

Education and Conflict In Yemen:

An Examination of the Effects of Humanitarian Aid and Education on Conflict

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The violence and instability of the Yemeni Civil War has killed hundreds of thousands of people and left millions displaced.¹ According to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), over 10,000 of the victims of the Civil War are children who have been killed or maimed.² In the face of this humanitarian crisis, Yemeni children often lack access to quality education, especially primary education. In response to the crisis of lack of primary education in Yemen, many international organizations and nonprofits, specifically the World Bank, have worked to launch humanitarian aid efforts focused on the improvement of education in Yemen. However, these efforts are often underfunded and misguided, affording too little funds to the issue of primary education. To improve relief efforts, the World Bank should increase its current International Development Association (IDA) grant for education to Yemen, while expanding the proportion of the funding designated specifically for primary education. In addition to the increase and reallocation of funds, the World Bank should focus on the implementation of new education programs both in the Hadi Government and Houthi rebel-claimed areas. Such education programs should prioritize teacher's salary and education, school meal programs, and standardized data collection, especially in regard to primary education.

Currently, the World Bank, with funding support from the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, and Save the Children, has provided Yemen with a \$303.9 million IDA grant, with the goal of supporting jobs, education, and livelihoods that have been impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.³ Of this grant, \$152.8 million is designated to education, with the funds

¹ Vincenzo Ruggiero, "Yemen: Civil War or Transnational Crime?" *Critical Criminology* (Richmond, B.C.) 27, no. 3 (2019): 503-514

² UNICEF, "Shameful milestone' in Yemen as 10,000 children killed or maimed since fighting began." 19 October 2021.

<https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/shameful-milestone-yemen-10000-children-killed-or-maimed-fighting-began> (Accessed 23 November 2021).

³ The World Bank. "New US\$303.9 Million Grants for Yemen Will Support Education, Access to Jobs, and Livelihoods Affected by COVID-19." 17 December 2021.

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/12/17/new-us3039-million-grants-for-yemen-will-support-education-access-to-jobs-and-livelihoods-affected-by-covid-19>. (Accessed 23 November 2021).

split between three categories: public administration, primary education, and other education.⁴ The funds have supported 1,000 schools, most of which lie in the Houthi claimed areas of Yemen, near the capital city of Sana'a, with few in Hadi government claimed Yemen. The grant is designated to last three years, and focuses on teacher payments and training, school infrastructure improvements, school feeding, and the distribution of school supplies. Of this money, 12% goes towards public administration, 13% towards primary education, and 75% towards other education.⁵ The grant, while prompted by the worsening humanitarian crisis exacerbated by COVID-19, should be expanded and altered to better address the educational needs of Yemeni children.

The first aspect of the IDA grant that should be altered is the amount and allocation of the funds. Currently, UNICEF reports needing \$235 million to continue its work in Yemen beyond the three years stated in the grant.⁶ While this is a large goal to achieve, the World Bank, in conjunction with other groups, like UNICEF, should work to increase the funding to at least half of the necessary funds, \$117.5 million. Providing additional funding will not only allow for the grant's goals to be met longer term, but will also provide the opportunity for an increase in the number of schools around Yemen which are supported by the grant. In addition to increasing the monetary amount of funding, the funds should be reallocated, providing a greater percentage of funds to primary education, increasing the allocation from 13% to 25%. The additional funds

⁴ The World Bank. "New US\$303.9 Million Grants for Yemen Will Support Education, Access to Jobs, and Livelihoods Affected by COVID-19." 17 December 2021. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/12/17/new-us3039-million-grants-for-yemen-will-support-education-access-to-jobs-and-livelihoods-affected-by-covid-19>. (Accessed 23 November 2021).

⁵ The World Bank. "New US\$303.9 Million Grants for Yemen Will Support Education, Access to Jobs, and Livelihoods Affected by COVID-19." 17 December 2021. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2020/12/17/new-us3039-million-grants-for-yemen-will-support-education-access-to-jobs-and-livelihoods-affected-by-covid-19>. (Accessed 23 November 2021).

⁶ UNICEF, "Shameful milestone' in Yemen as 10,000 children killed or maimed since fighting began." 19 October 2021. <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/shameful-milestone-yemen-10000-children-killed-or-maimed-fighting-began> (Accessed 23 November 2021).

should be shifted from the “other education” category to primary education, as primary education is one of the most important aspects of a child’s educational journey. In fact, most experts on education contend the most important use of funding and public resources is early childhood education, including primary education, which includes children aged six to eleven, and generally spans the first six years of a child’s traditional schooling.⁷ Therefore, it is integral that the IDA grant aims to support Yemeni children in their most important and formative years of schooling, in order to improve the overall state of education in Yemen.

