

The Colorado Historian

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Editors Note

It is with no small amount of trepidation that I present to you this year's edition of the Undergraduate History Journal. We are so pleased to be back after a brief lull between publications. The pieces collected here represent some of the best and brightest within our department. This work also represents the culmination of approximately two months of frantic scrambling and dedicated effort on behalf of our incredible team. Getting this journal together truly was a collective endeavor. I may pretend to be a fearless leader, but the illusion is nothing without the support of my loyal followers. I would like to personally thank our editorial staff, without whom these papers would have never seen the light of day. I would also like to thank our faculty coordinator, Dr. Lucy Chester, for organizing and funding our production, and Trish McCusker, for her logistical wizardry in getting us published.

And so, it is my great pleasure to give you, dear readers, the Spring 2018 edition of The Colorado Historian.

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Native American Paleontology and Equine Fossil Correlations with Living Horses

Tiffany Baker

In the centuries preceding European contact, Native Americans had forged a long history of collecting, interpreting, and trying to make sense of the prehistoric fossils that they found all around them. They made meaning of the fossilized animal remains through myths, legends, and stories that varied between the tribes. When Europeans first came to the Americas, paleontology was in its infancy, and the Europeans were naturally curious about the fossils present in the new lands they came to inhabit, “As European and Euro-American naturalists became aware of the significance of fossils in the New World, Native knowledge and guides actively contributed to the development of paleontological science”.¹ As paleontological knowledge grew, Native American myths and stories changed over time to reflect their greater understanding of the past and these extinct animals. As this greater understanding developed, Native Americans were also being introduced to the new live animals that the Europeans brought with them from the Old World. In the case of the horse, Native Americans would have been able to correlate and associate the equine fossils they were seeing with the new horses that were reintroduced to the Americas by the Europeans.

Very early on, Europeans were aware of the Native American knowledge of fossils and their locales. In 1519 Hernan Cortes, “brought Aztec fossil legends and a huge mastodon bone from Mexico back to the king of Spain”.² As time went on, many early naturalists relied on Native American knowledge to search for and find fossils. “Reports of immense fossil skeletons in the badlands along the upper Missouri probably filtered back to the East from Plains Indians via French traders...[and] the trails to the Rockies and the Pacific Ocean were known to

¹ Adrienne Mayor, *Fossil Legends of the First Americans* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2005) 297.

² *Ibid.*, Xxv.

eastern Natives, who sometimes made vision quests and explorations in the West, bringing back stories of what they'd seen".³

With their lack of knowledge about these extinct creatures, many Europeans and Euro-Americans even believed that some of the fossils they were finding and seeing belonged to animals that could possibly still be alive in the unexplored western regions of the Americas, and they inquired about such living beings with the Native Americans as well. At Kentucky's famous Big Bone Lick, Native Americans had been mistaking the fossil tusks there to a large bison species, and in 1762 the Englishman Peter Collison wrote to John Bartram asking, "for more information on the 'Great Buffalo' whose remains 'are now standing in a Licking place not far from the Ohio.'"⁴ In reply, Bartram stated that he had spoken with two Shawnees via interpreter and "Asked if they had ever heard from their old men, when these 5 were first observed, of if they, or their fathers, had ever seen any such large creatures living, as these bones were supposed to have been a part of, they answered they had never heard them spoken of, other then as in the condition they are at present, nor ever heard of any such creature having been seen by the oldest man, or his father".⁵

As stated, these early inquiries made to Native Americans about fossils, also implied the continued existence of these long dead animals. In his *Notes on Virginia* in 1782, Thomas Jefferson related a supposed Delaware legend stating that mammoths were still in existence, with a corroborating story from a man named Stanley, who had been taken prisoner and taken across the Rockies, and who had also been told that mammoths still existed.⁶ On the basis of

³ Ibid., 57.

⁴ Stanley Hedeon, *Big Bone Lick: The Cradle of American Paleontology* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008) 25-26.

⁵ George Gaylord Simpson, "The Discovery of Fossil Vertebrates in North America," *Journal of Paleontology*, 1943, 36. All misspellings and grammatical errors are copied verbatim from the original document.

⁶ Loren C. Eisle, "Myth and Mammoth in Archaeology," *American Antiquity*, 1945, 85.

this corroboration between native oral tradition and one unfortunate settler's purported first-hand experience, Jefferson posited that the

mammoth had vanished from the East but might still survive in remote American regions unaffected by the Indians' trading of animal skins for European goods...To add to this, the traditional testimony of the Indians [is] that this animal still exists in the northern and western parts of America...Those parts still remain in their aboriginal state, unexplored and undisturbed by us...He may as well exist there now, as he did formerly where we find his bones. If he be a carnivorous animal, and some Anatomists have conjectured, and the Indians affirm, his early retirement may be accounted for from the general destruction of the wild game by the Indians.⁷

In 1806, Thomas Ashe also published an account that he received from a Shawnee Indian about an animal he called *Megalonyx*. In another example of early paleontology naivety, *Megalonyx* was supposedly a giant, carnivorous lion, twenty-five feet high and sixty feet long, put together with sloth claws and mastodon teeth, an animal which Ashe stated the Indians believed still existed "beyond the lakes".⁸ Dr. M. F. Ashley Montagu, writing as late as 1944, even spoke of the "possibility that in certain parts of the Americas the mammoth may have lingered on up to as recently as five hundred years ago".⁹ Also inaccurately, Montagu quoted an unnamed Paleontologist, whose specialty was the horse, who believed that the horse never went extinct in the Americas, but that it was just a slow breeder, and that Native Americans upon adopting horses, were only using native American horse stock.¹⁰ Montagu also spoke about Native American myths as being what he regarded as "historical tradition," or Native Americans having knowledge of the mastodon and other extinct fossil animals based on actual and more recent memories.¹¹ Ten years earlier in 1934, W. D. Strong explained how "historical

⁷ Hedeon, *Big Bone Lick*, 62.

⁸ Loren C. Easley, "Indian Mythology and Extinct Fossil Vertebrates," *American Anthropologist*, 1945, 318.

⁹ M. F. Ashley Montagu, "An Indian Tradition Relating to the Mastodon," *American Anthropologist*, 1944, 568.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 568-569n.1.; Easley, "Indian Mythology and Extinct Fossil Vertebrates", 318

¹¹ Easley, "Indian Mythology and Extinct Fossil Vertebrates", 318.; Easley, "Myth and Mammoth in Archaeology", 84.; Montagu, "An Indian Tradition Relating to the Mastodon", 569.

traditions,' seem to embody a former knowledge of the living animals in question, perhaps grown hazy through long oral transmission" and he also discussed the opposite term, "myths of observation" which implies the more realistic view that Native Americans were not speaking of these fossilized animals from memory, but creating mythological interpretations based on what they observed in the rock.¹² These mythological interpretations are part of what constitutes as early Native American paleontology, which goes along with the early collecting of fossils by Native Americans.

In talking about Native American fossil collecting, archaeologist Jack T. Hughes explains, "People of the past were just as interested in gigantic bones and tusks as modern visitors to museums...When they found something beyond their ken— such as bones ten times bigger than those of the animals they hunted and butchered— they took notice. And sometimes they took samples, collecting to whatever extent their limited transport permitted".¹³ Even earlier than Bernal Diaz del Castillo described the aforementioned event in 1519, about the fossils and Cortes' expedition in Mexico, there is evidence of Native American fossil collecting in New Mexico, by the early Apaches and Navajos, on the floor of a pit house, showing that fossils were collected by its inhabitants at least 1000 years ago, around 700 and 900 A.D. Excavated in 1941 by E. T. Hall, two fossil jawbones of extinct mammals were found.¹⁴ During the 1600s, there is evidence of the Algonquians and Abenakis collecting, trading, and selling fossil ivory to the Hurons as pieces of a magic horn; fossil ivory they referred to as "bones found under the earth".¹⁵ The Shawnee, Iroquois and other tribes often

¹² W. D. Strong, "North American Indian Traditions Suggesting a Knowledge of the Mammoth," *American Anthropologist*, 1934, 81.

¹³ Mayor, *Fossil Legends of the First Americans*, 74 and 166.

¹⁴ George Gaylord Simpson, "The Beginnings of Vertebrate Paleontology in North America," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 1942, 132-133.; Mayor, *Fossil Legends of the First Americans*, 165.

¹⁵ Mayor, *Fossil Legends of the First Americans*, 9.

visited Big Bone Lick from very early on to hunt and procure salt, and during those trips found the fossils that the site is so famous for today.¹⁶ George Croghan wrote to the Earl of Shelburn in 1767 of his own trip to Big Bone Lick and how it was Indians who had told him of its location, and how he was going to send along to the Earl, the elephantine “Tusks, Grinders, etc”. that he had found, in a box on the first ship to London.¹⁷ Early paleontologists owe their knowledge of two other famous fossil sites, the Badlands and the Black Hills, also to Native Americans, who as early as the 1840s and 1850s served as guides and interpreters on collecting expeditions.¹⁸ It was in 1870, after “Indians and hunters had brought back stories of valleys strewn with giant petrified bones,” that the famous paleontologist Othniel Marsh and his Yale students became the first scientists to explore the Green and White rivers on the border of Utah and Colorado.¹⁹

But it is not just the vast history of Native American fossil collecting that contributed to paleontology. Native American interpretations of those fossils show that they also tried to explain what they were seeing in the rocks. “Their explanations, expressed in mythic language, were based on repeated, careful observations of geological evidence over generations...The Native observers envisioned the extinct creatures’ appearance, behavior, and habitat, as well as the cause of their disappearance, proposing gradual, and catastrophic extinction scenarios”.²⁰ This is important because those Native American interpretations also contributed to early paleontological understandings.

¹⁶ Hedeem, Big Bone Lick, 21-23.; Mayor, Fossil Legends of the First Americans, 45.

¹⁷ E. M. Kindle, “American Indian Discoveries of Vertebrate Fossils,” *Journal of Paleontology*, 1935, 450.

¹⁸ Allison M. Dussias, “Science, Sovereignty, and the Sacred Text: Paleontological Resources and Native American Rights,” *Maryland Law Review*, 1996, 112.

¹⁹ Mayor, Fossil Legends of the First Americans, 154.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 296-297.

With so many different Native American groups living on the continent, there were of course many different interpretations of the prehistoric animal fossils that they encountered. But commonly, the Algonquians, Tetons, Omahas, Ponkas, and many others, shared two broadly similar myths, regarding thunderbirds and water monsters, respectively.²¹ “In the Great Plains, the idea of primal conflicts between water monsters and giant birds was influenced by discoveries of the striking remains of huge flying reptiles, Pteranodons whose wings spanned twenty feet, lying in the ground near the skeletons of thirty-foot-long marine creatures such as mosasaurs”.²² The Sioux spoke about their water monsters being defeated by thunderbirds who set the earth on fire with lightning bolts, which left the water monsters “burned up and died...where their bones turned to rock”, and then later, the thunderbirds, having been turned into stone, had their remains scattered throughout the Badlands.²³ Paleontologist Othniel Marsh later named Brontotherium (“Thunder Beast”), an early relative of the horse, after this Sioux myth, at the suggestion of a Sioux Indian, who said that the creature was a “big horse struck by lightning”.²⁴ And in 1972, upon the discovery of a pterosaur in Texas with a 35-foot wingspan (resembling a thunderbird) it was named after another mythological figure, the Aztec serpent god Quetzalcoatlus.²⁵ The Abenakis and Iroquois both imagined water monsters as well, but in their cases, from the fossils and tusks of mammoths that emerged along waterways.²⁶

²¹ A. F. Chamberlain, “The Thunder-Bird amongst the Algonkins,” *American Anthropologist*, 1890, 54.

²² Mayor, *Fossil Legends of the First Americans*, 211.

²³ Dussias, “Science, Sovereignty, and the Sacred Text: Paleontological Resources and Native American Rights”, 109n.180.

²⁴ Adrienne Mayor, *The First Fossil Hunters: Paleontology in Greek and Roman Times* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2000), 76.; Kindle, “American Indian Discoveries of Vertebrate Fossils”, 451.; Mayor, *Fossil Legends of the First Americans*, 240-241.

²⁵ Mayor, *The First Fossil Hunters*, 76.

²⁶ Mayor, *Fossil Legends of the First Americans*, 38.

Most Native Americans that came across mammoth fossils, however, imagined different legendary creatures. The Eskimos believed that mammoth bones were “those of a huge animal that burrows under the ground. Should it breathe air it dies - hence the numerous bones”.²⁷ The Algonkians believed in a “Great Moose” imagining the mammoth trunk as a fifth leg between the moose’s shoulders, and the Abenaki had a similar legend about the “Great Elk” who had an extra arm coming from its upper body.²⁸ Those same mastodon bones shown to Cortes’ group in 1519 were “prized as historical evidence of giants” by the Natives in that region.²⁹ The Navajos even had a myth about a Burrowing Monster that resembled a giant horned gopher, based on fossils from the “*Epigaulus hatcheri*...a strange burrowing ‘gopher’ about a foot tall, with very long claws and upright horns on its head for tunneling underground. Its distinctive fossils are found in Navajo land and the Great Basin”.³⁰ As can be seen, a lot of these myths indicate a pretty good understanding of what the Native Americans were seeing in the fossils, and a close relationship to what those extinct creatures actually were.

As time progressed, and deeper understandings came into being, Native American myths changed and became even more close to realizing what the fossils were that they were seeing. As European and Euro-American paleontology also grew, Native American legends reflected that new knowledge as well. According to George Gaylord Simpson, a highly influential paleontologist, “the first approximately correct identification of an American vertebrate fossil” was made by African-American slaves, who had runaway, and intermingled with Indians of the Southeast. More familiar with elephant bones, being from Africa, these

²⁷ Strong, “North American Indian Traditions Suggesting a Knowledge of the Mammoth”, 82.

²⁸ Mayor, *Fossil Legends of the First Americans*, 11.; Strong, “North American Indian Traditions Suggesting a Knowledge of the Mammoth”, 85-86.

²⁹ Mayor, *Fossil Legends of the First Americans*, 78.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 142-125.

runaway slaves correctly identified the fossil molars of mammoths.³¹ In 1748, a French naturalist named Buffon was the first to report that the Indians of the Ohio Valley referred to the large fossil animals in the area as the “grandfather of the buffalo”, and later, in the mid-1800s, the French explorer Jean L’Heureux reported that the Blackfeet also referred to dinosaur fossils in the same way. This quickly became the way that many Native Americans referred to fossils that resembled living animals. They all became the “grandfather” of the bear, eagle, buffalo etc. This important realization shows that the Native Americans were beginning to recognize the correlation between the long extinct fossils and their relationship to living counterpart animals. As noted by paleontologist William Berryman Scott in 1887, “The fact that the mythical animals can be distinguished apart, and referred to appropriate originals in the extinct animals of the continent, speaks strongly for the accuracy of their stories”.³² The Zuni also had a great understanding of fossils and what they represented, as evidenced by the following explanation attributed to Zuni elders in 1891, “it happens that we find, here and there, throughout the world, their forms, sometimes large like the beings themselves, sometimes shriveled and distorted. And we often see among the rocks the forms of many beings that live no longer”.³³ In 1976, Geologists realized that the Ute name for trilobites very appropriately meant “little water bug in stone”.³⁴ Folklorist Jason Jackson speaks about how the Yuchis modernized their old legends by making “deeper interpretations based on further consideration and new evidence,” and started to use the word “dinosaur” instead of their older phrase “monster lizard”. And that they did so after watching the film *Jurassic Park*, when they recognized their “monster lizard” in the movie, and thus realized that their “monster lizard” myth was really a legend based on

³¹ Simpson, “The Discovery of Fossil Vertebrates in North America”, 27; Eislely, “Myth and Mammoth in Archaeology”, 86.

³² Mayor, *Fossil Legends of the First Americans*, 51-52. Citation applies to the previous four sentences.

³³ *Ibid.*, 106 and 112.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 153-154.

dinosaur fossils.³⁵ Tribes all over incorporate new paleontological knowledge into their stories and legends, the Iroquois and Delaware with knowledge of the mammoth, and the Navajos with pterosaur fossils, among others.³⁶

This realization that Native Americans very accurately interpreted fossils for what they were, and easily associated them with living animals, makes a case for the argument that they might well have recognized the similarity between equine fossils and the newly reintroduced horses that came to the American continent. Horses had existed in the Americas long ago, but had since gone extinct, “The complex-toothed horse disappeared around 10,000 years ago, and the last of the other native species died out approximately 8,000 years ago. North America was thereafter void of any equine until the Spanish conquistadors imported the present-day horse, *Equus caballus*, to the New World”.³⁷ Fossils recovered by a man named Clark from the Big Bone Lick in 1818 included the limb bones of a horse, and further expeditions at the Lick at later dates yielded even more extinct equine remains.³⁸ While on his 1870 expedition in the Badlands, Othniel Marsh encountered many fossils all over the surface of the land, including ancestral horses. The Pawnees among his group were superstitious of fossil collecting and only joined in after Marsh, “picking up the fossil jaw of a horse, showed how it corresponded with their own horses’ mouths,” and from then on, the Pawnees, with their new understanding of the correlation between the extinct horses and the living ones, rarely returned without bringing back fossil bones for Marsh.³⁹ In 1874, Marsh’s paleontologist rival, Edward Drinker Cope, rediscovered the same fossil beds that the two fossil jawbones of extinct mammals had come from, that were found in the pit house in 1941 by E. T. Hall. “One of Cope’s prize finds

³⁵ Ibid., 208.

³⁶ Ibid., 126 and 208.

³⁷ Hedeon, Big Bone Lick, 110.

³⁸ Ibid., 110.

³⁹ Dussias, “Science, Sovereignty, and the Sacred Text: Paleontological Resources and Native American Rights”, 117n.235.; Mayor, Fossil Legends of the First Americans, 183.

was a *Phenacodus primaevus* skeleton, a relative of the 'dawn horse.' One of the jaw fragments in the ancient [New Mexico] dwelling, with three teeth still embedded, belonged to Phenacodus".⁴⁰ Thus, there is ample evidence that Native Americans had been exposed to extinct equine fossils for many, many years. "Tribes in the area had long known of the existence of these remains and regarded them as the remains of the legendary "Thunder Horse".⁴¹ The fact that Native American mythological thunderbirds, were also referred to as thunder beasts, and later thunder horses, speaks to Native American understanding and the ability to correlate ancient horse fossils with the new horses that had been brought to the Americas by the Europeans.

With all the evidence of Native Americans collecting and interpreting fossils, both before and after European contact, one can be persuaded to see how Native American fossil hunting, mythology, and legends all led to the advancement of the field of paleontology. Without Native American collecting and stories, early European and Euro-American paleontologists would have had a much harder time finding fossils and the locales that are famous today. In thinking on Native American mythology and interpretation of fossils, it was not that much different or naïve than the early thoughts of Europeans, in their beliefs that these long-extinct animals were possibly still alive. With time and deeper understanding, both European and Euro-American paleontologists and Native Americans gained knowledge that changed the way they viewed the prehistoric animal fossils around them. Knowing how intuitive and intelligent Native Americans were in their fossil interpretations, it can be believed that they would have made the association between the living horses around them, and the equine fossils in the ground.

⁴⁰ Mayor, *Fossil Legends of the First Americans*, 165.

⁴¹ Dussias, "Science, Sovereignty, and the Sacred Text: Paleontological Resources and Native American Rights", 112.

