public and private appreciation that women gained, which allowed the suffrage campaign to gain momentum and contribute to the final legislation that provided women with suffrage.

Alternative evidence in support of the extent to which the women's workforce impacted the suffrage movement occurs in the form of quotations from prominent people and newspapers. Contemporary observations in the suffrage and the anti-suffrage camps, as well as many historians, attributed the government's change of heart on women's enfranchisement to its appreciation of the work performed women during the war.¹⁵ As Millicent Garrett Fawcett, leader of the NUWSS observed, "there was not a paper in Great Britain that by 1916 – 1917 was not ringing with praise

for the courage and devotion of British women in carrying out war work of various kinds..."¹⁶ The quotation demonstrate the positive social response to women's work that allowed them to influence ministers of parliament to pass legislation.

Another impact of the war work was to convert some anti-suffragists to the cause. In 1916 – 1917, Fawcett wrote that, "conversions of important public men and of newspapers came in, not by twos or threes, but by battalions."¹⁷ On August 13, 1916, the editor of *The Observer*, J. L. Garvin, wrote "I thought that men alone maintained the state, now I know, that men could never have maintained it, and that henceforth the modern State must be dependent on men and women alike for the progressive strength and vitality of its whole organization."¹⁸ With this high level support, prominent war heroes and politicians began to embrace the idea of women's suffrage. The Minister of Munitions, Mr. Montagu stated, "It is not too much to say that our armies have been saved and victory assured by the women in the munitions factories."¹⁹ A sentiment echoed by Winston Churchill: "without the work of women it would have been impossible to win the war."²⁰ The level of public and governmental support that the women working in the factories garnered for the suffrage cause was influential in changing suffrage legislation.

¹² Ibid., 544.

¹³ Ibid., 512.

¹⁴ Ibid., 535.

¹⁵ Kent, "The Politics of Sexual Difference," 234.

¹⁶ Andrea L. Miller, Eugene Borgida, "The Separate Spheres Model of Gendered Inequality," *PLoS ONE* 11, no. 1 (2016): 226.

¹⁷ Fair, "Political Aspects of Women's Suffrage," 283.

¹⁸ Ibid. 284.

¹⁹ Miller, "The Separate Spheres Model," 228.

²⁰ Kent, "The Politics of Sexual Difference," 234.

The role of women in the wartime workforce resolved of one of the more persistent anti-suffragist arguments: the ideology of separate spheres. This ideology is the idea that men and women are suited both physically and mentally for different facets of life; men belong in the public sphere of the workplace, such as factories and offices, and women belong at home cooking, cleaning, and taking care of children.²¹ This ideology also held that women were not capable of making decisions on legal matters and therefore did not deserve the right to vote. In a published series of letters, Fawcett summed up a similar argument made against women's suffrage by conservative Minister of

Parliament, Charles Radcliffe-Cooke, "'Everything' he says, 'that enables us to enjoy a high state of civilization is due to the labor of men.' This would be a first-rate argument but for one fatal defect; it is obviously and absurdly untrue."²² The war and the women's work in the factories made people realize that "civilization is built upon the united efforts, physical and moral, of men and women."²³ When women entered the workforce during World War I and began to break the separate spheres ideology, it set a precedent for other social and political changes and refuted a major argument against the suffragists.

Stopping Militancy

World War I helped the suffrage cause by forcing the WSPU to stop their counterproductive militancy and gain credibility by joining the workforce and supporting the war. The WSPU were known as the militant suffragettes because of their violent political strategy. They employed a variety of techniques to secure the vote but are most well known for their extensive window-smashing, arson, and bombing campaigns. "Before 1911, the WSPU had made only a sporadic use of violence, and it was directed almost exclusively at the government and its servants."²⁴ In the earlier days of the WSPU there was still some hope

of achieving the vote through constitutional means, but from 1912 to 1913 the WSPU turned from its less violent window-smashing militancy to their more extreme arson and bombing campaigns for three goals: one, to draw attention to the women's claim; two, to discredit laws by showing the government that its laws could not be enforced; and three, to put pressure on the government to force them to give in to suffragette demands.²⁵ This militancy was helpful in promoting the overall concept of women's suffrage to the general public because it achieved more attention in the newspapers than that of the constitutional suffragists.²⁶ This being said,

²¹ Miller, "The Separate Spheres Model," 228.

²² Fawcett and Radcliff-Cooke, "Women's Suffrage in Parliament," 11.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ C. J. Bearman, "An Examination of Suffragette Violence," *The English Historical Review* 120, no. 486 (2005): 365.

²⁵ Constance Rover, *Women's Suffrage and Party Politics in Britain*, (London, GB: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), 91.

²⁶ Purvis, "Gendering the Historiography of the Suffragette Movement," 577.

the suffragette violence after 1912 was sufficient to antagonize the public, but not violent enough to coerce the government.²⁷ The 1912-13 arson and bombing campaign especially “cannot be seen as anything other than a blunder which might easily have delayed the votes for women for a decade or even 20 years.”²⁸