The specified goals of the IDA grant should also be modified, shifting to prioritize on-time school enrollments and retention rates, keeping children in school throughout primary and secondary education. Currently, approximately 30% of primary school-aged Yemeni children are out of school, with one in six of enrolled children at risk of dropping out.⁸ While there has been progress made in enrolling students in the last 10 years, the progress has been slow, leaving many children enrolling in school late, if at all.⁹ Of the children who are enrolled, only 40% are in the correct grade for their age, with many children enrolling in school late.¹⁰ The goals of the World Bank’s grant should directly support the goal of helping children enroll in a timely manner. This should include not only students in Houthi-claimed territory, but also students in Hadi government territory, as the majority of current IDA grant supported schools are located in Houthi-controlled regions. It is integral that children throughout Yemen receive equal access to education, no matter within which borders they reside. Therefore, boundary claims by both the

⁷ Hania Bekdash, *Young Generation Awakening: Economics, Society, and Policy on the Eve of the Arab Spring* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press 2016).

⁸ UNICEF. “Summary: Yemen Country Report on Out-of-School Children.” October 2014. https://www.unicef.org/mena/media/6686/file/Yemen%20Country%20Report%20on%20OOSC%20Summary_EN.pdf%20.pdf (Accessed 23 November 2021).

⁹ Caroline Dryer, “Working Children and Educational Inclusion in Yemen.” *International Journal of Educational Development* 27, no. 5 (2007): 512-524.

¹⁰ Safaa El-Kogali and Carolyn Krafft, *Expanding Opportunities for the Next Generation: Early Childhood Development in the Middle East and North Africa*. (Washington, DC: The World Bank Group. 2015).

Houthis and the Hadi government should be allowed to be peacefully crossed in the name of education. Efforts to support this initiative may include enrollment clinics, encouraging parental or familial involvement, and creating enriching learning environments that encourage retention. These are relatively low-cost programs that can aid in the dispersion of education information and encourage students and their families to enroll in school on-time each year.

In conjunction with enrollment information and programs, it is important that the expansion of the IDA grant addresses some of the many reasons students are out of school or at risk of dropping out. Such reasons include, but are not limited to fear of physical attack at school, lack of poor sanitation at school, lack of quality of education, and prevalence of child labor in Yemen.¹¹ Schools have been physically destroyed, high school fees have been introduced, and classrooms are crowded with poor teacher/pupil ratios.¹² While the IDA grant for education would not have the capacity to address each social, political, and economic challenge facing out-of-school Yemeni children, it should aim to address the issues of sanitation, quality of education, and child labor. In 2012, only 53% of Yemeni schools had functioning sanitation and toilet systems, including drinking water.¹³ To address this, part of the funding should directly benefit the sanitation systems of the supported schools, offering children safe and healthy schools to attend. Furthermore, the grant should require all supported schools eliminate school fees, allowing any child who wishes to attend to have access to education. To offset the loss accompanied by the erasure of school fees, the grant should provide funding to participating schools which remove fees.

¹¹ Safaa El-Kogali and Carolyn Krafft, *Expanding Opportunities for the Next Generation: Early Childhood Development in the Middle East and North Africa*. (Washington, DC: The World Bank Group. 2015).

¹² Carol Webb, "Yemen and Education," *International Journal of Comparative Education and Development* 20, no. 3/4 (2018): 148-164

¹³ Carol Webb, "Yemen and Education," *International Journal of Comparative Education and Development* 20, no. 3/4 (2018): 148-164

Another pressing issue keeping Yemeni children out of school is the high prevalence of child labor in Yemen. Due to the high levels of poverty plaguing Yemen, many children are forced out of school to work, in order to earn money to support themselves and their families. In fact, nearly 23% of Yemeni children aged 5-14 participate in the labor market, with 16% of all Yemeni 5-year-olds engaging in child labor.¹⁴ These children are often malnourished, facing starvation of themselves and their families if they do not work. In order to counteract this, the grant should focus heavily on school meal programs, providing, at a minimum, breakfast and lunch for all children enrolled in school. Due to the current constraints in funding, it is unlikely meals could be provided for the family of students. However, should the funding increase, securing meals for all Yemeni children and their families would provide much needed stability, potentially decreasing the number of children who are forced into child labor at the threat of starvation.