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A Paradox: Merchant Values and Catholicism During the Commercial Revolution

Mark Benecke

“To take usury for money lent is unjust in itself, because this is to sell what does not exist, and this evidently leads to inequality which is contrary to justice...”⁴²

*-Summa Theologica
c. 1269*

The words of Thomas Aquinas paint an example of the mindset of economic thought in medieval Christendom. Aquinas believed that making a profit without exerting labor or producing anything, the natural results of being a merchant or usurer, is almost equivalent to stealing from God himself. In the 12th and 13th centuries, Scholasticism and Catholic theology still largely influenced law making and economic activities in southern Europe along the Mediterranean. Church and Civil authorities were instituting fixed prices of goods and wages based on Aristotelian ideas of a just price, where it was thought that there was a natural market price for goods and labor. By fixing the prices, authorities ensured that both parties would have equality in a transaction. Christians were barred from trading with the Saracen enemies in the east by papal decree, and committing usury was a mortal sin equivalent to, if not worse than, murder. Usurers who did not go through proper restitution of their profits would be excommunicated, their bodies exhumed and then thrown into the gallows. In some cases, they were even rounded up and killed by mobs. The negativity with which the public viewed merchants is clear in this excerpt dating 1260:

Thus the legend runs of a man who, entering an abbey, found many devils in the cloister but in the market-place found but one, alone on a high pillar. This filled him with wonder. But it was told him that in the cloister all is arranged to help souls to God, so many devils are required there to induce monks to be led

⁴² Aquinas

astray, but in the market-place, since each man is a devil to himself, only one other demon suffices.⁴³

The mindset was that the market place was where people were exploited and cheated by the sinning nature of traders and usurers. Despite their public scorn, merchants and usurers alike continued to carry on business where money they saw opportunity for profit. Circumstances in the Mediterranean changed dramatically with the passing of centuries. The rise of a new class of powerful merchants was coming about in southern Europe. Simultaneously, Christian traditions, theology, and preaching relentlessly condemned the sinful practices of the merchant: trading with infidels, not performing any productive labor, and committing usury. Yet, by the 15th and 16th centuries merchant values were almost synonymous with the functioning of medieval society. Christian traditions and law had little say over merchant behavior, and the great avarice condemned in the 12th century saw regular practice in the 15th century.

History remembers the medieval period as the boon of power and influence for the Catholic Church. This was manifested in the architecture of the period, often referred to as the Age of Faith, with the construction of many of the great cathedrals of Europe. It was a time when the Pope could rally all of Christendom on crusade after crusade. This view of power associated with the Church seems strange considering that this time was also accompanied by the increasingly secular merchant-driven development of society, especially in Italy. In the 12th to 15th centuries, the influence of the church in regulating southern European society seemed to be waning with the increase in power of merchants and commerce. Additionally, merchant princes and bishops alike were indulging in usurious practices without consequence. Was this

43 Jarrett Bede, *Social Theories of the Middle Ages*, (London: Ernest Benn, 1923), 164, reprinted in Roy C. Cave & Herbert H. Coulson, *A Source Book for Medieval Economic History*, (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1936; reprint ed., New York: Biblo & Tannen, 1965), 113.

acceptance of sinful behavior a result of some natural evolution of theology inside Catholic authority, or was Christianity forced to shift by the pressures of economic change?

Whether internally or externally caused, this shift to merchant ideals forms the rudiments of modern social thought, breaking away from traditionalism and placing the fulfillment of individual needs as the center of society's goal. While these ideals are present in modern society, it was not always so. Where did they come from, and how were they adopted into twenty first century life? Finding an answer to this question is a component in satiating the curiosity for the origins of modern society. In this case, the answer tells two things. Firstly, it sheds some small insight into human nature. The answer can be interpreted as whether it is human nature to be more practical and rational, or for mankind to be more idealistic and drawn to immaterial values, such as ethical constitution and the preservation of tradition. Secondly, the answer could provide insight into the future of mankind. Is the evolution of human society dictated by changes in our environment, geography, and economy? Or, do humans evolve by the sweat of their own efforts toward a future they envision for themselves? The question could be a case study for these broader quandaries in the human condition and the answer, external or internal, will help dictate answers to them.

Examining the broader developments of society and economics in the medieval Mediterranean proves to be pivotal. The Mediterranean was the epicenter of trade in the medieval era which brought an influx of sweeping changes for all aspects of society. A new merchant class was rising to the top rungs of the social ladder, governments were expanding and becoming increasingly dominated by merchants, and the plague had pulled the rural serfs into the cities, forming a class of sovereign consumers. The political, social, and philosophical climate along the trade routes of Mediterranean Europe was shifting like the trade winds. Natural economic changes during the 12th to 15th centuries induced religious changes in the Catholic Church which diminished the role of the church in the economy.

The study of the effects of merchants and usurers on the church and how they affected the church revealed a great deal of research already published on the subject. This paper works primarily off of the works of several scholars, most prominently Diana Wood, and her book *Medieval Economic Thought*. She argues that the profound changes in medieval society resulted in the growing preoccupation with material ends. In her own words, “what was natural and human and secular became as important as what was divine.” This single thought was a basis for much in this paper, but with a slightly different emphasis. Whereas Wood presents a very broad view of how this change affected society as a whole, this paper more specifically argues how it uprooted the church’s place in economics. Another author, Aron Geruvich, argued that the changes of the period initiated a connection between the rise of merchants and the rise of humanism. Geruvich’s concept of humanist ideas, defined as a shift to a preoccupation with the natural world, were a part of a counter religious movement. Two additional scholars with relevant research are Murray Rothbard and Mark Koyama. Although the foci of their studies are in early economic constructs, what they present still ties deeply into the role of the Catholic church. Rothbard argues mainly that several medieval theologians, including saint Bernardino of Siena, were far ahead of their time in terms of analyzing the economic development happening before them. He points out how Bernardino practically created the term ‘capital’ that defines the modern capitalism. Thus, while Bernardino condemned usury, he also created a modern justification for it that defines today’s economic system. In contrast, Koyama gives an interpretation of how the changes in clerical stances on merchants and usury stemmed from financial incentives, it was more profitable for the church to allow usury than to prosecute it. The referenced primary sources will vary from the words of theologians such as Thomas Aquinas and Bernardino of Siena, to family chronicles of prominent Italian citizens. The *Summa Theologica* and sermons *On Contracts and Usury* by Bernardino provide a glimpse into what prominent theology was arguing at the time. Additional

interesting sources include the family chronicles of Giovanni Villani, Marchione di Coppo Stefani and Francesco Datini. These men were primary witnesses of the changes taking place in society in that they were knowledgeable, involved in the affairs of state, and provided detailed accounts in their chronicles.

This exploration begins with the event that had the an all-encompassing impact on medieval society and played a major role in creating the paradox between the commercial movement and religious authority: the Bubonic plague of 1347. The massive labor shortage due to the plague had serious implications for Christian law. It had been a long-standing practice in European society to fix the price of goods and wages to a just level that was determined by the mathematical calculations of theologians. Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologica* is a good example. Aquinas was heavily influenced by the Aristotelian notion of justice and he asserts some "virtuous mean" must be "arithmetically determined for commutative Justice". Such thought, however, became problematic as the devastation from the plague had caused the common workers to start demanding higher wages for doing less work. In Marchione di Coppo Stefani's *The Florentine Chronicle*, he recalls how the serfs behaved during the aftermath of the plague.

Servants were so unhappy about the very high prices [they paid] that it was necessary to make great efforts to restrain [the price rises]. The workers on the land in the countryside wanted rent contracts such that you could say that all they harvested would be theirs. And they learned to demand oxen from the landlord but at the landlord's risk [and liability for any harm done to the animal]. And then they helped others for pay by the job or by the day. And they also learned to deny [liability for] loans and [rental] payments. Concerning this serious ordinances were instituted; and [hiring] laborers became much more expensive.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, Vol. 30. , ed. Niccolo Rodolico

The theological authorities believed that it was only just if laborers accepted pay suitable for what they produced and were upset to see the large-scale deviation from pre plague price levels. The new attitudes of laborers were subsequently deemed as avarice and greed.

The attempts by the preachers and authorities to combat this development were futile, and both employers and guilds had to acquiesce to the laborers' demands against church wishes. The practice of free bargaining emerged as a result. Free bargaining, more commonly referred to as haggling, is the act of the two parties agreeing on a price of wage on the spot. It directly undermined the aims of theological authorities trying to mathematically calculate a just price. Following the Black Death, the common people were collecting themselves into a new class of wage earning consumers. They shaped a new style of economy where individuals needed to purchase everything they needed to survive without connection to local lords. Theology eventually changed to justify what was happening, as Diana Wood says in *Medieval Economic Thought*, "the justice recommended in free bargaining from the time of Aquinas came to be based on proportional rather than arithmetical equality. Strict equality would have removed all incentive for exchange and the result would have been a deadlocked market". A deadlocked inventiveness market would have resulted in disaster for recovering medieval cities. It makes sense then that the church had to justify the validity for free bargaining, so that society, even how strange it had become, could function with a strong market.

The ideas of a strong market not only came from the aftermath of the plague but were spurred as well by the urban development of medieval cities. The fundamentals of successful trade, selling something for more than you bought it, obviously did not sit well with theologians for the reasons of maintaining a just price. However, church officials and preachers would be forced to cede their ideas of how the community should behave and accept merchant culture because of a new movement in southern Europe: the explosive growth of the urban population. After prospects of high paying labor in cities after the plague, the expansion of trade, and new

crafts brought the masses into the city and the churches had to start preaching more to the needs of the urban population and the new classes and occupations that were forming, moneylenders and merchant traders. Previously, preachers would ceaselessly berate these occupations and it created a glaring contradiction. The sermons of the famous saint Bernardino of Siena are a fine example, stating “accordingly, all the saints and all the angels of paradise cry then against him [the usurer], saying "To hell, to hell, to hell." Also the heavens with their stars cry out, saying, "To the fire, to the fire, to the fire." The planets also clamor, "To the depths, to the depths, to the depths.”⁴⁵ These occupations were insurmountably important to the functioning of urban life, and this excerpt is a contradictory exception in Bernardino’s thoughts on economics. In the rest of his sermons *On Contracts and Usury* Bernardino makes a liberal economic analysis and justification for modern capitalism, far ahead of his time, practically defining the word ‘capital’. Although Catholic thinkers and preachers openly condemned the practices of merchants and usurers, in their more benign private view of economics, they realized and accepted the importance of unconstrained consumer markets and the roles played by merchants, bankers, and usurers.

Take the city of Florence as a case study. At the turn of the 14th century, Florence had emerged as an epicenter of finance, commerce, and industry. The description of 1330s Florence in *The Chronicle of Giovanni Villani* paints the scope of the movement: “from the amount of bread constantly needed for the city, it was estimated that in Florence there were some 90,000 mouths”.⁴⁶ Yet, an article by David Abulafia argues that during that time, “Florence could only

⁴⁵ On Contracts and Usury in Murray Newton Rothbard, *Economic Thought Before Adam Smith: An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought* (Aldershot, Hants, England ; Brookfield, Vt., USA: E. Elgar Pub, 1995), n.p.

⁴⁶ Giovanni Villani, “More on the Greatness and State and Magnificence of the Commune of Florence,” in *The Chronicle of Giovanni Villani* in Robert S Lopez and Irving W Raymond, *Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World: Illustrative Documents* (New York: Norton, 1979), 71.

feed itself from its own contado for only five months of the year”.⁴⁷ Florence needed strong trade and skilled merchants if it was to make it through the year without a famine. The city survived by acquiring privileged access to the wheat and barley produced in southern Italy, Naples and Apulia, by means of lending money to the house of Anjou for their war efforts.⁴⁸ The very practices which the church had traditionally condemned were the lifeblood of Florence, literally feeding the ever-hungrier city.

In addition to trading food, Florence also incorporated the movement of large quantities of raw wool along these trade routes to fuel the immense textile industry of the city. The magnitude of this industry can be envisioned when Vallani states that in one year the workshops of Florence, “made from 70,000 to 80,000 pieces of cloth, which were worth more than 1,200,000 gold Florins [...] and more than 30,000 persons lived by it”⁴⁹ That equated to a third of the population of Florence at the time that worked in the textile industry. With so much of the city’s livelihood and wealth dependent on trading and merchant industries, the church could not uphold the contradictions of trying to appeal to the populous while at the same time condemning what kept them alive. The contradiction made the Catholic Church look disreputable and outdated for rejecting what was now the foundations of the new society.

The 1338 city scene of Siena depicted below in the fresco *The Effects of Good Government* by Ambrogio Lorenzetti shows the mindset of this urban movement.⁵⁰

The central theme of this fresco is the prevalence of the market. It takes up nearly the whole fresco. Lorenzetti and his employers must have demonstrated with this single work their belief

⁴⁷ David Abulafia, “Southern Italy and the Florentine Economy, 1265-1370,” *The Economic History Review* 34, no. 3 (1981): 385.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ Villani, “Commune of Florence,” in *The Chronicle of Giovanni Villani* in Lopez and Raymond, *Medieval Trade*, 72.

⁵⁰ Ambrogio Lorenzetti, *Effects of Good Government in the City, 1339-1338*, fresco, 7.7m x 14.4m, Palazzo Pubblico, Siena, Italy.

that the role of a good government was to ensure a healthy and thriving marketplace. Religion had no place in Lorenzetti's fresco because of the growing mindset across southern Europe that a city was strong if its market was strong. Theologians witnessing the great changes before them had to start accepting that new occupations, merchants, lenders, and industrialists, where someone could make profit without producing anything, were justifiable occupations necessary for the community.

Political developments played a major role in the change that Christianity undertook during the commercial revolution. The insertion of wealthy industrialists into the heads of merchant oligarchies in the city-states of Italy accompanied urban development. These increasingly secular establishments, some of their members practicing usurers themselves, worked to keep sinful commercial practices out of clerical jurisdiction. For example, in the legislation of 1345, after conflict between the city and the papacy, the Florentine commune decreed all citizens free from the jurisdiction of church courts. The reasons were, as Villani says in his *Chronicles*, "the desire of the state to prevent the opposition of the clergy to usurious contracts."⁵¹ By the late medieval period, almost all trials of usury were held in secular civic courts instead of ecclesiastic, a phenomenon that spread as far as England.⁵² As the law made its way into the hands of secular authorities there was very little that the Catholic Church could do in response. The domain of financial law was slowly stripped away from underneath the church by civic courts that were much more permissive of usury.

Along with rule over law, the rising merchant's culture also took the ownership of time away from Catholic doctrine as another tool to justify commerce. It was a long-standing theological tenet that time belonged to God and time was handed out to humans to make

⁵¹ Becker, Marvin B. "Three Cases Concerning the Restitution of Usury in Florence." *The Journal of Economic History* 17, no. 3 (1957): 447.

⁵² Diana Wood, "The Just Price and the Just Wage," in *Medieval Economic Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 183.

good work with it. More simply, God owns time. Returning to saint Bernardino, he declares, “[only Jesus Christ] knows the time and the hour. It therefore it is not ours to know the time, much less is it ours to sell it.”⁵³ Usury was considered a sin because by making profit from lending money, a usurer was selling time, and subsequently stealing its ownership from God. The philosophical development in the late medieval period that what you did with the time you have determines what you accomplish in your lifetime overtook this old viewpoint. We can see this in *The Family* by the humanist Leon Battista Alberti. He says, “[time] is the most precious thing. These hands and eyes of mine do not belong to me as much as that”⁵⁴ and in the words of Francesco Datini, “He who knows how to spend his time better will outstrip the others.” A merchant simply uses his time intelligently to accumulate wealth. Thus, time became a commodity under the ownership of the individual, “God’s time” became “Merchant time”.⁵⁵ With time now a material commodity, it paved the way for new justification for merchants and usury. The merchant and usurer were putting their time at risk in their occupations, buying and selling it. As time became more of a commodity, the acceptance of usurers and merchants by society and the church prevailed because time was now the property of men and it became known that “time is money”.

Even with all the changes working in favor of justifying Usury it was nevertheless prohibited to all Christians several times by the Catholic Church. But, no matter how awful or how extortionate the usurer was he could still be forgiven if he made restitution of every penny of his profit to the borrower. Of course, this brought up some uncertainties. For example, who is to receive the restitution if the borrower is dead? This was called restitution “*incerta*” in Italy.

⁵³ Rothbard, *Economic Thought Before Adam Smith*, n.p.

⁵⁴ Leon Battista Alberti and Renée Neu Watkins, *The Family in Renaissance Florence: I Libri Della Famiglia*. (Prospect Heights, Ill: Waveland Press, 1994), 173.

⁵⁵ Aron Ja. Gurevich, “The Merchant,” in *The Medieval World*, ed. Jacques Le Goff, *The History of European Society* (England: History Today, 1991), 278.

It was the most abundant type of restitution and was most often paid to the church for use on “good works” or to be distributed to the poor.⁵⁶ Suddenly for the church it wasn’t so bad to have a large number of usurers around, it would always mean a steady inflow of cash when restitution was abused by the clergy. The magnitude of the usury and restitution issue is evident in a letter to the bishop of Arras from pope Innocent III where he suggests, “proceed cautiously in enforcing the decrees of the Lateran Council [against usury] because usurers are so numerous that if all were punished many churches would have to be shut down.”⁵⁷ The bottom line is where there was profit to made usurer, merchant, and clergy alike were there to pursue it. The article by Mark Koyama, *Evading the ‘Taint of Usury’*, sums up what eventually happened to the church’s stance on usury, as he states, “During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the costs of evading the prohibition fell, while the costs of enforcing it rose— together these factors can help to account for the gradual decline of the prohibition”⁵⁸. All considered, it is evident that preaching and theology do not form an effective weapon in countering financial gains. Ultimately, church doctrines could not resist the immense weight of a changing society and financial incentives to accept the money usury and unrestrained commerce reaped.

This paper sought to answer whether changes in theology preceded the fundamental changes in society and economics of the 12th to 15th centuries or vice versa. By considering what the scholarly community had said on this subject and examining the words of the people of the time, a concise argument can be formed. The revolutionary changes in medieval society

⁵⁶ Benjamin N. Nelson, “Religion: The Usurer and the Merchant Prince: Italian Businessmen Ad the Ecclesiastical Law of Restitution, 1100-1550,” *The Journal of Economic History* 7 (1947):107.

⁵⁷ Clapham, J.H., 1929. *Commerce and industry in the middle ages* in Tanner, J., Orton, C., Brooke, Z. (Eds.), *The Cambridge Medieval History, The Victory of the Papacy*, Vol. IV. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), 491

⁵⁸ Mark Koyama, “Evading the ‘Taint of Usury’: The Usury Prohibition as a Barrier to Entry,” *Explorations in Economic History*, vol. 47, no. 4, 2010, 17.

irreversibly altered the Catholic Church. The pressure of a radically transforming society forced the Church to make cessation after cessation of its role in governing economics until almost abandoning its stance in economic affairs completely. Now, it is clear that religion has little to no sway when it comes to governing the realm of economics. In retrospect, the embodiment of modernism began with the development of society willing to let go of its archaic traditions to make room for an increase in the pursuit of rational interests.

Exploring how society changes and how once great institutions lose their grasp on whole realms of human affairs will tell historians much about who we are and how human society changes over time. Such research sheds light on how modern western society evolved into what it is today. This paper explains that the western world was created in large part by the unyielding power of economic incentives, bringing down long standing traditions to better suit financial concerns. What implications does this have for future global systems? Are we simply powerless to stop cultural institutions from bending to the whim of material gains, or is it positive that archaic traditionalism like that in the medieval church was broken down to allow the development of the modern world? What does it say about the future of the Catholic church and Christianity in general if their authority in one very important field of human life can be diminished to nothing in a relatively short time?

There is still so much to be added to this discussion and room for more scholarly research in this area. Research still needs to be done to support the argument that natural economic changes precede and create societal changes. This paper explored this concept in the context of medieval merchants in the Mediterranean. Specifically, how they irreversibly reduced the reach of the church in human affairs and how these merchants eventually dominated the society that scorned them. But, this short analysis only scratched the surface of this topic. By accumulating more findings and research from the middle ages, as well as expanding the search for similar instances where merchant behavior subverts traditional

institutions spanning across different epochs and regions, it is possible to formulate a new theory on the great extent and role economic development plays in the evolution of human society.