World War I impacted the suffrage movement by ceasing the militant actions of the WSPU because women went to work in factories and offices in the place of men instead of smashing windows and burning buildings. Before the war broke out, militancy was showing signs of hurting the suffrage cause.²⁹ Some historians even claim that by 1900 the NUWSS had won over the anti-suffragists to their cause, and the militancy of the following years hurt the women’s suffrage cause by alienating the Ministers of Parliament (MPs).³⁰ In June of 1913, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, David Lloyd George, said that the “behavior of the militants had become the chief barrier to enfranchisement.”³¹ In October 1913, he told a non-militant deputation that he couldn’t hope for suffrage legislation because the minds of his fellow ministers had become “poisoned on the question of women’s suffrage.”³² In December 1913, Philip Snowden, a firm suffragist, commented “Mr. Lloyd George is absolutely right when he

says that militancy has turned a good deal of indifference into outright hostility,” and added that “there was no likelihood of getting woman suffrage in this generation”³³ due to the unlawful threats of the militant suffragettes. Snowden told an audience in June 1914 “the women’s actions during the past year had so set the clock back that the suffrage question was temporarily as dead as Queen Anne.”³⁴ Claims made by historians since the 1930s that the government was close to ‘surrender’ or was at least softening its attitude by the summer of 1914 are untrue, as evidenced by the words of 1914 legislators.³⁵ It was generally accepted by the British population that the WSPU violence had shelved the question of women’s suffrage until the suffragettes used a lawful technique to campaign for the vote.³⁶ With the possible exception of anti-suffragists, no one enjoyed the situation created by the militants, but there was no sign that the government was willing to resolve the situation.³⁷ The minimum condition for negotiations would have been the cessation of militancy, and there was little sign, in early 1914, that the WSPU would agree.³⁸ Therefore, World War I (when women joined the workforce and ceased militancy), did not only save the government from a difficult situation, it also rescued the Pankhursts and the suffrage cause and gave Emmeline and

²⁷ Rover, *Women’s Suffrage and Party Politics*, 292.

²⁸ Bearman, “An Examination of Suffragette Violence,” 397.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 369.

³⁰ Purvis, “Gendering the Historiography of the Suffragette Movement,” 582.

³¹ Bearman, “An Examination of Suffragette Violence,” 395.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*, 396.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 395.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 369.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 395.

³⁸ Bearman, “An Examination of Suffragette Violence,” 396.

her daughters positive public recognition rather than “a reputation as failed terrorists.”³⁹

Suffrage Reform

Despite the state of the suffrage movement before World War I due to militant suffragettes, there were a significant number of politicians who were not opposed to granting suffrage to women. Repeatedly before 1914 women’s suffrage measures gained majorities, but bills had failed for nearly 50 years simply because of the difficulty of passing private member’s bills.⁴⁰ Women’s suffrage was treated as an ‘open’ question, thus depriving it of any official support or opposition from either party.⁴¹ The suffragists fell in an awkward place with the conservative party having friendly leaders but a mostly antagonistic population, and a liberal party with hostile leaders and a largely favorable rank and file.⁴² In the case of this bill, the Speaker of the House ruled the amendments out of order and the government was obliged to abandon the bill.⁴³ Suffrage reform was therefore at a standstill, and would probably have remained in this state if not for the outbreak of World War I.

Before the war, there was little recognition of the need for any electoral reform until the voting register (a list of eligible voters), which was compiled in 1914, went into effect in early 1915. The register

was immediately obsolete because tens of thousands of soldiers and sailors who were serving overseas were rendered incapable of voting.⁴⁴ This presented a difficult problem for the government. How were they to confront the pressing problem of granting suffrage to men serving in the military, without reforming the entire franchise law and therefore bringing up the question of women’s suffrage? The government was unwilling to rectify this anomaly for fear of engendering subliminal prewar electoral controversies such as women’s suffrage.⁴⁵ It was a classic case of agreeing to disagree so as not to spend time on the issue.⁴⁶ As such, the legislators set out on a series of temporary measures and excuses designed, as put by C. P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian, as “an abortive attempt to deal with the difficulties of the moment, avoiding all the big issues.”⁴⁷ The government was forced to postpone the holding of all municipal elections and abandon the compilation of any new registers, pending a reform of the electoral system. On July 12, 1915, the Prime Minister set up a special committee to deal with the question of franchise. He asked the Speaker of the House of Commons, James

³⁹ Ibid, 397.

⁴⁰ Rover, *Women’s Suffrage and Party Politics*, 189.

⁴¹ Fair, “Political Aspects of Women’s Suffrage,” 275.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Bearman, “An Examination of Suffragette Violence,” 365.

⁴⁴ Fair, “Political Aspects of Women’s Suffrage,” 279.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Rover, *Women’s Suffrage and Party Politics*, 102.

⁴⁷ Fair, “Political Aspects of Women’s Suffrage,” 279.

Lowther, to preside over a committee with the power of drafting new suffrage legislation.⁴⁸ This conference was slightly suffragist because it included fifteen pro-suffragists, eleven anti-suffragists, and two “wobblers”.⁴⁹ It was through this committee with, rather than the usual parliamentary channels, that allowed for the final passage of the reform bill and provided some women with the right to vote.⁵⁰ By the end of 1916, Lowther and his colleagues had successfully merged the issues of women’s suffrage and soldier and sailor disqualifications into a single bill; thus, it became impossible for women’s suffrage to be considered apart from other more politically pertinent topics.⁵¹ When the terms on which women would gain suffrage were decided the bill could move to Parliament to be discussed and eventually passed in 1918.