In addition to improving enrollment and retention rates, the IDA grant goals should be changed to reflect the need for improved standardized testing and education requirements throughout Yemeni schools. Currently, there is no nationally representative standardized primary education testing in Yemen, leading to little-to-no data regarding the quality of education Yemeni students receive.¹⁵ The lack of a proper national data collection mechanism in Yemen presents issues both in maintaining a standard quality of education and in measuring the effectiveness of humanitarian aid and grants. The World Bank's current project development analysis regarding the success of the IDA grant in Yemen offers little insight into its successes or failures, stating "No available data for target schools" for many of its success measurements.¹⁶ In order to

¹⁴ Safaa El-Kogali and Carolyn Krafft, *Expanding Opportunities for the Next Generation: Early Childhood Development in the Middle East and North Africa*. (Washington, DC: The World Bank Group, 2015).

¹⁵ Carol Webb, "Yemen and Education," *International Journal of Comparative Education and Development* 20, no. 3/4 (2018): 148-164

¹⁶ The World Bank. "Yemen: Restoring Education and Learning Emergency Project." 4 March

improve the quality standard of education and to better gauge the effects of humanitarian aid, the new IDA grant should prioritize the creation of a national education standard. This standard could be achieved through standardized testing, curriculum, and teacher training. A data collection mechanism should be implemented in Yemen, through the World Bank, UNICEF, or other international organization or nonprofit, to ensure the proper recording and reporting of testing scores.

To ensure Yemeni students reach the academic standards that will be implemented by the policy, the policy will also aim to improve the quality of education Yemeni students receive. Yemeni students are currently far behind other countries in terms of education. According to the minimal amount of available data, only eight percent of Yemeni primary students were proficient in mathematics in 2014, demonstrating a low quality of education.¹⁷ The lack of quality education stems in part from the lack of funds and education provided to teachers. Two-thirds of Yemeni teachers have not received a normal salary since 2016.¹⁸ In fact, many Yemeni teachers report higher levels of depression due to their low salary, with many teachers only receiving between \$250 and \$300 a month.¹⁹ The lack of adequate salaries has caused teachers to walk out in protest, leading to overcrowded classrooms, or classrooms that simply had to close with no teachers at all. This has left thousands of students without an adequate education, or with no education at all.

2021. <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P175036>. (Accessed 23 November 2021).

¹⁷ Carol Webb, "Yemen and Education," *International Journal of Comparative Education and Development* 20, no. 3/4 (2018): 148-164

¹⁸ UNICEF, "Shameful milestone' in Yemen as 10,000 children killed or maimed since fighting began." 19 October 2021.

<https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/shameful-milestone-yemen-10000-children-killed-or-maimed-fighting-began> (Accessed 23 November 2021).

¹⁹ Abdulghani Muthanna, "Quality Education Improvement: Yemen and the Problem of the 'brain drain'." *Policy Futures in Education* 13, no. 1 (2015): 141-148.

The salary crisis in Yemen has been exacerbated by the war, and the changing claims of territory that have accompanied it. Since claiming control in 2014, the Houthis have refused to pay teacher's salaries in full, if at all, often taking portions of the salaries for themselves or the military.²⁰ Due to the Houthi control of the capital city of Sana'a, the Hadi government was forced to move the Central Bank to Aden, in Southern Yemen, making it difficult for the state to pay any public servants, especially teachers in Northern Yemen who are not paid by the Houthis.²¹ The expanded IDA grant should aim to better fund teachers, improving their pay and training. With better pay and training opportunities, teachers will be better equipped to provide higher quality education to their students, and students who were forced to leave teacherless classrooms will be permitted to return. Teachers will no longer be forced to rely on the unstable Central Bank of the Hadi government, or the whims of the Houthis.

Ultimately, the changes made to the current World Bank IDA grant for education in Yemen have the ability to improve the overall future quality of life in Yemen for students, teachers, and their communities. Many researchers have studied the effects of quality education on conflict and peace, finding, on an international scale, education is highly effective in "reconstructing societies and building nations."²² Due to the fact that education can teach principles of conflict resolution, it has the power to contribute to peacebuilding.²³ In the context of the Yemen Civil War, this would require providing the same standard and demilitarized education to every student in Yemen, under both Houthi and Hadi control, a goal of the proposed

²⁰ Mareike Transfeld, "Yemen's education system at a tipping point. Politics, Governance, and Reconstruction in Yemen." *The Project on Middle East Political Science: The Elliott School of International Affairs* (2018): 39-42.