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The Raid that Sparked the War:

A Study of the Jameson Raid and the South African War of 1899-1902

Stuart Hayes

The continent of Africa became a central focus of history throughout the 19th century. During this period, countries, nations, and empires from all across the globe raced to claim and colonize as many regions in Africa as possible, while also utilizing these lands for their natural resources. History calls this massive world race the Scramble for Africa. The Scramble for Africa also resulted in creating great conflicts between those seeking to claim the many regions of the continent. From the eve of the 19th century to the dawn of the 20th century, the territory of South Africa became the central battleground of a great war. History knows this clash as the South African War of 1899-1902, which eventually became recognized as the greatest armed conflict that took place during the Scramble for Africa⁵⁹. The South African War of 1899-1902 included the British Empire, who controlled the Cape Colony of South Africa, and the Boer controlled territories of the South African Republic and the Orange Free States. The war began in the fall of 1899 from a long-lasting political struggle over control of the Transvaal territory. Controlled by the Boers at the time, the British sought to take control of it in order to unify all of South Africa under the British flag⁶⁰.

Three years of armed conflict later, and the South African War of 1899-1902 had placed a heavy toll on the British Empire, not only in fatalities, but also in expenses and self-pride⁶¹. For the Boers, one of the biggest consequences of the war included the loss of countless farms, crops and livestock, as well as Boer civilians and prisoners of war who lost their lives

⁵⁹ Iain R Smith, *The Origins of the South African War, 1899-1902* (New York: Longman, 1996),

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⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

while being forced into British controlled concentration camps⁶². As for the British, the war had forced them to heavily reorganize their beliefs towards their military and imperial abilities. But while the magnitude of the aftermath of this war remains recognized to this day, this paper will focus on determining what single event truly set off this great conflict.

The beginning of the South African War of 1899-1902 resulted from a long standing rivalry between the British and the Boers. Indeed, this conflict's roots stretched far back into the history of European settlement and expansion throughout the 19th century and even before that. Many historians have argued that a large number of causal factors, which could have possibly sparked the Second Boer War, exist. One notable causal factor, which I will share in detail later in the paper, involved the discovery of gold within Transvaal in the year of 1886⁶³. The causal factors studied and debated by historians, however, all find common ground with topics revolving around the relationship and rivalries between the British and the Boers in South Africa. Yet, despite the vast number of possible causal factors, historians could not come to a conclusion as to what truly ignited the war between the British and the Boers in South Africa. In this paper, drawn from various sources, analyzes an event that took place approximately three years before the South African War Began, the Jameson Raid. In relation to the South African War, the Jameson raid was the first British offensive against the Boers, and was what truly set off this great conflict.

The formulation and execution of the Jameson raid took a great amount of time and effort to execute. It began with the British goal to control all of South Africa, a vision that had existed among British officials since the beginning of the Scramble for Africa. "Following the First Boer War of 1880-81, the Afrikaans-speaking Boer Republics of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State were given grudging recognition from the British, who had designs on

⁶² Gregory Fermont-Barnes, *The Boer War, 1899-1902* (Great Britain: Osprey, 2003), 86.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 16.

creating a grand federation in southern Africa, which included these fledging republics”.⁶⁴ The mastermind behind the Jameson Raid was Cecil Rhodes. Cecil Rhodes became the prime minister of the Cape Colony in South Africa in the year 1890, and had a dream to create a unified South Africa under the British flag. At first, Rhodes attempted to unify South Africa through economic means by bringing out “a railway and customs union with free trade in South African products and to fit this union into a wider scheme of imperial preference that would, he hoped, open the way to a grand federal union of the British Empire”.⁶⁵ Four years into Rhodes’ time as prime minister, however, his vision of a unified South Africa had still failed to become reality. During that time, Cecil Rhodes, although still seeking to unify South Africa, opted for a more forceful strategy to turn his vision into a reality⁶⁶. Rhode’s considerations towards a more aggressive strategy grew when a surplus amount of gold was discovered within the mines of Transvaal.

While seeking alternative methods to unify South Africa under British rule, Cecil Rhodes came across a topic known today as the Uitlander question. The Uitlander question referred to the British immigrants residing in Boer controlled Transvaal making complaints towards the unjust conditions they endured while residing in this territory, such as heavy taxations, as well as beliefs “that the administration was inefficient, corrupt and dictatorial”.⁶⁷ “With the development of the gold and diamond fields of the Rand, an influx of British and other European immigrants into the Transvaal made the Boers of that republic a minority in their own country by the later 1890’s”.⁶⁸ In turn, the Boers became more determined to maintain the

⁶⁴Adam Burns and Robert Gallimore, “Duplicated Debacles?: A comparison of the 1895-96 Jameson Raid and the 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion,” *Historian*, no. 132 (2016/2017): 1.

⁶⁵ Jean van der Poel, *The Jameson Raid* (South Africa: Oxford University Press, 1951), 1.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁶⁸ David Steele, “Salisbury and the Soldiers,” in *The Boer War*, ed. John Gooch (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 6.

independence of the Boer republics, further halting Rhodes' vision for establishing total British control over all of South Africa.⁶⁹ In addition to the previous complaints mentioned, "the loudest complaint against the Transvaal Government was its virtual denial of the franchise to the Uitlanders".⁷⁰ Exploiting these beliefs that the Uitlander's endured miserable and oppressed lives within Transvaal, Cecil Rhodes conspired a new plan to aid the British colonies of South Africa. Thus the planning of the Jameson Raid had officially begun, and the future of the British and the Boers in South Africa would eventually change forever.

Working with Britain's Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, Cecil Rhodes formulated a plan to "exploit existing discontent and to organize a rebellion in Johannesburg".⁷¹ Johannesburg was a major city that resided within the Transvaal territory at the time. To lead this raid, Rhodes commissioned his Lieutenant, L.S. Jameson to go forth into Transvaal and ignite the planned rebellion.⁷² Had the rebellion succeeded, according to some British politicians, "a solicitous imperial power would intervene to bring peace and mediate a safer British future for the troubled Boer state".⁷³ Initially, Rhodes sought to gain support from the Uitlanders in Transvaal, but had failed to rally support from both the political leaders of the Uitlanders as well as the miners.⁷⁴ Though Jameson succeeded in recruiting roughly a thousand men, plans for the raid were postponed until after Christmas in the year of 1895⁷⁵. However, Jameson received a letter consisting of pleas for help from the Uitlanders, which according to mercenary George Wyndham was revealed to be fake, and sought to commit the

⁶⁹ Gooch, *The Boer War*, 6.

⁷⁰ Poel, *The Jameson Raid*, 6.

⁷¹ Andrew N. Porter, "British Imperial Policy and South Africa 1895-9," in *The South African War: The Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902*, ed. Peter Warwick (Essex: Longman, 1980), 41.

⁷² Porter, "British Imperial Policy", 41.

⁷³ Bill Nasson, *The South African War: 1899-1902* (London: Arnold, 1999), 30.

⁷⁴ Porter, "British Imperial Policy", 43.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 43.

raid as soon as possible.⁷⁶ Against orders, Jameson and his men invaded Transvaal on December 29, 1895⁷⁷. Unfortunately, Jameson and his men had already lost the element of surprise and were quickly overtaken by Transvaal soldiers by January of 1896.⁷⁸

In the wake of the failed raid, a flood of humiliation struck everyone involved. It was considered such an embarrassment, that pro-Boer literature animated “diverse figures as G.K. Chesterton, Rudyard Kipling and Olive Schriener”.⁷⁹ Cecil Rhodes was forced to resign from his role as prime minister of the Cape Colony,⁸⁰ and Jameson spent 15 months in prison in London, with Chamberlain denying any type of involvement he had in the raid.⁸¹ However, the heaviest effect of this failed raid took place among the Boers, especially Paul Kruger, who would eventually become President of the South African republic. With the raid a failure, Kruger gained far greater support from the Boers, greatly increased pro-Boer and anti-British beliefs, and even strengthened an alliance between Transvaal and the Orange Free State.⁸² With this unity between nations, Kruger then sought to heavily improve the military capabilities of the Boer regions by obtaining and arming the Boer forces with more modern weapons of that period, most of which were imported from Germany.⁸³ Three years later, and after several political disputes between the British and the Boers in response to the raid, war in South Africa erupted.

⁷⁶“Another Typical Imperialist?” The Speaker: A Liberal Review No. 3 (1900): 33, <https://search-proquest-com.colorado.idm.oclc.org/britishperiodicals/docview/6518557/68F484F35C1540FBPQ/19?accountid=14503>.

⁷⁷ Porter, “British Imperial Policy”, 43.

⁷⁸ Nasson, The South African War, 30.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 30.

⁸⁰ Warwick, The South African War, 44.

⁸¹ Fermont-Barnes, The Boer War, 22.

⁸² Nasson, The South African War, 31.

⁸³ Ibid., 32.

The Jameson Raid is a crucial event to understand in relation to the South African War. Many historians have focused heavily on what caused the South African war, analyzing events that took place in this region all the way back to when the first Europeans settled there. And yet, despite the data and facts collected, scholars could not narrow down these factors to identify what spark had set off the powder keg that was the South African War. One key thing to note is that the Jameson Raid was the final notable conflict between the British and the Boers before the war officially began. The raid has been recognized and debated by many individuals for many years, with historically renowned leaders such as Winston Churchill recognizing its importance.

The failure of the Jameson Raid, moreover, was a heavy blow towards the British Empire's pride, and towards its status in the world as an empire. As David Steele put it, "the Jameson Raid and its aftermath encouraged the belief that Britain lacked the will to bring its relatively enormous strength to bear in an effective fashion on a tiny population bred for generations to fight on the veldt".⁸⁴ The raid revealed a weakness in the British Empire, causing it to lose its powerful and mighty image. This belief about the British' weakness was recognized by not only the Boers, but also by various nations and empires across the world. Thus, it is important to recognize the Jameson raid within the context of history, for it fractured the strength and image of the British Empire, which continued to be affected during and following the South African War.

Although the Jameson Raid was a failure, it nonetheless was considered an attack on the Boers from the British. However, there have been some debates as to what was truly the turning point that set the South African War in motion in 1899. According to some historians, such as Gregory Fermont-Barnes, war between the British and the Boers was ignited when the

⁸⁴ Gooch, *The Boer War*, 6-7.

British failed to meet the demands of the Boers in 1899, which included the annexation of Swaziland by the Orange Free State and British repayment of the damages and costs done by the Jameson Raid.⁸⁵ This report may challenge the argument made here because the Jameson Raid took place more than three years before the South African War even began. Although this was the last British-Boer event that took place before the war actually began in 1899, it was only one part of the aftermath of the raid that stretched on throughout the war. A number of direct responses to the raid will be explored, as well as reports of various events and actions that were determined to have been a direct result of the Jameson raid. These events provide evidence that the Jameson Raid was indeed the final straw in the long-lasting Anglo-Boer disputes, unleashing the armed conflict that was the South African War of 1899-1902.

The non-British responses to the Jameson raid heavily demonstrate why it is what truly sparked the South African War. The failed raid had caught the attention of nations and leaders from around the world, with one of the most notable responses coming from Germany. The German Kaiser Wilhelm II sent a telegram to Transvaal President Paul Kruger, congratulating him for repelling the raid.⁸⁶ Within this telegram, the Kaiser stated:

I express to you my sincere congratulations that you and your people, without appealing to the help of friendly powers, have succeeded, by your own energetic action against the armed bands which invaded your country as disturbers of the peace, in restoring peace and in maintaining the independence of the country against attack from without.

⁸⁷When the Kruger telegram was released to the public, “the British press broke out into a bitter denunciation of Germany, which had, they declared, deliberately insulted them and their Queen”.⁸⁸ The Kaiser referred to the British in this telegram as individuals who “invaded” a country, casting them as incoming attackers. The German Kaiser also wrote this telegraph as a

⁸⁵ Fermont-Barnes, *The Boer War*, 31.

⁸⁶ Poel, *The Jameson Raid*, 135.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 135.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 135.

way to insult the British for the humiliating failure of the raid.⁸⁹ For the Boers, gaining support from Germany was very important, for, during the 1880's, the native Dutch of the Netherlands had lived in fear that Germany would try to Annex a number of the Netherlands' colonies abroad.⁹⁰ Germany's support for the Boers was further demonstrated when the Boer republics received large amounts of German weapons, as I mentioned previously.

Like the German Kaiser, Present Paul Kruger voiced his beliefs about the Jameson raid, viewing it as a British act of war against the Boers. In the aftermath of the raid, Kruger took part in an interview, which was documented in *Oom Paul's People*, where he stated his opinions towards the raid and his plans for the future following it.

When it became known all over the world twelve years ago that the most extensive gold fields have been discovered in our apparently worthless country, England became envious and laid plans to annex such a valuable prize... They made all sorts of pretexts to rob us of our country... they planned the Jameson raid, which was merely a bold attempt to steal our country.⁹¹

The president of the South African Republic clearly painted an image of the British as being treacherous marauders, who only sought to exploit other nations and countries for their own benefits. Moreover, the British strongly appeared to fit such a description by formulating an attack against the Boers to take the state's resources by force.

Following the Jameson raid, pro-Boer support significantly increased all across South Africa. A new wave of beliefs and propaganda emerged to further promote the Boers in the region. "In many ways, the reactions to this incident foreshadowed what was to happen during the war that started in 1899".⁹² Because of Jameson's' use of violence during the raid, a great

⁸⁹ Poel, *The Jameson Raid*, 135.

⁹⁰ Vincent Kuitenbrouwer, *War of Words: Dutch Pro-Boer Propaganda and the South African War: 1899-1902* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012), 56.

⁹¹ Howard Clemens Hilegias, "Oom Paul's People", in *Europe and Africa: Commerce, Christianity, Civilization, and Conquest* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1899), 158.

⁹² Kuitenbrouwer, *War of Words*, 56.

number of the Dutch populace labeled the event as “a war of extermination”.⁹³ From a certain perspective, “men advancing into enemy territory and enforcing the rigours of occupation could hardly be viewed as anything other than barbarians or devils by a civilian population...”⁹⁴ This mentality was shared by Boers throughout the South African War, demonstrating how the Jameson raid was the key causal factor to the outbreak of war.

The Boers characterized those who were involved with the planning of the raid, specifically Rhodes and Chamberlain, as evil British imperialists, a belief that was maintained throughout the war.⁹⁵ Additionally, many Afrikaners in the British cape colony felt a sense of betrayal towards Rhodes, with one of them openly characterizing Rhodes as “a sort of dividing wall between the colonial Afrikaners and their brothers in the Republics.”⁹⁶ Even in the Netherlands, the Dutch populace was considered important allies of President Kruger and his government.⁹⁷ In terms of propoganda in the wake of the Jameson raid, both the British and the Boers attacked each other with crude and controversial media. On one hand, the British utilized theatre performances to portray President Kruger as a treacherous, antagonistic villain who would be vanquished by a brave hero like Dr. Jameson.⁹⁸ On the other hand, the Jameson Raid became the foundation for the creation of the Algemeen Nederlandsch Verbond or the General Dutch Alliance.⁹⁹ The goal for this organization was to promote the idea of “a Greater Netherlands with a special focus on the Dutch language.”¹⁰⁰ With a massive growth of Pro-Boer

⁹³ Ibid., 94.

⁹⁴ Nasson, *The South African War*, 256.

⁹⁵ Gooch, *The Boer War*, 75.

⁹⁶ Smith, *The Origins of the South African War*, 97.

⁹⁷ Kuitenbrouwer, *War of Words*, 63.

⁹⁸ Steve Attridge, *Nationalism, Imperialism and Identity in Late Victorian Culture: Civil and Military Worlds* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 25.

⁹⁹ Kuitenbrouwer, *War of Words*, 58-59.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 58-59.

beliefs among the Afrikaners, negative Anglo-Boer relations in South Africa significantly increased to the point of extreme aggression, an aggression that would soon escalate to war.

Whether it succeeded or not, the very organization of the Jameson Raid strongly resembled a British offensive against the Boer Republics. The first thing to note is that those involved in the raid had military professions. In a collection of British parliamentary papers, it was noted that Dr. Jameson would be tried for his actions in the raid, “and the military officers associated with the raid”.¹⁰¹ The parliamentary papers discussing the actions of Dr. Jameson and his cohorts during this raid heavily mentioned how the raid was prepared. The papers stated that “the political head of Rhodesia had for months past, in concert with officers of the British Army, been collecting arms, storing provisions, inquiring into the military strength and equipment of the Boers... taking the necessary preliminary steps to carry out a military coup de main upon the Boer capital”.¹⁰² The paper also mentioned how the raid involved crossing British borders and entering a “friendly state”.¹⁰³ Therefore, the raid was a violation of territorial laws, which have often times been considered an act of war. Such vast military organization demonstrates how the Jameson Raid was a British offensive and how it sparked the South African War of 1899-1902.

The Jameson raid caused a massive change for both the defensive and offensive capabilities of the Boer’s militaries. After the raid, President Kruger called for the South African Republic and the Orange Free States to unify under a Pro-Boer cause. With this unity between nations, Kruger then sought to heavily improve the military capabilities of the Boer regions by obtaining and arming the Boer forces with the more modern weapons of that period.¹⁰⁴ Heavy

¹⁰¹ “ART. X.-1. Parliamentary Papers: South Africa. 1896 and 1897,” *The Edinburgh Review* 186, no. 381 (1897): 249.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 250.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 252.

¹⁰⁴ Nasson, *The South African War*, 32.

fortifications were built around Pretoria and Johannesburg, with one near Johannesburg and four more around Pretoria.¹⁰⁵ The Boers also utilized a secret service organization for espionage against potential threats, which while established in 1894, grew following the Jameson Raid and continued to provide military intelligence.¹⁰⁶ By the time war broke out in the 1899, Boer soldiers were “well equipped with the latest Mauser and Martini-Henry rifles imported from Europe”.¹⁰⁷ The South African Conciliation Committee, a British antiwar organization opposed to the South African War, published a debate towards whether or not the Boer’s foresight of the Jameson raid caused the increase of Boer armaments, or if the raid itself caused it. During this debate, it was noted that the Boers were in possession of a great amount of armaments, supposedly costing almost 60,000 British pounds by the year 1895.¹⁰⁸ On the other hand, the report of the organization’s debate stated that Captain Younghusband had obtained information in 1896 following the raid that heavy artillery; armaments for every Dutchman, and even drill instructors and artillerymen were ordered into the Boer territories of South Africa.¹⁰⁹ Since the Boers heavily armed themselves following the Jameson raid, one could argue that they were preparing for a second attack. Moreover, with the importation of drill instructors and artillerymen, it is also clear that the Boers were assuming the worst and expecting to fight the British very soon.

Because of the German Kaiser’s support for President Kruger and the South African Boers, the British Empire felt a great sense of threat looming over them. Following the release of the Kruger telegram, Britain made a clear message to the German Government that they had placed themselves in a position that was very close to creating great hostility with the British

¹⁰⁵ John Gooch, *The Boer War*, 80.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 81.

¹⁰⁷ Smith, *The Origins of the South African War*, 99-100.

¹⁰⁸ *The Boer armaments: were they the cause of the Jameson Raid or its effect* (South African Conciliation Committee, 1899), 3. <https://dds-crl-edu.colorado.idm.oclc.org/crldelivery/2081>.

¹⁰⁹ *The Boer Armaments*, 4.

Empire, and may lead to war.¹¹⁰ An article from The Illustrated London News featured an account by one of the raiders where it was argued that Britain's imperial power in Africa was essential because of the threat from the Boers taking over Africa as Germany's "spearhead".¹¹¹ Sir Graham Bower, the secretary to the British High commissioner/Governor of South Africa, wrote that following the Jameson raid, he felt that "the peace of Europe had been endangered, as there could be German intervention".¹¹² For the British Empire, the German Empire was a powerful rival, which would soon become their greatest enemy in both World War One and World War Two. In both Germany and Great Britain, the response to the telegram "shows the deep-seated rivalries that caused the war of 1914 were already becoming articulate".¹¹³

Like Britain's fears about Germany's support for the Boers following the Jameson Raid, the Boers also felt a great sense of fear toward the possible future actions the British Empire may take. "The attempt by British Imperialists to topple the Transvaal government caused an outcry in the Netherlands because it was seen as a confirmation of fears that these men would settle for nothing less than complete dominance over South Africa".¹¹⁴ The Dutch in the Netherlands had seen the raid as a great threat towards their national interests because one of their most vital colonial territories would've been lost, which would "serve as a dangerous precedent for great powers to bully small nations".¹¹⁵ Hence, when President Kruger came to power, he sought to protect the South African Boers from Britain's imperial expansion.