Now the only issue facing the cause of women’s suffrage was to agree on terms that would satisfy the committee, Parliament, and the Suffragists. Fawcett argued with the committee in 1916 on the pros and cons of women’s suffrage, and in a letter published in a suffragette newspaper, claimed that “women who pay rates and taxes ought to be allowed to vote.”⁵² A main opponent of women’s suffrage, Mr. Radcliff-Cooke, claimed that although women were taxed equally to men, “representation no longer followed as a consequence of taxation...”⁵³ To which Fawcett responded,

Suppose we accept this definition of the present basis of representation, where is the argument against women’s suffrage which the reporters will not report? Women householders are not waifs and strays; they have a substantial concern in the affairs of the community. Why should they not have a share in choosing those who make the laws for and govern the country.⁵⁴

Other opponents were not so reasonable, some MPs were simply afraid that women would hold too much power. Conservative MP, William Bull, wrote, “It was clear to us at the speaker’s conference that the women’s question had to be settled in some shape or way, but their number presented an appalling difficulty... We decided to reduce their number by an age limit which would be fair to all classes.”⁵⁵ The conference voted 15 – 6 in support of the bill for women’s suffrage with an age limit, and 12 – 10 against equal suffrage.⁵⁶ Thus, the result was an extremely conservative measure that would be difficult for the young working population to influence.⁵⁷ This age limit became known as the motherhood franchise. It was placed on women’s suffrage not only to decrease their numbers, but also because women who were at least 30 were more likely to be married with children, a factor which would make them less susceptible to radical class or

⁴⁸ Ibid., 283.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 275.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Fawcett and Radcliff-Cooke, “Women’s Suffrage in Parliament,” 3.

⁵³ Ibid., 7-8.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 10.

⁵⁵ Fair, “Political Aspects of Women’s Suffrage,” 288.

⁵⁶ Harold L. Smith, *The British Women's Suffrage Campaign 1866 - 1928*, 2nd ed. (Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited, 2007), 83.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 84.

gender movements.⁵⁸ In August 1916, a committee memorandum was published stating that mothers deserved the franchise more than industrial women workers because they had given their husbands and sons to armed forces.⁵⁹ In 1914, when the war began, national political leaders worried that mothers would discourage their sons and husbands from engaging in military service for fear that their loved ones would be killed or injured. As it turned out the political leaders were wrong to worry; the willingness of mothers to sacrifice their sons and husbands was important in undermining resistance to women's suffrage.⁶⁰

The legislation did not provide votes for women on the same terms as men, many suffragists viewed the measure as a defeat.⁶¹ Suffrage advocates in the conference were concerned that women's organizations like the NUWSS and WSPU might reject the report and initiate a campaign for equal franchise rights.⁶² However, some suffrage advocates, warned that pressing for something too radical, such as adult suffrage, would likely result in no women's suffrage at all.⁶³ Fawcett and the others present agreed that raising the women's voting age would be the least objectionable way of reducing the number of women enfranchised to a level acceptable to the majority of the speaker's conference.⁶⁴

In 1918, the Representation of the People Act granted the vote to women who

were 30 and older and restricted that number to those who were also local government electors or the wives of local government electors; it also gave the vote to men at age 19 if they had seen active service in the armed forces and to all men at age 21.⁶⁵ As a result, 8,400,000 men and women, who comprised 39.6% of the electorate, were allowed to vote.⁶⁶ However, the requirement that in order to vote women must be married or own property excluded 22% of women aged 30+, many of whom were working class and unmarried. About 83% of the newly enfranchised women were wives and mothers, making it disproportionately middle-class housewives, while the bill excluded much of the female workforce. Although the women's role in the labor force increased and contributed to the changed attitude towards women's suffrage, the Representation of the People Act did not recognize most of the workforce, the great majority of whom were women under 30.⁶⁷ Claims therefore that women were given the vote as a reward for their services in the war economy are incorrect because most of the women who participated in the workforce were not granted the right to vote in 1918.⁶⁸

The extension of suffrage to women did not 'just happen' as a result of women's increased social standing from being in the workforce. If the First World War had not brought up the urgent question of giving soldiers and sailors the vote, the issue would

⁵⁸ Ibid., 88.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 83.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 81.

⁶¹ Ibid., 84.

⁶² Smith, *The British Women's Suffrage Campaign*, 84.

⁶³ Ibid., 83.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ *Representation of the People Act, 1918*.

⁶⁶ Smith, *The British Women's Suffrage Campaign*, 88.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 83.

⁶⁸ Smith, *The British Women's Suffrage Campaign*, 83.

not have been considered.⁶⁹ This was because the chief obstacle encountered by women suffragists in their long struggle was parliamentary procedure.⁷⁰ No party wanted to risk time and energy on a bill that might be defeated when dealing with the uncharted grounds of women's rights.⁷¹ However, the war spirit of cooperation had so penetrated

society and the conference that it simplified the task of reaching a compromise.⁷² And while the changing status of women during the war acted as an "omnipresent stimulus," it was through the inter-party, legislative committee, that this constitutional change was made.⁷³

Conclusion

It is not frequently disputed that the First World War was vital to women's enfranchisement in Great Britain; however, the specific impacts of the war are more debatable. Some historians claim that the women's role in the workforce was the primary impact of World War I on British women's suffrage. However, while women's war work was a factor in them gaining higher social and economic standing by breaking customary feminist understanding, there were other significant factors that were instrumental in women's suffrage legislation. The militancy of the WSPU suffragettes was a hindrance to women's suffrage because it alienated many of the actual policy makers. World War I provided a prime opportunity for the militancy to stop and the suffrage cause to recover. Arguably the most important factor, though, was the political implications of the war. When Great Britain realized that many of the soldiers and sailors who were serving in the war were unable to vote under the suffrage legislation, Parliament recognized that it needed to

reform said legislation. By forming a committee to deal with the suffrage question with a president who was positive towards the women's suffrage cause the 1918 Representation Act was passed. This act allowed women over 30 and who were property owners or who were married to property owners, to vote. While not a complete victory, as many younger women were still unable to vote, the legislation was as inclusive as the conservative political climate would allow. The fact that many women who participated in the workforce were not enfranchised in 1918 further supports the idea that while women's war work was important it was not the primary impact of World War I on British women's suffrage. It wasn't until ten years later with the 1928 Equal Franchise Act that universal suffrage was granted to all women on the same terms as men.