²¹ Mareike Transfeld, "Yemen's education system at a tipping point. Politics, Governance, and Reconstruction in Yemen." *The Project on Middle East Political Science: The Elliott School of International Affairs* (2018): 39-42.

²² Abdulghani Muthanna, "Quality Education Improvement: Yemen and the Problem of the 'brain drain'." *Policy Futures in Education* 13, no. 1 (2015): 141-148.

²³ Ensor, Marisa O. *African Childhoods: Education, Development, Peacebuilding, and the Youngest Continent*, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

expansion of the IDA grant. Additionally, higher rates of enrollment lead to a higher opportunity cost of engaging in conflict, thus reducing the number of new recruits for both the Houthi rebel forces and the Hadi government's army.²⁴ Furthermore, increased opportunities for education and the creation of a more educated workforce can lead to better economic conditions for students and their families. This allows for students to enter the workforce in a traditional sense, and has the potential to build an economic foundation in Yemen that may prevent the cycle of child labor that has kept young children out of school.²⁵ While this is not to argue that improved education will finally produce an end to the Yemen Civil War and humanitarian crisis, adequate schooling has the potential to offer brighter futures to the children of Yemen.

Based on the recommended changes to the current World Bank IDA grant for education in Yemen, the short term goals should reflect realistic changes in Yemen's education system. The first and most important short term desired outcome is an increase in the funding of the IDA grant from organizations like UNICEF, the WFP, and Save the Children. If this goal is met, the next step is to reallocate the funds from the current 13% spent on primary education, increasing the funds to 25% of the total grant. Once the funding and allocation goals are achieved, only then can the actual improvements in the classroom occur. It is important to note short term goals regarding changes to the state of education in Yemen are minimal, on account of the many challenges facing the swift and successful implementation of the policy.

Due to such challenges, the short term success of the policy is likely to be minimal. It will require extensive time and effort needed to implement and record meaningful changes. It will take a considerable amount of time to train teachers and to get teachers back in the

²⁴ Gudrun Østby, Henrik Urdal, and Kendra Dupuy, "Does Education Lead to Pacification? A Systematic Review of Statistical Studies on Education and Political Violence." *Review of Educational Research* 89, no. 1 (February 2019): 46–92.

²⁵ Gudrun Østby, Henrik Urdal, and Kendra Dupuy, "Does Education Lead to Pacification? A Systematic Review of Statistical Studies on Education and Political Violence." *Review of Educational Research* 89, no. 1 (February 2019): 46–92.

classroom implementing their new skills. The policy will also require adequate time to enroll students who are currently out of school, especially those who reside in rural areas where the current IDA grant is not serving. Once teachers and students are back in adequate classrooms, it will take time for the new program to demonstrate effectiveness in standardized testing. It will also take time to implement such standardized measurements and tests to measure the success of the policy. Nonetheless, in the short term, the goal of the policy is to reach and enroll as many students as possible, with a focus on enrolling five and six-year-olds in kindergarten and first grade on time. Additionally, teachers who have left the classroom, out of both protest or necessity, should be made aware of the new policy and offered opportunities to teach again, under the terms they are paid equitably. While the number of people, students and teachers, who are initially reached will be minimal, the short term goal of the policy recognizes drastic changes will take time, and thus will aim to simply begin the implementation process.

However, the desired outcomes of the policy in the long term will include notable improvements to each aspect of the recommended policy. A main and consistent long term goal of the policy is to increase funding for the grant, with the ultimate goal of meeting and surpassing UNICEF's \$235 million estimate of the funds needed to continue education support in Yemen. Without continued efforts in funding the grant, any changes to the Yemeni education system will be temporary, so it is imperative advocating for funding be a continued goal of the grant. While the current grant was issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, it is clear the problems surrounding the state of education in Yemen span beyond the impacts of the pandemic. Therefore, extending the grant as much as funding will allow is an integral aspect of ensuring the success of the grant, as well as the success of Yemeni students.

In addition to continued funding, the policy will have very specific and measurable goals that relate to improving the current state of education in Yemen. First, the policy aims to lower the number of primary-aged children in Yemen who are out of school to less than 10%, an improvement from the current 30%. Additionally, the policy aims to lower the number of children at risk of dropping out to 1 in 10 children, much less than the current 1 in 6, through an erasure of school fees, school meal programs, and an improvement in the quality of schooling. The policy will also aim to have teacher's salaries paid in full, bringing back as many possible teachers and hiring as many new teachers as possible, providing them with the proper training and support. Ultimately, the proposed policy would also aim to drastically lower the percentage of Yemeni children who engage in children labor, with a goal of less than 5% of all children engaged in child labor, a considerable improvement over the 23% of children who are currently subjected to labor.