¹¹⁰ Poel, The Jameson Raid, 136.

¹¹¹ Alan Cousins, "The Jameson Raid: Politicians, Plots and Scapegoats in South Africa" *Historian*, no. 90 (2006): 22. <https://searchproquest.com.colorado.idm.oclc.org/docview/274888104/fulltextPDF/EBEC1E171B78480FPQ/1?accountid=14503>.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 26.

¹¹³ Poel, The Jameson Raid, 135.

¹¹⁴ Kuitenbrouwer, War of Words, 62.

¹¹⁵ Kuitenbrouwer, War of Words, 62.

From the British perspective, Winston Churchill, Britain's most famous Prime Minister, strongly believed that the Jameson raid was the main cause of the South African war, and many conflicts that followed. For Churchill, the Jameson Raid played an important role in shaping his belief of peace and war in South Africa.¹¹⁶ In the year 1896, after he returned to Britain from the Fourth Hussars cavalry,¹¹⁷ he heard the news of the Jameson raid's failure and voiced his disappointment of it among a great number of British officials.¹¹⁸ Thirty years later, however, Churchill expressed in a letter that he had supported Dr. Jameson and his men all throughout that period.¹¹⁹ Winston Churchill's remarks towards the Jameson raid demonstrate how its failure heavily affected the British Empire.

By the end of the First World War, Winston Churchill, a member of the liberal party, voiced his opinions of the Jameson Raid again. In contrast to his previous statement of the Jameson raid, Churchill stated: "I date the beginnings of these violent times in our country from the Jameson Raid in 1896".¹²⁰ It has been argued by historians that the South African War of 1899-1902 was a major causal factor towards the First World War, and, indeed, Churchill places the Jameson Raid in the context of both of these great conflicts, which Britain, and most of the world, were forced to endure. Years later while writing an autobiography, Churchill inscribed: "In December 1895 there had occurred in South Africa an event which seems to me as I look back over my map of life to be a fountain of ill".¹²¹ The event that Churchill mentions is the commencement of the Jameson raid, which was described as having sparked a chain of events that escalated into the South African War. In Churchill's perspective, the Jameson raid

¹¹⁶ S. Burrige Spies, "Peace and Two Wars: South Africa, 1896-1914," in Churchill as Peacemaker, ed. James W. Muller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 122.

¹¹⁷ Muller, Churchill as Peacemaker, 122.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., 122.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 123.

¹²⁰ Ibid., 124.

¹²¹ Muller, Churchill as Peacemaker, 124.

had not only been a causal factor that led to the beginning of the South African War, but also a factor that impacted the British Empire for many years, even to the end of the First World War.

The British strongly believed that war against the Boers was inevitable following the Jameson Raid. In one case, a telegraph sent to Mr. Chamberlain following the raid provides evidence that the Jameson Raid became the spark that would set off the South African War. Following the raid, Chamberlain sent High Commissioner Sir Hercules to confer with President Kruger to prove the credibility of the Uitlander grievances.¹²² In one telegraph, Sir Hercules mentions: “the burgher levies are in such an excited state over the invasion of their country that I believe President of South African Republic could not control them except in the event of unconditional surrender”.¹²³ It can be assumed from the burgher levies excitement due to the failed raid, that they also desired to fight the British even more so. This was again demonstrated by the increase in armaments of the Boers following the raid as well. Based on the Boer’s attitudes towards the British in this telegram, the Jameson raid had truly started a great conflict in Anglo-Boer relations that would soon escalate into an all-out war.

Despite having attempted to weasel out of the situations that followed the failed Jameson Raid, Joseph Chamberlain found himself tangled up in the aftermath. Between June and October of 1896, Chamberlain wrote a private memorandum where despite expressing his disbelief towards the idea. The thought of war against the Boers was clear in his mind: “I shall never enter into such a war with a light heart, and at the present moment we have no reason either of

¹²² Porter, “British Imperial Policy”, 44.

¹²³ Fitzpatrick, J. P. “The Transvaal from Within”, in *Europe and Africa: Commerce, Christianity, Civilization, and Conquest* (London: William Heinemann, 1900), 162.
http://gdc.galegroup.com/colorado.idm.oclc.org/gdc/ncco/MonographsDetailsPage/MonographsDetailsWindow?disableHighlighting=false&displayGroupName=DVI-Monographs&docIndex=&source=&prodId=NCCO&mode=view&limiter=&display-query=&contentModules=&action=e&sortBy=&windowstate=normal&currPage=&dviSelectedPage=&scanId=&query=&search_within_results=Jameson+Raid&p=NCCO&catId=&u=fort17418&displayGroups=&documentId=GALE%7CBBLTY859019519&activityType=BasicSearch&failOverType=&commentary=

right or interest which would justify the enterprise... I do not believe there will be a war—but Kruger will not be wise if he dismisses that possibility altogether from his calculations, or assumes that if it comes the result will be favorable to him”.¹²⁴ For Chamberlain, the idea of Britain going to war against the Boers was “perhaps the most trying moment in his whole career”.¹²⁵ Chamberlain, who had played one of the largest roles in the Jameson Raid, next to Rhodes and Jameson, clearly stated in his memorandum that the possibility of war against the Boers was very present, stemming from the failed raid as well as his and Rhode’s goal to drape the British flag over the South African Republic.¹²⁶

Between one and two years before the beginning of the South African War, Sir Alfred Milner believed that war against the Boers was inevitable. Alfred Milner was sent to South Africa in 1897 as high commissioner by Chamberlain, and Milner said to him: “There is no way out of the political troubles of S[outh] Africa except reform in Transvaal or war. And at present the chances of reform in Transvaal are worse than ever”.¹²⁷ Speaking to Chamberlain, one of the key figures involved in the Jameson raid, Milner has made it very clear that Anglo-Boer tensions have gotten much worse since the failure of the Jameson raid and that any outcome, apart from war, would be impossible.

Another notable political leader who voiced important remarks towards the Jameson Raid was Jan Smuts. Though an Afrikaner, Jan Smuts was initially sympathetic towards the British Empire’s cause in South Africa, having been raised in the Cape colony, and received education at Cambridge University.¹²⁸ Following the Jameson raid, however, Smuts heavily opposed Britain’s pressure towards the Boers, as the state attorney of the Transvaal.¹²⁹ In

¹²⁴ Poel, *The Jameson Raid*, 183-184.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 183.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 183.

¹²⁷ Muller, *Churchill as Peacemaker*, 124.

¹²⁸ Kuitenbrouwer, *War of Words*, 182.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 182.

1906, four years after the South African War, Jan Smuts as Prime Minister of South Africa wrote: “the Jameson Raid was the real declaration of war in the Anglo Boer Conflict... [The] aggressors consolidated their alliance...the defenders on the other hand had silently and grimly prepared for the inevitable”.¹³⁰ Like Winston Churchill, Smuts believed that the Jameson Raid was the event that truly started the armed conflict of the South African War, claiming it to be a declaration of war. Smuts also notes the Boer’s alliance, which was a notable result of the raid. Like the telegram sent by Sir Hercules, the Boers truly felt ready for combat against Britain both during and following the raid.

In relation to the South African War, the Jameson raid was the first British offensive against the Boers, and was what truly set off this great conflict. The raid was planned as an excuse for the British Empire to take over the Boer territories of South Africa and to exploit its resources and riches, specifically gold. In the aftermath of the raid, Anglo-Boer relations heavily diminished and fingers from around the world were pointed at the British for acting in such a selfish and careless way. With Anglo-Boer relationships diminishing, both sides began preparing for a great conflict, which further fueled their negative beliefs towards one another.

I have presented first-hand accounts of a great number of political representatives from both sides between the British Empire and the Boer Republics of South Africa. Though some of the accounts presented do not openly connect the Jameson Raid to the spark that set off the South African War, there were heavy implications that the Anglo-Boer conflict in South Africa of that period would become much worse. Each account has come to the conclusion that because of the Jameson Raid, the long-lasting Anglo-Boer feud in South Africa had reached its final breaking point where both sides would then attack each other not with words or policies,

¹³⁰ Fermont-Barnes, *The Boer War*, 22.

but with fire and metal for almost 3 years. The effects of these years, the South African War of 1899-1902, would still be felt in many years, and many conflicts, to come.

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The Superior Diplomacy of Amílcar Cabral

Luke Hartauer

The revolution in Guinea-Bissau, formerly known as Portuguese Guinea, lasted from 1963 to 1974. It ended in the establishment of an independent Guinea-Bissau, freed from the heavy hand of Portuguese colonialism. Many thousands lost their lives, the country was terrorized, and Portugal drained its coffers, contributing to an internal revolution within Iberia. The war in Guinea-Bissau required aid from all corners of the country, and eventually all corners of the world; it would not have been possible without the growth of national unity among Guineans in the face of Portuguese atrocities. One figure stands out: Amílcar Lopes da Costa Cabral, the leader of the *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (PAIGC). He was not only a driving force behind the cause, but also helped build, direct, and lead the efforts of the PAIGC and the country up until his assassination at the hands of a plot by the *Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado* (PIDE), the ruthless Portuguese secret police. As Al J Venter writes in his book about his experience as a war correspondent in Guinea-Bissau, “the PAIGC without Cabral would, relatively speaking be like a United States without its first citizen. In the words of another PAIGC delegate at the same OAU summit: ‘Cabral is the PAIGC and the PAIGC is Cabral’”.¹³¹

Cabral and his party the PAIGC promoted nationalism, unity, anti-terrorism¹³², adherence to international law, cooperation among African nations, and recognition that the true enemy of the Guineans was not the Portuguese people but the ruthlessness and

¹³¹ Al J Venter, *Portugal's Guerrilla Wars in Africa: Lisbon's Three Wars in Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea, 1961-74* (Solihull, England: Helion & Company, 2013) 316.

¹³² Patrick Chabal, *Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War*. (Trenton, NJ, Africa World Press, 2003), 76.

exploitation brought by imperialism and colonialism. It was through this lens that Cabral contextualized the revolution in Guinea and made the struggle of his people known to the world. His policy of non-alignment, respect for international organizations, calm demeanor, and unmatched approach to dialogue won him respect, even among his enemies. Through the vehicle of the PAIGC, with Amílcar Cabral at the wheel, Guinea-Bissau was able to overcome great odds and liberate itself from the “colonial yoke of Portuguese Imperialism”.¹³³

Colonization was a relatively new phenomenon in Guinea-Bissau. Prior to the late nineteenth century, the Portuguese only controlled a few coastal towns and forts that allowed them to trade in the region, and had allowed them to buy slaves since 1446.¹³⁴ The actual efforts to fully colonize the area, especially inland, were precipitated by the ‘Scramble for Africa’ by the major European powers, and Portugal wanted to have a claim over the territory. From 1870 to 1936, the Portuguese launched multiple military campaigns to pacify the populace.¹³⁵ Arguably, the Portuguese did not effectively control Guinea until at the earliest 1936, and most of the population never fully accepted Portuguese governance. In comparison to the other Portuguese colonies in Africa, only 2,263 white Europeans lived in colonial Guinea.¹³⁶ The area was never given away to white settlers for farms or businesses, and the economies of both Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde primarily centered around subsistence farming. The recentness of Portuguese colonialism combined with the lack of an entrenched white-elite in Portuguese Guinea helped catalyze the revolution.

¹³³ Amílcar Cabral, “The nationalist movement of the Portuguese colonies,” *Revolution in Guinea: Selected texts by Amílcar Cabral*. (NYC, NY, Monthly Review Press, 1969), 80.

¹³⁴ Peter Karibe Mendy, "Portugal's Civilizing Mission in Colonial Guinea-Bissau: Rhetoric and Reality." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 36, no. 1 (2003): 37.

doi:10.2307/3559318.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹³⁶ Chabal, Amílcar Cabral: Revolutionary, 20.

However, this effort was not easily achieved, and took years of planning among the leaders of the PAIGC, which was founded in 1956 by Cabral, his brother, and four other leading figures among the revolution.¹³⁷ Cabral was born in Portuguese Guinea in 1924, but lived most of his life in Cabo Verde, a colony that had a special relationship with Portugal. Although Cabral's family was not poor, Cabo Verde and Portuguese Guinea were both very impoverished regions, and the failure of Portuguese colonial governance was evident to Cabral and his contemporaries. He was able to attend university in Lisbon, a rarity for many Portuguese colonial Africans, and became an agronomist¹³⁸. Cabral spent some of his time working in the Alentejo as an agronomist at the beginning of his career, where he analyzed the farming methods and techniques of the farmers in Portugal's poorest region. Cabral's job as an agronomist helped to form much of his later political theory as he was often interacting with the poorest people in a given region, usually subsistence farmers. He also took assignments in Mozambique and Angola before settling permanently back in Guinea-Bissau, it was those two assignments that put him in close contact with the revolutionary movements in the respective countries. However, it was while working in the Alentejo that he was able to connect the struggle of the farmers of the region to struggle of the African people: both were weighed down by the fascist regime of Portugal. Although Cabral recognized that the poor and destitute of Alentejo were not under the imposition of colonialism, their plight was similar in that the system did not provided them with opportunities or mobility, much like the situation in Africa. However, in Portuguese Africa, the people had to deal with the additional burden of being governed by a people from a foreign land and with a very different agenda.

¹³⁷ Basil Davidson, *No Fist is Big Enough to Hide the Sky* (Zed Books Ltd, 2017), 15.

¹³⁸ Agronomy is an agricultural subspecialty concerning crop production and land use.

In 1953, Cabral was hired by the government of Portugal to do fieldwork in Portuguese Guinea and report back on his findings on the agricultural status of the territory. He was able to use this experience, interacting with native peoples all across Guinea from different backgrounds to gain a much more complete understanding of the people of the Guinea and the landscape of the country.¹³⁹ Although he distrusted initially due to his status as a state-employed Cabo Verdean, Cabral was able to gain an idea of what life was like in the country and the obstacles that faced his fellow countrymen. The reason Cabral was so interested in agronomy and why his survey in Guinea-Bissau resonated so greatly was because of his adolescent experiences in Cabo Verde. Reflecting in 1969 on his upbringing in the mismanaged agricultural economy of Cabo Verde, Cabral said, “I saw folk die of hunger in Cabo Verde and I saw folk die from flogging in Guiné (with beatings, kicks, forced labour), you understand? That is the entire reason for my revolt”.¹⁴⁰ This experience solidified his dedication to the cause of equality in Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde.

Cabral’s focus on non-alignment and the desire to be recognized as quickly as possible by foreign powers and international bodies set him apart from other revolutionaries. He publicly acknowledged help from the Soviet Bloc, China, and Cuba, and proclaimed his respect for socialism without declaring himself or the PAIGC as either socialist or Marxist. Oftentimes, either if asked or when giving speeches, he would make known what countries were helping the struggle. For example, when asked about which countries were offering the PAIGC aid, he answered that,

We want to mention the special aid given to us by the peoples of the socialist countries. We believe that this aid is a historic obligation, because we consider that our struggle also constitutes a defence of the socialist countries. And we want to say particularly that the Soviet Union, first of all, and China, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and other

¹³⁹ Chabal, Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary, 48.

¹⁴⁰ Mendy, “Portugal’s Civilizing Mission,” 56.

socialist countries continue to aid us, which we consider very useful for the development of the armed struggle.¹⁴¹

The aid from the socialist nations would be the most significant the PAIGC would receive throughout the war. Almost all of the weapons that were procured by Cabral (truly at his own expense) came from the USSR via the allied nation of Guinea where the PAIGC headquarters was located.¹⁴² Many of the early guerrillas and political leaders were sent to China or Russia for training; Cabral himself received military training in China before the actual armed struggle began in 1963. However, this blatant acknowledgment of aid from socialist countries did not mean that Cabral was aligning with the Soviet or Chinese side in the greater Cold War context. Cabral was often asked if he was a Marxist or Leninist or Communist, and to give an example of a usual response, he once replied, “if you decide it is Marxism, tell everyone it is Marxism...but the labels are your affair; we don’t like those kind of labels”.¹⁴³ Cabral had studied Marx while at university in Lisbon; certainly, his ideas were heavily influenced by Marxism, but only as far as they served the interests of the people of Cabo Verde and Guinea-Bissau.¹⁴⁴ Cabral had decided early on that no single ideology was right for his people, his understanding of the struggle in Africa combined with the fact that he had no previous political experience gave him a unique position to develop a theory entirely his own. As Chabal writes, “Cabral was first and foremost a nationalist. Nationalism, not communism was his cause. But he was also a humanist, a socialist, and above all a pragmatist. His political values were largely based on moral commitments... although a political optimist, he was basically a realist.”¹⁴⁵

¹⁴¹ Cabral, “Practical problems and tactics,” 149.

¹⁴² Dhada, Mustafah. "The Liberation War in Guinea-Bissau Reconsidered." *The Journal of Military History* 62, no. 3 (1998): 583. doi:10.2307/120438.

¹⁴³ Chabal, Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary, 87.

¹⁴⁴ Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa; 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2009), 186.

¹⁴⁵ Chabal, Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary, 168.

This kind of unwavering public stance against alignment with any specific ideology helped the movement's efforts in garnering support from a wider base of countries than many other liberation movements.¹⁴⁶ This was also clear in the years after Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde gained independence, during which both countries received considerably more foreign aid from the international community than other recently liberated countries.¹⁴⁷ Not only was Cabral averse to aligning with an ideology in public, but all the PAIGC writings produced under his leadership were devoid of references to any singular-overarching idea or movement. The lack of references to a mono-ideology in the PAIGC writings helped not only the international effort, but also greatly assisted internal party cohesion. Because there was no 'party line', dissenters within the party could voice their opinions with less fear of fierce pushback.¹⁴⁸ This skillful and important aspect of Cabral's politics helped retain internal unity and gather international support, but the way in which Cabral did not admonish any certain theory, ideology, or nation—except for the ones that actively supported imperialism and neo-colonialism—also points to something deeper.

It is interesting to note that one of the heaviest supporters of PAIGC was, naturally, the governments of African nations, but Cabral himself was often displeased with the amount of aid the party received from the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Cabral used the vehicle of the *Confêneria das orgnizações nacionalistas das colónias portuguesas* (CONCP) to help gain recognition for the PAIGC by the OAU in 1964.¹⁴⁹ He needed the CONCP to help him gain the support of the OAU because Guinea-Bissau was a small country and the OAU had a policy of helping all nationalist parties within a given independence struggle. As Cabral solidified the

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 87.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 87.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 65.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 86.

position of the PAIGC as the rightful governing force for Guinea Bissau, the support from the OAU increased, but as Cabral remarked during a speech:

I have said to the African heads of state many times, that the aid from Africa is very useful, but not sufficient. We believe that they could do better, and so do they. Last June in the Rabat summit meeting [of the OAU] they agreed to increase their aid by 50 percent. Why didn't they do this before? We know that they had not only financial and economic difficulties, but political difficulties as well. In some cases, the difficulty was a lack of consciousness about the importance of this problem.¹⁵⁰

This was not the only time he would mention how African nations could play a larger role in aid sent to Guinea-Bissau, but he never directly admonished them in public. Instead, he used a tone of understanding that still called on additional aid from the OAU, aid that he believed the OAU wanted to supply as well. This truthful yet clear approach to dealing with allies and enemies helped Cabral earn a winning reputation across the world.

Non-alignment was an important stance; it earned the PAIGC support and aid from many countries, not just the socialist, revolutionary, or African nations. Luiz Cabral (Amilcar's brother) would later say, "[Amilcar's] aim was to generate maximum support for the struggle, thus creating the best conditions in order to obtain maximum aid. Essentially the strategy was to call on *all* anti-colonialist forces."¹⁵¹ Cabral was also one of the few leaders to be able to maintain support from both China and the Soviet Union. In a surprising move, Sweden also began to offer aid to the PAIGC in 1969, becoming the first Western country to do so. Cabral would later say that the PAIGC was receiving more from Sweden than most of the Eastern Bloc combined.¹⁵² This was strengthened in 1972 by the move from two other Scandinavian

¹⁵⁰ Amilcar Cabral, "Connecting the Struggles: an informal talk with Black Americans," *Return to the Source: Selected Speeches of Amilcar Cabral*. Edited by Africa Information Service. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), 81.