The issue of women's suffrage is a complex topic because many historians have conflicting views regarding the subject. Over time, historiography has undergone several

⁶⁹ Fair, "Political Aspects of Women's Suffrage," 275.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 293.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 275.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 286.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 275.

changes. Revisionist historians from the 1930s focus on economic arguments for women's suffrage. During feminist movements of the 1960s and 1970s, historians focused more on the social and political factors of the suffrage movement. This topic is still relevant today not only

because of the omnipresent issues regarding women's rights, but also because understanding the diverse points of view that make a fundamental change, such as granting women the right to vote, can help in the study of other issues, both historical and current.

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Abolitionism in the Age of Revolution: The Failure of the First International Humanitarian Cause

Ryan Furr-Johnson

Beginning in the late eighteenth century and continuing through the nineteenth century, the Enlightenment brought along values of inherent rights and human autonomy antithetical to the immensely successful Transatlantic slave trade. These ideals cultivated an abolitionist movement in Britain that ended its participation in the Transatlantic slave trade in 1807 and pressured other countries to do the same. Through bilateral treaties, Britain received guarantees from other nations that they would end their involvement in the slave trade and created Courts of Mixed Commission to adjudicate illegal slave trading. But why did the Transatlantic slave trade continue to operate at significant levels after these British-led bilateral efforts to end it? Despite their promise, these treaties and Courts of Mixed Commission were ineffective in ending the Transatlantic slave trade because countries such as Portugal and Spain had no economic motivation to diligently suppress their slave trades, and the trade was impossible to regulate without the dedicated effort of all the countries involved in slave trading.

From 1501 to 1875, the transatlantic slave trade forced approximately twelve and a half million people into slavery. The Netherlands, the U.S., Portugal, Britain, France, Spain, and Denmark participated in the trade at different times. In fact, even after Britain abolished the trade in 1807, Europeans enslaved and transported more than three million more people.¹ Slavery and the slave trade had established themselves as global economic institutions that even Britain, with its hegemonic dominance, found incredibly hard to kill. However, during the Age of Revolution (late-eighteenth through mid-nineteenth centuries), En-

lightenment reforms led Britain to try, as it led the attack on the transatlantic slave trade.

In the late-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries, a series of Enlightenment-based political and economic revolutions informed British abolitionism. The concepts of human autonomy, inalienable rights, and popular sovereignty spread worldwide, posing an antithesis to slavery. Writers such as Montesquieu, Smith, and Rousseau criticized the institution by pointing out the fundamental contradiction between inherent human freedom and systems of bondage.² The dissemination of these ideals soon led to political revolutions

¹ “Assessing the Slave Trade: Estimates,” *Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database*, <http://www.slavevoyages.org/assessment/estimates> [accessed May 1 2017].

² Rafe Blaufarb and Liz Clark, *Inhuman Traffick: The International Struggle Against the Transatlantic Slave Trade* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 19.

across the world which codified them. In the American Revolution (1775-1783), the U.S. inspired further revolutions by liberating itself from a coercive relationship with Britain and establishing the first representative democracy. Economic hardship in France, partly due to its involvement in the American Revolution, helped inspire its own revolution that abolished feudalism in 1789. These two revolutions created documents embodying the Enlightenment ethos of human rights: the Declaration of Independence and the Declaration of the Rights of Man. Across the Atlantic, the Haitian Revolution established an independent, free nation from what was originally one of France's slave colonies. Economically and globally, the Industrial Revolution massively increased the production of goods as theorists like Adam Smith popularized the benefits of the market economy. These revolutions all demonstrated that the world was changing, and suggested that people change their exploitative behavior accordingly.

Among those most convinced were evangelical Quakers and later Protestants in Britain, who used their diffuse support bases to create an abolitionism movement that ultimately secured British abolition of the transatlantic slave trade. In 1787, some religious leaders and politicians created the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade. Its leaders realized that slavery was too entrenched to defeat outright, so they settled for a step in the right direction. Thus,

the organization helped create antislavery clubs, gathered petitions, and lobbied Parliament.³ After twenty years of partisan conflict and indecision, Britain finally outlawed the transatlantic slave trade on March 25 1807.⁴ From then on, Britain worked hard to suppress the trade but failed to make a significant impact. In 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, Britain forced a declaration condemning the transatlantic slave trade from the rest of the participating nations, but it lacked enforcement.⁵ Britain responded by signing bilateral treaties with the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. No longer a major player in the transatlantic slave trade, the Netherlands ended its participation immediately. For 400,000 sterling, Spain agreed to slowly abolish the trade starting in 1820. For 300,000 sterling, Portugal agreed to end its trade north of the equator. The treaties also stipulated a mutual right of search and seizure for ships suspected of slaving and created Courts of Mixed Commission to adjudicate such seizures. These courts comprised of judges from each country and the signatories established them at Sierra Leone, Rio de Janeiro, Havana, and Surinam.⁶ Over the course of the nineteenth century, Britain exported its Enlightenment-age abolitionism to other slave trading nations to found these international courts of humanitarian effort. However, the courts were ultimately ineffective in upholding slaves' newfound rights due to the ambivalence of slave trading nations in

³ Ibid, 19.