Finally, the policy will aim to create and employ standardized testing and data collection techniques, and use them to demonstrate overall growth in the students' academic performance. Due to the fact there is no current, nationally representative baseline data for Yemeni primary school-aged students' academic performance, there is no target improvement number. The goal for improving academic performance will be based on data gathered from the newly implemented mechanisms. Such standard tests will focus on basic subject matters, including basic literacy, mathematics, social sciences, and physical sciences. Despite a lack of baseline data, an improvement in the academic performance of the students, as measured by new standard exams and evaluations, will be an important long term goal of the policy.

The probability of the long-term success of the policy depends on the many confounding factors and challenges facing Yemeni students and teachers. It is likely that the program will

increase the number of students who are enrolled in school, as well as the quality of education received by the children. By providing meal programs and adequate sanitation and water systems, more children will have the opportunity to attend school, without fear of starvation. Additionally, by providing funds for improved teacher training, the quality of education in Yemen is likely to improve, leading to an increase in test scores and student enrollment. Furthermore, by focusing the funds on primary education, the policy aims to implement a strong academic foundation for the youngest Yemeni students, encouraging them to continue their educational journey, with the goals of leading towards long term success. Therefore, in terms of enrollment percentages and academic performance, it is likely the policy will be successful in improving the academic experience in Yemen, and will have a lasting effect on the students it serves.

However, there are factors that keep students from school the policy does not have the means to address, which may limit some aspects of its long term success. The policy can not prevent the conflict from continuing, and therefore does not have the ability to prevent violence from interfering in the education of Yemeni students. Schools that have been destroyed will not be rebuilt, and teachers and students who fear physical attacks will likely not have their fears quelled until the war ends. The fear of such violence is likely to keep children out of school, despite the efforts of the policy to enroll them. The continued violence will also likely deter teachers who left their jobs due to the conflict, despite promises of adequate pay and training. Overall, for many Yemeni students, teachers, and families, the physical threat that accompanies life in the Yemeni Civil War may outweigh the benefits of receiving an education, limiting the success of the policy.

Another major challenge threatening the success of the policy is the current Houthi movement to control the school curriculum in Houthi controlled regions of the country. When the Civil War began in 2014, the Houthis began a takeover of the country's schools and curriculum, employing pro-Houthi allies and teaching hostility towards the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other enemies of Iran.²⁶ The children in some Houthi-controlled schools "grossly violate the ideal of peacemaking" and encourage violence as the only solution to the conflict.²⁷ The Houthi takeover of curriculum may offset the goals of the policy in different ways. First, the implementation of the Houthi curriculum has caused many teachers to strike, refusing to return to the classroom, leaving many Yemeni students in overcrowded classes, or without a teacher at all. Even if promised adequate pay, some teachers may still refuse to return to school, in fear of the repercussions of refusing to teach Houthi material. Additionally, the Houthis, in control of nearly two thirds of Yemen, may simply refuse to allow the grant to operate within their control, especially with the goal of teaching a curriculum based on peace. Without a peaceful curriculum, the Houthis will continue to spread propaganda to young Yemenis, radicalizing them with images of violence and death, leading to a continuation of the conflict.

A third notable challenge to the success of the policy is the issue of the "brain drain" in Yemen. Due to the lack of economic opportunities in Yemen, well-trained and well-educated teachers and instructors at all levels of education have little incentive to continue teaching in Yemeni schools.²⁸ Many rich Gulf countries can afford to pay well-educated instructors nearly five times the salary they receive in Yemen, while also providing a safer working environment.²⁹

²⁶ Christopher Hamill-Stewart, "Yemeni teacher's Union Slams Houthi Curriculum Takeover." *Arab News* (2021).

²⁷ Christopher Hamill-Stewart, "Yemeni teacher's Union Slams Houthi Curriculum Takeover." *Arab News* (2021).

²⁸ Abdulghani Muthanna, "Quality Education Improvement: Yemen and the Problem of the 'brain drain'." *Policy Futures in Education* 13, no. 1 (2015): 141-148.

²⁹ Abdulghani Muthanna, "Quality Education Improvement: Yemen and the Problem of the 'brain drain'." *Policy Futures in Education* 13, no. 1 (2015): 141-148.