¹⁵¹ Chabal, Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary, 86.

¹⁵² Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 212.

countries, Norway and Denmark, to also supply the PAIGC with aid.¹⁵³ Both countries were members of NATO, and were therefore actively aiding enemies of their ally. The following year, the Netherlands and Finland both decided to follow suit with promises of aid. Thus, in four years, the PAIGC had secured aid from the entirety of Scandinavia, despite most of the region being allied with Portugal.

These nations were not the only western entities to support the PAIGC. Multiple councils and organizations across the Western world gave support and aid to the PAIGC, especially as the war dragged on. Two important organizations to note are the World Council of Churches and the Vatican itself.¹⁵⁴ In an embarrassing blow to Catholic Portugal, the Pope granted an audience to Cabral and the other revolutionary leaders of Portuguese Africa. In 1970, with Cabral, Agostinho Neto (Angola), and Marcelino dos Santos (Moçambique) present, Pope Paul VI said, “the Church and we ourselves are on the side of those who suffer. We are for the peace, the freedom, and the national independence of all peoples, particularly the African peoples...We pray for you”.¹⁵⁵ This overt recognition of support by the Pope gave credence to all revolutionary wars being fought by the people of Africa under Portuguese control, specifically Angola, Mozambique, Cabo Verde, and Guinea-Bissau. It was also a major blow to Portugal, which aligned itself heavily with the Catholic Church, as did Franco’s Spain. This further damaged Portugal’s public stance that the African people wanted to be under the control of the Portuguese colonial machine. The event further showed how Cabral was able to muster support even from Portugal’s usual allies.

¹⁵³ Lars Rudebeck, *Guinea-Bissau: A Study of Political Mobilization* (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1974), 56.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 56.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 56.

While the PAIGC received support from a multitude of countries, the aid and ideas that came from Cuba were among the most important to the PAIGC efforts, and Cubans ended up being the only people who fought in Guinea-Bissau alongside the guerilla fighters of the PAIGC.¹⁵⁶ Cabral reaching out to Cuba in 1963 sparked this relationship and it was solidified by Che Guevara's trip to Africa in 1965, along with Castro's growing interest in Africa.¹⁵⁷ Cabral had immense respect for Castro and his revolutionary bent, thinking of him as one of the leading freedom fighters of their time. When Cabral visited Cuba in 1966 for the Tricontinental Conference in Havana, American intelligence reported, "everyone was struck by [Cabral's] great intelligence and personality. Fidel was very impressed by him".¹⁵⁸ This relationship greatly profited Cabral and the PAIGC, Cuba would end up supplying almost all the doctors for the Guinea-Bissauan war effort, along with officers knowledgeable about the use of high-tech Soviet weaponry. It also benefited Castro because he was helping a country rebel directly against an important NATO ally. This also connected Latin American revolutions to those in Africa.

Cabral had explicitly stated that, "we want no volunteers...they would rob my people of their one chance of achieving a historical meaning for themselves: of reasserting their own history, of recapturing their own identity".¹⁵⁹ Yet, Cabral allowed the Cubans in, mostly out of necessity, for the PAIGC was severely lacking medical aid and highly trained officers. But it was also allowed because Cabral trusted the Cubans, who were able to send black personnel to blend in Guinea-Bissau and Castro never publicly stated anything about troop assistance in Guinea-Bissau. Cuban soldiers and doctors who fought and worked with the PAIGC were

¹⁵⁶ Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 212.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 186, 212.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 187.

¹⁵⁹ Davidson, *No Fist is Big Enough*, 62.

sworn to secrecy, instructed to tell family and friends they were going to study in Moscow.¹⁶⁰ This policy of secrecy was not quite as effective on the ground in Guinea-Bissau, Cabral's brother later remembered that "it soon became public knowledge that the men who were driving the PAIGC trucks were Cubans; they were the only ones in Conakry who smoked cigars!"¹⁶¹ Regardless of how public the knowledge was among the Africans, American intelligence, and others, it never became mainstream knowledge and so Cabral's idea about the revolution being fought by Guineans was kept intact. This important relationship can best be summed up by Cabral himself, speaking to Cubans in August 1966. "I don't believe there is life after death," he told the Cuban soldiers, "but if there is, we can be sure that the souls of our forefathers who were taken away to America to be slaves are rejoicing today to see their children reunited and working together to help us be independent and free".¹⁶² This important diplomatic relationship was much more than that, and Cuba's aid to Guinea-Bissau was vital in the successful war effort, and one can say definitively that it would not have worked so smoothly if it weren't for Cabral's extraordinary character and belief in his own revolution. It is also interesting to note that although the Americans were keenly aware of the support Cuba was giving Guinea-Bissau; they did worry about it affecting the larger Cold War conflict because Cabral was so effective at his public policy of non-alignment.

Cabral worked hard to not alienate countries or organizations from supporting the PAIGC, but that is not to say that he did not lodge criticism against Portugal's allies, specifically NATO. In a statement released by Cabral in 1968 he says:

In the basic fields of economics, finance and arms, which determine and condition the real political and moral behavior of states, the Portuguese government is able to count more than ever on the effective aid of the NATO allies and others. Anyone familiar with the relations between Portugal and its allies, namely the USA, Federal Germany and

¹⁶⁰ Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 204.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 189.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 198.

other Western Powers can see that this assistance is constantly increasing, in the most diverse forms, overt and covert.¹⁶³

Portugal received almost of all its large weaponry and aircraft from NATO allies. Although the charter of NATO explicitly states that each country should only use such weapons to protect its own borders and the borders of other NATO allies, the Western Powers did very little to curb Portugal's use of NATO weapons for their colonial wars in Africa. This apparent cynicism to Cabral as well as some foreigners, one of the best descriptions of the contradiction of NATO weaponry used to kill far less-armed Africans comes from Basil Davidson, a former English spy who spent time with PAIGC guerrillas during the war. He writes:

Next morning, back at base camp in Quitafine, I walk across the parade ground and find, in the shadow of a hut, a large fragment of an unexploded napalm canister dropped at the same time as the one that scorched Tengbatu. It is neatly printed with its identity: FCM-1-55 NAPALM 300 KG – 350 L M/61. It is part of the military material which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization supplies to Portugal. For the defence of the Free World. A strange region, the Free World.¹⁶⁴

That is not to say that fellow NATO members lodged no protest against Portugal, but it was always a toothless chiding. These complaints came mostly from the different US administrations active during the war in Guinea-Bissau, of which many different members had a cursory respect for Cabral and his passion for his people.¹⁶⁵ The Air Combat Information Group (acig.org) has information on some of the US responses to air raids and missions by the Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau. They note, "the USA did not complain about the deployment of Sabre jet aircraft to Angola, but the presence of these fighters [in the war in Portuguese Guinea] was obviously disturbing for one reason or another".¹⁶⁶ However, the United States also had stakes in their military base in the Azores and would not allow its existence to be

¹⁶³ Cabral, "The development of the struggle," 124.

¹⁶⁴ Davidson, *No Fist is Big Enough*, 9.

¹⁶⁵ Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 194.

¹⁶⁶ Venter, *Portugal's Guerilla Wars*, 257.

threatened. Gleijeses, author of an extensive work on Cuban involvement in colonial Africa, sums it up best: “despite Kennedy’s uneasiness and the strong opposition of a few U.S. officials, the administration’s policy was clear: the base in the Azores was more important than self-determination in Africa”.¹⁶⁷ As long as military cooperation against the Soviet Union and the growth of communism remained in the interests of America and other NATO allies, no amount of rhetoric would cease the shipments of weapons to Portugal.

Another facet of Cabral’s international diplomacy was his outwardly known adherence to and acceptance of international law and international organizations, in particular the United Nations. He often mentioned the United Nations in his speeches and writings, especially criticizing Portugal’s non-compliance to its agreement with the UN to grant more rights to the people in its “overseas provinces”. Cabral also had the opportunity to speak in front of a UN commission in 1962, and twice in front of the fully assembled United Nations body in New York. In the ending of his speech to the commission, Cabral says: “the people of Guinea, reaffirming its confidence in the United Nations, hopes that the Organisation will not fail urgently to adopt specific and effective measures to oblige the Portuguese government to respect international law, and thus fulfill the weighty responsibilities incumbent upon it for the final elimination of colonialism in Guinea”.¹⁶⁸ This call on the United Nations made Cabral and the PAIGC appear to respect international law while the Portuguese flagrantly disobeyed it. But it also reflects another notion of Cabral’s: the only way to prevent discord and imperialism in the future was through an organization such as the United Nations, which represented all the peoples of the world. Later that same year speaking before the United Nations General Assembly, Cabral makes a profound comparison:

For us, the only difference between the Indian soldier, the Italian pilot or the Swedish administrator who dies in the Congo and our comrade who dies in Guinea or the Cabo

¹⁶⁷ Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, 195.

¹⁶⁸ Cabral, “Excerpts of a Statement in Conakry to United Nations Special Committee,” 49.

Verde Islands is that by acting in our country for the same ideal we are simply *anonymous soldiers for the UN*... The names of our comrades who have fallen victims of the Portuguese colonialists are not on the files of the UN. We have never been paid or equipped by the UN, nor do we have any budget assigned to cover the ever-increasing costs of our struggle. But in the uneven struggle which we are forced to wage we are nonetheless at the service of the UN, defending its prestige and the respect owed by all governments to the resolutions of an international character which it has adopted.¹⁶⁹

By appealing to the member states and equating all the peoples fighting colonialism, he actively decried imperialism and aggressive capitalism, but he differed in the way that he also appealed to the authority of international bodies as a way to keep the peace throughout the globe. Using the United Nations as a platform, Cabral was able to garner support for Guinea-Bissau from the different member states while also delivering rhetoric that explicitly tied Guinea-Bissau to the United Nations through their anti-colonial efforts.

After Cabral's last visit to the United Nations in 1972, he organized a meeting of at least thirty different organizations representing African-Americans. Once again, Cabral was connecting the struggle of the revolution in Guinea-Bissau to other efforts fighting oppression around the globe. Cabral said:

We try to understand your situation in this country. You can be sure that we realize the difficulties you face, the problems you have and your feelings, your revolts, and also your hopes. We think that our fighting for Africa against colonialism and imperialism is proof of understanding of your problems in this continent. Naturally the inverse is also true. All the achievements toward the solution of your problems here are real contributions to our own struggle. And we are very encouraged in our struggle by the fact that each day more of the African people born in America become conscious of their responsibilities to the struggle in Africa.¹⁷⁰

Cabral's appeal was similar to others made by the leading Africanists of the time, and is reminiscent of his speech to the Cuban soldiers. The idea of the Pan-Africanists was to connect African people and their descendant's peoples across the world and to unite, because they had all suffered under the oppression of colonialism. The awakening to African

¹⁶⁹ Cabral, "Anonymous soldiers for the United Nations," 52.

¹⁷⁰ Cabral, "Connecting the Struggles: an informal talk with Black Americans," 76.

consciousness was strong at the time, and had helped fuel Cabral's initial drive to free his homeland from the Portuguese colonial machine. During a speech to the Portuguese speaking nations of Africa (CONCP), he said,

our hearts are also with our brothers in Cuba, who have shown that even when surrounded by the sea, a people is capable of taking up arms and successfully defending its fundamental interests and of deciding its own destiny. We are with the Blacks of North America, we are with them in the streets of Los Angeles, and when they are deprived of all possibility of life, we suffer with them."¹⁷¹

Cabral's impressive ability to bring together varied groups with different ideologies and speak to them all simply and eloquently was one of the many ways in which he won allies across the globe.

Along with Cabral's international diplomacy and efforts to establish cordial relationships with many entities, it is also important to understand some of his own political thinking. Upon the founding of the PAIGC in 1956, Cabral and the five other founding party members laid out a vision for a movement that Cabral stuck to for the rest of his life. That meeting produced a six-point plan, the latter four points of which are necessary for an overall understanding of PAIGC thought. Those points are:

3. Develop and reinforce unity around the Party of the Africans of all ethnic groups, origins, and social strata.
4. Prepare as many cadres as possible, either inside the country or abroad, for political leadership and the successful development of our struggle.
5. Mobilize emigres in neighbouring territories so as to draw them into the liberation struggle and the future of our people.
6. Work to acquire the means that will be needed for success. So as to guarantee the security of a part of the leadership, and to develop the struggle outside, the Party decided to transfer its general secretariat outside the country.¹⁷²

The policy laid-out upon the founding of the party helped keep the leaders of the movement grounded. It is remarkable that the all the while Cabral was alive, the party maintained a very

¹⁷¹ Cabral, "The nationalist movement of the Portuguese colonies," 81-82.

¹⁷² Davidson, *No Fist is Big*, 17.

precise vision of their goal for the nationalist movement within Guinea-Bissau was. The fact that it took only seven years after Cabral's death for the party to begin repressing dissenting views further solidifies the argument that Cabral was central to the very fabric of the Party's goals. He had a very clear picture of what the revolution's purpose, never falling prey to the folly of dogmatism. Cabral wrote in 1965:

Always remember that the people are not fighting for ideas, nor for what is in man's mind. The people fight and accept the sacrifices demanded by the struggle in order to gain material advantages, to live better and in peace, to benefit from progress and for the better future of their children. National liberation, the struggle against colonialism, the construction of peace, progress and independence are hollow words devoid of any significance unless they can be translated into a real improvement of living conditions.¹⁷³

Cabral had no illusions about what the revolution stood for, and what he and his people were trying to achieve. His success as a politician and diplomat stemmed from his adherence to the truth and rational acknowledgment of real problems. He was not averse to admitting he was wrong and welcomed input about how the PAIGC could improve and better the lives of the people of Guinea-Bissau. He came out against execution for a means of retaliation, because he never wanted to create an atmosphere where the party became a totalitarian state. Cabral was often very candid about his own mistakes and articulated them well. He would often surround himself in Conakry with party traitors in an attempt to "rehabilitate" them, which left him surrounded by people who did not like him or were plotting against him, but he still believed he could change their minds by talking to them and being around them.¹⁷⁴ In that same document quoted above, Cabral later writes: Every responsible member must have the courage of his responsibilities, exacting from others a proper respect for his work and properly respecting the work of others. Hide nothing from the masses of our people. Tell no lies. Expose lies whenever

¹⁷³ Chabal, Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary, 105.

¹⁷⁴ Chabal, Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary, 135.

they are told. Mask no difficulties, mistakes, failures. Claim no easy victories...¹⁷⁵ This speech is a perfect example of the exacting standards to which Cabral held his party.

Cabral's diplomacy was considered so persuasive and his dialogue was so feared that Michael Caetano, the fascist president of *O Estado Novo* (The New State), would not allow the ranking Portuguese general in Guinea-Bissau, General António de Ribeiro de Spínola, to conduct negotiation talks with Cabral. It was feared that Cabral would talk Spínola into very generous peace terms that would grant Guinea-Bissau independence, becoming the first domino to fall in Portuguese Africa. This fear held by the Portuguese government was the reason that they tried so hard to hold onto Guinea-Bissau in the first place. This fear was so deeply rooted that the Brazilian commentator Marcio Lavez wrote, "to hold on to the Empire was fundamental for Portuguese fascism. Economically, the African territories – and especially rich Angola – were so important to Portuguese capitalism that Caetano took over from Salazar on the condition that they would be defended".¹⁷⁶ Guinea-Bissau was not a wealthy colony and did not provide a large benefit to the Portuguese, but the government of Portugal feared that if they let it go, all the other colonies would fall behind them. This fear caused the Portuguese to deploy around 35,000 Portuguese troops and 5000 African mercenaries by 1968¹⁷⁷, and the war was already costing the Portuguese government at least 350,000 USD per day by 1965.¹⁷⁸ By 1970, "the Portuguese deployment represented a troop level in proportion to the Portuguese population [that was] five times greater than that of the United States in Vietnam in the same year."¹⁷⁹ This strain on the economy and the massive deployment of soldiers across

¹⁷⁵ Cabral, "Tell no lies, Claim no easy victories...", 89.

¹⁷⁶ Venter, Portugal's Guerilla Wars, 213.

¹⁷⁷ Davidson, No Fist, 42.

¹⁷⁸ Mustafah Dhada, "The Liberation War in...", 584.

¹⁷⁹ Venter, Portugal's Guerilla Wars, 227.

Portuguese Africa sharply increased civil discontent in Portugal and ultimately led to the end of fascism in the country.

Cabral also made an effort to remind the people of Portugal that he was not fighting them in particular, and he repeated this same statement of the citizens of other NATO countries. In a declaration to *Voz de Liberdade* radio in 1969, Cabral said:

We know (and I speak as a technician) that Portugal has the means of offering a dignified life to all of its sons. That is to say that it is their own country which the Portuguese must defend and build with their efforts and sacrifices, and in a certain future they will collaborate with us of Guinea and Cabo Verde, and we will all link hands fraternally, on the basis of history, of friendship and of all the ties that unite us...In relation to the demonstrations against the colonial wars which have recently taken place in Portugal, we must say that we appreciate them greatly and are following them very attentively. We have always said to our people is a worthy people which in the course of history has already made an outstanding contribution to the evolution of humanity.¹⁸⁰

He was able to demonstrate the truth of his words by releasing Portuguese prisoners of war back to Portugal. Twice, he released them along with a statement explaining his reasons, which harkened back to the words that he had been repeating since the beginning of the war, that the people of Portugal were united with the peoples of Africa. Upon the first major release of prisoners, Cabral wrote, "the freeing of Portuguese soldiers captured by our armed forces was both necessary and predictable. This humanitarian gesture, whose political significance will escape nobody, is the corollary of a fundamental principle of our party and our struggle. We are not fighting against...Portuguese individuals or Portuguese families."¹⁸¹ This appeal to the Portuguese people was not purely out of a deep solidarity Cabral imagined he had with them (although that was present as well). The appeal also served a political point that went beyond his desire to appear noble and reasonable on the international stage. Cabral was convinced that the success of the African nationalists against Portuguese colonialism would

¹⁸⁰ Cabral, "Message to the people of Portugal," 154-155.

¹⁸¹ Cabral, "On freeing captured Portuguese soldiers-I," 127.

bring down the fascist regime in Lisbon, but he did not believe that would reverse was necessarily true.¹⁸²

Cabral not only made overtures to the people of Portugal, but also to Portuguese opposition parties, many of which were operating in exile. This outreach was aimed at securing a future for the people of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde if a revolution in Portugal preceded the military victory against the fascist regime. As Chabal in his seminal biography on Cabral writes, “This policy towards Portugal, and the PAIGC’s ‘clean’ war, gained Cabral and his party great popularity in Portugal itself.”¹⁸³ Cabral’s appeal to the people of Portugal and his recognition of the importance of unity among the peoples of all Portuguese-speaking countries is important. It gives further credence to Cabral’s stance on unity in the face of oppressive governments or economic systems, one in which all the world’s peoples are united. This belief in people went so far that it also helped to indirectly kill him. He refused armed bodyguards and tried to reform party members suspected of defecting or of spying for PIDE.¹⁸⁴ Some members of the party were perturbed by Cabral’s unbending adherence to his set of principles. His brother, Luiz Cabral later said, “my brother did not like to take sanctions because for him unity was priceless...He did not understand that a revolutionary struggle also has its own requirements and that one simply cannot trust everyone. He did not understand that national consciousness in Guiné and Cabo Verde was still fragile.”¹⁸⁵ It is easy to think of Cabral as an idealist, especially when he had suspected-traitorous party members surround him at the PAIGC headquarters in Conakry. But perhaps it’s the strict adherence to principle that kept Guinea-Bissau and the PAIGC on its non-alignment path and allowed it to become the first Portuguese colony in charge of its own land.

¹⁸² Chabal, Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary, 88.

¹⁸³ Ibid., 88.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 135.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 136.