⁴ "Abolition of the Slave Trade," *The National Archives*,

<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/blackhistory/rights/abolition.htm> [accessed May 2 2017].

⁵ Blaufarb and Clarke, *Inhuman Traffick*, 24.

⁶ Ibid, 25.

prosecuting their citizens involved in the trade.

Abolitionism in Britain

During the Age of Revolution, the emerging concept of innate human freedom led Quakers and later Protestants in Britain to oppose the transatlantic slave trade. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, an incredibly prominent Enlightenment philosopher, had this to say about slavery in his *Social Contract*: "From whatever aspect we regard the question, the right of slavery is null and void, not only as being illegitimate, but also because it is absurd and meaningless. The words slave and right contradict each other, and are mutually exclusive."⁷ He viewed slavery as antithetical to human rights because slaves have no rights, which resonated strongly with British Quaker moralism. In the 1770s and 1780s, they added a religious component to such morally-based abolitionism and spread it to a broader group of evangelical and non-evangelical Protestants. These religious organizations disseminated the abolitionist message to the people of Britain through their churches, creating a popular support base.⁸ This spread of Enlightenment ideals opposed to slavery made many British people view the slave trade as a morally bankrupt institution. It would soon kick-start the international abolitionist movement.

In response to this popular abolitionism, Thomas Clarkson, Granville Sharpe, and William Wilberforce founded the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade.⁹ Thomas Clarkson was the most active in leading the organization, collecting evidence to present to the Privy Council and House of Commons. William Wilberforce, a member of Parliament, initiated legislation against the trade in 1789. The same year, the Privy Council presented a substantial amount of evidence on the cruelty of the *middle passage* (the passage from Africa to the Americas) from Clarkson's research. Despite support from most of the prominent members of Parliament, however, the abolitionists failed to pass legislation after debates in 1789, 1791, and 1792. After the third debate, the House of Commons did decide to bring an end to the slave trade in 1796.¹⁰ By that time, though, the French Revolution had radicalized, terrifying British moderates who had originally supported abolition. In 1793, the French National Assembly executed Louis XVI for counter-revolutionary actions and declared war against Britain. That same year, two years after a total slave revolt in Saint-Domingue, France freed all of the colony's slaves to ensure the colony would not fall into British hands.¹¹ The prospect of

⁷ "Images: The Early Movement," *The Abolition of the Slave Trade*, <http://abolition.nypl.org/images/abolition/2/122> [accessed May 1 2017].

⁸ Blaufarb and Clarke, *Inhuman Traffick*, 19.

⁹ *Ibid*, 19.

¹⁰ Ralph A. Austen and Woodruff D. Smith, "Images of Africa and British Slave-trade Abolition: The Transition to an Imperialist Ideology, 1787-1807," *African Historical Studies* 2 (1969): 70.

¹¹ Blaufarb and Clarke, *Inhuman Traffick*, 23.

political revolution and slave revolts in Britain thus quelled support for abolition until the French Revolution ended under Napoleon.

When revolutionary sentiment settled in France and Saint-Domingue, abolition resurfaced as a popular issue. In 1804, the same year Napoleon declared himself Emperor of France, Saint-Domingue asserted its independence from France, renaming itself Haiti. It had been the world's largest sugar producer, powered thoroughly by slave labor. Despite popular moral concern with the transatlantic slave trade, Haiti's independence ensured members of Parliament that France would not benefit at the expense of British abolition. Furthermore, Britain ended the possibility of French invasion by destroying Napoleon's fleet in the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805.¹² One cannot dismiss the importance of these geopolitical factors. In 1805 as well, Wilberforce found some success by convincing Prime Minister William Pitt to issue an order forbidding the importation of slaves into territories recently acquired from France. In 1806, Parliament passed a bill prohibiting British importation of slaves into foreign territories as well.¹³ Finally, on March 25 1807 the Abolition of the Slave Trade Act became law, passing forty-one to twenty in the House of Lords and 114 to fifteen in the House of Commons.¹⁴

While mostly humanitarian in nature, the British abolitionist movement had economic components as well.¹⁵ As mentioned above, the popular moral and religious support for abolition largely drove forward the issue in Parliament. However, among politicians there was a less discernible economic argument. Haiti's independence and the destruction of the French fleet as the immediate impetus for abolition illustrated its economic considerations among members of Parliament. Further, as the Industrial Revolution radically modernized the global economy, politicians also believed slavery was becoming less efficient than wage labor. Yet, before 1807 the manufacturing class had minimal influence in Parliament, so these economic concerns had a limited impact.¹⁶ Besides, recently historians have minimized the role of economics in British abolition after discovering that slavery remained a profitable institution after the Industrial Revolution.¹⁷

Regardless of motive, Britain's decision to abolish the transatlantic slave trade in 1807 had an immediate impact. As a hegemonic power in the international system, Britain immediately started to export its moral abolitionist policy to other nations to bring an end to the slave trade. This would prove to be incredibly challenging, as Britain would soon find out.

¹² Ibid, 24.

¹³ Austen and Smith, "Images of Africa and British Slave-trade Abolition," 71.

¹⁴ "Abolition of the Slave Trade," *The National Archives* [accessed May 2 2017].

¹⁵ Austen and Smith, "Images of Africa and British Slave-trade Abolition," 69.

¹⁶ Ibid, 74.

¹⁷ Blaufarb and Clarke, *Inhuman Traffick*, 23.