This exacerbates the shortage of adequate teachers in Yemen, a supply that is already strained by the complications of the Civil War. The “brain drain” applies to other well-educated members of Yemeni society, causing doctors, lawyers, and other educated members of society to opt for a safer and more prosperous life outside the dangers of daily life in Yemen. Therefore, it could be argued improving education in Yemen may have no effect on the Civil War, as those who are fortunate enough to benefit from increased education will simply choose to leave the chaos of Yemen for a more prosperous future. It could be argued that if the issue of the “brain drain” continues, the cycle of poverty and poor education may continue, making the efforts to improve primary education in Yemen a futile one.

Finally, it is important to note the Yemen Civil War has suffered from the influence of Iran and Saudi Arabia, with the two countries using Yemen during their proxy war. Iran currently backs the Shia Houthi rebel forces, with a goal of draining their enemies, namely Saudi Arabia, of resources and willpower. Saudi Arabia, fearing the creation of Iranian hegemony in the Middle East, led a coalition to reinstate President Hadi as the uncontested leader of Yemen. Due to the funds and will of both Iran and Saudi Arabia, the war has persisted, with the goals of each side outweighing the cost of continuing the fighting.³⁰ Due to the international nature of the conflict, finding a solution that benefits all parties involved becomes increasingly difficult. Therefore it could be argued that working to increase Yemeni education is futile, as the outside forces of Iran and Saudi Arabia will continue the conflict, exacerbating the negative effects on education, until either side is content with the results.

As noted by UNICEF, the conflict must come to an end to find a true stop to the violence, poverty, and death that has occurred since March 2015 in Yemen. While a focus on education is a

³⁰ Peter Krause and Tyler Parker, “Yemen’s proxy wars explained.” *MIT Center for International Studies*. (26 March 2020).

good first step to finding peace in the war-torn country, it is just one aspect of what must be a multi-faceted approach to ending the war. Simply improving primary education will not immediately result in peace, but it will offer much needed support and hope to young Yemeni children, with the hopes of raising a new generation of young Yemenis who are inspired by peace. Similarly, however, it is unlikely that simply a military resolution will end the conflict.³¹ There must be many aspects and opinions considered in the struggle for peace in Yemen. A solution will not be uniquely military, diplomatic, or education-based. Therefore, although there are many issues beyond the scope of increased primary education in Yemen, it is important to focus on the youth and their education, rather than resulting in deeming Yemen a lost cause. A focus on education may not be the only and final solution, but it is an important part of a greater plan of reaching peace in the region.

Therefore, despite the many challenges facing the implementation and success of the recommended policy to expand the World Bank's IDA grant to provide greater funds for education in Yemen, it is still imperative the policy be implemented. In October 2021, UNICEF reported that over 10,000 Yemeni children have been "killed or maimed" during the war, calling it a "shameful milestone."³² This number is only increasing, with roughly four children a day dying from the violence and the chaos it has created. UNICEF has deemed the Yemeni crisis "severely underfunded" and has called on government donors and individuals to support UNICEF's education efforts in Yemen. Therefore, it is crucial the World Bank works to fund and implement the policy of education expansion in Yemen, as it is clear the country and young Yemenis desperately need the help.

³¹ Peter Krause and Tyler Parker, "Yemen's proxy wars explained." *MIT Center for International Studies*. (26 March 2020).

³² UNICEF, "Shameful milestone' in Yemen as 10,000 children killed or maimed since fighting began." 19 October 2021. <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/shameful-milestone-yemen-10000-children-killed-or-maimed-fighting-began> (Accessed 23 November 2021).

In conclusion, due to the overwhelming need for improvements in education in Yemen, the World Bank should increase the amount of funding it provides to Yemen for education. Due to the importance of primary education, the funds from the current IDA grant for education in Yemen should be reallocated to provide an increased amount of money for primary schools in Yemen. Additionally, due to the limited nature of funding for education in Yemen, the funds should work to directly address the biggest issues and downfalls of the current education system in Yemen. This should include securing teachers' pay and education, creating and implementing standardized testing procedures, and working to create clean and safe schools with adequate meal problems. The current grant should also be expanded to include schools that fall under both the Houthi and Hadi controlled regions, providing equal access to and quality of education to all Yemeni children, no matter where they reside. Overall, the changes and expansions to the current IDA grant will work to counteract the major negative effects of the Yemen Civil War on the education of Yemeni students, with an ultimate goal of fostering peace and stability in the future generation of Yemeni citizens.

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