Amilcar Cabral, at the helm of the PAIGC, successfully led the liberation war against the Portuguese. Even though he was assassinated in 1973, he created a movement that was in control of ninety-percent of the land in Guinea-Bissau. Independence and international recognition of Guinea-Bissau and Cabo Verde came within a year after Cabral's death, and the international relationships that Cabral founded and maintained during his tenure as the General Secretariat of the PAIGC helped Guinea-Bissau during its infant years as an independent state. One can only speculate the different future Guinea-Bissau could have had if Cabral had not died at the age of 48. Following Cabral's death, Cabo Verde quickly decided that it wanted to be its own separate nation, only linked to Guinea-Bissau by warm relations. Although the PAIGC remains the main political force in Guinea-Bissau today, without the unity that Cabral insisted upon, the party quickly succumbed to infighting and executions. By 1980, the first coup had removed Luiz Cabral from power, and the country has been plagued by coups and civil wars ever since. Today, it is classified as one of a handful of "narco-states" in which wealthy drug traffickers effectively control the government.

The sad state of affairs in Guinea-Bissau today does not take away from the incredible feat achieved by Cabral and the people of Guinea-Bissau. A small country on the west coast of Africa was able to defeat Portugal, a NATO ally with more advanced weaponry, more advanced training, and a much larger economy. This was made possible by the outstanding diplomacy of Cabral. He was able to maintain relations with a wide and diverse group of countries and organizations that in turn supplied military and economic aid to the PAIGC. Under Cabral's control, the PAIGC gained international recognition and respect, and the revolution in tiny Guinea-Bissau became an international issue. Cabral's adherence to his principles and to his open and reconciliatory stance towards Portugal helped propel Guinea-Bissau to an independence that was unlike other former European colonies.

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The Scots and the Two Revolutions

Anne Lopez

On February 18th, 1776, British loyalist forces marched on American-revolutionary held capital of Wilmington, North Carolina. However, these men were not part of the British military, they were the inhabitants of nearby Cross Creek, rallied by Allan and Flora MacDonald to fight for their crown. They were Scottish Highlanders, recently emigrated from Skye, and carried with them on their attack the traditional tartans, claymores, and bagpipes. Apocryphal records of the attack describe Flora riding before them on a white horse before the battle, rallying them through a speech to stay loyal to their king.¹⁸⁶ The revolutionaries were prepared for their assault, however, and quickly repelled them.¹⁸⁷

On its own, this incident would just be an unusual and somewhat amusing anecdote, but considering the historical context makes it even stranger as this took place only thirty years after the end of the last of the Jacobite Rebellions in 1745. As Highlanders, many of the Scots of Cross Creek came from families that stood against the House of Hanover's ascension to the throne and faced violent retribution for it.¹⁸⁸ Flora MacDonald and her family had sheltered Prince Charles, the figurehead of the rebellion, from British authorities and smuggled him out of Scotland, and faced imprisonment for it.¹⁸⁹ The British had even outlawed many of the Scottish cultural symbols they brought with them on their American attack. The American Revolution was a rebellion against the king whose family the Jacobites saw as usurpers to the rightful throne of the Stuarts. And yet these Scots stood with the crown. Furthermore, this was not an

¹⁸⁶ Hugh, Douglas, *Flora MacDonald: The Most Loyal Rebel* (Gloucestershire: Alan Sutton, 1993), 168.

¹⁸⁷ Fry, Michael, *How the Scots Made America* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2003), 25-26.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 25

¹⁸⁹ Fremont-Barnes, Gregory, *The Jacobite Rebellion 1745-46* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2011), 78.

isolated incident. During the American War of Independence, the majority of Scots in the North American colonies sided with the British Empire.

Evidentially, something changed in the relations between the British and the Scottish within the three decades between the Jacobite Rebellion of '45 and the American War of Revolution. Interactions between the two peoples were much more complicated than the cruel British oppressing the freedom-loving Scots or the Highlander Barbarians terrorizing their southern neighbors. The empire, while hostile to the Jacobites specifically, could also provide success and prosperity to the Scots who cooperated, and the so-called New World held many of these opportunities. The Scottish population of the North American colonies generally remained loyal to the British Crown during the American Revolution because, between an improvement of their economic and social standings and the rough relationships between the Scottish and the English colonists, it was much more beneficial for the Scots to stay than to rebel.

The Jacobite Rebellion and Its Aftermath

The Jacobite movement arose from the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The English Parliament, fearing that King James II was too sympathetic towards Catholics and would place a Catholic heir on the throne, deposed him and replaced him with the Protestant William of Orange from the Netherlands. Those who opposed this move and wished to restore James II and the House of Stuart to the throne became known as Jacobites. As the Stuarts came from Scotland, many in the Highlands, which were less Anglicized and therefore more Catholic than the Lowlands, supported them. Some Episcopalians, as another religious group outside of the official Church of England, backed the cause as well. While there were unsuccessful uprisings in 1689 and 1708, the last and most well known rebellion began in mid-1745 with the arrival of James II's grandson Charles Edward Stuart in Scotland. Charles became a rallying point for the Jacobites, who at first enjoyed great military success against

the British in their quest to place his father and James II's son James Francis Edward on the throne. The British army soon recovered and began to push the Jacobite forces back into the Highlands, culminating in a disastrous rout at Culloden on April 16, 1746. Charles fled to France, and the Jacobite cause collapsed.

British aggression towards the Highlanders did not end with the rebellion's failure. In the so-called "pacification of the Highlands", the British army committed widespread retaliatory violence ranging from the destruction of Catholic and Presbyterian churches to the sexual assault of Highlander women. Even clans that had not participated in the rebellion or sided with the British were not always safe from their wrath. The army seized huge numbers of cattle, the main source of food and income for many Highlanders, leading to widespread starvation and economic devastation. While relatively few Jacobite prisoners were executed, the courts transported around a thousand of them to the colonies.¹⁹⁰ The legislature also imposed strict laws on Catholic and Episcopalian churches, abolished the ability of lairds to legislate their own estates, and even banned traditional Highlander clothing until 1782.¹⁹¹ While the Highlands would later see some economic improvement afterwards, they had little agriculture and were still far behind the Lowlands in manufacturing. Furthermore, many landlords raised their rents to drive off unwanted tenants.¹⁹² It would seem logical that these acts would not be soon forgiven or forgotten by the Highlanders.

The Scots in the Colonies

When the Union of 1707 legalized Scottish immigration to the North American British colonies, they attracted a mix of Scottish people diverse enough that it would be a mistake to

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 85-86.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 89.

¹⁹² Graham, Ian Charles Cargill, *Colonists from Scotland: Emigration to North America, 1707-1783* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), 8.

treat them as one uniform group.¹⁹³ Both Highlanders and the more Anglicized and economically integrated Lowlanders, emigrated to the colonies. The emigrants also included the Ulster Scots, also known as the Scotch-Irish or Scots-Irish, who began to arrive in New England in sizable numbers circa 1718. These were ethnic Scots who hailed from Ulster, Ireland, and were predominately Presbyterian.¹⁹⁴ They created their own settlements separate from those of mainland Scots, most notably in the backcountry of the Appalachians.¹⁹⁵

Some of the Scots arrived as indentured servants, sometimes unwilling. Even prior to the Union of 1707, Scottish courts could deport criminals and vagrants to the colonies.¹⁹⁶ In 1716, over six hundred Jacobite prisoners were transported to the Chesapeake colony to serve as indentured servants. They were forbidden from returning to the British Isles, but were able to settle as free men once they'd served the length of their contract.¹⁹⁷ Another group of about one hundred and eighty-five Jacobites found a similar fate in South Carolina.¹⁹⁸ After the failure of the '45 rebellion, more than nine hundred prisoners sent to American plantations; unfortunately, there are few surviving records as to what became of them.¹⁹⁹ At least four hundred and twenty-five were sent to the West Indies, though one ship escaped indentured servitude after being seized by French privateers from Martinique, who refused to return the Scots to British authorities and instead freed the would-be captives'.²⁰⁰ Not all indentured servants were prisoners however; many were just people who could not have otherwise

¹⁹³ Ibid., 9.

¹⁹⁴ Dobson, David, *Scottish Emigration to Colonial America, 1607-1785* (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1994), 83.

¹⁹⁵ Graham, *Colonists from Scotland*, 19-20.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., 9-10.

¹⁹⁷ Dobson, *Scottish Emigration*, 95.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., 104.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 96.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 125.

afforded to cross the Atlantic. Furthermore, not all Jacobite supporters who moved to the colonies were necessarily deported, some emigrated voluntarily for their own safety.²⁰¹

For the Scots, one of the biggest draws of the colonies was new economic opportunity. Prior to the Union of 1707, Scots could not legally trade with the colonies due to the Navigation Acts, which restricted colonial trade to be exclusively with Britain, although Scottish smugglers had worked in North American waters before that.²⁰² Scottish periodicals gave readers enticing descriptions of the New World to draw emigrants. In 1734, the *Caledonian Mercury* said of Georgia that, “the people settled there is about 500, who have already cleared from 2 to 4 acres of land each, and planted them with corn, potatoes, pease [sic], beans, yams, cabbages, &c...They have plenty of horses, cattle, hogs, fish, poultry, and wild turkey from 20 to 30 pounds weight each...the climate and soil is equal in Goodness to the best part of [Italy].”²⁰³ Such a description must have been highly appealing to people who could not pay the rents on farms or find much other work, even if it meant indenturing themselves to get over there.

Another element that brought Scots to the colonies was military service. In the 1730s, several Highlander regiments who had served the imperial army in the Americas discharged; some settled in New York, others returned to Scotland but with a favorable view of the colonies that may have attracted their neighbors to emigrate.²⁰⁴ As the imperial army was their employer, these soldiers and their families were usually loyal to the crown. In Georgia, which the empire had created in part to be a buffer between the Carolinas and the Spanish-controlled Florida and hostile Native Americans, the governor specifically sought out Highlander colonists,

²⁰¹ Ibid., 100-101.

²⁰² Ibid., 94.

²⁰³ Parker, Anthony W. *Scottish Highlanders in Colonial Georgia: The Recruitment, Emigration, and Settlement at Dairen, 1735-1748* (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1997), 38.

²⁰⁴ Dobson, *Scottish Emigration*, 89.

creating the settlement of Dairen.²⁰⁵ Colony secretary Benjamin Martyn justified the recruitment of Highlanders as they could both fight and farm:

In pursuance of his majesty's charter, and in order to fulfill the good intents and purposes therein expressed, it was thought necessary for the Trustees to send such poor people, and foreign Protestants, as were willing to live in Georgia, not only to cultivate the lands, but at the same time to strengthen His Majesty's Colonies. For which purposes they considered each inhabitant, both as a planter and as a soldier; they were therefore to be provided with arms for defense, as well as tools for their cultivation, and to be thought the exercise of both...Each lot of land was to be considered as a Military fief.²⁰⁶

The fiefdom that Martyn mentions still existed in the land system of the pre-1745 Highlands. While this proposition regarded Highlanders as different than other prospective British colonists, it was not necessarily a dangerous difference but one the Georgian administration could use to benefit the empire.

The Scots had a much greater role in British military ambitions than just as buffers against unwanted neighbors. In 1729, Duncan Forbes proposed recruiting Highlander clansmen to serve as local, all-Scottish regiments. In 1730, the army assembled six Highlander regiments that became known as "independent companies". They usually operated in the districts from where their members hailed.²⁰⁷ In an area with limited economic opportunity, long-standing cultural martial traditions, and restrictions on civilians carrying weapons even before the '45 Uprising, it was an appealing position to many young Highlander men.²⁰⁸ While still part of regular British military units, Scots displayed their heritage by wearing the tartans of their commanders' clans as part of their uniforms and carried dirks and broadswords alongside their firearms.²⁰⁹ While initially used for maintaining British control in the Highlands, these units

²⁰⁵ Parker, *Colonial Georgia*, 20.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 21.

²⁰⁷ Forbes, Archibald, *The Black Watch: The Record of an Historic Regiment* (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1910), 3-4.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 10-11.

became valuable enough to see action overseas. Two of these companies even fought with the British army against the Jacobite rebels of 1745, even if it meant fighting their own kinsmen, and assisted in the violent “pacification” of their homeland.²¹⁰ The 1756 declaration of war against France in what would become known as the Seven Years’ War saw the arrival of a regiment of around 1,300 Highlander soldiers in North America.²¹¹ These men played a key role in many major battles, including the Second Battle of Ticonderoga in 1759. At Fort Ticonderoga, the 42nd Regiment, nicknamed the Black Watch for their black bear hats, became notorious for their stubbornness against retreating, even in defiance of orders. It cost them dearly; the regiment lost 314 men, with 324 soldiers wounded.²¹² While their obstinance earned them the ire of their British commanders, it also shows a high level of dedication to their jobs as soldiers.

The Black Watch was also one of the Scottish regiments deployed to North America to fight for the British during the American War of Independence. They were part of the main force commanded by General Howe, alongside other non-English troops such as the “Hessian” Germans, and spent the early part of the war highly successful against the patriot forces.²¹³ The Black Watch was also present at the Siege of Lucknow in 1857 during the Indian Rebellion. Alongside Welsh and Irish regiments, they participated in the capture of the city with minimal losses of their own men, and one lieutenant amongst their ranks even earned a Victoria Cross for his bravery in the field.²¹⁴ In 1899, the Black Watch was sent to reinforce British troops in the South African War, where they aided in the capture of the Orange Free

²¹⁰ Ibid., 36-37.

²¹¹ Ibid., 46.

²¹² Ibid., 53.

²¹³ Ibid., 99-102.

²¹⁴ Ibid., 293.

State capital of Bloemfontein.²¹⁵ The British Empire had gone from suppressing a violent revolt in the Highlands to using the people of that land to combat other revolutions.

The Views of the Colonial Englishmen

Another factor to consider is how the colonists of English ancestry, who made up the majority of the colonies' population, saw their Scottish neighbors, along with the rebellion that some of them attempted. One colonial reaction to the Jacobite Rebellion comes from a sermon from Thomas Prince (1687 – 1758). Prince, a Congregationalist minister from Massachusetts, gave the sermon several months after the Battle of Culloden and it was later published in pamphlet form. Prince praises the victory as a “Great Deliverance” from God against the “impious Idolaters”.²¹⁶ He credits the empire's success to its current line of monarchs: “Under the happy Reigns of these *four* Protestant and most gracious SOVEREIGNS, the *British* Nations have enjoyed such Civil and Religious Liberty, Trade, Wealth and Prosperity, as they never knew before; and wherein they have been and are incomparably happier than any other People on the Face of the Earth.”²¹⁷ However, a Jacobite victory would bring unmitigated horrors upon these good English Protestants. “As in such a horrible Scene as this, the City of *London* wou'd be run down with *Blood*; so all the immense *Treasures* of the *Protestants* therein wou'd be suddenly seized; Whereby their remaining Families wou'd be beggared and ruined, as also Multitudes of wealthy Families thro' the Kingdom who have their Wealth in *London*, and He and his Popish Party infinitely strengthened.”²¹⁸ Once this “papist” was in power, “...He would doubtless immediately order all the *Protestants* to bring in to Him their Arms and Ammunition...And thus all the *Protestants* disarmed wou'd lie at his Mercy, and he might easily

²¹⁵ Ibid., 318.

²¹⁶ Prince, Thomas, A sermon delivered at the South Church in Boston, N.E. August 14. 1746. Being the day of general thanksgiving for the great deliverance of the British nations by the glorious and happy victory near Culloden (Boston: Henschman and Kneeland & Green, 1746), 6.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 10.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 14.

do what He pleased.”²¹⁹ (Ironically, Prince acknowledges that the crown similarly disarmed the Catholics, though does not linger on the morality of that.) The Jacobites would then oppress the Protestants, or even

if his *popish* Priests and Politicians should think it best or safest, or the shortest Way, to fire the Cities of *London, Bristol*, and others, or commit a *general Massacre*, as have been in *France and Ireland* on the *Protestant Part*; he would have sufficient Power by his *popish Arms*; yea, ‘tis likely wou’d think, his Religion, Conscience, Interest, eternal Salvation, and temporal Safety, wou’d conspire to oblige Him...and as He has learnt in *France*, order their *Children* to *popish* Priests or Nuneries [sic]; yeah, for this End, the ancient *Monstry* [sic] and *Abby-Lands* wou’d no doubt be taken away from the present Owners, as sacrilegious Intruders, and restored to their superstitious Uses.²²⁰

Prince then claims that the Stuarts would give Britain’s Caribbean colonies to other Catholic states to pay off debts, and that “Cruel *Papists* would quickly fill the *British Colonies*, seize our Estates, abuse our Wives and Daughters, and barbarously murder us; as they have done the like in *France and Ireland*.”²²¹ This fear mongering prediction of what a Jacobite victory could have produced shows that a strong anti-Jacobite sentiment existed in at least some colonists.

Of course, Mr. Prince’s views on the Jacobites do not represent those of all Anglo colonists of this time period, but there are other pieces of media that record hostility towards the Scots. Some of these hailed from Britain while reprinted in the colonies. One of these was a pamphlet entitled “The Jacobites [sic] Catechism”, written around the time of the earliest Jacobite uprising by Benjamin Bird, a rector from Dorset. It presents an interview with a nameless Jacobite explaining his beliefs. This Jacobite is an unsubtle straw man who declares his intentions to “foment the Differences amongst all Protestants whatsoever,” and to “keep the wounds of the Church open and bleeding...and villifie [sic] moderate Men and Men of *healing Spirits*.”²²² He even says that the Jacobites no longer follow the commandment to

²¹⁹ Ibid., 15.

²²⁰ Ibid., 17-18.

²²¹ Ibid., 18.

²²² Bird, Benjamin, *The Jacobites Catechism* (Boston: London Coffee House, 1692), 4.

“Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy self, or do as thou wouldst be done unto.”²²³ As that commandment was one directly given by Jesus in the New Testament, Bird implies this Jacobite, and by extension all his comrades, are not real Christians anymore. The pamphlet then interviews a Williamite—a supporter of James II’s replacement William of Orange—who explains in a rational and more positive manner why a Catholic is not fit to govern them. As this pamphlet precedes the latter two uprisings in 1724 and 1745 and even the legalization of Scottish immigration in 1707, material such as this made it the American colonies before the arrival of most Scots.

The anonymous 1724 pamphlet *The Madness of the Jacobite Party* takes a similar approach in depicting the Jacobites as irrational. The author says that one must assume the Jacobites have lost their reason, “for it is most unreasonable to suppose, that Men who are blest’d with the free exercise of Reason, should endeavor to subvert the present Happy Constitution both in Church and State, and to set on the British Throne a *Pretender*, who, if ever he comes, will most certainly bring in *Popery* and *Slavery* with him.”²²⁴ The pamphlet argues that no sane mind would try to get rid of the current king, then George I, and replace him with the Stuarts, not just because the Catholics would inevitably bring, but because the Protestant kings brought such good to their subjects, acknowledging “His Majesty’s paternal Care & Tenderness, in desiring to ease His Subjects from all unnecessary Burdens, &c. ... His Majesty is pleased to found the Grandeur of the Crown, in the Security of the Liberties of His People, and His Glory in promoting their Prosperity.”²²⁵ To this pamphleteer, supporting the revolution was a threat to the life, liberty, and property of good British subjects, and thus a

²²³ Ibid., 5.

²²⁴ Author Unknown, *The Madness of the Jacobite Party* (Boston: D. Henchman, 1724), 1.

²²⁵ Ibid., 5.

clearly irrational act, with no real consideration of the actual reasons the Jacobites wanted to restore the Stuarts.