Britain's Initial Abolition Efforts - 1807-1817

Britain along with the U.S.'s abolition of the transatlantic slave trade restructured the trade immediately. On March 2, 1807, the U.S. Congress passed an, "[a]ct to prohibit the importation of Slaves into any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United States, from and after the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eight."¹⁸ This legislation eliminated two significant portions of the slave trade overnight, as from 1780 to 1807, Britain traded almost 950,000 slaves while the U.S. traded over 165,000.¹⁹ After abolition, Britain began to patrol the African coastline for illegal slave trading and tried to persuade other slave-trading nations to stop.²⁰ Areas that depended heavily on the British slave trade such as the Gulf of Guinea saw it disappear almost immediately. Meanwhile, British naval dominance discouraged France from filling its place, leaving only Portugal and Spain as the major slave-trading nations.²¹ Accordingly, the number of slaves taken to the Americas decreased to around 550,000 from 1807-1815.²² Despite this initial success, slave trading nations remained ambivalent towards abolition and Britain found it could not police the entire slave trade without violating state sovereignty. This reality ultimately necessitated legal engagement with other

slave-trading nations through bilateral treaties.

In this environment, Britain unwittingly promoted the slave trade post-abolition through its demand for slave-produced goods. Urbanization accompanying the Industrial Revolution in Britain led to economic and demographic growth that consequently increased demand for goods like coffee and sugar.²³ To meet this demand, after the Napoleonic Wars Britain expanded its trade network and reduced trade restrictions to slave-trading countries. Since France had lost most of its colonial territory while the U.S had terminated its involvement in the slave trade, Portugal and Spain assumed the market share.²⁴ Accordingly, after the Napoleonic Wars, slave traders began to operate in the areas once dominated by the British but out of immediate reach from the Royal Navy. Unfortunately, these factors actually made the volume of the transatlantic slave trade begin to rise.²⁵

Before 1817, Britain struggled to restrict the growth of the Portuguese and Spanish slave trades. In 1809, an Order in Council passed allowing Britain to search Portuguese slave ships without their approval. In 1810, a slave trade clause in an Anglo-Portuguese treaty restricted the Portuguese trade to its own territories.

¹⁸ "Act of 1807," *Annals of Congress, From The Abolition of the Slave Trade, U.S. Constitution and Acts*, http://abolition.nypl.org/essays/us_constitution/5/ [accessed May 3 2017].

¹⁹ "Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade – Estimates," *Voyages: The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database*, <http://www.slavevoyages.org/assessment/estimates> [accessed May 1 2017].

²⁰ Austen and Smith, "Images of Africa and British Slave-trade Abolition," 71.

²¹ Blaufarb and Clarke, *Inhuman Traffick*, 24.

²² "Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade – Estimates," *Voyages* [accessed May 1 2017].

²³ *Ibid*, 45.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 44.

²⁵ Blaufarb and Clarke, *Inhuman Traffick*, 25.

However, Portugal did not promise to enact its own legislation and the treaty did not allow Britain to interfere with Portuguese slave traders.²⁶ For Spain, Britain did not consider a treaty an urgent need, as the Spanish trade was around a tenth of Portugal's.²⁷ The larger problem facing Britain was that effectively regulating the slave trade required extra-legal methods, and even more central to British liberalism than abolitionism was the existence of state sovereignty and the rule of law.²⁸ Despite this concern, the British Admiralty used the 1809 Order in Council to capture and condemn Portuguese slave ships that traded beyond the 1810 treaty's specified territories. Between 1810 and 1812, the Navy captured at least twenty-four Portuguese ships, infuriating Portugal to the point that Britain had to pay 300,000 sterling before it could propose another treaty. After doing so, in 1815 Britain forgave an extant 600,000 sterling loan in return for the end of Portuguese trading north of the equator.²⁹ While Spain did not agree to any treaties limiting its slave trade before 1817, Britain seized and condemned at least forty-three Spanish ships between 1809 and 1819.³⁰ Undoubtedly, Britain was trying extraordinarily hard to bring an end to the trade. Both countries even signed a

condemnation of the transatlantic slave trade at the Congress of Vienna along with France, Prussia, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia, but it contained no enforcement clauses.³¹ The ambivalence of Portugal and Spain toward such a vital economic institution was obvious.

As demonstrated, the decade after British abolition presented a series of challenges for Britain's international effort. First, Britain did not want to overexert its authority and delegitimize its commitment to the sovereignty of nations. Second, Britain indirectly promoted the transatlantic slave trade by relaxing trade restrictions after the Napoleonic Wars and consuming more slave-produced goods. Economic revolution was actually counterproductive here. Third, Portugal and Spain were clearly hesitant to eliminate the trade, as they demanded large sums of money for even slight concessions. To have at least some impact in suppressing the transatlantic slave trade, Britain needed legal permission to search, capture, and condemn other nation's slave ships. As the hegemonic power in the international system with undisputed naval dominance, negotiating a mutual right of search and seizure would do just that.

Bilateral Treaties Against the Transatlantic Slave Trade - 1817-1833

In 1817, Britain took a step forward in its abolition efforts by signing bilateral treaties with the Netherlands, Portugal, and

Spain. The Netherlands, barely trading anymore, agreed to end its slave trade immediately, while Portugal confirmed the

²⁶ Eltis, *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade*, 104.

²⁷ Ibid, 105.

²⁸ Ibid, 106.

²⁹ Ibid, 107.

³⁰ Ibid, 108.