Granted, these works are more anti-Jacobite and anti-Catholic than anti-Scot in general, and thus would not apply to many Scots who came to live in the colonies. However, documents show signs of hostility towards other groups of Scots, including the Presbyterian clergy. For example: *A narrative of a new and unusual American imprisonment, of two Presbyterian ministers, and prosecution of Mr. Francis Makemie one of them, for preaching one sermon in the city of New-York*. As the long form of the title implies, it is a record of the 1707 trial and imprisonment for two Presbyterian ministers, John Hampton and the Ulster Scot Francis Makemie, who were arrested in New York for preaching at a private residence without a proper license. While this was an actual law, Makemie's main argument in his and Hampton's defense during the trial was that said law was a violation of the 1689 Toleration Act, giving freedom of worship to certain religious nonconformists outside of the Church of England.²²⁶

Makemie explicitly frames this as an attack on their Presbyterian faith, saying,

And it will be unaccountable to *England*, to hear that *Jews*, who openly blaspheme the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, and disown the whole Christian Religion; *Quakers*, who disown the fundamental Doctrines of the Church of *England*, and both Sacraments; Lutherans, and all others, are tollerated [sic] in your Lordship's [Lord Cornbury, then governor of New York and prosecutor of this trial] Government; and only with the Act of Toleration, and are nearest to, and likest the Church of *England* of any Dissenters, should be hindered, and that only in the Government of *New-York* and the *Jerseys*.²²⁷

As this is from Makemie's own account of the event, it is possible that this was just a licensing dispute he reframed to make himself look better, though a previous incident where Lord

²²⁶ Makemie, Francis, *A Narrative of a new and Unusual American Imprisonment* (New York: Gaine, 1755), 3

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

Cornbury had seized a Presbyterian church despite the reverend had a proper dissenter license suggests he was genuinely hostile towards Presbyterians.²²⁸

These sources present colonists as mistrustful of outsiders, particularly religious ones. Quotes from Anglo colonists also support this. One Marylander in 1718, in a letter complaining of a Scottish clergyman recently removed from his position for inappropriate behavior, said, “It would be better for parishes to remain vacant than to be supplied with young men from Scottish universities.”²²⁹ This hostility did not fade over time; a Bostonian complained in 1775, “Your king seems to be infatuated with a parcel of Scotchmen and Jacobites. At least this is the best excuse that can be made for his conduct, and keeping them about him. If this was not the case, he would have removed his evil councilors long since, and thereby healed this unhappy quarrel [between the colonists and the Parliament].”²³⁰

Faced with this unfriendliness, it is not unsurprising that Scots tended to prefer their own company to that of the English. Scottish merchants and lawyers depended on widespread family networks for their businesses.²³¹ They formed the Scots Societies and St. Andrews Societies, headed by Scots who held reputable occupations such as doctors, clergymen, lawyers, and traders.²³² These were charitable organizations that also became political machines.²³³ One of the most powerful and notorious was the club in Savannah, which fought to keep free people of color out of the Georgia colony so that they could not compete with whites for low-paid positions. While they did not succeed, the governor of Georgia passed wage regulations and removed restrictions on the purchases of land originally placed by the

²²⁸ Page, Isaac Marshall, *The life story of Rev. Francis Makemie* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1938), 153-154.

²²⁹ Dobson, *Scottish Emigration*, 100.

²³⁰ Graham, *Colonists from Scotland*, 128.

²³¹ Dobson, *Scottish Emigration*, 90.

²³² *Ibid.*, 138.

²³³ Graham, *Colonists from Scotland*, 131-132.

colonial charter.²³⁴ Political organization such as this gave them substantial political power. Between the Union of 1707 and the end of the American War of Independence of 1783, there were around thirty Scottish governors and lieutenant governors in the colonies.²³⁵ Scottish and English parties competed for elected offices, making them political rivals. By the time of the revolution, the Scots made up their own distinct communities who did not necessarily share the same goals and desires as those of English decent.

Against a New Revolution

Some historians attribute the Scots' loyalty to the crown as an extension of a natural Scottish conservatism.

The loyalty of the Highlander in America to the Crown was a logical extension of his unquestioning obedience to his immediate landlord. It is true that some of the Highland peasants became independent farmers and appreciated the advantages of their new status. But at Cross Creek and elsewhere in North Carolina, the chief center of active Highland loyalty, the overwhelming majority of the immigrants follow those who had been their leaders in Scotland and who had accompanied them to the American colony.²³⁶

Michael Fry's *How The Scots Made America* holds a similar opinion: "Scotland was an old country, which maintained its traditional ways of life in conservative defence [sic] of them: revolution could do no good, but on the contrary was likely to wreak harm."²³⁷

Regardless of how conservative the Scots actually were, some Anglo colonists seem to view them as holding dangerous outdated ideas. To return to Thomas Prince's sermon, he derides the Jacobite cause for supporting the concepts absolute monarchy and the divine right of kings.

He [Charles] is also full perswaded [sic] that *his Father* has a divine, hereditary, absolute, unalienable Right, by Birth, to rule the *British Nations*, whether they will or not, or tho' they are ever so much against Him; that no Degree or Kind of Tyranny can forfeit his pretended Right; that 'tis lawful for Him to destroy Half the Nation, that He may have

²³⁴ Ibid., 134-138.

²³⁵ Ibid., 142.

²³⁶ Ibid., 150.

²³⁷ Fry, *How Scots Made America*, 27.

the Pleasure of reigning over the Reft; that if his *Father* gets the Throne, let Him do what He pleases, and rule ever so cruelly, yet the Nation are but as Beasts of Burthen for him, the must make no Resistance, they must tamely submit, and mayn't presume to judge of Him or his Actions.²³⁸

Ironically, Prince later claims that the Stuarts were illegitimate to begin with, then derides on the same page the Tories for supporting any king for his supposed divine right. Similarly, *The Madness of the Jacobite Party* refers to Catholic nations as “those Countries whose Kings are *Arbitrary*, by a fixed unalterable Constitution; where the People are *wretched Slaves & Vassals to Tyrants*, than *Subjects unto Kings*.”²³⁹ The natures of the Jacobite Rebellions and the American Revolution were inherently different, as the former was to restore a deposed monarch to the throne and the latter became a fight to be free of kings.

Yet some Scots were on the side of the American revolutionary cause. The Ulster Scots supported the Americans, especially once other European powers joined the war against the British. A conflict this massive put an enormous strain on British resources, and they could not afford a similar uprising in Ireland and thus give the Irish a better position from which to bargain.²⁴⁰ Four of the men who signed the Declaration of Independence in 1776 were Ulster Scots or of said ancestry.²⁴¹ On the intellectual side of things, Scottish philosopher David Hume said of the Americans that “I am American in my principles, and wish we would let them alone to govern or misgovern themselves as they think proper.”²⁴² He opposed Britain’s imperial activities, but on a practical ground, as any empire that overstretched itself ran the risk of growing corrupt and collapsing as Rome did.²⁴³ However, as Hume was an atheist, many religious Scots viewed him with suspicion.²⁴⁴ Within the colonies themselves, two of the signers

²³⁸ Prince, A sermon, 13.

²³⁹ Author Unknown, *Madness*, 2.

²⁴⁰ Fry, *How Scots Made America*, 27.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 35.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 29.

²⁴³ *Ibid.*, 30.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 31-32.

of the Declaration of Independence—John Witherspoon of New Jersey, a Presbyterian lawyer, and James Wilson of Pennsylvania, also a lawyer—were born in mainland Scotland.²⁴⁵ Thirteen other delegates had Scottish ancestry, but that does not mean they were guaranteed to have any concern for the Scots. Thomas Jefferson of Virginia, descended from minor Scottish nobility on his mother’s side, complained in a draft of the Declaration of Independence of the “Scotch and foreign mercenaries” that George III had sent after them, though the other delegates edited it out.²⁴⁶ Those Scots who supported or even joined the Patriot cause were mostly outliers whose positions gave them motivations different than the majority of the Scots.

Finally, Fry gives one major reason as to why the former Jacobites did not see the American Revolution as a chance to get back at the British: “After 1745 they had just escaped seeing their cherished national institutions – Church, law, and universities, all guaranteed under the Union of 1707 – taken from them by vengeful Englishmen. So there was no mileage for the Scots in siding with the revolt in another part of the Empire. The second motive lay in the benefits that the Empire was bringing the Scots. Their trade had expanded, and the economy of their country was moving forward. They thought that much of the improvement depended on the imperial connection. Loud commitment to this connection could bring its own rewards if, as most Scots expected, the Americans were soon defeated.”²⁴⁷ The events of the Jacobite rebellion and what followed it had taught the Scots that rebelling only brought devastation, while standing with the empire brought prosperity; they had no reason to rebel any more.

Conclusion

²⁴⁵ Ibid., 32-34.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., 35.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., 26-27.

For many of the Scots living in the colonies, the British Empire was the source of their prosperity. The middle class had found a place for their professions and businesses. Even some of the poorer immigrants had used the transportation brought by their indenturing contract to find a better life across the ocean. This new revolution, full of people who had long viewed them as rivals to their own success, threatened to destabilize what they had. With all these factors considered, it is not surprising that the Scots stood with the British Empire, even after the destruction of the '45 Uprising.

Ironically, it may have actually been more beneficial to rebel this time. The American rebels had one key to success that the Jacobites had sought but never received: the aide of Britain's archrival France. As such, the British could not preserve the prosperity the loyalists hoped they would keep. Hostility from their Patriot neighbors and the growing threat of war looting drove many loyalists to New York City, which the British occupied from September 1776 until November 1783, two months after the Treaty of Paris formally ended the war. Among them was the MacDonald family, who had rallied their Highlander neighbors to fight for the king at Cross Creek.²⁴⁸ The revolutionary forces captured most of the MacDonald men and held them for several months while the family estate fell into financial ruin from plundering.²⁴⁹ Allan MacDonald became a captain in the British forces, and was eventually reassigned to Fort Edward in Nova Scotia in 1778.²⁵⁰ His wife and Jacobite heroine Flora soon returned to London in 1779, then to their old home in Skye.²⁵¹ They were not alone, as many Scots were among the loyalists leaving the former colonies for Canada or other parts of the empire. Without the British Empire, it was no longer advantageous to stay.

²⁴⁸ Douglas, 187.

²⁴⁹ Ibid. 178-180.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., 194.

²⁵¹ Ibid., 198.

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Liberalism, Race, and the South African War:
Setting the Conditions for Segregationist South Africa

Anna Wood

Introduction

The South African War proved a **pivotal moment** in the history of British colonialism and its legacy of white supremacy. While racial discrimination existed in Africa and around the world long before the war broke out in 1899, certain conditions in the socio-political environment during and after the war led to a new kind of state-sponsored segregation that would characterize South African life for decades to come. Specifically, the British hoped the treaty that resulted from the South African War would ensure economic stability and lead the Boer republics to join a union of southern African states. This desire for a confederation led the British to largely push aside any regulation of the historically discriminatory traditions of Afrikaners. The "Native Question," as it was commonly known, was swept under the rug.²⁵² This outcome differed significantly from how black Africans expected a British victory to impact their rights. With many educated both in European thought and British liberal ideology, and still more having served the British army during the conflict, Africans looked forward to a more egalitarian South African culture supported by British racial legislation after the war. Instead, **the results of the South African War helped to establish the system of segregation that ultimately gave way to apartheid in the aftermath of the Second World War.**

The South African War

Commonly known as the Boer War, the South African War was the second in a two-part conflict between Boer, or Dutch, settlers and the British imperial administration. These two wars were also preceded by a series of conflicts with native African peoples. The Boers had

²⁵² "Peace Treaty of Vereeniging - original document," 1902, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/peace-treaty-vereeniging-original-document>.

been the first European settlers of southern Africa, landing in the Cape during the seventeenth century. By the early nineteenth century, however, the British had become the dominant power in the region. They implemented a series of reforms, most significantly the abolition of slavery in 1833. Seen as an intrusion into their way of life, these reforms angered many Boers and some British settlers, prompting a migration out of the Cape Colony, known as the Great Trek.²⁵³ The trekkers moved north away from the cape, and settled areas that would later become the Orange Free State, the Transvaal Republic, and Natal. While Natal quickly became a British colony similar to the Cape, the other two states remained largely independent and historically took pride in this independent culture, a significant factor in their resistance during the South African War.

In the mid-nineteenth century, southern Africa witnessed a mineral revolution, prompted by the discovery of rich gold and diamond mines in the Kimberly and Witwatersrand regions. Many scholars argue these mineral riches provided the catalyst for the South African War,²⁵⁴ which began with an event known as the Jameson Raid. In a plot cooked up by colonial officials and gold-mine tycoons, men in the employ of Cecil Rhodes invaded the Transvaal and attempted to incite an uprising. Although a failure, the raid indicated to the world that war was imminent. Under President Paul Kruger, the Transvaal began to mobilize and invited its allies in the Orange Free State to do the same. The Boers framed the conflict as a fight against imperial aggression, necessary to preserving their independent way of life. Even though they knew conflict was coming, the British were significantly less prepared when the war broke out in December 1899, and suffered heavy losses during the first phase of the war. As they slowly escalated their commitment to the war, the British launched an offensive into the Boer

²⁵³ Nancy L. Clark and William H. Worger, *South Africa: The Rise and Fall of Apartheid*, 2nd ed (Harlow, England; New York: Longman, 2011), 13.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid*, 15.

republics and captured significant cities such as the capital of the Transvaal. In return, the Boers implemented a massive guerilla campaign against the British. Eventually, with the aid of General H. H. Kitchener's harsh scorched earth policy, the war ended with the 1902 Treaty of Vereeniging.²⁵⁵

Black Involvement in the War

At the beginning of the South African War, the British and the Boers made a tacit agreement that this would be a "White Man's War."²⁵⁶ As it turned out, however, both Boer and British forces depended on Africans, both in combatant and non-combatant roles. Africans did everything from transport and supply jobs to veterinary duties and sanitary work.²⁵⁷ Within the Boer forces, Africans tended to fill the role of camp followers and scouts more than combatants. These participants, known as *agterryers*, were often the servants of the farmers and other citizens that made up the commando ranks. Although the Boer armies rarely armed Africans, it was not unheard of for some to serve as occasional marksmen against the "Coloured" scouts serving the British.²⁵⁸ On the other hand, it was much more common for Africans to fill combatant roles in the British forces. By the end of the war, "Kitchener admitted to having provided firearms to 2,496 Africans and 2,939 Coloureds in the Cape, and 4,618 Africans in Natal, Orange River Colony, and Transvaal, 10,053 in all."²⁵⁹ These statistics are also supported in British parliamentary reports,²⁶⁰ for Africans frequently joined the fight in

²⁵⁵ Bill Nasson, *The Boer War: The Struggle for South Africa* (Stroud, Gloucestershire: History Press, 2011).

²⁵⁶ Peter Warwick, *Black People and the South African War, 1899-1902*, African Studies Series 40 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 6.

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 21.

²⁵⁸ Oxfordshire Light Infantry Chronicle (1902), 83, in Bill Nasson, *Abraham Esau's War: A Black South African War in the Cape, 1899-1902* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 94.

²⁵⁹ Warwick, *Black People and the South African War, 1899-1902*, 25.

²⁶⁰ H. H. Kitchener, "Dispatch by General Lord Kitchener, Dated 8th March, 1901, Relative to Military Operations in South Africa.," March 8, 1901.

response to British promises that their civil and political rights would be much improved following the end of the war.

Both the Boers and the British disapproved of the other's use of African soldiers and arming of black Africans. Where British newspapers scoffed at the fact that Africans would fight for a group of people who treated them so poorly, Boer officials were enraged by the idea that the British were arming so many blacks.²⁶¹ By condemning the arming of African actors by the opposing side while also utilizing African soldiers themselves, both the Boers and the British strove to keep the war as close to a white-man's conflict as possible. This effort to keep non-white actors out of the war reveals the true motivations of the British army. Even though British officials recognized the necessity of extra soldiers in the conflict, their clear reluctance to trust nonwhite soldiers demonstrates the depth to which they planned to follow through on promises to African participants.

The Existing Legislation

Throughout the war, assurances of civil rights protection brought Africans into the conflict on the supposed side of progress.²⁶² These promises significantly influenced African support, largely due to the existing oppression that they lived under throughout southern Africa. Before 1910, the southern African states were largely independent, each with relatively distinct laws and cultures. Thus, it is important to look at their legislation and regulation of race in slightly separate terms, while still recognizing the over-arching historical processes that impacted the region. The Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State, having formed partly in reaction to the British reforms of the 1830s, regulated the franchise of black Africans in



²⁶¹ "Moral Aspects of War," Chicago Daily Tribune (1872-1922), March 12, 1900, 172973376, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Chicago Tribune; Warwick, Black People and the South African War, 1899-1902, 17.

²⁶² Warwick, Black People and the South African War, 6.

stricter ways.²⁶³ Natal, under the influence of British imperialism, did not have a strict color bar on voting laws, but made unapologetic rules to disqualify nonwhite inhabitants of the colony.²⁶⁴ The Cape, while boasting a color-blind franchise law, still allowed a significant amount of discrimination within its borders.²⁶⁵

The Boer Republics

The Orange Free State, often seen by the British as the lesser of the two Afrikaner evils, exemplified the racism inherent in Boer culture. However, from the beginning of its statehood, the Orange Free State made it very clear that white men, and white men only, would be considered citizens.²⁶⁶ The first article of the Orange Free State constitution, written in 1854, defined the qualification of burghers as being "white persons born in the State;" "white persons who have resided in the state for one year and have immovable property registered in their names to the value of at least 200 Rds;" and "white persons who have resided in the state for three successive years."²⁶⁷ From there, the constitution restricted the vote, many property rights, and the ability to hold office through racial qualifications. Despite these constraints, the Orange Free State expected Africans to be model citizens: loyal, but without any of the rights of political participation. For instance, in the Occupation Law of 1866, the Orange Free State established an early version of Colored Reserves, in which nonwhite peoples were meant to live and demonstrate "strict obedience" to the commands of the Executive Council, for which they were not allowed to vote.²⁶⁸

²⁶³ Clark and Worger, *South Africa*, 13.

²⁶⁴ G. W. Eybers, *Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African History, 1795-1910* (London: G. Routledge & sons, limited; New York, E. P. Dutton & co., 1918), 194.

²⁶⁵ P. Lewsen, "The Cape Liberal Tradition-- Myth or Reality?," *Race & Class* 13, no. 1 (January 1, 1971): 67.

²⁶⁶ James Bryce, *Studies in History and Jurisprudence* (New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch; London, H. Frowde, 1901), 364.

²⁶⁷ Eybers, *Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African History*, 286.

²⁶⁸ Eybers, *Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African History*, 319.

The Aborigines Protection Society claimed the state did not necessarily treat Africans worse than "in the British possessions."²⁶⁹ This claim derives from the Boer's regulation of slavery. At the Bloemfontein Convention in 1854, when the Orange Free State was first granted its sovereignty from the British Crown, Boer authorities agreed that the government would "permit no slavery, or trade in slaves, in their territory,"²⁷⁰ despite the fact that Boers had founded the Orange Free State after fleeing British reforms which had included the abolition of slavery. Perhaps this is what shaped the opinion of the Aborigines Protection Society. Still, the Boers in the Orange Free State had a legacy of state-sponsored racial discrimination, and, despite this one progressive step, they did not treat Africans as equals either in law or in practice.

The same kind of discrimination informs the constitutional documents of the South African Republic, also known as the Transvaal. While this state also abolished slavery upon its foundation, the South African Republic expressed its refusal of nonwhite political participation in much stronger language than the Orange Free State. The Franchise Law of 1876 stated, "no person not regarded as belonging to the white population of the S.A. Republic shall be enrolled as a burgher possessing the franchise."²⁷¹ Additionally, the Grondwet, or constitution, of the South African Republic began, "The people desire to permit no equality between coloured people and the white inhabitants."²⁷² This language reflects the strong emotions informing the racial thinking of Afrikaners.

The British Colonies (Natal & The Cape)

Natal, while officially a British colony, treated Africans more along the lines of the Boer Republics. While the franchise laws of mid-nineteenth century Natal did not specifically

²⁶⁹ Fox Bourne, "Blacks and Whites in South Africa, 76.

²⁷⁰ Eybers, *Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African History*, 284.

²⁷¹ *Ibid*, 439.

²⁷² Eybers, *Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African History*, 364.



legislate against nonwhite participation, settlers did produce a constitutional document aimed at "disqualifying certain Natives from exercising Electoral Franchise."²⁷³ The "Native Franchise Act" of 1865 restricted voting on the basis of property and residence criteria, which kept Africans from participating in the Natal government. The settling process driven by the Great Trek had shaped the culture of the state in ways similar to those of the Boer Republics, disrupting the legitimacy of its more liberal legislative policies. Natal, however, was never the emblem of British colonial liberalism in southern Africa. That distinction belonged to the Cape Colony.