³¹ Blaufarb and Clarke, *Inhuman Traffick*, 24.

end of its trade north of the equator for 300,000 sterling. Given that most of the Portuguese trade existed south of the equator, this was not an especially impactful treaty, but it was something.³² Finally, Spain officially ended its role in the trade for 400,000 sterling. As Article One of *The Treaty with Spain for Preventing the Slave Trade* says, “the slave trade shall be abolished throughout the entire dominions of Spain, on the 30th day of May 1820,” provided that ships which left before then be given five months to complete their trips.³³ The treaties agreed to the mutual right of search of each other’s ships if suspected of slaving, which in practice meant the Royal Navy policed the other nations. Lastly, the treaties created Courts of Mixed Commission in Sierra Leone, Rio de Janeiro, Havana, and Surinam to adjudicate these illegal slaving cases.³⁴ By signing these bilateral treaties with the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, Britain established the first international human rights courts. Unfortunately, however, they were not effective because the slave trading nations remained equivocal toward abolition and effective suppression required thoroughly policing one’s own citizens.

The Courts of Mixed Commission largely failed because of ambivalence towards the transatlantic slave trade, their composition, and what counted as evidence. Most critically, the courts judged the legality of a slave ship’s seizure without charging the

slavers. Each party in the case appointed an administrator and a judge, who made the ruling. When the judges disagreed, the court chose an arbitrator randomly to make the final decision with no possibility for appeal.³⁵ This method gave representatives from Portugal and Spain a fifty percent chance to free slave traders if they so pleased, which often happened. Furthermore, based on the 1817 bilateral treaties slaves had to be on board for the courts to condemn a ship.³⁶ This loophole kept the British from seizing slave ships on their way to Africa with immense loads of water, chains, and other equipment necessary to imprison thousands of people. Perhaps worst of all, to pay for costs of operation the courts often sold the ships back to the slavers.³⁷ Thus, while the Courts of Mixed Commission were a step in the right direction, providing a universal bureaucratic institution for combatting the slave trade, they had many weaknesses.

To fix the problem of needing slaves on board to prosecute, Britain signed multiple treaties to widen the scope of what constituted suspected slave-trading. In 1822 with the Netherlands, 1826 with Brazil, 1835 with Spain, and 1842 with Portugal, treaties recognized certain materials as evidence of slave-trading: a slave deck, excessive bulkheads and water casks, grated hatches, and shackles, among other items. Additionally, the treaties allowed the Courts of Mixed Commission to destroy the ships

³² Ibid, 25.

³³ “The Treaty with Spain for Preventing the Slave Trade,” signed September 23, 1817, from Parliament Data, *HANSARD 1803-2005*, <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1818/jan/28/copy-of-the-treaty-with-spain-for> [accessed May 1 2017].

³⁴ Blaufarb and Clarke, *Inhuman Traffick*, 25.

³⁵ Eltis, *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade*, 84.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid, 82.

after their condemnation.³⁸ In some cases, the courts provided freed slaves with ample opportunity to start new lives. In Sierra Leone, for example, the Mixed Commission Court gave freed slaves plots of land in Freetown that developed into villages. In Rio de Janeiro and Havana, however, the courts condemned freed slaves to government indenture quite similar to slavery.³⁹ Unfortunately, these courts of international humanitarian effort had a notably limited impact on suppressing the transatlantic slave trade.

Despite British efforts, the transatlantic slave trade continued to expand in response to the Industrial Revolution as well as Spain and Portugal's reluctance to act. In 1819, Britain established the Slave Trade Department to oversee the treaties and Mixed Commission Courts.⁴⁰ These officials quickly realized suppression could only fully succeed through traditional diplomacy and legal effort on the part of slave-trading countries.⁴¹ Regardless, the same year Britain established a permanent anti-slaving squadron off of the West African coast (West African squadron) to enforce the treaties. British naval officers and local mariners called *Krumen* manned the squadron in small, fast ships that captured slavers by surprise.⁴² The *Kru* originated from the Ivory Coast and Liberia; they knew the inshore waters extensively and were relatively immune to West African diseases, making them invaluable shipmates. The West African squadron's extensive efforts against

the transatlantic slave trade helped move the majority of the trade below the equator, where it was still legal for Portugal.

International developments around the world during the early nineteenth century also dealt setbacks to Britain's abolition efforts. Due to tensions between American sailors and the Royal Navy that helped spark the War of 1812, the U.S. categorically refused the mutual right of search. Along with France, this policy allowed illegal slave-traders to use their flags as protection.⁴³ This loophole frustrated Britain immensely and it applied constant diplomatic pressure on the U.S. and France. The U.S. did increase its presence on the African coast, genuinely attempting to suppress the trade.⁴⁴ France did the same, but remained completely irresolute and even complicit in the trade at times. In 1822, Brazil declared its independence from Portugal and nullified the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1817. Almost all Portuguese slave ships had come from Brazil, making a new Anglo-Brazilian treaty imperative. Thus, in 1826, under severe diplomatic pressure, Brazil signed a treaty promising to abolish the slave trade after 1830. It agreed to the mutual right of search and accepted the authority of the Courts of Mixed Commission. After 1830, however, Brazil refused to enforce the treaty because the transatlantic slave trade was incredibly profitable and its citizens did not hold strong moral views on the trade.

On a positive note, in 1830, a liberal revolution in France brought to power a

³⁸ Ibid, 84.

³⁹ Blaufarb and Clarke, *Inhuman Traffick*, 29.

⁴⁰ Eltis, *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade*, 109.

⁴¹ Ibid, 111.