The most anglicized colony during the nineteenth century, the Cape projected the image of British liberalism in southern Africa. Often referred to as Cape Liberalism, the government's policies included a color-blind franchise.²⁷⁴ Moreover, a constitutional provision established that all men who met certain property and residence requirements were eligible to vote and to hold office in the Cape Colony.²⁷⁵ After the 1880s, however, the growing Afrikaner Bond, "a political organization established to represent the interests of white Afrikaner farmers," worked to pass local regulations and raise obstacles for nonwhite voters.²⁷⁶ The group succeeded in passing the Franchise and Ballot Act of 1892, legislation that "raised the property qualification, and imposed an educational test for participation in parliamentary elections."²⁷⁷ Through similar acts, such as the Masters and Servants Acts, The Native Locations Act, the Certificate of Citizenship Act, and the Glen Grey Act, the Cape tightened its

²⁷³ Ibid, 194.

²⁷⁴ Paul B. Rich, *White Power and the Liberal Conscience: Racial Segregation and South African Liberalism, 1921-60* (Manchester [Greater Manchester]; Dover, N.H., USA: Manchester University Press, 1984), 135.

²⁷⁵ Eybers, *Select Constitutional Documents Illustrating South African History*, 45.

²⁷⁶ Julie Evans, ed., *Equal Subjects, Unequal Rights: Indigenous Peoples in British Settler Colonies, 1830-1910*, *Studies in Imperialism* (Manchester, UK; New York: Manchester University, 2003), 162.

²⁷⁷ Fox Bourne, "Blacks and Whites in South Africa, 47.

control of nonwhite residents, establishing early pass laws and the beginnings of the reserve system.²⁷⁸ Still, the Cape was regarded as the cradle of liberalism within southern Africa, and

the Afrikaner Bond did not control the majority in the Cape parliament. Most Africans, some Britons, and much of the international community expected the British colonial government in the Cape to govern according to classical liberal ideology. The British colonial government itself meant to do so. The administration not only worked to sustain liberal government of the Cape, but also sought to extend liberal principles across southern Africa. In 1898, Cape Prime Minister Cecil Rhodes promised "equal rights for every civilized man south of the Zambesi."²⁷⁹

British Promises

With the outbreak of the South African War, progressive Cape politicians no longer needed to court the conservative Afrikaner voters. Instead, Cape administrators began to offer strong offers of equality, hoping for African support during the impending conflict. Throughout the war, most British politicians and imperial officials, including Cecil Rhodes, British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury, British High Commissioner Alfred Milner, and Colonial Secretary Joseph Chamberlain, continued this "rhetorical commitment to justice and protection."²⁸⁰ Rhodes's promise of "equal rights for every civilized man" became well known among the Cape black elite.²⁸¹ Lord Salisbury assured that "due precaution will be taken for the kindly and improving treatment of those countless indigenous races of whose destiny I fear we have been too forgetful."²⁸² Milner even went so far as to say; "no basis for peace will be accepted...that does not secure Equal Rights for all civilised British Subjects, irrespective of colour."²⁸³ Cape

²⁷⁸ Ibid, 46-49.

²⁷⁹ Quoted in Evans, *Equal Subjects, Unequal Rights*, 165.

²⁸⁰ Nasson, *Abraham Esau's War*, 33.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Ian Loveland, *By Due Process of Law?: Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote in South Africa, 1855-1960* (Oxford; Portland, Or: Hart Pub, 1999), 62; Nasson, *Abraham Esau's War*, 33.

newspapers, including the *South African Spectator*, confirmed that British victory would allow Africans to "pass from the rod of oppression to the glorious heritage of free men."²⁸⁴

Bill Nasson argues the Cape administration established a "Boerophobia," to support the conceptualization of the "liberalizing presence of imperialism" and accomplish African recruitment.²⁸⁵ Africans and Britons alike feared the destructive force of Republicanism, as it endangered the Cape's market freedom, property rights, and equality before law. The rhetoric of the Cape administration utilized this fear to solidify public support.²⁸⁶ Joseph Chamberlain publicized the "disgraceful" treatment of black Africans in the Boer republics, deeming it "unworthy of a civilised power."²⁸⁷ This language of civilization versus barbarism frequently informed British wartime propaganda. In 1901, the *London Times* printed a profile of the Boer population written just after the Jameson Raid. It read, "we have to consider these people from a South African and not a European point of view...the Boer is shamefully cruel to natives...the coloured man has been treated as vermin and exterminated. One cannot defend such acts, but in rough communities they will happen."²⁸⁸ The British fiercely pushed the idea of the war as a civilizing, liberalizing mission. They painted the Boers as cruel, backwards people, who needed to be set straight. The British illustrated Boer treatment of blacks as a most "grievous sin," and juxtaposed this racism to their own progressivism, thus gathering wartime support from African peoples.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁴ *South African Spectator*, 20 April 1902, in Nasson, *Abraham Esau's War*, 33.

²⁸⁵ Nasson, *Abraham Esau's War*, 32.

²⁸⁶ Rich, *White Power and the Liberal Conscience*, 4.

²⁸⁷ Nasson, *Abraham Esau's War*, 33.

²⁸⁸ "Cruelty of the Transvaal Boer: [Final 2 Edition]," *The Times*; London (UK), December 31, 2001, sec. Features.

²⁸⁹ H. R. Fox Bourne, "Blacks and Whites in South Africa: An Account of the Past Treatment and Present Condition of South African Natives under British and Boer Control." (Adam Matthew Digital, 1900).

Black Expectations

The British seemed set on expanding the rights of Africans. Assurances from Milner, Rhodes, Chamberlain, and Lord Salisbury conjured up images of equality and respect for all races.²⁹⁰ In response to these promises, British newspapers reported on the surprisingly unwavering support from Africans, who had "every confidence in the justice of Britain's rule."²⁹¹ Memories of the abolition of slavery, ordinances demanding equality among blacks and whites, and the well-publicized color-blind franchise made it easy to think that the British promises of justice were genuine.

The black population of southern Africa looked forward to the extension of the Cape franchise after the South African War, and largely trusted the British promises. That said, one exception to this rule, African activist and newspaper owner John Tengo Jabavu, often spoke out against the legitimacy of the British colonial government. He was, however, a supporter of African political participation. He distrusted the colonial interest in the African vote, but still wanted as many Africans to register as possible. In his newspaper, *Imvo Zabantsundu*, Jabavu said, "history shows unmistakably that the votes of the natives have been used discreetly in the best interests of the country and of civilization, and that they have steadily and consistently been employed to strengthen the English or the party of right and justice in the House."²⁹² At the same time, he organized hundreds of Africans to register to vote and to petition the Queen for greater franchise rights.²⁹³ As the Afrikaner Bond lost influence with the outbreak of the South African War, the British progressives re-intensified their courtship of African peoples. Jabavu and other skeptics of British sincerity were pushed aside by groups like the South



²⁹⁰ Nasson, Abraham Esau's War, 33.

²⁹¹ "Moral Aspects of War."

²⁹² Imvo Zabantsundu, 30 March 1887, in T. R. H. Davenport, *The Afrikaner Bond: The History of a South African Political Party, 1880-1911* (Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 121

²⁹³ Evans, *Equal Subjects, Unequal Rights*, 162-163.

African Native National Congress and the African Political Organization, who clearly and vocally supported British colonial efforts and had full faith in liberalism.

The newly elected president of the South African Native National Congress, John Langelibalele, expressed his faith in the British in a letter to his colleagues. He cited a "sense of common justice and love of freedom" that was supposedly "so innate in the British character" that native rights would eventually triumph over "colour prejudice and class tyranny." He referred to himself and his followers as "citizens of the glorious British Empire," an empire that had taught them to "seek and strive" for political rights.²⁹⁴ He and many other Africans absorbed and internalized the rhetoric of administrators and educators when they invoked ideas of the war being a struggle for equality. Africans like Solomon Plaatje, mission-educated and residents of the Cape, took their right to vote very seriously, and used their literacy to strongly support the British empire against the Boer republics, "which offered no such political rights to Africans."²⁹⁵ Optimistic African liberals hoped that through an assimilation of British education and culture more Africans would "gradually be integrated into the political system."²⁹⁶ They would be proven to be sorely mistaken in their faith in Britain's intentions to live up to these ideals.



Shifting British Priorities

British actions before, during, and after the war largely undercut their strong promises of racial equality and liberalism. Their ambivalence toward African rights reflects a longer-term shift in imperial policy. During the nineteenth century, with all of its conflict and tension, Britain began to transform from a classically liberal empire to one focused on "new" imperialism. New

²⁹⁴ John Langelibalele, "Letter of John Langelibalele Dube, Accepting Position of President of South African Native National Congress, 2 February 1912," Text, (February 2, 1912).

²⁹⁵ Evans, *Equal Subjects, Unequal Rights*, 165.

²⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 166.

imperialism was a much more economically driven, exploitative brand of colonialism.²⁹⁷ Britain had historically pushed a policy of what Richard Parry calls "assimilation."²⁹⁸ Classical liberal colonialism was, for lack of a better description, a civilizing mission. With the second industrial revolution came an ideological shift. In South Africa, this shift can also be put into the context of the mineral revolution and military conflict of the late nineteenth century. New economic opportunities and a rising class of western-educated Africans began to challenge the traditional power structure. Instead of supporting a system of representative government, Britons saw Africans as "an insidious political threat to the stability and order of the frontier districts."²⁹⁹ Newly popular doctrines of progress through competition and pseudo-scientific racism bolstered a call for greater control of African peoples.³⁰⁰ As the social and economic structure of southern Africa shifted, imperial ideology evolved. Even before the war, resistance to liberalism in the existing legislation of Cape Colony foreshadowed this shift.

As we saw earlier, a series of legislative acts in the middle of the nineteenth century began to roll back the rights of Africans.³⁰¹ These actions indicated the British transition from previous assimilation policies to policies of control.³⁰² Even Cecil Rhodes, who had been recognized for his rhetoric for racial equality, shifted his language. With policies such as the Glen Grey Act of 1894, Rhodes created land and labor requirements that hindered African political participation and solidified their position as an unskilled labor force. He seemed to have no problem "maintaining a rhetorical commitment to inclusiveness while actively

²⁹⁷ Susan Kingsley Kent, "New Politics, New Imperialism," in *A New History of Britain since 1688: Four Nations and an Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

²⁹⁸ Richard Parry, "'In a Sense Citizens, but Not Altogether Citizens...': Rhodes, Race, and the Ideology of Segregation at the Cape in the Late Nineteenth Century," *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 17, no. 3 (1983): 379.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 383.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 378.

³⁰¹ Fox Bourne, "Blacks and Whites in South Africa," 46-49.

³⁰² Parry, "'In a Sense Citizens, but Not Altogether Citizens...,'"

promoting limitation.³⁰³ As time went on, "imperial racism was given legal and political expression" in the form of native protectorates, the South African Native Affairs Commission, and racial discrimination in the Witwatersrand mines.³⁰⁴ In one extreme case, John Merriman, a figurehead of the Cape's white population, "expressed the wish that there were no blacks in South Africa."³⁰⁵ Ultimately, "the aggressive assertion of white political and economic interests" took the form of an abandonment of classical liberalism.³⁰⁶

Some British officials attempted to stay true to at least some liberal ideals, if only minimally. In a letter of correspondence in 1877, T. Shepstone, a British South African administrator, stated, "equal justice must be guaranteed to the persons and property of both white and coloured, but the adoption of this principle does not, and should not involve equal civil rights, such as the exercise of the franchise by savages."³⁰⁷ In his 1909 address in Cape Town, high commissioner Lord Selborne argued, "it is a mistake to seek for a system which will apply equally and simultaneously to natives as to white men. On the other hand, I am not with those who say that the natives require no system of representation whatever."³⁰⁸ While neither of these sources seems to support the classically liberal ideals of representation, they cannot outwardly advocate the harsh controls of new imperialism. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries mark a period of transition as public rhetoric still attempted to be liberal in nature, even as political action shifted towards new imperialist control of the non-white laborer. This ambiguity between British action and rhetoric is exactly why so many Africans

³⁰³ Evans, *Equal Subjects, Unequal Rights*, 164.

³⁰⁴ Loveland, *By Due Process of Law?*, 65-67.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 33.

³⁰⁶ Parry, "In a Sense Citizens, but Not Altogether Citizens...", 380.

³⁰⁷ "Correspondence Respecting War between Transvaal Republic and Neighbouring Native Tribes, and Native Affairs in S. Africa (Maps)," 19th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers 60 (January 1, 1877).

³⁰⁸ Lord Selborne, "The Native Question in South Africa," *The Christian Express*, April 1, 1909, Nineteenth Century Collections Online.



misinterpreted what was to become of South Africa after the war. The Aborigines Protection Society thus understandably argued, "unless it is accompanied by a very great and comprehensive change in British policy towards natives, the contemplated overthrow of Boer rule can bring them no benefit."³⁰⁹ This prediction was not far from the truth.

The Results

In 1902, the Treaty of Vereeniging established the conditions for how the armies would be demobilized, how the Boer Republics would be annexed into the British Empire, and how the question of the "Native" franchise would be decided. Instead of taking the opportunity to strongly protect African rights, the British chose nonintervention. Article 8 of the treaty read, "The question of granting the Franchise to Natives will not be decided until after the introduction of Self-Government."³¹⁰ In the aftermath of the war, the British hoped for stable political conditions that would benefit the empire. Those who drafted the Treaty of Vereeniging willingly compromised African rights in exchange for this promise of economic and political stability. When Afrikaners proved unwilling to accept guarantees of African rights and threatened to undo the peace, British negotiators backed down. As High Commissioner Alfred Milner admitted, "sacrifice 'the nigger' absolutely and the game is easy."³¹¹ Each state, as it gained independence from the British Empire, would decide for itself whether or not to regulate the franchise by race. This predictably led to a strict whites-only franchise in the Boer republics and Natal, but no one expected the Cape to lose its color-blind voting laws. The British retained little ability to protect Africans, however, especially after the progressives lost political power later in the decade.

³⁰⁹ Clark and Worger, *South Africa*, 89.

³¹⁰ "Peace Treaty of Vereeniging."

³¹¹ Martin Meredith, *Diamonds, Gold and War: The Making of South Africa* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2007) in Myles Osborne and Susan Kingsley Kent, *Africans and Britons in the Age of Empires, 1660-1980* (London; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), 130.

In 1908, "Afrikaner parties won elections in the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and Cape Colony."³¹² The Afrikaner Bond party gained footing in the Cape, and managed to win a majority in the parliament. That year, *The Spectator* reported, "for the first time in its history, the Bond has undertaken the responsibilities of office, and has the largest majority ever held by any Cape party."³¹³ The *Chicago Tribune* attributed this Afrikaner victory to the "financial depression following the war" and the "enfranchisement of many former rebels."³¹⁴ This political re-orientation allowed for a much more conservative government in the Cape. The new administration revoked many of the liberal policies of the nineteenth century, and began the segregationist policies of the twentieth century. The results of the 1908 election handed Afrikaners the last tools needed to implement racialized disenfranchisement.

After the Afrikaner government came to power in the Cape, little stood in the way of a federation of southern African states. Now more than ever, the Boer Republics could gain "unity on our terms."³¹⁵ At the meetings of the National Convention in Durban, Cape Town, and Bloemfontein, delegates outlined the constitution of the Union, and, in May 1910, the King of England declared independence for the Union of South Africa.³¹⁶ A *Spectator* article on the South African constitution congratulated the delegates at the convention for creating a "result

³¹² Osborne & Kent, *Africans and Britons in the Age of Empires, 1660-1980*, 130.

³¹³ "Our South African Experiment," *The Spectator* Archive, June 13, 1908, <http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/13th-june-1908/7/our-south-african-experiment>.

³¹⁴ "Dr. Jameson Quits Office: Raider's Party Defeated, He Resigns as Premier and Secretary of Cape Colony.," *Chicago Daily Tribune* (1872-1922); Chicago, Ill., February 1, 1908.

³¹⁵ F. Villette, "Seeds of Racial Strife Sown 1910: The Union of SA," *Cape Times*, 2016, <https://colorado.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/colorado.idm.oclc.org/docview/1785122228?accountid=14503>.

³¹⁶ "Minutes of Proceedings with Annexures (Selected) of the South African National Convention: Held at Durban, Cape Town, and Bloemfontein, 12th October 1908 to 11th May 1909" (Cape Times Limited Government Printers, November 28, 1910), <https://0-dds.crl.edu/libraries.colorado.edu/item/298423>.

so desirable" in such a short time after the war.³¹⁷ Unfortunately, the South African Constitution simply continued the vague, noncommittal nature of the Treaty of Vereeniging. Known as the Merrimen-Smuts Compromise, the convention established that "each colony would retain its existing franchise arrangements."³¹⁸ Africans and progressives thus suffered another crushing disappointment.



The Treaty of Vereeniging and the terms of the Union both enabled growing Afrikaner majorities to gain political power and segregate South Africa. After May 1910, the "last effective imperial checks against local political initiative were removed."³¹⁹ With the Native Lands Act of 1913, "more than a million peasants were abruptly proletarianized."³²⁰ The act restricted two thirds of the South African population to approximately 7% of the land. Racialized law like the Native Lands Act of 1913 became the precedent for segregationist legislation in twentieth century South Africa.³²¹ During this period, many black Africans not only lost their right to vote, but were limited in employment, travel, property ownership, and other freedoms.

Conclusion

The developments of the late-nineteenth century, including the South African War, created the conditions for a shockingly racist state-sponsored discrimination. While at first a war over territory and resources, the South African War later became a struggle over ideologies. Formed in reaction to British liberal reforms of the 1830s, the new Boer identity

³¹⁷ "Topics of the Day: The South African Constitution," The Spectator Archive, accessed April 13, 2017, <http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/15th-may-1909/4/topics-of-the-day-the-south-african-constitution-t>.

³¹⁸ Villette, "Seeds of Racial Strife Sown 1910."

³¹⁹ John Whitson Cell, *The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South* (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 79.

³²⁰ Cell, *The Highest Stage of White Supremacy*, 79.

³²¹ Osborne & Kent, *Africans and Britons in the Age of Empires, 1660-1980*, 130.

clashed with the British ideology of Cape Liberalism. The war became a battle between the supposedly progressive British Empire and the more conservative Boer people. The British subsequently recruited Africans to their side with promises to spread their liberal policies after the war, specifically by extending the franchise to all citizens, regardless of race. The ideological conflict was now three-sided. Boers wanted independent conservative states with restricted African rights; Africans wanted a more egalitarian union with a color-blind franchise; and the British wanted an economically stable union.

Unfortunately, as Africans were putting more and more faith in the ideology of liberalism and equality before law, the British were drawing further away from it. British interests were shifting. Britons knew that after the war they would need to ensure stability in the now profitable regions of South Africa. They also knew that granting a color-blind franchise was likely to rock the boat. The "Native Question" slowly began to be framed as the "Native Problem," and the administration began to shift its rhetoric from paternalistic protection and assimilation to outright control. The British Empire was turning away from liberalism as a new group of Western-educated Africans was beginning to adopt it. This ideological misalignment led to the disappointing outcome of the South African War for Africans. The Treaty of Vereeniging eliminated Britain's ability to make a change in southern Africa, and started the region on a path towards even greater racial discrimination.

The Treaty of Vereeniging allowed Afrikaner states to disenfranchise Africans. In the years that followed the conflict, South Africa saw a curtailment of African rights. Even in the context of a British victory and a historically "liberal" empire, equal rights before the law could not trump the economic benefits of a socially stable South Africa.³²² The changing nature of British liberal ideology, prompted by shifting imperial priorities, enabled the creation of

³²² Parry, "In a Sense Citizens," 379.

segregationist policy in post-war South Africa. This era of segregation ultimately led to apartheid in the latter half of the twentieth century. Although the loss of the color-blind franchise in the Cape was unexpected, British liberals did not do much to protect it. We can thus trace the beginnings of segregation and apartheid almost all the way back to the South African War and a British willingness to compromise the rights of Africans.

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