⁴² Blaufarb and Clarke, *Inhuman Traffick*, 26.


⁴³ Eltis, *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade*, 84.

⁴⁴ Blaufarb and Clarke, *Inhuman Traffick*, 29.

progressive king, Louis Philippe.⁴⁵ Following this liberal revolution, in 1831 and 1833, France and Britain signed two treaties which granted the mutual right of search without the jurisdiction of the Courts of Mixed Commission. In their place, France used its own domestic tribunals to adjudicate cases. Ironically, this policy effectively ended French involvement in the transatlantic slave trade because France vigorously suppressed its people's participation.⁴⁶ This result demonstrated that only slave-trading nations' concerted suppression of their own citizens' illegal trade could end the trade as a whole.

David Eltis summarizes this reality well: "Interdictions of the slave trade were chiefly effective when a government passed

and rigorously enforced legislation on their own nationals... International treaties were neither a guarantee of nor a substitute for this decision." For all its diplomatic effort and occasional disregard for international law, Britain could at best detain one of three slave ships sent to Africa.⁴⁷ Even more shocking is a graphical representation of freed slaves that disembarked at Sierra Leone, Cuba, and Brazil as a percentage of total slaves disembarked between 1807-1866. Figure 1 illustrates that during that period, of the 3,317,511 registered slaves that embarked from Africa and disembarked somewhere in the world, only 148,833 (four percent) disembarked freely in the specified locations.⁴⁸



⁴⁵ Ibid, 30.

⁴⁶ Eltis, *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade*, 84.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 99.

⁴⁸ "Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade – Estimates," *Voyages* [accessed 1 2017].

This chart gives a good idea of how hard it was for Britain to suppress such a powerful global economic institution with relatively little help. After accounting for all of the disembarkation regions for freed slaves, the Royal Navy freed around 175,000, or six percent of slaves that embarked from Africa.⁴⁹

Ultimately, Britain's many bilateral treaties and occasional extrajudicial efforts failed to suppress the transatlantic slave trade on a large scale. Establishing international Courts of Mixed Commission was a triumph for abolitionism and international human rights, but ambivalence hampered their effectiveness. Britain quickly realized diplomacy would not bring about the end of the trade and sometimes resorted to extralegal methods. Even then, British efforts could not match a nation's dedicated policing of their own slave traders. In 1850, a survey of senior Admiralty officers involved in the abolition movement reflected this sentiment.⁵⁰ As a result, later in the

nineteenth century, Britain used its hegemonic power to coerce Portugal and Spain into cooperation.⁵¹ Despite the failings of Britain's international efforts from 1817-1833, it is crucial to note its positive impact. To British policymakers in the nineteenth century, laissez faire economic policy and anti-slavery did not contradict each other. One cannot blame them for failing to see Britain's indirect contribution to the transatlantic slave trade. Furthermore, Britain undoubtedly catalyzed the abolition of the trade; its abolitionism served as a model for countries such as the U.S. Most significantly, Britain freed 175,000 people from slavery.⁵² It is easy to disregard this number in the context of much greater human suffering after 1807, but for most of those 175,000 people, British efforts positively changed their lives forever. The overall failure to suppress the slave trade more reflected its status as a hegemonic economic institution than Britain's individual failure.

Conclusion

Due to the spread of Enlightenment ideals during the Age of Revolution, Britain exported its abolition movement to slave-trading nations to ultimately establish Courts of Mixed Commission. Despite their promise as the first courts of international humanitarian effort, they largely failed to suppress the transatlantic slave trade because countries such as Portugal and Spain had little economic motivation to cooperate.

During the late eighteenth century, Enlightenment ideals regarding human freedom spread through political and economic revolution around the world. In this context, British Quakers and Protestants came to view slavery and the transatlantic slave trade as morally unacceptable, creating a groundswell of popular abolitionism. Parliamentary debates over abolition occurred for twenty years until the political

⁴⁹ Blaufarb and Clarke, *Inhuman Traffick*, 31.

⁵⁰ Eltis, *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade*, 80.

⁵¹ Blaufarb and Clarke, *Inhuman Traffick*, 31.

⁵² *Ibid.*

context in Britain allowed abolition in 1807. As a liberal hegemonic power, Britain began to export its abolitionism to slave-trading nations. After initial success in slowing down the slave trade, Britain realized that it needed bilateral treaties allowing the search and seizure of foreign ships to make any significant impact. In 1817, treaties with the Portugal and Spain gave Britain this right in a limited capacity. Furthermore, they established Courts of Mixed Commission as the first international human rights courts to adjudicate slave ship seizures. However, these courts did not even come close to ending the transatlantic slave trade because structural faults allowed ambivalent of slave-trading nations to decline to prosecute their own slave traders. Treaties were always incomplete in their scope, singularly because countries such as Portugal and Spain did not want to cripple their economically productive slave trades.

Throughout the nineteenth century, Britain struggled with its ideological commitment to classical liberalism and ending the transatlantic slave trade. Removing economic restraints on Portugal and Spain allowed their slave trades to develop in the market vacuum Britain created. Further fueling this development was the Industrial Revolution, which increased general British demand for slave-produced luxury goods such as coffee and sugar. However, the British believed unfettered capitalism and slave productivity were not linked, as they assumed wage labor was becoming more efficient. Additionally, to stop the slave trade, Britain often sacrificed its commitment to state sovereignty to get around diplomatic loopholes assisting the illegal traders. Thus, within the confines of its ideology, Britain did as well as it could to end the transatlantic slave trade and catalyzed the process for other nations as the century progressed.

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